Weak supervenience 6 26
02 6/26/2002
4:16 PM C:\B\B\n\Weak supervenience 6 26 02.doc
Matjaž Potrč, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, matjaz.potrc@guest.arnes.si
The difficulty with the weak supervenience is in that it allows for strange behavior of evaluative terms with only a slight change in subvenient basis. This difficulty is the result of generalist presuppositions entrenched in the way supervenience is supposed to work. On the basis of these presuppositions it is claimed that strong supervenience should be followed. If one embraces the opposed particularist presuppositions though, then the importance of the weak supervenience may be revived, and it turns out to be just what is needed in an account of evaluative properties’ behavior. Weak supervenience is also compatible with the naturalistic program involving evaluative terms.
It is held that weak
supervenience cannot be adequate, for it allows for strange behavior: weak
supervenience holds just for the actual world in which this descriptive
subvenient property basis determines supervenient properties. But if there
would be just a slight difference in the subvenient basis of a possible twin
world, say just one atom missing, it may be that all the supervenient
properties, such as that of being good, could completely reverse their valence.
What was morally good would become morally bad. But this seems inadequate. So
strong supervenience is needed, which extends over all possible worlds. If
certain descriptive subvenient basis results in an evaluative fact of a certain
valence, then this specific valence of evaluative facts should be extended over
all possible worlds.
This argument is questioned. The first questionable
position is Kim’s construal of subvenient basis to consist of thick properties,
which already come evaluatively laden. Even if these subvenient properties
would ground the supervenient set of properties, there would be further
hurdles. It is an unsupported presupposition that supervenient properties get
projected over all possible worlds, as the strong or global supervenience
thesis requires.
Even more, from a particularist point of view, the
weakness of the weak particularism that seems disastrous from the generalist
point of view (to which Kim seems wedded) is actually an advantage, going along
with the particularist statement about possible change of value in the even
slightly changed descriptive circumstances.
So weak supervenience is revived – as an adequate
basis of particularism. A problem though is whether weak supervenience is
suitable for naturalistic approach, given that non-naturalist interpretations
are sometimes embraced as being compatible with particularism. It is argued
that weak supervenience may be compatible with naturalistic particularism, from
this perspective, and not just with the non-naturalist particularism.[1]
Weak supervenience
claims that higher order terms, such as evaluative properties, are in relation
of dependency in respect to their subvenient basis. If St. Francis is good,
then his higher order property of being good depends on the lower order properties,
in the sense that, if there would be the same lower order property arrangement
in another possible situation, then the St. Francis duplicate over there would
be good as well.
Although dependency between the lower subvenient
and higher supervenient orders of properties is claimed by the weak
supervenience, there is no necessity of this relation affirmed. Necessity
though is achieved by strong supervenience, which claims that the identity of
subvenient bases has to hold along all possible worlds.
Particularism may come in several forms and one of
these forms claims that moral principles can always be overridden.
Particularism is a view opposed to the generalism which affirms normative
authority of general principles.
It may be said that for generalism, there is a
general pattern of pairings involving a list of cases involving descriptive and
evaluative properties. Such a list does not need to be united by general
principles according to particularism.
We may think about the extension of several cases
such as
D1 → D2, …, Dn → En
to range over all
possible worlds (D is for descriptive here, and E is for evaluative). In this
case we would have a general pattern ranging over all these possibilities, and
so we would have generalism. If contrary to this we do not think that there is
a necessary transition from one case to the next, then we do not have an
overall pattern tying them. Whereas the first case of systematizing seems to
feature strong supervenience, the second particularist case features weak
supervenience.
Strong and weak supervenience are not just neutral
descriptions. Rather, strong supervenience goes along with generalism, whereas
weak supervenience has a tendency of naturally fitting particularism. The
reason is that the extension over possible worlds assures general pattern in
the case of strong supervenience. Whereas weak supervenience only gives
naturalistically respectable conditions for each particular case, without that
any such general pattern would be involved.
