Matjaž Potrč, University of Ljubljana, matjaz.potrc@guest.arnes.si
Pascal distinguishes between reasons of geometry and between reasons of heart or reasons of finesse. The affairs of knowledge were for too long treated and evaluated by tractable procedures or algorithms only, proper to reasons of geometry. It is on time to consider human knowledge as being closer to reasons of heart and to evaluate it accordingly. In Pascal terms thus, the proper evaluation of knowledge comes from the side of reasons of heart or reasons of finesse. If so, then reasons of geometry cannot really provide an appropriate account of knowledge. But reasons of geometry – definitory endeavors and tractable procedures – underlie the main available accounts of knowledge. Reasons of geometry are supported by generalist repeatable patterns, whereas reasons of heart are supported by the particularist unique beautiful patterns. Generalist patterns turn out to be constitutionally devoid of relevance, for they only cling to the repeatable. Salience and uniqueness of particularist patterns, on the other hand, brings the relevance. Justification giving follows those reasons that are best rendered by narration and not by tractable explanatory procedures, which are rather customary for the area of philosophy of science. Morphological content is a natural support for such an explanatory endeavor. Justification having, as well, gets naturally supported by non-classical multi-dimensional landscape proper to the morphological content. Being justified comes from having justification and having it for a good reason. Morphological content is one candidate for whatever sustains the non-classical and non-definitory account of knowledge. It delivers a structure that requires unique particularist patterns and intuition as its support, and provides relevance to knowledge. This is not possible for generalist patterns. Relevance is at the heart of particularist account of knowledge.
When
talking about knowledge, it is not the biblical knowledge that I have in mind.
I talk about the theory of knowledge or epistemology. The main idea is that
epistemology, in the ways that it proceeds, has lost its heart, that the
relevance has drifted out of its sight. But relevance, or heart, is needed for
there to be knowledge. This does not mean that tractable geometrical and
definitory proceedings operative in establishing conditions for justification and
for knowledge in epistemology up to date were all straightforwardly wrong.
Quite to the contrary, richness and diversity of the debate is astonishing. The
very first presupposition though – that conditions for knowledge may be set up
in tractable ways – may be questioned. The definitory and tractable trials of
setting up conditions for knowledge are not wrong per se; they may be just
misguided about allowing for knowledge without the substantial involvement of
the heart. As they stand, the laying out of conditions for knowledge may be
impeccable, but their endeavor may still be questionable without the heart
being involved into the enterprise.
Pascal's distinction between reasons of geometry and between reasons of heart
or reasons of finesse
There is a view that various kinds of reasons cannot be really differently handled.[1] This is a view that I endorse: you really cannot treat in substantially different ways moral and practical reasons, say, as both these kinds of reasons are holistically supported.
Nevertheless I think that it is dialectically fruitful to adopt the view that the ways of dealing with things according to the algorithmic rules are different from the ways of treating things on the basis of intuition and insight. Notice that this does not imply how the things that are held to be functioning according to the rules do indeed also behave in the thus described manner.
In the area of models of mind, it was argued that the widely accepted proposals of using algorithms as the basis for cognitive models couldn’t be appropriate if measured by the actual cognitive performance. Our cognition just does not behave as relying on algorithms and upon the tractable computational rules. The difficulties for a rule-based account appear in conundrum such as the frame problem. The problem about putting a frame around a to-be-delimited area arises as the follow-up of somebody adopting algorithm based computation as the proposed ground upon which cognition works. The frame problem clearly shows that there are difficulties for an algorithm-based approach in the area of cognition. Specifically, these problems are related to the fact that relevance just cannot be achieved on the basis of the algorithmic computation based models of mind.
This shows that some other kind of approach than the algorithmic one is appropriate in the area of models of mind. It will be non-algorithmic, intuition or some other similar manner based approach.
But saying that the nature of some area is not algorithmic does not imply that it cannot be treated in an algorithmic way. This, I think, is actually happening in most areas of philosophy, between which I wish to sort out the attempts to determine knowledge. If such an algorithmic treatment of knowledge is possible this still leaves open the option that it is wrong, or at least this is what I argue.
