O RESNICI IN OBSTOJU

Dopisovanje med Matjazem Potrcem (M) in med Bojanom Borstnerjem (B), 11-13 februar 2005

B: Matjaz, zdravo.

M: Ce so SOA's (stanja stvari, States Of Affairs) zadnji gradniki, potem je tvoja ontologija morda podobno kot moja varcna. Kajti po mojem dojemanju je varcnost v tem, da ne pristanemo na vse bitnosti, ki se jim na prvi pogled zaveze zdravi razum. En primer varcne ontologije je, ce dopustimo le zadnje delce fizike in ziva bitja (van Inwagen). Drugi primer varcnosti je, ce dopustimo zgolj obmocja. Tudi ce se v obmocjih potem zavezemo atomarnim bitnostim, tega ne storimo na ontolosko zadnji nacin.

B: V cisto ontoloskih razpravah je tezko zagovarjati tezo, da je npr. van Inwagnova pozicija varcna. obicajno se varcnost opredeli na osnovi vrst bitnosti, ki v svetu so. Pri Inwagnu pa (vsaj tako, kot sam razumem njegovo material beings) pa ni jasno, kaj je z lastnostmi in relacijami, ki zagotavljajo funkcioniranje fizikalnega sveta in hkrati se zdi, da je opredelitev zivih bitij na sibkih temeljih. kako je z obmocji in obmocnimi ontologijami, ki temeljijo na ideji o posredni orespondenci? Zame je to neustrezen pristop.

M: Van Inwagen skusa odgovoriti na vprasanje: Kdaj, pod kaksnimi pogoji, bitnosti sestavljajo bitnost? Tu ima na razpolago razlicne opcije: vselej (univerzalizem), nikdar (nihilizem). Pomembno pri njegovem pristopu je, da se sprasuje po nacelu, ki naj velja za dopustitev bitnosti.

Ker je njegov odgovor da bitnosti (po njegovem osnovni fizikalni delci) tvorijo bitnosti le v primeru zivljenja (do cesar pride z eliminacijo neprimernih kandidatov za sestavljivost, kakrsen je denimo stik (stik trdi, da bitnosti sestavljajo novo bitnost, ko so v stiku)), je njegova

ontologija vsekakor varcna v tem smislu, da se odpove marsikaterim bitnostim. To se mi zdi docela legitimno ontolosko vprasanje, ki pac zajema eno razseznost (dimenzijo). Poleg tega seveda obstajajo lahko se druge razseznosti (dimenzije) ontoloskega vprasevanja/meril za obstoj, kot so denimo problem lastnosti in relacij, kar pa je seveda drugo vprasanje, ki ga je prav tako potrebno resiti. Strinjam se, da je to lahko tezko vprasanje. In zanimivo. K njemu se bova gotovo se veckrat vrnila, ce bova nadaljevala to razpravo.

M:   Naj poskusim razumeti. Macka je na predprazniku -- to je verjetno po tvoje opis SOA, ki sestoji iz vec gradnikov (macka predpraznik, relacija biti na).

B: Ne. Macka sama je ze SOA in ona - v ontoloskem pomenu - ni gradnik, ker so gradniki (metafizicni) zgolj partikularije (ki pa so izpraznjene - zelo podobno tistemu, kar je nekoc Bergmann opredelil kot prazna - bare - partikularija) ter lastnosti (monadicna, diadicne, n-adicne).

Gradniki niso deli v mereoloskem smislu. Zato je smiselno govoriti le o stanju stvari, ki ga razumem kot uprimerjeno lastnost v (na) partikulariji. Tako imam zgolj SOAs z njihovimi metafizicnimi gradniki. Zame je potem povsem vseeno, kaj ta SOAs v posameznem kontekstu

so. Tisto, kar v ontoloskem smislu steje, je partikularija na eni in univerzalija (lastnost) na drugi strani.