Kim defines weak
supervenience as follows:
“A weakly supervenes on B if and only if
necessarily for any x and y if x and y share all properties in B, then x and y
share all properties in A – that is, indiscernibility with respect to B entails
indiscernibility with respect to A.” (58)
Here, B is the subvenient base, and A is for the
realm of the supervenient. According to Kim, the supervenient relation of
dependency is really a “relation between families of properties” (55) of which
respectively each the base and realm of the supervenient consists.
Here is one example. If x and y both share
subvenient properties of being courageous and benevolent, say, they are also
bound to share the property of being good.
On the face of it, this seems to be a too strong
requirement, for sharing all the properties means being an exact physical
duplicate in the same world. And each physical duplicate has an enormous amount
of properties. Besides to the ones mentioned, there are also properties of having
a certain weight, a certain age, and many more. But not all of these are
required if we focus our attention at the subvenient basis whose resultance is
the supervenient predicate of being good. The talk about the “relation between
families of properties” may surprise at first sight. But here is its
explanation: the supervenience relation determines several or many properties,
not only in the subvenient basis but also in the area of the supervenient. Many
or most of these properties belonging to the realm of the supervenient will not
be relevant for the supervenient property we center upon, being good in our
case. So, the relation of weak supervenience is even too strong a requirement
as supervenient resultance from the subvenient basis of properties. It is too
strong, because relevance is not taken into account. But in the
practical rendering of the example, which includes properties of being
courageous and benevolent, just these relevant properties are given as
supporting supervenient property of being good* (G*), i.e. being good in the
sense of having a positive or negative valence (G, -G). Thus there is not a
whole family of properties given, although this would be the requirement of
weak supervenience.
“Weak supervenience of A on B therefore comes to
this: any two objects with the same B-maximal property must have the same
properties in A – they are both G or both –G.” (59)
Thus the weak supervenience, although it goes
under the name of weak, on the one hand gives too strong requirements, and one reason
is that it does not cash in the relevance. Relevance though is respected in the
above formulation, as a preamble to the practical examples that illustrate it.
Although there is no “family of properties” anymore that we face at the
supervenient level.
But this is not the worry that Kim would address in
the case of the weak supervenience. To the contrary, he claims that weak
supervenience is “too weak” (59). In what sense?
What valence the subvenient basis will produce for
the supervenient property, “whether G* is G or –G depends on the particular
world under consideration, and is not a feature invariant across possible
worlds” (60).
The requirement is thus that indiscernibility is
not just limited to the actual world, but that it extends to other possible
worlds, and thus that it turns out to be a necessary relation, actually that it
becomes strong supervenience. Strong supervenience thus brings the necessary
lawful generalization along with it.
If one would just stay with the relation of weak
supervenience, the following strange things would be permitted, according to
Kim:
“(a) In this world anyone who is courageous,
benevolent, and honest is a good man, but in another possible world no such man
is good; in fact, every such man is evil in this other world.
(b) Again, in this world anyone who has courage,
benevolence and honesty is good; in another world exactly like this one in
respect of the distribution of these virtues, no man is good.
(c) In another possible world just like this one in
respect of who has, or lacks, these traits of character, every man is good.”
(60)
Weak supervenience stays “within” (60) possible
worlds, which we may interpret as possible situations, but does not extend to
other global possible situations. It does not assure any pattern. There is no projectibility
coming along with the weak supervenience:
“The particular association between A-properties
and B-properties in a given world cannot be counted on to carry over into other
worlds” (60).
Here is the reconstructed argument (compare p. 60):
Pr1 Weak supervenience only requires that within
any possible world there are no two things agreeing in B but diverging in A.
Pr2 It is possible according to the weak
supervenience that things agreeing in B in this world diverge in A in other
possible worlds.
C1 .: According to the weak supervenience, the
particular association between A-properties and B-properties in this world will
not transfer to other worlds. (There is no general pattern according to the
weak supervenience.)
