Bled Philosophical Conferences

ETHICAL ISSUES:
# Theoretical & Applied

June 2-6, 2014

ETHICAL ISSUES:
Theoretical & Applied
June 2-6, 2014

Organizers:
Nenad Miščević (University of Maribor) · Alastair Norcross (University of Colorado)
Matjaž Potrč (University of Ljubljana) · Danilo Šuster (University of Maribor)
Justin Weinberg (University of South Carolina)

*The conference is officially included in the program of the
activities of the Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy.*

History. Philosophical conferences at Bled (Slovenia) were initiated, on the suggestion by John Biro, in 1993, at first as a continuation of the IUC - Dubrovnik postgraduate course in philosophy but they gradually started a life of their own, with the help, first of Eugene Mills and then Mylan Engel Jr. They typically take place during the first week of June and are dedicated to various topics in analytic philosophy. Past conference topics have included philosophy of mind, metaphysics, truth, modality, vagueness, rationality, contextualism, ethics, particularism, political philosophy, epistemic virtue, freedom and determinism, knowledge, and group epistemology.

★ Kompas Hotel   ★ Hotel Lovec

SCHEDULE

Monday, June 2nd

9:40-9:55	Welcoming Remarks
10:00-11:00	**Andrew Sepielli** University of Toronto "Moral Realism without Moral Metaphysics"
11:00-11:15	break
11:15-12:15	**Julinna Oxley** Coastal Carolina University "Civic Virtue in the Age of Public Justification"
12:15-2:00	lunch
2:00-3:00	**Daniela Cutas** Umeå Univ., Univ. of Gothenburg "Beyond the Sexual Family: an Ethical Analysis of Modes of Organisation of Close Personal Relationships"
3:00-3:15	break
3:15-4:15	**Simon May** Florida State University "Rights, Wrongs, and Demands"
4:15-4:30	break
4:30-5:30	**Douglas Portmore** Arizona State University "Foundational Consequentialism and Its Primary Evaluative Focal Point"

Tuesday, June 3rd

9:00-10:00	**Matjaž Potrč** University of Ljubljana "Moral Judgment"
10:00-11:00	**Elinor Mason** University of Edinburgh "An Account of Subjective Obligation"
11:00-11:15	break
11:15-12:15	**Matthew Smith** University of Leeds "Reliance Structures and Freedom"
12:15-2:00	lunch
2:00-3:00	**Mylan Engel** Northern Ilinois University "Fishy Reasoning"
3:00-3:15	break
3:15-4:15	**Regina Rini** University of Oxford / NYU "Abortion, Ultrasound, and Openness to Moral Persuasion"
4:15-4:30	break
4:30-5:30	**Ralph Wedgwood** University of Southern California "The Normativity of Rationality"

SCHEDULE

Session A		*Session B*
Viktor Ivankovich Central European University "How Should Egalitarians Respond to the Leveling-Down Objection?"	9:00-10:00	**Neven Petrović** University of Rijeka "Intelligence and Justice"
Daniel Silvermint University of Connecticut "Intentional Resistance"	10:00 11:00	**Jonathan Pugh** Oxford University "Autonomy in Bioethics - Lessons from Theory, Lessons from Practice"
break	11:00-11:15	break
Richard Hoffman University of Graz "Weakness of Will and the Argument from Self-Respect"	11:15-12:15	**Andras Szigeti** University of Tromsø "Focusing Forgiveness"

SCHEDULE

Session A		Session B
Zlata Božac Central European University "Can the Problem of the Demos Constitution Be Solved…?"	9:00-10:00	**Vojko Strahovnik** University of Ljubljana "Accepting Cognitive Expressivism in Light of Error Theory"
Toni Pustovrh University of Ljubljana "Key Ethical Issues In Human Enhancement"	10:00-11:00	**Amelie Stuart** University of Graz "Kantian Duties of Love to the Poor"
break	11:00-11:15	break
Hallie Liberto University of Connecticut "The Three Wrongs of Rape: Against a Unified Account"	11:15-12:15	**Mark Alfano** University of Oregon "Dying to Be Virtuous"
lunch	12:15-2:00	lunch
I**Kerah Gordon-Solmon** Queen's University "Fairness and Liability to Defensive Harm"	2:00-3:00	**Stan Husi** University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee "Money and Morality"
break	3:00-3:15	break
Nenad Miščević University of Maribor "Kantian Ethics and Thought Experiments"	3:15-4:15	**Milan Franc** University of Maribor "Ideology of Globalisation"
break	4:15-4:30	break
Justin Weinberg University of South Carolina "Emotional Control and Moral Novelty"	4:30-5:30	**Saul Smilansky** Haifa University "Designer Ethics: Should We Sacrifice the Utilitarians First?"