M: To da je macka sama ze SOA se mi zdi prav nenavadno. Po mojem skromnem razumevanju SOA ustrezajo temu, kar lahko opisemo/podamo s stavki/sodbami. Npr. Macka obstaja je SOA/ustreza SOA, ne pa macka sama!

Kaj so prazne partikularije? Ali so to oblike/forme substanc, lastnosti itd?  Ce je tako, tega ne razumem dobro. Kaj naj bi to bilo? Ce so kar je pravkar bilo povedano, potem to gotovo niso zadnje ontoloske bitnosti ampak prej nekaj kar ustreza konstruktom jezika/misli.

Na vsak nacin, ker so izgleda prazne partikularije zate gradniki, bi bilo dobro, ce podas kaksen primer. Kaj je prazna partikularija? Ali je macka prazna partikularija, ker je SOA, kot pravis ti? Ta tocka se mi zdi bistvena za razumevanje vsega. Vendar moram priznati, da je ne razumem.

Nadalje, jaz sam si seveda gradnike najlazje predstavljam na mereoloski nacin.

Kaj je prazna partikularija in kaj je oprimerjena lastnost na partikulariji (SOA, kot ti pravis)? Tu bi res pomagal primer z macko ali s cim podobnim, kjer bi lahko ti pokazal, kaj je prazna partikualrija. Ce pa tega ne mores prikazati (zdi se, da tvoja razprava poteka v to smer),

potem prazne partikularije (karkoli ze je) pac ne potrebujemo.

Tudi ce sprejmem (zacasno) tvojo tezo, da steje le partikularija in univerzalija, si to se najlazje ilustriram z macko (partikularija) in biti na predprazniku (univerzalija). Vendar se mi zdi kot ze receno, da je njuna sestavljenost oziroma SOA sele nekaj kar ustreza stavku Macka je na predprazniku.

Mimogrede in kot ze povedano se mi taksna opredelitev potem zdi v drugi razseznosti kot Posebno Vprasanje Sestavljenosti. Potem imamo dve razseznosti, in obe sta legitimni kot raziskavi v ontologiji, vendar moramo ugotoviti njuno razmerje.

Povzetek: res mislim, da bi primer z macko ali s kaksnim stavkom glede macke pomagal, da bi jaz razumel o cem sploh govoris. Sicer se bojim da niti jaz niti studenti niti drugi kolegi ne bodo vedeli kaj so SOA in kaj so gole partikularije, in kaj so lastnosti. Poleg tega: gole lastnosti imajo tezavo, da opredelimo, kako se nanje lepijo partikularije. Ce pa so gole lastnosti same partikularije, potem je to zelo cudno, vsaj slisi se cudno.

M: Vendar se ti zavezes celotnemu kompleksu SOA na zadnji nacin, macki itd pa zgolj na referencni nacin, na nacin referencnega dejanja, in

torej ne kot zadnjim bitnostim.

B: Razlikovanje med zavezanostjo na nacin referencnega dejanja in na nacin zadne bitnosti se mi zdi neutemeljeno, saj v cisto ontoloski razpravi s tem ne pridobis nicesar. Je pa to uporabno v kontekstu kot da razprav, kar pa je zunaj horizonta moje pozicije.

M: Problem ZATE je po mojem v tem, da moras pristati na to, da je macka, ali SOA, ali gola partikularija ali kaj podobnega zadnji ontoloski gradnik, in da potem vselej rokujes pod najvecjimi normativnimi pritiski razprave v ontologiji. Vendar potem spregledas, kje ontologija meri

na zgolj referencno zavezanost. Mislim, da glede tega nisi sam, ampak z vecino ontologov. Vendar to se ne pomeni, da razlika v ontoloski zavezanosti (zgolj referencna/zadnja ontoloska) ne obstaja. Kar ti imenujes kot da razprave so na tvojo zalost razprave o vecini bitnosti, ki jih predpostavljamo v govoru obicajne referencne zavezanosti, in to je vecina govora ontologije kot jaz razumem (saj ontologija mora govoriti o mackah, o SOA, o partikularijah).