The dialectic trick is as follows. For a while, you allow algorithmic treatment to co-exist with the non-algorithmic treatment. You do not abolish the legitimacy of algorithmic treatment, though. But you assert that actually, the non-algorithmic treatment dominates and disciplines the algorithmic one. This may go for collectivistic sequence dominating the individualistic sequence in the area of the transvaluationist approach to vagueness. (The individualistic sequence in the sorites argument involves modus ponens and so it involves algorithmic reasoning. Well, there is also a repeatable predictable pattern of reasoning here.) But the result is more widely adaptable: the non-algorithmic disciplines the algorithmic.
This is to say that the non-algorithmic reasons are the appropriate ones to adopt, for an account of such areas as cognition or epistemology. But some sequences belonging to these areas may still be appropriately described by the usage of algorithms.
The structural distinction between two manners of approaching some area, between what we have called algorithmic and non-algorithmic ways of description, was invoked by Pascal as the distinction between the reasons of geometry and between the reasons of heart or of finesse. Obviously, the idea is not that there is no purpose at all in the algorithmic reasoning. Pascal achieved some insights in mathematics and geometry and he proposed an interesting calculation of your odds to embrace the status of true believer, which is now widely known as Pascal’s wager.[2] But his idea clearly was that reasons of heart or reasons of finesse dominate reasons of geometry. The direction of calculation is that you should embrace true belief. Thus Pascal argues that
- there are two kinds of reasons: reasons of geometry and reasons of heart or reasons of finesse;
- the reasons of heart or reasons of finesse dominate and discipline the reasons of geometry.
I agree with Pascal that this is the way to go. You do not need to reject the reasons of geometry, the algorithmic reasons or reasons of calculation. But you need to discipline them with the purpose and relevance that may only be given by direction indicated along your faith, by reasons of your heart and finesse.
This dominating and disciplining relation I take it is treated in the much-quoted Pascal’s aphorism:
“The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing.”
According to my interpretation, this means that the calculating or algorithmic reason should be disciplined and finally dominated by the reasons of heart. I would opt for the merry dominance and disciplining endeavor. Relevance should be achieved, home should be reached. And home is where the heart is! There is no direction in your journey if there is no home, if heart is not involved into it.
Pascal also stresses the illusory pull that clings to each of the principles if followed separately.
“The difference between the mathematical and the intuitive mind. – In the one, the principles are palpable, but removed from ordinary use; so that for want or habit it is difficult to turn one’s mind in that direction: but if one turns it thither ever so little, one sees the principles fully, and one must have a quite inaccurate mind who reasons wrongly from principles so plain that it is almost impossible they should escape notice. But in the intuitive mind the principles are found in common use and are before the eyes of everybody: One has only to look, and no effort is necessary; it is only a question of good eyesight, but it must be good, for the principles are so subtle and so numerous that it is almost impossible but that some escape notice.”
The difference mentioned is actually that between the reasons of geometry and reasons of the heart. If you just take the perspective of geometry or mathematics you will reason from some principles, but going just this path you will be blinded in respect to the reasons of heart. Reasons of the heart, on the other hand, are constitutionally incapable to see in a geometrical or algorithmic way the complex area that they inhabit and that they usually approach on the basis of intuition.
The right way to go is to respect the geometric mind, which however still needs relevance and therefore needs to be dominated by the reasons of heart.
Knowledge was for too long treated
and evaluated by tractable procedures or algorithms only, proper to the reasons
of geometry
It is just wrong that knowledge extends only to what is covered by conditions that are set by the help of the analysis determining something to be the candidate for knowledge. So before going to the discussion of these conditions – the mentioned discussions are ubiquitous in epistemological literature anyway – it is perhaps profitable to look at a certain case of knowledge.
I did not know that my paper was accepted for presentation.[3] Now somebody has told me and so I know. One difference between then and now – between the moment before I knew and between the moment I learned it and I knew, is that of the quality of my experience. There is the qualitative phenomenological feeling related to the fact that I have learned. It is related to the fact that I do not know all the consequences of my acceptance yet, but there is a kind of intuitive feeling that I momentarily form about the things that this involves. This intuitive and qualitative feeling is based upon my previous experiences, involving everything that I gathered in my cognitive background about similar cases, what to expect in situations like that and comparable stuff.