C2 .: According to the weak supervenience,
B-properties do not fix its A-properties (its supervenient properties).
C3.: According to the weak supervenience the base
properties do not determine supervenient properties.
The requirements in the above argument may be
elucidates with the help of particularism. Particularism claims that there is
no general pattern that would extend over cases that possess a certain
evaluative valence, such as being good.
From this point of view, weak supervenience thesis
assures a subvenient descriptive basis for the evaluative, without that it
would also assure a projectible subvenient descriptive basis for the
evaluative.
Each evaluative supervenient A-property is
supported by a subvenient B-property descriptive basis, and this suffices for
the requirements of naturalism. But if the situation or possible world changes,
even slightly, there will not be any automatic extension of the same relevant
B-basis to result in the same A-properties. Similarity between situations or
between possible worlds does not suffice to have an automatic transmission from
one to the next situation figuring the same value of the evaluative A-property
on the basis of the same subvenient B-properties. And this is just what
particularism claims: that there is no pattern assured from the
descriptive to the evaluative.
The strange consequences (a), (b), (c) are exactly
what the particularist agrees with. Possessing a set of properties such as
being courageous, benevolent and honest may change their valence in another
situation (in another possible world). The reason may be that the relevance
(which is not thematized by Kim for the case of weak supervenience) does not
extend just to the three enumerated subvenient B-properties that result in
supervenient A-property (good, say). The relevance actually extends to the
whole of each new situation, of each new world. And it is then not so
surprising at all that the valence may be changed in the new situation.
Similarity is not enough to assure the sameness of the valence of supervenient
A-property. But there is also a strange requirement here if one strengthens the
situation from one case to the next: then it seems that the possible worlds
would actually need to be identical in their entire overall subvenient
B-properties base. But this seems to be a too strong requirement even for
strong supervenience, which should after all leave the space for difference
between different worlds or situations. At least something in situations
(worlds) should be different so that they would differ from each other.
Pr1 presents a minimal naturalist
requirement. If there are exactly identical B-property bases in a situation
(within a world), then there will be no divergence in supervenient
A-properties. This minimal naturalist requirement though does not take into
account the relevance – which properties are exactly these properties in a
situation such that they determine the supervenient A-property. Determination
relation may be holistic.
Pr2 seems to present a realist statement, at
least from the point of view of the particularist. Say that there is a
situation (a world) in which a small, finite or tractable number of
B-properties diverge in the outcome about which A-property gets produced. If
there is one situation where there are C, V and H in the subvenient basis, and
they produce good as their supervenient outcome in this situation, the
supervenient outcome may be just the opposite of good in another situation
(world) figuring C, V and H. The relevance must in this case of course be
extended over all the holistic possible situations. With this, we get a
classical setting of the particularist. Even if the kernel stays with the same
properties in the subvenient base, the holistic environment of the situation
may still change and so it may contribute to the result bringing in new valence
to the supervenient property.
C1 This conclusion is denying the extension
of patterns for the same subvenient basis. But we have seen that the difficulty
in determining the subvenient basis was the one about relevance. As many
features may be relevant, particularist bites the bullet and transfers the
relevance to the whole holistic situation. Each situation will have its own
evaluation. As per definition each two situations differ (otherwise they would
be the same situations), the holistic system may have different impact in each
of these situations. But this just means that there is no general projectible
pattern available.
C2 It is not justified to conclude from the
above though that “B-properties do not fix the A-properties”. Certainly they do
not fix them in a rigid way. But this would be unrealistic anyhow. We will
admit that the moral and other evaluative situations change, and that because
of this change, there may be different evaluations in different situations,
even if some limited number of B-properties gets preserved from one complex
situation to another one.
C3 follows even less from the previous
points in the argument than does C2. If “determining” is to be understood in
the sense of “completely determining” this may be an appropriate
characterization. But complete determining would seem to be too strong anyhow.