M: Ce je tako, je tvoja ontologija res varcna, ker so zanjo pomembna nekaksna podrocja (SOA's), ne pa njihovi gradniki. Vendar pa je morda tod lahko problem: ce so SOA individuirana na podlagi atomarnih gradnikov (macka, predpraznik je razlicno od pes, trava, in zato je SOA1 opisano z Macka je na predprazniku razlicno od SOA2 Pes lezi na travi): ce je temu tako, ontologija ni varcna.

B: Glej zgoraj, kaj so SOAs.

M: Kot receno bi te res prosil, da mi pojasnis, kaj SOA so, morda s primeri, kajti jaz zgornjega nisem razumel.

B: Individuiranje pa je se posebna zgodba. dejstvo je, da sam nikoli nisem nikjer trdil, da se SOAs individuirajo (oposameznijo) preko svojih gradnikov.

M: Ce se SOA ne individuirajo (oposameznijo) preko svojih gradnikov -- preko cesa pa se? Sam imam najprej tezavo, da ne razumem kaj naj bi sploh bila SOA kot jih ti razumes. Drugic, tisto malega kar razumem je, da so SOA po tvoje gole partikularije. Ce je tako, se po vsej verjetnosti morajo na nek nacin oprimeriti. Ce je macka sama SOA ne pa gradnik, pa sem res izgubljen.

B: Nekaj mojih notic:

What is the principle /or cause of individuation? Is the principle/cause of individuation something that is the same to all entities? The basic difference between the Intension of Individuality and Principle of individuation is the difference between the determination of: necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be individual (Intension of Individuality) and necessary and sufficient condtions for something to become individual (Principle of Individuation). In the first part (Intension) we are concern about the logical conditions of individuality; in the second (Principle) we are seeking for metaphysical conditions required to bring about individuality. = what does it take universal to become individual.

M: What are entities here, as you consider the possibility that the principle/cause of individuation may be the same for all entities? Seems to me that we do NOT talk about SOA’s anymore, but about CATS and the likes of those, including BEING ON MATS, i.e. properties and relations.

A principle, as the expression itself tells us, is something normative. And it would be a good thing to have such a normative thing that does not change with each change in context.

Now, as for cats (I stick with these so we understand what we are talking about) they are vague guys, according to my understanding. And this is sufficient for me to claim that there really aren’t any of those around according to the available criteria. Or again, cats really cannot be sensibly individuated according to ontological commitments, although they may be sensibly individuated according to just/only referential commitments. Somehow misleadingly one may claim that cats are denizens of regional and not of ultimate ontology (this is misleading because the ontology substantiation talk is finally wrong, as compared to the discursive commitment talk.)

Conditions for something to be individual are needed. If these conditions do not commit us to everything presupposed by common sense, say, to be REALLY there, we have an austere ontology.

Principle of individuation: Necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be recognized as individual. Seems to me that for all this regional stuff (cats, say) again we will have to deal with vagueness and there will be perhaps troubles to recognize any REAL regional entities.

Now: What does take the universal to become individual seems to me a question that is quite loaded with presuppositions. Why should there be universals at all in the first place? Why should these necessarily have individuals as their INSTANTIATIONS? And so on.

B: There is a well known objection against metaphysical position - epistemic objection - which is based on the assuptiom that all metaphysical theses are spurious one, if there is no epistemological explanation of their position.

M: The only referential commitment is not just as-if commitment. It is real commitment to the world – the point we have started with in our discussion involving truthmakers. So it is not just epistemic. But it certainly claims that the cat (or SOA, or whatever) is not the ontologically ultimate entity. This is what seems to me to be yours (misguided, according to me) presupposition.

B:  But, it does not matter in the metaphysical invetsigation about the nature of thing (in our case about the nature of individuation), that we do not (at least yet) have criteria for the identification of the nature of things? It is just epistemological problwm and epistemologists have to worry about it. [The same situation we can find in sciences - physicist would not stop her investigation just because epistemologist does not (yet) have an appropriat theory of knowledge that would explain her conclusions, results.]