7pm: Conference Dinner

SCHEDULE

9:00-10:00	**Friderik Klampfer** University of Maribor "Is moral philosophy done without appeal to intuitions? Should it be?"
10:00-11:00	**Eugene Mills** Virginia Commonwealth Univ. "People, Plants, and a Problem for Utilitarianism"
11:00-11:15	break
11:15-12:15	**Molly Gardner** University of North Carolina, University of Bayreuth "Doing, Allowing, and Causation"
12:15-2:00	break
2:00-3:00	**Danilo Suster** University of Maribor "Begging the Question and the Ability to Act Otherwise"
3:00-3:15	break
3:15-4:15	**Alastair Norcross** University of Colorado "How to Be Good"
4:15-4:30	Closing Remarks

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Mark Alfano
"Dying to be virtuous." (Thursday)
What we say about the dead may say as much about us as it does about them. Obituaries, in particular, are records of human values. When we describe our beloved dead in an obituary, we emphasize the aspects of their lives that 1) we find important, meaningful, and praiseworthy; 2) we expect that others in our communities would find important, meaningful, and praiseworthy; and 3) we can bring ourselves to say publicly, if only after a certain amount of elision and exaggeration. My research generates and interprets maps of human values in different communities by data-mining obituaries. Along with my collaborators, I collect all and only the agent-level descriptors applied to the deceased in their obituaries. We then use network analysis to generate maps of these values. These maps represent, as it were, the values of a local community. As part of this project, I compare and contrast what's said about the dead in various towns, as well as in historically and philosophically important texts, such as Pericles' funeral oration, Plato's Menexenus, and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. This project contributes to the empirical study of the cultural relativity of values, the Ramsification of values, the study of what Michael Stocker calls "moral schizophrenia," and recent arguments for the hypothesis that the vehicle of moral character may be extended into the social environment.

Zlata Bozac
"Can the Problem of Demos Constitution Be Solved Within the Democratic Theory?" (Thursday)
The boundary problem in democratic theory refers to the issue of how we should define the membership in a political community that is relevant for democratic decision making. How should we decide who has the right to membership in a demos and who should be excluded? If "democracy" is government "by the people", who are those included among "the people"? Democratic theory has usually neglected this issue, discussing features of democracy on already established demos, whose composition emerged at one point without using some kind of a democratic procedure. The solution that comes to mind is to try to solve this problem simply by using democratic method. However, we are immediately faced with a difficulty of constituting a demos through a vote before knowing who the members of the relevant demos should be. While demos could be reconstituted through voting in the later stages, the initial demos cannot be delineated in the usual democratic way. Frederic G. Whelan, in his seminal work on this issue, argues that this poses a serious problem for democratic theory, since it shows that such a foundational question cannot be resolved within its own limits. Nonetheless, it seems that it is not necessary to determine the relevant demos by application of a democratic method in order to constitute a demos democratically. It can be done by establishing some kind of principle for demos constitution that will be in line with, or even inherent to, democracy. Whatever criterion we choose as the principle for demos constitution, the consequence will be the radical reconsideration of the present state of affairs. To address this question, this paper will explore some of the usually proposed demarcation criteria for demos constitution, while focusing especially on one of the most popular proposals for solution of the boundary problem: All Affected Interests Principle. After discussing the main points and entailments of this principle, as well as its main criticisms, it is argued that demos constitution problem cannot be solved within democratic theory (alone). All Affected Interests Principle, although hinting towards certain idea of justice, cannot provide the same for democratic method, which is after all, a distinguishing feature of democratic regimes as opposed to, for example, enlightened absolutism. The principle correctly indicates that there is a need to address global or at least trans-border injustices adequately, but fails to demonstrate why people afflicted by the injustice have to be included in the demos in the first place. In my paper I wish to explore what exactly bothers us when it comes to situations of mutual affectedness and is democratic theory a right place for such debates.

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Daniela Cutas
"Beyond the Sexual Family: an Ethical Analysis of Modes of Organisation of Close Personal Relationships" (Monday)

Reproductive and family policy across Europe operates largely on the assumption that there is something of significant value in children being born to and raised by their own two genetic parents, one male and one female, who are in a particular type of relationship with each other, preferably institutionalised as marriage, and that this is the core relationship model for everyone to aim for. Evidence that this model in itself is not what provides the goods that we endow it with, has a very hard time sinking in and influencing both the ethics and, especially, the policy. The extent to which the model leaves many and in some cases most people outsides of its many social and legal advantages, makes its imposition both increasingly unrealistic and harmful. The expectations that it inspires create a lot of suffering as well as unjustifiably limit fruitful outcomes for pronatalist agendas of the very same countries that uphold it.

I will explore alternatives to this model of reproduction and the family, and invite further reflection on what to replace it with in order to more realistically and fairly account for the legitimate diversity of private lives, preferences, and experiences. In order to achieve this, I will examine the values in close personal relationships and the family, and the interests and justifications that states might have to participate in the organisation of private life.