It is indeed a requirement steaming from the strong supervenience. And it is
dubious whether strong supervenience is flexible enough in order to assure a
proper working and explanation in the area of of moral deliberation and in the
area of deliberation supporting action. Determination in the sense of weak
supervenience may be holistic and thereby broader, not based on atomistic
presuppositions. It seems that just this kind of determination is also
realistic in supporting our moral and action directed deliberation.
The overall result of the
above discussion is that weak supervenience is seen as a defunct from the
generalist perspective, which would require strong supervenience. We may wish
to put things in order to some extent, by analyzing the situation.
1. First, what is it that the weak supervenience is
committed to?
a. There is naturalistic basis: non-moral
subvenient underpinning of the moral. I.e. if there would be another subvenient
basis just like this one, it would result in the same kind of supervenient
property.
b. The supervenience relation just holds for this
world. I.e., if there would be another subvenient basis situation just like
this one, it would have to exist in this world in order that the supervenient
relation would hold.
2. What are
the reasons weak supervenience is rejected?
a. Disagreement with (1.b). I.e., if in determining
the supervenient relation one stays in this world only, the supervenient
properties may show a strange behavior in other, possible worlds.
3. Questions
directed at the reasons for rejection:
a. Strange behavior of weak supervenience described
in (2.a) is strange on the basis of the presupposition only that strong
supervenience is the correct position.
b. The difference between strong supervenience and
weak supervenience is that the first one pushes in direction of generalism,
i.e. it extends over all possible worlds. And extension over all possible
worlds is exactly the move promoted by generalism. But this move is dubious,
because possible worlds must be at least slightly different to the actual one
(otherwise they are identical to it).
Whereas weak
supervenience only secures subvenient basis for each particular occasion
of the supervenient property appearance. But this results in a strange behavior
once it is transferred to other possible worlds. Transfering conditions for
subvenient support of the supervenient properties assures a pattern, i.e.
generalization of these conditions. But such a pattern is denied by weak
supervenience. Weak supervenience displays strange behavior, strange if
measured with the generalist strategy (atomism and tractability in the
subvenient basis) of strong supervenience model. The same behavior (of not
extending the conditions of subvenient basis for a certain supervenient
property to other possible situations or other possible worlds) is not only
compatible with, it is even desired by the weak supervenience. So, weak
supervenience is compatible with particularism.
The
presupposition of generalism are as follows. The subvenient basis in the actual
world is atomistic and of tractable nature. This should be countered by
particularism: the subvenient basis in the actual world is holistically
complex, nontractable and not atomistic.
The definition of weak supervenience as it actually
stands is shaped by the generalist presuppositions, so that the entire score is
biased in favor of generalism, and in favor of strong supervenience as the
model of generalist relation.
Therefore, the very definition
of weak supervenience should be shaped otherwise, so that it will be based on
the rich holistic nontractable nonatomistic basis. What is needed is thus a
new definition of weak supervenience as Particularly Weak Supervenience.
As this Particularly Weak Supervenience will be there in order to catch
the holistic nontractable nonatomistic subvenient basis and the special way
this basis supports supervenient properties, without generalist
presuppositions, it may be compatible with local supervenience
definition (perhaps along Horgan’s local supervenience definition and the
overall idea in Superdupervenience paper). And if PWS (Particularly Weak
Supervenience) is related to nontractable holism, including its vicinity to
Local Supervenience, then PWS is also the right basis for naturalist subvenient
basis of particular quasi-items or quasi-entities as encounterd in the Blob,
one complex nontractable holistic world. All this merits to be elaborated. Let
us turn to the question about the relation between weak supervenience and
naturalism now.
Particularism is a
naturalistically supportable teaching, under the condition that it embraces
weak supervenience. For weak supervenience does not promote any projectability
and thereby it does not buy any generalities, which is compatible with the
definition of particularism.