Discernability of Individuals

M: I think that on many occasion the world is certainly such that it makes it right/correct, i.e. true to say that there is a cat around, although there does not need to be any CAT there in the ultimate ontology. I.e. the talk about cats may well satisfy our referential commitments, without also necessarily satisfying our ontological commitments. But as our discourse is about the world, the procedure is not just epistemological.

B: This is for sure epistemological problem. How can I discern my dog Nero as an individual? The classical formulation of the question is:

What is the cause or principle that allows me to know it as individual? What are the criteria that serve to identify individuals as such? We are seeking for necessary and sufficient conditions on the base of which minds may know something as individual.

M: By the way, a search for necessary and sufficient conditions for concepts may well be suspect.

B:It could be illustrated with the help of an old position: matter is a principle of individuation. According to the aristotelian tradition matter itself has no properties, at least no perceptual characters. So, we can say "Something, an X, is individual because of matter", but we can not say "I know something, an X, to be an individual because of matter." There is no epistemic ground in matter of x and Y which could be used as the cause (principle) of discernibility between this X and that Y.

M: I agree that discernibility of items in the world does not succeed on an epistemic basis. It simply depends on how the world is like – in a regional manner, or better, according to our just referential commitment to the world. Despite this commitment being just referential, it is still to the world.

B:  Therefore, we must distinguish between The problem of Individuation (ontological problem) and The problem of Discernability of Individuals (epistemological problem).

M: Seems that there is a background presupposition here that there is some ultimate ontology of ENTITIES around, and quite unrelated to it epistemological concerns that have nothing to do with the world. I say that commitment is still to the WORLD, in a referential manner, but not to CATS. I.e. as we refer to cats, we are referring in an indirect manner to the WORLD.

B: Or, we can say that individuality and distinction on one side and discernability on other side are two different things (and not, as many defenders of Identity of Indiscernibles would say: it is the same question/problem).

M: These guys may have a point here, however!

B: Individuality and distinction is something that an enitity has (independently of someone, who tries to know something about it - it is an absolute feature of an entity)

M: Under the presupposition perhaps, that the entity in question is not vague, just for starters!

B: …in it an discernability is something relational (it is a relational between the knower/his mind

and an entity/individual). Therefore, it is clear, why it is not necessarily that the lack of discernability entails the nonexistence of distinct individuals.

M: OK. If two things are not discerned, they may still be two things. Sounds plausible. But the things that are discerned may many times be the things that come to the fore because of the way the world is.

B: Reference to Individuals

There we have a semantic approach. Ontologist is concerned with the individual itself, its nature, principles; epistemologist is concerned with the way we know the individual; semanticist is interested with the functions and natures of the terms and expressions used to refer to

individuals [The function of the term "Nero" (my dog) is to refer to Nero and no othe individual.]

M: Actually, it turns out that most of individuals are such that the criteria for their ontological and semantical individuation are quite intertwined – most of the entities to which we are referentially committed.

B: There are obvious candidates for such terms as are proper names ("Nero" refers to my dog, but however at the same time to tyran from Rome], indexicals  ["I am philosopher" refers to me, if I am the person who utters this and it refers to you if you are the person who utters this.] and definite descriptions ["The teacher of Plato"].

M: These are just referential commitments. Interesting!

B: Principle of Individuation

1.    What is (the identification of) the principle of individuation?

2.       Is this principle the same for all individuals?

M: Would seem to be an appropriate thing to reply affirmatively to 2.

B: The question is: what the individual must have and what at the same time universal must lack that individual is noninstantiable and universal is instantiable?

M: Let me see. What would be an instantiable universal? One example: the universal cathood instantiates this pretty cat. Is the individual noninstantiable in this case? I would say that it is well noninstantiable because the universal has just instantiated it. The universal possesses the normative authority of instantiation power that the individual does not have, in this case.