Mylan Engel Jr.
"Fishy Reasoning: The Inconsistency of Fish-Eating Ethical Vegetarians" (Tuesday)

Ethical vegetarians believe that it is morally wrong to eat meat. And yet, many of these so-called ethical "vegetarians" continue to eat fish. The question my paper addresses is this: Can one coherently maintain that it is morally wrong to eat meat, but morally permissible to eat fish? I argue that it is inconsistent for ethical vegetarians to eat fish, not on the obvious yet superficial ground that fish flesh is meat, but on the morally substantive ground that fish deserve moral consideration equal to that owed birds and mammals.

Milan Franc
"Ideology Of Globalisation" (Thursday)

In this paper, I am going to discuss more broadly the question of globalisation ideology. Firstly, I am going to present the circumstance that 'gave birth' to the globalisation narrative and its ideology. Then, my intention is to show the sequential phases of its development, and finally, hopefully also the reasons and also some solid account for its hegemony. But let us start at the beginning and look at several general conditions for the emergence of this new ideology. The beginnings of it are of course to be sought in the basic premises of capitalism and its never ending striving for the highest profits. Therefore, even its 'highest' idea(l)s were not to be sought in the realm of complicated philosophical abstractions or leftist moral principles of equality, brotherhood and co-operation. Instead, the 'story' about the ideology of globalisation begins at very realistic assumption that it is quite impossible to separate the spheres of economical and political.

Molly Gardner
"Doing, Allowing, and Causation" (Friday)

It is intuitively plausible that the distinction between doing and allowing has something to do with causation. One might be tempted to say that doing a harm just is causing it, and allowing a harm just is not causing it. Nevertheless, this causal account of the distinction has been roundly rejected in the literature. First, there appear to be cases of allowing that are also cases of causing: If I am the sole caretaker designated to water your plants, then when I refrain from watering them, I both allow and cause them to die. Moreover, there appear to be cases of causing that are not cases of doing: If I hire a hitman to kill you and he does, then I cause your death, but I do not kill you. Consideration of these kinds of cases has prompted many philosophers to give up on the causal account and appeal, instead, to distinctions between allowing and originating sequences, actions and omissions, having

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lots of ways in which one might have moved one's body and having few, and various other counterfactuals. In this paper, I argue that philosophers were too hasty to abandon the causal account. The apparent counterexamples to the above formulation of the account can be dealt with as long as we (1) commit to a substantive but plausible claim about the metaphysics of causation and (2) formulate the causal account in terms of necessary conditions, rather than necessary and sufficient conditions. I defend the following formulation: (a) An agent does a harm only if at least one of her actions causes the harm and (b) An agent allows a harm only if there is no action of hers that causes the harm. I then consider and respond to objections.

Kerah Gordon-Solmon
"Fairness and Liability to Defensive Harm" (Thursday)
If a person is liable to some measure of defensive harm, it means that she has forfeited her right against being harmed in that way, in that circumstance. She is not wronged by, and has no right to defend herself against that harm. The predominant account of liability is Jeff McMahan's 'responsibility' account; but it's been increasingly challenged by powerful rivals. The task of this paper is to defend McMahan's account against one such rival, namely, Jonathan Quong's 'moral status' account of liability. Section I explicates the distinguishing normative commitment of the responsibility account, which Quong opposes, namely, the commitment to distributive fairness. Section II explicates and critiques Quong's moral status account; it argues that a commitment to distributive fairness is a requisite feature of any plausible account of liability to defensive harm.

Richard Paul Hofmann
"Weakness of will and the argument from self-respect" (Wednesday)
Why should we avoid being weak-willed? I want to argue for an answer to this question which is based on the value of self-respect. Following Rawls, I understand the primary good of self-respect as comprising two different aspects: the sense a person has of the value of his conception of the good and the confidence in his ability to fulfill his intentions and plans. If a person is weak-willed, he acts against his own conception of what he takes to be valuable to pursue. Constant weakness of will undermines the confidence of a person in the ability to realize his conception of the good and thereby deprives him of the primary good of self-respect. Since self-respect is one of our primary goods and as such valuable, we should not act in a way which is incompatible with having it. So we should not be weak-willed. This evaluation of weakness of will has to be qualified in three ways: first, the evaluative quality of each weak-willed action has to be assessed additionally according to the preferred normative standard. The argument from self-respect only uncovers what is wrong with weakness of will considered on its own, in abstraction from the concrete deeds and effects of the weak-willed actions. Second, cases of inverse akrasia show that sometimes it may be better for an agent to be weak-willed than strong-willed. If the conception of the agent is terribly wrong, weakness of will might provide a mechanism for overcoming this wrong conception. Third, the value of self-respect is relative to social roles and standards. It differs according to the importance which is attached to fulfilling one's intentions given a certain social role. For some, being weak-willed might even form a part of their way of life. Nevertheless there exists a certain threshold of minimum strength of will which is necessary for every agent to have.