Embracing of non-naturalism, to the contrary, seems
to succeed under the presupposition that strong supervenience and thereby
generality is adequate for particularist enterprise. But this just cannot be
right. So as a particularist, especially as a naturalistically minded
particularist, one should reject strong supervenience with its underlying
generalist presuppositions, and one should embrace weak supervenience.
Some supporters of particularism are wedded to strong
supervenience and thereby they are committed to generalist presuppositions. For
generalist presuppositions embrace projectability as a precondition for a
viable non-naturalist project.
But there is no need for projectability (extension
of a property and of its value over possible worlds) in order that a naturalist
project would be pursued. So, particularism is not saved by the move in
direction of non-naturalism, it is just pushed into an implausible direction.
Non-naturalism seems to be an implausible direction, for there does not seem to
be any explanation possible along its lines. It is also not taken into account
that weak supervenience requires non-generalist explanation, in form of complex
narrative stories, and that these figure as reasons, which is incomprehensible
to the generalist.
Some defenders of particularism are still prey to
the generalist presuppositions. They think that particularism is tied to
non-naturalism. But the push towards non-naturalism is promoted by the
presupposition that the right supervenience is strong supervenience, one that
allows for projectability. And projectability is tied to the generalism, so by
embracing the presupposition of strong supervenience the promoters of
non-naturalism are really continuing to support generalism.
As against this, particularism seems to be
compatible with naturalism. One option of how to advance the project of
naturalistic particularism is to follow weak supervenience instead of strong
supervenience.
Is there a “connection between moral and non-moral
properties”? Little (2000) denies it and says that as related to this, “the
model backing particularism clearly belongs in the non-naturalist camp”(4/5).
But what should the connection between moral and non-moral properties really
look like? Should it be covered by general patterns, patterns that extend over
all possible worlds, as the strong supervenience requires? Or should there be a
naturalist basis for moral properties, and just this, without extension to
further cases, as this is required by weak supervenience? It seems that this last
option widely exceeds the first one for anybody that would like to have both
particularism and naturalism. And this combination seems to be a desirable
outcome, also because naturalistic particularism offers a support for a viable
explanatory story, which is precluded to the non-naturalist approach.
What is the meaning of moral properties being
“shapeless with respect to the nonmoral” (5)? Does this entail that moral
properties should be without any generalized pattern over instances or possible
cases? Yes. Does this require that there be no non-natural basis for the
supervenient moral properties? No. Notice now that extending non-moral to moral
pattern over a range of possible situations or worlds is required by strong
supervenience thesis, and that there are reasons for this being unjustified.
Notice on the other hand that weak supervenience thesis distinguishes two
tasks: (1) Providing a nonmoral naturalist basis for each instance of the
moral. (2) Not extending this basis to other possible situations or possible
worlds. Now, (1) is entirely adequate for a naturalist particularist project.
Whereas (2) excludes strong supervenience and therewith it excludes generalism.
Anyway, “being shapeless with respect to the nonmoral” does not seem to involve
any requirement that there would be no naturalist base for case-to-case
examples. But this is all that particularism really requires. Asking for more,
i.e. for extension of cases over several situations or worlds may only come
from a generalist presupposition.
Little (2000) argues in favor of non-naturalistic
particularism by using two considerations. Let us observe how the
presupposition of projectible and generalizable patterns, that is actually a
property of generalism and a presupposition of strong supervenience, is shaping
up the following reasoning.
(i) The first reasoning in direction of non-naturalistic
particularism builds on the impossibility of extending to the general patterns.
Here is the reconstruction of the argument:
Pr1 There is no uniform extension from each non-morally
supported particular case to another such case.
C1 .: Therefore, there is no non-moral supporting of the
moral cases.
C2 .: Therefore non-naturalism follows.
The argument overlooks that moral cases may still be
non-morally supported, for each case, even if there is no general pattern
around, as Pr1 claims. So the intermediate conclusion C1 seems to be misguided.