B: When we speak about the necessary and sufficient conditions of individuation we are looking for something tjat is (somehow) responsible for the individual's noninstantiability.

M: This is OK then, for as I have identified the problem, according to the presuppositions of this discussion universals do instantiate individuals, and so individuals cannot instantiate themselves. But the WORLD, by the way, according to my understanding, does not instantiate individuals, because they ARE the world (although they do not exist, being vague guys)—captured by just referential and thus according to commitments proper to indirect correspondence.

B: [Four possible approaches/theories for the problem of the individuation of substances: bundle theories, accidental theories, essential theories, extrinsic theories of individuation.]

Some factors that distort the (right) formulation of the problem of individuation:

(a)        confusions concerning the intension of (term/concept) of 'individuality'.

(b)    The formulation of the problem in the epistemic terms.

(c)       A reductionist attitude.

According to (a) we can say that are at least two important points which are somehow responsible for the (possible) confusion about the intension of individuality: individuality as some kind of distinction or difference. On what basis this distinction/difference is grounded? In Bundle theory they would say that Bush and Putin are two (distinct/different) humans because Bush has some features which Putin does not have. Even if it would be the case that both (Bush and Putin) would have the (very) same features there is always spatio-temporal location to account for the

difference/distinction between Bush and Putin. However, if we do accept that individuality is conceived as noninstantiability then it is extremly impossible to find the proper explanation for it (noninstantiability) in the frame of these theories.

M: If noninstantiability means that universals instantiate individuals?

B: The second point is about the intensional confusion concerns the understanding of individuality as requiring some kind of actual or potential division of a species. [see the introductionary part for the interpretation.]

What we cannot forget: Individuality is at the core (center) and any principle (either it is understood as cause or not) of it must be intrinsic to the thing.

The slogan: THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION OF THE SUBSTANCE MUST BE SUBSTANTIAL AND NOT ACCIDENTAL.

What does follow from such an attitude?

THE EXISTENTIAL THEORY OF INDIVIDUATION = def. Existence is the principle of individuation for all individuals.

M: This cannot be correct for cats and SOA’s for according to me they do not exist – they do not exist according to the ultimate ontological commitment.

B: Assumption 1: existence is not a feature of thing. We can distinguish between existence (of the thing) and the features which characterize this thing (essence or nature of it).

M: If the WORLD is substance for all this regional stuff and things, then it is not their feature, indeed. Because a cat (vague entity in regional ontology, according to regional commitment) is showing how the world is, region-ishly.

B: [see Aquinas Being and essence, ch. 4, par. 6 for the doctrine of the real distinction between essence and existence.] "Existence is not a predicate". Therefore, existence is the only condition that is both necessary and sufficient for the instantiation - or it is the only necessary and sufficient condition for the instantiation of universal.

M: I agree that the WORLD brings existence to the cat (cat IS the world, on a very narrow and ontic scale), and that thus it cannot be a predicate of these regionish and inexistent guys. In a way then, WORLD does instantiate the cat, but not as a separate individual entity (remember that the cat is vague).

B: Assumption 2: in virtue of existence there are noninstantiable instances of instantiables. Therefore, existence is the cause of (it causes) noninstantiability.

M: If one understands noninstantability as powerlessness of a cat to instantiate itself. The WORLD instantiates the cat, with the intertwining of epistemic and semantic standards.

B: [do not forget: when we speak about existence we include both kinds: actual and possible existence.]

M: Perhaps for starters we make clear the actual existence concerns, first.

B: Assumption 3: existence is nonsharable. (Who can exist for me?) I do not exist for anybody else, nor anybody else exists for me.

M: This assumption is certainly wrong. For I cannot exist without the WORLD. Actually I think that I do not exist (cf. Unger vagueness skeptical arguments for that) (perhaps I do ex-sist though, as the existentialist philosophers would say it), whereas the WORLD does well exist.

B: Possible objections

What can happen in the case that we have possible worlds and possible individuals? Is an existence really the principle of individuation even in such a case?