Stan Husi
"Money and Morality" (Thursday)
The guiding principle of my research is to investigate morality as a social practice, which is continuously evolving, and which embodies a net of complex and interrelated norms. A lot of fascinating work has been done, especially in the social sciences, on the history and operation of the norms making possible the incredibly complex social phenomenon of monetary exchange. Yet this research has gone almost entirely unnoticed by philosophers dedicated to the social practice approach to morality, despite a host of illuminating

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connections that can be drawn between the two practices. This is unfortunate, since the phenomenon of money as a social practice is comparatively better understood than morality as a social practice, and moral philosophers stand to learn a great deal from applying this research to their own domain. I am particularly interested in the intricate misalignment we occasionally find between the functioning of a social practice, such as money, and the interpretation or understanding of it. Similarly, I wish to argue that we find a comparative misalignment between morality as a functioning social practice and philosophically prevalent interpretations of it. The money-morality analogy helps us see how to overcome flawed interpretations of morality, and to envision ethics to become a social science.

Viktor Ivanković
"How Should Egalitarians Respond to the Leveling Down Objection?" (Wednesday)
In my presentation, I am dealing with the problem of the normativity of distributional outcomes. In an influential paper dating back over a decade ago, Derek Parfit forced egalitarians (concerned with the justice of distributional schemes) to retreat back to much more limited philosophical conceptions. Parfit drives us into asking the question of whether it is equality that we should be concerned with when we are dealing with the plight of the hungry and the poor, that is, whether what is really at stake is their relative position to those more affluent, or we are simply dealing with the injustice of objective poverty and hunger, that is, with merely prioritizing those in dire need. According to Parfit, those egalitarians who believe that inequality in itself is at least in one way bad, must comply with very dubious philosophical conclusions, such as to lower the welfare of one, more advantaged group, to the previously established level of a worse off group, solely for the purpose of achieving equality. Faced with this conflict, egalitarians have to establish a solid case that would justify why equality should be defended to begin with. If egalitarians are to push back from the ropes in claiming their place under the sun with other distributional conceptions, they must first prove that equality is something worthy of pursuit. Only then can they start dealing with the leveling down objection. Therefore, the first part of my presentation deals with justification of equality in normative considerations of outcome assessment. When further faced with the leveling down objection, all egalitarians adopt pluralism of value as the initial step. This means egalitarians confirm equality's importance in distributional considerations, but only as one important value among others, in this case, namely, utility. Here is where many egalitarians part company, and here is where the problem of the defending egalitarianism lies – how do we measure between different egalitarian values, and how do we thus provide a good egalitarian answer to the leveling down objection? This is the focus of the second part of my presentation.

Friderik Klampfer
"Is moral philosophy done without appeal to intuitions? Should it be?" (Friday)
In the last two decades, experimental psychologists and philosophers have increasingly focused their attention and investigative tools on ordinary moral judgment and reasoning. Their often groundbreaking and ingenious research has offered valuable insights into, and alternative explanations of, both the origin and the content of our most widely shared and deeply held moral intuitions. What's more, lay intuitions were shown to depart from those to which professional philosophers typically appeal in defence of particular philosophical claims and theories, thus raising doubts about how representative the latter really are. Moral philosophers, however, have been in general (and to my astonishment) quite dismissive of these findings. The latter's relevance for moral epistemology and methodology of moral philosophy has been denied for a number of reasons. While some disputed the very use of the label 'moral intuition' for the snap, spontaneous and unreflective judgments lay people typically make in response to hypothetical moral scenarios, and praised the putative epistemic superiority of philosophers' considered moral judgments, others ridiculed the very notion that moral philosophy could and should be done without appeal to intuition. In the paper, I take up the most recent challenge in this ongoing dispute,

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posed by Herman Cappelen (2012). According to Cappelen's analysis, our concern about, and preoccupation with, the central role of intuitions in philosophical inquiry is exaggerated, since, once intuition is precisely defined, current philosophical practice will turn out to display much less of the problematic appeal to intuition than wished by some and feared by others. The paper has three objectives and, accordingly, is divided into three parts. In the first part, I raise some doubts about Cappelen's analysis of two famous disputes from moral philosophy, Judith Thomson's Violinist and Philippa Foot's Trolley case. In the second, I draw the flaws of his analyses back to the inaccuracy of his diagnostic tools. In the third, I argue for the relevance of experimental psychology and philosophy and briefly discuss some viable alternatives to intuition-based moral philosophising.

Hallie Liberto
"The Three Wrongs of Rape: Against a Unified Account" (Thursday)
Conceiving of rape as a property crime, a type of theft or vandalism, is wildly unpopular in the philosophical literature on rape, especially among feminist scholars. Some scholars, such as Anne Phillips, favor an embodied experience model of rape. Other authors, such as Tom Dougherty, cast off both such approaches for a sex-minus-consent model of rape. In this paper, I will first argue that neither of these more popular accounts explains the wrong of all acts of rape. Finally, I will defend the adoption of the property model of rape used in combination with the other models.