Notice that it does not follow that there cannot be any support of the
non-moral to the moral if there is not any generalizable pattern extending a
case over several possible situations. From this point of view, the following
seems to involve a strangely unfounded reasoning:
“One reason for advancing a doctrine of
shapelessness is the belief that we cannot mark out the boundaries of moral
concepts in purely nonmoral terms: the items grouped together under a moral
classification such as ‘cruel’ do not form a kind recognizable as such at the
natural level. The thought here, familiarly, is that, of the infinitely many ways
of being cruel – kicking a dog, teasing a sensitive person, and forgetting to
invite someone to a party might each qualify – there is no saying what they
have in common (and why, say, the pain inflicted during a spinal tap is
different) except by helping oneself to the moral concept of ‘crulety’. This is
to believe non-naturalism, because one denies there are any
finitely-specifiable conditionals of the form ‘If M then N’.” (5)
Having something in
common, it seems, is not a requirement for non-moral support of the moral. Each
case of cruelty may well be naturalistically supported, even if there is no
general pattern covering all of these cases. So there is no reason to adopt
non-naturalism if one is a particularist. There is just one conditional ‘If M then
N’ for each particular case. No projection from one case to the others is
needed to preserve both particularism and naturalism. One may ask oneself
though why the requirement of this generalizable extension is posed besides to
the viable case-to-case non-moral naturalist support of moral property. It is
hard to imagine something else as the adoption of the presupposition that the
strong supervenience gives an appropriate account of the relation between the
moral and the non-moral properties. To the contrary, kicking a dog, teasing a
sensitive person and forgetting to invite someone to a party are each one a
case of cruelty, and they are appropriately non-naturalistically supported
(each by another set of properties, still furthering the diversification between
cases by taking a different holistic background into account for each case),
although they do not form a pattern common to them all. The question prompting
the recourse towards generalization seems to be “What makes all these
particular cases examples of ‘cruelty?” But this question does not have any
direct link to the support of each case by a non-moral basis. This basis may
stay, although it would not be generalizable over a range of instances.
(ii) The second reasoning in favor of
non-naturalistic particularism seems more decisive to Little. Particularist
“denies that we have reason to hope for any
finitely-specifiable conditionals of the sort ‘If N then M’. … The point is to
deny that such considerations [of each moral case being supported by the
non-moral in case of particular instances] carry their reason-giving force atomistically.
Natural features do not always ground the same moral import… Holism is not
complicated monism… There is no cashing out in finite or helpful propositional
form the context on which the moral meaning depends… This is not to deny that
the moral supervenes on the nonmoral.” (6)
Thus, as it was already established in the
discussion of the former point, the moral may without harm be supported by the
nonmoral properties for each case. The problem is then just that each such case
remains holistically bound to a specific context. The radical difficulty here
about the particularism is that there cannot even in principle be identified
any subveniently contributing properties, as atomistic properties, because the
contribution of subvenient properties is deeply contextual for particularist,
and so it is bound to be different from one case to another. There is no
general pattern unifying these particular cases where a very weak form of
supervenience gets established. But why would one need something more than the
weak supervenience?
The problem is that for a “particularist… the
conditions for something being cruel can’t be spelled out … at all” (8). They
cannot be spelled out because spelling out would require a tractable procedure,
based on the contribution of subvenient properties that would be determined in
an atomistic way. But this is not possible if particularism is really bound to
a radical holism in respect to the contributory causes.
It is hard to see again why this all would push
someone into the direction of non-naturalism. Little herself admits that each
case of cruelty, say, is appropriately and uncontroversially subveniently
naturalistically supported. Just that there does not exist any projectible
pattern that would cover all cases of cruelty in respect to their subvenient
basis. So she admits naturalism as to the instances of cruelty (naturalistic
holistic support for each case), but denies naturalism about a projectible
subvenient basis supporting cruelty. It is not clear though why this subvenient
projectible basis would be necessary for naturalism. Naturalism may well
succeed for each particular case in a holistic nontractable manner. Just that
this does not imply any necessity of having more than weak particularism – weak
particularism allows for the first particular nonmoral underpinning of the
moral already. Only strong supervenience may incite towards this stronger
atomistic and tractable subvenient support requirement.