M: OK. In the case of possibility we are talking about thought/language, i.e. semantic and similar constructs. But these certainly do depend on the World – at least in their semantic evaluation. Truth ascription at least will depend on the WORLD, on how the WORLD is.

B: - Possible objects are not individuals = they are (just) composites of features. Features are instantiable (golden mountain; Pegasus;), therefore they could not be individuals.

M: Real cats are individuals. Possible cats are normative constructs that come around quite independently from the WORLD and that really depend on thought/language almost exclusively. This is why they are close in this to mathematical objects.

B: -  Possible objects = mental images of individuals that have actually existed. Therefore, they could not have used past existence as the principle of individuation. They do not have existence (they do not exist) now.

Existence can be classified into actual, possible and impossible. The last could not play the role of the individuator, because impossible entities are not entities at all and therefore cannot be classified as individuals. In is inconceivable that wooden iron (whatever it means) could exist and therefore, it could not be the case that it would be either actual or possible individual.

In the case of possible individuals we do accept the following: something is possible existent iff its existence does not implies contradiction.

Therefore, in a possible individual the principle of individuation would be possible existence, while in an actual individual it is actual existence.

M: Yes, possible individual has the possibility of actuality, but an impossible one doesn’t.

B: Objection: my dog Nero is a possible being (because I never had a dog) since I can and could have had one. Nero is possible individual because it could have become actualized anytime during my lifetime - it means that it does not involve any contradiction.  Let assume that I have a dog now and it is Nero. Nero (a possible individual) and Nero (my actual dog) are the same individual. But the principles of individuation for Nero(p) and Nero(a) are not the same: for N(p) it is possible existence; for N(a) it is actual existence. Inconsistency? Contradiction? Once I realize the mere possibility of having a dog I do have an actual dog. This happens once I get myself a dog after my long time wish of having one.

The confusion is based on the difference between the principle of identity and the principle of individuation. N(p) and N(a) are identical, but they do not have the same (one) principle of individuation.

M: My actual dog is instantiated (or whatever) by the WORLD, but not the possible dog.

B: But how can we then say that they are identical? Simple answer: there is one entity N(p) which is rendered noninstantiable by its possible exisistence when it was only a possible being and

by its actual existence when it is an actual being.

Another objection: The existence is what instantiates a universal into a noninstantiable instance. "Dog" becomes this or that dog when it exists. Problem: if existence is responsible for making "dog"  this or that man, then it could not be the principle which makes "dog" this and

not that  dog. Therefore, it could not be the necessary and sufficient condition for there being this and not another individual (existence could not be the sole principle of individuation).

M: Well, thought/language is as all right for vague/nonexistent entities such as dogs.

B: This objection is based on the confusion between individuality and difference. How? The existence is the sole condition (necessary and sufficient) for there being an individual which is an instance of universal(s) and is , by itself, noninstantiable entity. However, the existence

is not the sole principle of there being an instance which is different from another instance. The existence is an explanation for there being a dog as an instance of "dog", but it is not the (sole) explanation of there being Nero and Fido as two individuals which are different from

each other despite their (loose) indentity in the respect of "being dog". We can say that the sameness and difference between individuals (Nero and Fido) is due to the natures and features of individuals and not heir existences.

Last objection: noninstantiability is something primitive (as we said earlier). How then it could be the case that an existence is proper explanation for it (noninstantiability is analyzable into existence)? To say that noninstantiability is primitive means that there can not be found any equivalent (concept) for it. It is one of the buildings blocks of our metaphysics. Therefore, when we say that the existence is the principle of individuation, we do not mean that noninstantiability is reducible to existence. To exists and to be noninstatiable are two different things, even if, there is a case that in the world, whatever exists (actual or possible) is noninstantiable (there are no universals) or vice versa (there are no - in proper sense - particulars - there are only instantiables = universals). To say that something exists is not the same as to say that something is an individual. Even if we accept that only individuals exist (a bold ontological commitment - not mine) and

existence and noninstantiability are coextensive, they are not (for sure) cointensive. It is not true that existence is a conceptual component of individuality, but we can say that existence is much more like a causal principle of it.