Ellie Mason
"An Account of Subjective Obligation" (Tuesday)
A distinction has developed between different ways of thinking about rightness, or obligation. Our objective obligation is to do what is actually best, or what actually obeys the rules. Our prospective obligation is to do what it would be rational to do, given our account of what would be best and our limited knowledge. This leaves a third notion: what we ought to do given our actual state, which is not necessarily rational. In this paper I give an account of what our subjective obligation is. Subjective obligation is often roughly characterized as being about what we believe is right. I argue that we should not think of subjective obligation as being about beliefs: for various reasons, what we ought to do does not depend on the beliefs we happen to have. Rather, our subjective obligation is based on combination of attitudes. I argue that our subjective obligation is to try to do well by morality. I defend the implication that subjective obligation has an objective element: it requires us to know something, namely, roughly what morality says.

Simon Cabulea May
"Rights, Wrongs, and Demands" (Monday)
A claim-right is the right of an individual (X) that another agent (Y) act in some way (f). I claim that moral claim-rights have two essential features:
(a) Y owes X a moral duty to f.
(b) X has moral standing to demand that Y f.
Refer to these two features are direction and standing respectively. I argue that direction and standing are logically distinct and independent relations. I advance a justificatory interest analysis of direction and a liability analysis of standing. I use these two analyses to explain the complex connection between moral claim-rights and respect. I then criticise Leif Wenar's account of claim-rights.

Eugene Mills
"People, Plants, and a Problem for Utilitarianism" (Friday)
I aim to give one clear and plausible sense to the familiar but unclear objection that utilitarianism doesn't take seriously the distinctness of persons. One way of understanding this objection is that the aggregation of utility central to utilitarianism doesn't accord persons the moral standing they are due. I argue, first, that if animalism is true, then

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utilitarianism would, in some possible cases, accord persons and other sentient beings the same moral standing as non-sentient potted plants; and second, that there is no good argument from utilitarianism to the denial of animalism. Absent some independent argument against animalism, then, utilitarians ought to accept the possible moral ascendancy of non-sentient potted plants. I take this as a strike against utilitarianism.

Alastair Norcross
"How to be Good" (Friday)
As soon as we take morality seriously (as opposed to, say, becoming fans of Ayn Rand), we realize that it can be quite demanding. Just how demanding? Traditional, maximizing, forms of consequentialism appear to be very demanding indeed, requiring us always to do the best we can. But even decent versions of deontology issue demands, which, in the current state of the world, go far beyond how most people actually behave. Any half-way plausible version of virtue ethics (and, let's face it, that's about as plausible as it's going to get for virtue ethics) will include a demanding form of beneficence as one of its central virtues. Even the correct moral theory—scalar utilitarianism—while not issuing demands as such, tells us that we have very strong moral reasons to behave far better than we do. When we take the interests of other sentient beings seriously (as any decent person, whether a consequentialist, deontologist, or even, dare I say it, a virtue ethicist, must), we find ourselves beset by onerous demands, or at least reasons for behavior. It appears, then, that it is, in fact, quite hard to be good, if we understand that notion in terms of living up to the standards of traditional moral theories. As many philosophers know, however, appearance and reality frequently diverge. Alas, not in this case. I explain why it is actually so hard to be good, and why it is only contingently so. Although the prospects of the world changing enough to significantly lessen the burdens on us of morality are presently quite dim, there is still some cause for optimism. It *is* really hard to be good, but for most of us, it is quite easy to be significantly better. And that has to count for something, doesn't it?

Julinna Oxley
"Civic Virtue in the Age of Public Justification" (Monday)
Contemporary theories of liberalism that emphasize public justification seek to provide an epistemic account of the legitimate justification of political power, an articulation of the principles that can be justified to all reasonable persons, and a theory of the reasons that justify the principles. In focusing on public reasons that can be used as a basis of justification acceptable to all reasonable citizens, rather than on liberal values, the idea of civic virtue is understandably neglected in these theories. This article provides a thumbnail sketch of two conceptions of civic virtue that follow from two prominent theories of public justification: Rawls' political liberalism and Gaus' justificatory liberalism. The civic virtues associated with both versions of public justification are properly understood as epistemic virtues. Rawls' view of civic virtue includes traits such as civility, reasonableness, understanding and tolerance. Gaus, on the other hand, argues that a well-ordered democracy should be organized so as to not require civic virtue on the part of citizens (much beyond empathy with others, in order to understand their reasons). He rejects a minimal duty of civility, and encourages citizens to simply say what is on their mind – eventually a public justification will come about. I conclude by offering objections to both views, and suggest that a normative, rather than a descriptive or idealistic, theory of civic virtue is needed for public justification liberals.