So, what kind of
supervenience is adequate for particularism: weak or strong? The answer seems
to be not just that weak supervenience is an alternative that particularists
usually take; it is even mandatory for particularists to take weak
supervenience if they wish to preserve their status of particularists. The very
notion of weak supervenience needs to be altered though so that it will not be
shaped anymore by the generalist views that take strong supervenience as a
model. The argument that strong supervenience is a must needs to be resisted.
Particularism shows that weak supervenience is appropriate for moral properties
as interesting or relevant supervenient properties.
Moral Twin Earth argument claims that the behavior
of the supervenient moral properties is different to the behavior of
supervenient mental properties. How is this related to the fact that subvenient
base for the moral is circular (courageous, benevolent), where physical basis
of the mental seems not to be naturalistic indeed? This may be used in order to
clarify the fact that Kim proceeds with thick already morally loaded properties
(courageous) in the subvenient basis.
What is the change of supervenience base that
allows for so called disastrous consequences with weak supervenience?
a. If the basis is that of thick properties (already loaded
properties, such as “courageous”, “moderate”), there is a question about how
such a basis may be changed at all. If there are changes here, these are already
changes in the evaluatively loaded properties.
b. Another possibility is that changes are in the physical
basis: one atom changes in the next possible world, in respect to the actual
world, and possibly all evaluative properties go berserk by changing their
valence. (There is a question about the relevance of this.)
Perhaps a. and b. are just possibilities on a large
spectrum of things. Perhaps a. is not plausible because of its circularity, and
b. is not plausible because of being of the physical base nature and too far
away from the evaluative. How can then one establish the desired connection?
Consequences actually introduce holistic
picture and this is why they seem a nuisance to Kim, who subscribes to two
generalist presuppositions of i. atomism and ii. tractability.
All this is based on an utterly wrong
presupposition about how the supervenience works. The subvenient basis just
cannot be atomistic and tractable in its nature.
The argument against weak
supervenience:
Pr1 Weak supervenience
assures the dependency of supervenient on the subvenient basis.
Pr2 Yet because the
weak supervenience is limited to the actual world only, small differences in
subvenient basis may have extensive consequences for value changes in the
supervenient evaluative area in the next possible worlds.
Pr3 Strong or global
supervenience assures that the evaluative area does not change, by fixing the
same valence over all possible worlds.
.: So, weak
supervenience does not really assure an adequate account of the dependency of
evaluative upon the descriptive, whereas the strong supervenience does.
Ad Pr3: Notice that
this premise really argues against particularism, and for generalism, by
claiming that there cannot be any value change across all the possible worlds
(if there is almost the same subvenient basis). But the argument presupposes
that there is at least one change (in thick properties, or in physical
properties), and this may lead to extensive valence changes in the area of
evaluative. And this is just what the holistic particularism presupposes: That
there may be an extensive change and also complete valence change of the area
of evaluative based on slight changes in the valence base (the overriding).
Notice as well that Pr3 is utterly implausible. It
is just not the case that evaluative valence properties do not change with
small changes in the subvenient basis (may these be thick properties, or
physical constituents of the subvenient basis). According to the particularism,
this change is all pervading. And this particularist claim is well based on the
experiences of how the valuation functions, whereas this is not the case with
generalism.
What is the supervenience basis: Two candidates a.
Thick properties (courageous, benevolent). b. Physical properties,
constituents.
Presuppositions of generalism (i) atomism, (ii)
tractability.
An argument for weak
supervenience and against its negative treatment by generalism.
Pr1 Strong
supervenience does not allow for any valence change in the evaluative
properties, and therefore it is unrealistic.
Pr2 Weak supervenience
allows for such change of valence involving evaluative properties.