Consider also that at the moment I learned the fact and that I have come to know it I did not engage into a detailed investigation of conditions that may be satisfied or that may fail to be satisfied. It is just the background intuitive assurance, which seems to suffice to let me know at the very first moment. You may ask me and I may give you some justification of why I am persuaded that I know: the person I learned the information from is sufficiently reliable; the information was given in appropriate circumstances. All my knowledge comes in an intuitive flash, and now that I know I have obtained certainty. But undoubtedly I do not do any analysis of conditions for knowledge.
The first thing that we notice if we consider cases of knowledge is the qualitative experience related to them, the specific qualitative experience related to knowledge. There is a certain subjective certainty that comes as intertwined with this qualitative epistemic experience. I simply know that my paper was accepted, not that I would just entertain belief about the matter. There is a definite difference between the qualitative experience related to one entertaining beliefs on the one hand and between one having knowledge on the other hand.
Cases of knowledge are mostly and simply like that. You just know that this is true. This just isn’t a mere entertaining of belief. You may explain this later, but at the moment as you come to know it, it will usually impress itself upon you. The knowledge is something relevant. Just any old stuff that you read in the newspaper is not knowledge yet. Knowledge touches you, it is related to the specific itinerary that it marks; it does not leave you indifferent. While the newspaper stories may leave you indifferent. Most of them have nothing to do with what is relevant to you, anyway.
Think
about several occasions where you have learned something in the sense that you
might then have said that you now know it. You will notice that all of these
occasions were important; that they were relevant to you, and that it
was by this token that a qualitative feeling of epistemic experience
that you had came into place. The experience of having learned something and
the experience that you now know something is first of all, relevant to
you. This qualitative epistemic experience is based upon particular
patterns that provide relevance and that are constitutive for a claim
or a thought to figure as knowledge. It is thus essential for knowledge
that it is based upon qualitative experiences, on intuition and upon a
non-tractable but relevance providing background.
This is all in opposition to the usual accounts of knowledge that are to be found in the epistemological literature. The first thing that is effectuated there is putting in place a setting that is designed for purging the situation of relevance. This is done by establishing cases of knowledge as those cases that provide tractable analyzable conditions, bringing the assurance against the very possibility of counterexamples. These analyzable and tractable conditions may indeed assure the cases of knowledge, in the circumstances of normatively very high contextually attuned requirements. It is not my aim to deny that these analytic precautions do indeed assure knowledge in those normatively demanding circumstances. But it seems appropriate to state that for most cases where these definite conditions of analyzing knowledge are in place, they need to be taken just for what they are – the conditions that are involved where comparatively high requirements are set for something to figure as knowledge. Requiring though that all cases of knowledge be treated just by measures set by these high standards actually means abandoning relevance for most of cases. Relevance does not come to knowledge just by the help of tractable conditions, although such conditions may become important in circumstances figuring high normative requirements. In most cases, the qualitative side of knowledge naturally disciplines those tractable conditions that may be provided by analysis.
According to Pascal’s way of putting things, the accent of heart needs to be put upon definitory and tractable means by which cases of knowledge are treated in the epistemological literature. If epistemological tradition treats cases of knowledge in the ways proper to procedures of geometry or of algorithms, this does not need to mean that knowledge is indeed a matter of specification in the area of algorithmic normative procedures.
For quite a long time now episemologists are used to employ tractable and definitory analysis procedures for determining knowledge.[4] It all started with the analysis of knowledge and with the proposed definition of knowledge as justified true belief:
Knowledge =def Justified true belief, or
Kap =def p & Bap &Jap.
According to this line of introducing knowledge, it is argued that a person knows a certain proposition that p just in case where all of the following is satisfied: It is true that p. The person believes that p, i.e. she is in some kind of psychological relation in respect to the proposition. And finally, there exists some justification for the person to believe that p, such as the reliability involved into these processes through which the belief is attained.
We see that we encounter, in such a way, a definition of knowledge that provides tractable conditions for something to be knowledge. A natural follow-up is that the counterexamples to knowledge may now offer themselves, such as the famous Gettier style examples that argue against justified true belief automatically implying knowledge. The conditions of justification need then be sealed off in all imaginable ways. Despite much of energy being invested into this, the enterprise did not accomplish its job however: delivering exceptionless conditions for knowledge.