Neven Petrović
"Intelligence and Justice" (Wednesday)
One of the main ambitions of contemporary egalitarians is to compensate those with less adequate natural endowments, which are held to be responsible for a poorer living standard of such persons. Arguably, one of the prominent capacities of that sort, at least in the modern economies, is intelligence. However, the question arises can egalitarians really ask for compensation for the lack of this particular personal feature given the self-perception

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of individuals concerning their possession of it. The present research is an attempt to investigate how the most important philosophical positions (e.g. Rawls's, Dworkin's and luck egalitarian) belonging to this camp could or would deal with the issue.

Douglas W. Portmore
"Foundational Consequentialism and Its Primary Evaluative Focal Point" (Monday)
Following Shelly Kagan's useful terminology, foundational consequentialists are those who hold that the ranking of outcomes is at the foundation of all moral assessment. That is, they hold that moral assessments of right and wrong, virtuous and vicious, morally good and morally bad, etc. are all ultimately a function of how outcomes rank. But foundational consequentialists disagree on what is to be directly evaluated in terms of the ranking of outcomes, which is to say that they disagree on what the primary evaluative focal point is. Act-consequentialists take acts to be the primary evaluative focal point. They evaluate acts in terms of how their outcomes rank (the higher ranked the outcome, the morally better the act), but evaluate everything else in terms of the morally best acts. Thus, the morally best rules are those that would, if internalized, most reliably lead us to perform the morally best acts. Rule-consequentialists, by contrast, take rules to be the primary evaluative focal point. They evaluate rules according to how their outcomes rank and then assess everything else in terms of the morally best rules. Thus, the morally best acts are those that conform to the morally best rules.

In this paper, I argue that foundational consequentialists should not take the primary evaluative focal point (or points) to be acts, rules, virtues, or even everything. In so doing, I argue against act-consequentialism, rule-consequentialism, virtue consequentialism, and global consequentialism. But my project is not entirely negative, for I argue that the primary evaluative focal point should be a complex of acts and attitudes. In the end, then, I claim that foundational consequentialists should accept a new kind of consequentialism, which I call attitude-consequentialism.

Matjaž Potrč
"Moral Judgment" (Tuesday)
Moral cognitivism and noncognitivism opposition follows propositional analysis inspired separatist agenda. The fence is put under question though by mixed proposals, from error theory to fictionalism, quasi-realism and cognitivist expressivism. The push is towards simple intuitive view of judgment as reflexive intertwining of intentional content and phenomenology endowed committal attitude.

Jonathan Pugh
"Autonomy in Bioethics – Lessons From Theory, Lessons From Practice" (Wednesday)
The preservation of personal autonomy is often a key concern in bioethical debate. However, autonomy is an ambiguous concept that has lent itself to a plethora of different uses in moral philosophy. This has led many bioethicists who appeal to the value of autonomy to reach divergent conclusions concerning salient bioethical issues. In this talk I shall suggest that some bioethicists seem to overlook important theoretical points regarding the nature of autonomy, since they fail to give an adequate account of the critical reflection that many philosophers believe to be a necessary component of autonomy in their discussions of the concept. However, I shall also argue that philosophical theories of autonomy can also be improved by acknowledging insights that can be garnered from considering the ways in which we use the concept of autonomy in applied ethics. I shall argue that insights from this context suggest a practical dimension of our concept of autonomy, pertaining to the agent's freedom to act effectively in pursuit of their ends. I shall claim that recognising this dimension of autonomy is of theoretical importance for two reasons. First, this dimension of autonomy makes salient the fact that agents form their motives in the light of what is practically realisable for them. Second, recognising this dimension of autonomy allows us to offer a deeper explanation of why coercion undermines autonomy.

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Toni Pustovrh
"Key Ethical Issues In Human Enhancement" (Thursday)

During the past decade, the idea of Human Enhancement (HE) has begun to attract considerable attention both in scientific and academic circles, with specific issues now garnering wider public interest. Generally, HE can be construed as the notion that average or normal human capabilities can be expanded and augmented through the direct, increasingly intimate application of technology to the human body. While there are many open issues connected with the idea, ranging from what notions like average or normal capabilities actually mean, through how HE differs from previous technologies that have vastly expand human capacities, to specific definitions of HE depended on the means employed and the goals sought, the progress of science and technology is already presenting us with some practical applications of Human Enhancement Technologies (HET). Thus we are no longer faced only with the question of whether we can, but of whether we should attempt to engage in specific types of HE. The issue of normativity in turn raises the question of what the key ethical issues in various types of HE and HET are. The concept of HE thus poses challenges both for theoretical and applied ethics, for the former in further analyzing and developing the concept and its underlying notion, and for the latter in offering practical guidance in cases of specific, already available or emerging applications of HET. With the increasing (public) visibility of HE and the prospects offered by HET, the pressure to make (or not make) practical individual and collective decisions will only increase. The paper will attempt to examine and elucidate the underlying concept of HE and identify some of the key ethical issues posed by HE and HET, which might offer further orientation in regard to whether (and how) we should attempt to engage in specific types of HE. In this regard, the means (technological applications) and goals (desired outcomes of enhancement) are important, as they can be used to distinguish between different types of HE (e.g. physical enhancement, cognitive enhancement, healthy lifespan extension), which might carry different, specific ethical implications and issues. Both theoretical analysis and empirical data will be employed. The latter will draw on relevant results from an extensive study of the recommendations concerning new and emerging technologies that were produced by national ethics advisory bodies at the level of various European countries.