.: So, weak
supervenience assures an adequate account of dependency of the evaluative upon
the descriptive, whereas strong supervenience does not.
Against presuppositions of generalism: (i) holism, (ii)
nontractability.
Weak supervenience is unjustifiedly neglected. Especially,
weak supervenience is appropriate for particularism, fitting to it. Why?
Because weak supervenience allows for naturalism (no change in supervenient
properties without the change in the subvenient basis); but weak supervenience
also allows for weird behavior: just a small change in subvenient properties
may have as the consequence complete reversal of supervenient (evaluative,
moral) properties. This seems to be a big fault of the approach. But it is just
a big fault from the point of view, from the perspective of generalism, which
starts with the presupposition of tractability and of projectability.
Kim starts with the presupposition of
projectability. This goes for him together with the presupposition of atomism,
i.e. that there are atomistic elements or ingredients in the subvenient base,
the elements (subvenient properties) that get tractably connected between them.
This atomistic and tractable approach is directed against holism. But holism is
characteristic for particularism. According to particularistic holism, there is
no projectible pattern. And the holistic argument claims that what appear as
slight continuous changes from the point of view of generalist projectible
patterns are really bunch of singular cases. Each of these cases is intertwined
with the rich holistic background of which it is a result. So what may appear
as a general pattern linking several cases (that may be similar, yes) from the
point of view of a generalist is just a wishful thinking unjustified
projection. About projectability, which is grounded on similarity, one may look
at Goodman’s thesis that the projectability is not justified: quus instead plus
may arise (see also Kripke on Wittgenstein), and this depends on induction,
where similarity just is not enough to secure the general pattern. This general
pattern is more a wishful thinking along the generalist lines. Already
induction is a problem for generalist, because it does not allow for general
patterns to come through all the way. All these are generalist presuppositions.
What needs to be done is to turn the perspective all around, and start with the
presupoposition of rich holistic background supported structure for each
particular occasion, with no general pattern extending over similar structures.
The claim is that weak supervenience is compatible
with particularism. But as particularism is giving the right account of (moral)
deliberation, so weak supervenience is compatible with the naturalistic account
of (moral) deliberation.
Kim’s argument against weak supervenience is actually an
argument for generalism and against particularism, in the sense that it defends
general patterns and projectibility as precondition of supervenience. But it is
far from clear that generalities are needed to assure the supervenience, or to
assure naturalism, as for that matter. Supervenience and naturalism are well
possible without generalities. Or, the issue of generalities is at least
orthogonal to the issue of supervenience and naturalism.
The people before Kim, i.e. people like Moore and
Hare were right: weak supervenience is all that is needed and it is also
sufficient for what is needed. Strong supervenience would put too harsh
requirement for materialism, especially if materialism would like to stay
nonreductionist. (See Horgan’s position on this.)
The weak supervenience is not weird. It is just the right naturalist account of supervenient properties. There does need not be any projectability involved into the project of specifying supervenience. People did not wish to upgrade the project with any projectability. They did not wish to upgrade it to the strong supervenience. Weak supervenience sufficed for the task: specifying the naturalistic basis of supervenient properties.
Literature
Goodman, Nelson. (1973). Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Horgan, Terence. (1993). “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of the Material World”. Mind 408: 555-586.
Horgan, Terence and Timmons, Mark. (1992). “Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived.” Synthese 92: 221-260.
Kim, Jaegwon (1993). “Concepts of Supervenience.” In Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kripke, Saul A. (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Little, Margaret (2000). “Moral Generalities Revisited”. In Hooker B.W. and Little M. Moral Particularism. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Potrč, Matjaž (Unpublished). »Particularism and Productivity Argument.«
[1] This paper originated from a discussion with Noa Latham who pushed for the specification of supervenience relation in the transition from the descriptive to the evaluative properties, arguing for the plausibility of strong supervenience. Discussion with Vojko Strahovnik (Marijo Bilus joined in) brought me to the brink of formulating the defense of weak supervenience.