M:  Resnicnost kot posredna korespondenca se ne zaveze mackam in psom v zadnjem ontoloskem smislu, kljub temu, da se jim zaveze v referencnem smislu. Ce se tem bitnostim zavezemo zgolj referencno, potem imamo se vedno varcno ontologijo.

B: Samo potem nimamo resnicnosti, ampak zgolj nekaj kot da.

M: Ampak: vecina trditev resnicnosti je potem kot da. Se strinjam.

M: To je zdruzljivo tudi s posredno korespondenco. Problem je, ali so ustvarjalci (ne:tvorci??) resnice misljeni kot nekaj nad svojimi elementi ali kot sestavljeni iz svojih elementov in nic drugega. Ali ti elementi sploh obstajajo v svetu? Ce so SOA's zadnja zavezanost, morda ne. Po moje bo nazadnje vedno problem ce bodo ustvarjalci resnice dolocena podrocja (SOA's), vkolikor bomo poskusali ta podrocja ali elemente tocno omejiti. Njihova omejitev bo izkazala, da so nejasni. Svet pa je jasen.

B: Na cem temelji teza, da je tisto, kar je v svetu, nejasno, svet sam pa je jasen. po moje je to zgolj epistemolosko pretiravanje.

M: Teza izvira iz ontoloskega preudarka o nejasnosti. Prepostavi, da katerakoli obmocna bitnost (macka) obstaja. Ob upostevanju nejasnosti s pomocjo RAA prides do rezultata, da slednja ne obstaja. Svet sam pa ne more biti nejasen.

M: Po moje nastane problem negativnih sodb in podobno ce izhajamo od (po moje zgresene) predpostavke, da sestoji svet iz atomarnih gradnikov v smislu zadnje ontoloske zavezanosti. Ce to predpostavko opustimo -- vkolikor se atomarnim bitnostim zavezemo le referencno--  se problem negatrivnih sodb ne pojavi vec, saj enostravno recemo, da je svet tak, da na pimer v tvoji sobi sedaj ni dveh slonov. Ce nasa zavezanost slonom ni ontoloska, tudi ni problema. (Je namrec zavezanost govoru/misli, korespondenco pa preverimo s tem, kako se svet ujema z govorom/mislijo.)  Svet v celoti pa ima pri pojasnitvi tega "negativnega stanja stvari" svojo naravno vlogo.

B: Razumem, kam pes taco moli. Vendar pa je zame odprto naslednje vprasanje: Ali je negativna sodba lahko resnicna? Ce je resnicna, ali je zgolj kot da (zavezanost v jeziku).

M: Ne, negativna sodba je resnicna glede na to kako je s SVETOM. Da v tvoji sobi sedajle ni dveh slonov je resnicno glede na to kako je dejansko s svetom.

B: Ce to drzi, potem pac se vedno pristanem na klasicno korespondencno teorijo, ki ne potrebuje teh kot da.

M: V veliki vecini primerov se na svet pac nanasamo zgolj posredno.

B: Ali pa mi je morda se blize Demokritova ugotovitev: "By convention sweet, by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention color; but in reality  atoms and the void." (Democritus B9; B125) Tako ekplicitno poves, da je nekaj kot da in se ne "igras" posredne korespondence.

M: Ne, pripoznati moramo, da so zgolj referencne zavezanosti se vedno zavezanosti temu kako je s svetom. Ce ne pripoznas posredne korespondence se potemtakem izgubis v togem razlikovanju med zadnjo ontologijo (macke so zadnje ontoloske bitnosti, torej so MACKE ali pa jih sploh ni), ter med zgolj dogovornostjo/konvencionalnostjo obstoja in na tem temeljeci resnicnosti. Vsako posebej in oboje skupaj je nesmiselno in brez prave utemeljitve.

B: Lp.-- Bojan