Regina Rini
"Abortion, Ultrasound, and Openness to Moral Persuasion" (Tuesday)

Some political jurisdictions require a woman seeking abortion to first view ultrasound images of the fetus. The legitimacy of such coercive requirements is one matter; here I consider a slightly narrower question: is there a moral obligation for a woman seeking an abortion to view fetal ultrasound images? I argue that the answer may be yes, because (a) other members of the moral community sincerely believe abortion to be a grave moral error, (b) we have a general obligation to make ourselves open to persuasion by the sincere moral commitments of other community members, and (c) fetal ultrasound images can function as a form of moral argumentation. I defend these three claims and consider the strength of the resulting obligation, including limitations imposed by the particular intimacy of abortion decisions. I also argue that this obligation does not justify coercive ultrasound-viewing laws.

Andrew Sepielli
"Moral Realism without Moral Metaphysics" (Monday)

My aim in this talk is to convince you that a metaphysically deflationist but explanatorily robust version of moral realism is a live possibility. The view is deflationist in the way that many versions of expressivism, transcendental constitutivism, and quietism are: roughly, it has no truck with inquiries into the naturalness, constitution, or reducibility of moral properties or facts, and it purports to dissolve, rather than to solve, the so-called "placement problem". At the same time, it offers a general explanation from outside the ethical domain of how we can accurately represent the world in moral thought and talk. This distinguishes it from some versions of expressivism and constitutivism, which conceive of moral thought and talk as "aimed" at solving practical problems rather than as *(continued)*

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(also) representing the world; and it distinguishes it from quietism, which abjures any attempt to vindicate the ethical domain from, as one prominent quietist puts it, "sideways on". The practicing meta-ethicist is no doubt familiar with the charge that defenders of robust (that is to say, non-quietist) moral realism "owe us" an account of what what moral properties are like, of how they fit into the world as described by science, of how we can "reach out to them" in thought and language, and so on. If the view I'll sketch in this talk is a serious option, then it is not clear that the robust realist is under any such obligation.

Daniel Silvermint
"Intentional Resistance" (Wednesday)
Does a victim have to intend to resist oppression in order to discharge her obligation to do so, or is it sufficient to resist oppression intentionally in the course of pursuing other life plans and projects of importance to her? This is the difference between, say, a woman calling attention to sexist double standards in the workplace in order to advance the cause of equality, and a woman calling attention to them because she wants to advance in an otherwise rewarding profession. I argue that resisting intentionally can be sufficient to discharge a victim's obligation: given that certain valuable plans and projects are systematically complicated or blocked by oppressive burdens, their active pursuit by victims sometimes just is resistance. Requiring that victims count 'ending oppression' among their projects misses a wide range of everyday responses to oppressive burdens – responses that are morally worthwhile and that can still cost victims greatly. Having argued that pursuing one's own plans and projects is sometimes sufficient to discharge the obligation to resist, I close by considering how the plans and projects of other agents as well as collectives affect the account.

Saul Smilansky
"Designer Ethics: Should We Sacrifice the Utilitarians First?" (Thursday)
It is commonly thought that morality applies universally to all human beings, and their own moral views are not thought to be a reason to treat them differently from others. I explore a radical alternative moral view, according to which morally correct behavior may be determined by the moral positions of those who are to be affected. For example, since utilitarians are more welcoming of the idea that human beings may be sacrificed for the greater good, perhaps it is permissible (or even obligatory) to give them "priority" as potential victims. This odd idea has manifold drawbacks, but I claim that it also has advantages, and that it should be given a role in our ethical thinking.

Matthew Noah Smith
"Reliance Structures and Freedom" (Tuesday)
Human agency is not a purely psychological phenomenon. Rather, human agency involves a complex interaction between mind and world. One of the central features of this interaction is reliance. In particular, action depends upon successful reliance and so failures of reliance prevent the manifestation of agency. So, stable sources of reliance - reliance structures, as I call them - facilitate manifestation of agency. Failures in reliance structures threaten the manifestation of agency. In this essay, I develop this line of argument, and in particular its political significance. I summarize the nature of reliance, its connection to agency, and the politics associated with it.

Vojko Strahovnik
"Accepting Cognitive Expressivism in Light of Error Theory" (Thursday)
One of the open questions arising out of Mackie's error theory is what we should (pragmatically) do with our moral language and thought once we become convinced about the truth of error theory, i.e. that our ordinary moral judgments are systematically false. There are several open possibilities ranging from a revolutionary proposal of completely abolishing moral language and thought to a more conservative stance of self-deceivingly continuing with our existing practices. Recently Köhler and Ridge (2013) proposed that the most viable stance to adopt if error theory turns out to be true is expressivism *(continued)*

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(revolutionary expressivism). In the paper I argue that in considering the open possibilities Köhler and Ridge overlook a position of cognitive expressivism and that the latter (despite being developed as a hermeneutical position, supposed to be true about our existing moral language and though) fares well also as a revolutionary proposal if one were to fully embrace the lessons of error theory.

Amelie Stuart
"Kantian duties of love to the poor" (Thursday)
The Doctrine of Virtue may have over the course of time received its due attention by scholars and moral philosophers. Still, neither has the moral significance of love in Kantian ethics been thoroughly analyzed until recently, nor has Kant's notion of poverty found its well-deserved attention. Therefore, his rather complex conception of moral love in relation to duties of virtue will be the focus of this presentation. In order to show its significance for today's moral philosophy, key aspects from the Doctrine of Virtue, such as duties of love to others, will be presented and discussed. Moreover, one topic will be addressed in particular, which is the issue of global poverty. How, from a Kantian perspective, can we claim positive duties to the poor? To answer this, we will need to take a look at Kant's notion of poverty which is, as I will show, interconnected with his duties of love to others. If we presuppose his understanding of poverty as a threat to a person's morals, preventing poverty becomes the content of a duty to others.

Danilo Suster
"Begging the question and the ability to act otherwise" (Friday)
It seems that every line of reasoning about the arguments for (in)compatibility of free will and determinism can be driven to the state of begging the question with respect to the notion of ability involved. In "Does the consequence argument beg the question?" (2013) John Martin Fischer and Garrett Pendergraft defend the Consequence Argument against the charge that it begs the question against the compatibilist. But I argue that their defense based on considerations of practical reasoning does not succeed.

Andras Szigeti
"Focusing Forgiveness" (Wednesday)
Forgiveness is closely related to emotions. Bishop Butler's "forswearing of resentment" is still the definition most take as their point of departure. The negativity of this approach is striking. Can we say more about the positive features of forgiveness? This paper aims to contribute to such a "non-privative" characterization of forgiveness. I argue that we should take seriously the thought that forgiveness is a sui generis emotion type. Forgiveness may be classified as an emotion because it displays a sufficient number of the generic features by which we distinguish emotions from other mental attitudes and episodes. But forgiveness is also clearly distinguishable from other emotions in terms of its core evaluative concern, phenomenology and empirical characteristics. I also make a case for the claim that forgiveness is the positively valenced counterpart of resentment. The suggestion is that the relationship of resentment and forgiveness is similar to that between other emotions of opposite valence such as envy/admiration, thrill/fear, or lust/disgust. The overcoming of resentment, which is generally assumed to be distinctive about forgiveness, consists on this proposal in the reversal of resentment's emotional valence.

Ralph Wedgwood
"The Normativity of Rationality" (Tuesday)
What sort of concept is expressed by the term 'rational', as it is used in such areas of inquiry as decision theory and formal epistemology? Some reasons are given for the view that in these contexts, the term expresses a normative concept – roughly, a concept that has to do with proper use of our faculties of reasoning. On this view, the notion of what is "rationally required" of an agent at a particular time is a kind of 'ought'. However, this view faces a number of problems. (a) Is this view consistent with the principle that 'ought' implies 'can'? (b) The requirements of rationality seem to consist primarily in what could in

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a broad sense be called coherence; but what – if anything – is bad about failing to be coherent in this way? (c) There seem to be cases in which it is rational to have false beliefs about what one ought to do; so how can we avoid absurdities if we simultaneously say that 'rational' expresses a normative concept? An outline of a solution to these problems is sketched, based on the idea that the notion of a "rational requirement" is a kind of "subjective 'ought'".

Justin Weinberg
"Emotional Control and Moral Novelty" (Thursday)
Experiential emotional control refers to the control over which emotional states one experiences. With various pharmaceutical and technological advances, it seems likely that we will eventually acquire the means for direct experiential emotional control, and with this comes many questions. This paper looks at the broad question of whether increased experiential emotional control would be good for us. This is a difficult question to answer, I argue, because the widespread deployment of such control presents us with *moral novelty*. Moral novelty, among other things, not only resists the application of the familiar fundamental moral ideas with which we make moral judgments, but challenges us to reconsider those very ideas. In the case of experiential emotional control, elements of our moral thinking that appear both in commonsense morality and in sophisticated moral theories, such as the goodness of happiness, the value of autonomy, and the meaning of character, are called into question. Further, new questions are raised, such as: to what purpose should we, morally speaking, put emotions? This paper is an attempt to lay out and begin to address the challenges of moral novelty in regards to experiential emotional control, and to show how difficult it will be to advance defensible claims about the value of such control, good or bad.