It is proposed here that this failure is just a symptom of a larger issue: that the phenomenon of knowledge was not treated appropriately, as the matter of heart and of relevance, in addition and above specification of tractable conditions, according to the definitory analysis proper to tractable reasons of geometry.
Definitory analysis with its algorithmic means of proceeding cannot be the only way to go in matters of specifying knowledge. Knowledge has an accent, it has dimension of relevance, and all of that may only be provided by reasons of heart that dominate the exclusive reasons of geometry.
The main two branches in defining knowledge on the basis of an analysis of its ingredients (certainly this is an algorithmic procedure) figure coherentism and foundationalism. Coherentism tries to analyze conditions entering into justification of a certain belief by the means of surrounding of this belief, and notably by setting conditions for coherence of the net of beliefs by probabilistic or by some other tractable algorithmic procedure. Whereas foundationalism centers at the analysis of to be algorithmically determined conditions for an atomistic belief to count as a case of knowledge.
These tractable conditions for knowledge are tried to be given by what may be called reasons of geometry by both coherentism and foundationalism. The relevance of the epistemic enterprise, however, seems to be lost thereby, and it may be only achieved by disciplining definitory analytic reasons of geometry, by giving a direction to them. And certainly it seems that there is direction in knowledge, which separates it from the cases of mere opinion. If you really know something, this sometimes gives directedness to your activity.
It is on time to consider human knowledge as being closer to reasons of heart and to evaluate it accordingly. In Pascal terms the proper evaluation of knowledge comes from the side of reasons of heart or of reasons of finesse.
One may wonder whether there is any sense in the promotion of reasons of heart for epistemology, in counterdistinction to reasons of geometry. It seems though that this is exactly the direction that is slowly pushing through in the area of epistemology. In order to grasp what is in the offing we may take a short look at the historical development of epistemology in the last decades. What do we see? The days of the industrial strength analysis of knowledge which may also be called Gettier industry that were prevalent some decades ago seem to be over. What was the purpose of the Gettier industry, what did it produce? The task was to provide characterization of knowledge according to definitory requirements. Gettier cases tried to identify and neutralize all the definitions of knowledge where justified true belief does not imply knowledge. So Gettier industry clearly is on the side of reasons of geometry, according to the Pascalian nomenclature for algorithmic tractable reasons.
Times of Gettier craze were followed by the era of naturalistic epistemology. Somehow, naturalistic epistemology tried to find the system that would allow it to step out of the definitory circle by offering empirical conditions for justification. Quine paved the way here by affirming permeability of even the most a priori looking truths by empirical impact of truths gathered at the experiential outskirts of science. Others tried to provide conditions for varieties of externalist support for justification, such as conditions for proof tight information provided by Dretske. The naturalist approach nicely showing existing tendencies is that by Alvin Goldman. Naturalistic conditions for justification and notably for reliability are given there by the means available to cognitive science. On the other hand, the definitory endeavor of determining conditions for knowledge comes into sight in a comparatively unaffected and separated part of the book Epistemology and cognition. Naturalist epistemologists tried to break away from just definitory epistemological enterprise. But they still wholeheartedly accepted algorithmic definitory conditions for knowledge, without questioning them.
The reaction to the naturalism took an interesting turn by stressing the a priori nature of knowledge.[5] The important thing in this exercise is not perhaps so much the criticism of externalist empiricist groundings of knowledge, but introduction of a priori elements and of such things as intuition figuring as legitimate founding of knowledge. The need for acknowledgment of relevance in order to get to a viable account of knowledge in epistemology surfaced in an opaque manner. Shifting towards the a priori as the basis of knowledge also provided a hint in the direction of acknowledging knowledge as an enterprise having to do with normativity.
Recent developments enhanced this tendency to establish an account of knowledge as a normative endeavor. Let me only notice the appearance of virtue epistemology and of various contextualist epistemologies. Virtue epistemology considers the main job of epistemology, that of providing justification for beliefs, as having to do with virtue, perhaps with something such as the balance, which has to be achieved similarly to the modes of obtaining virtuous deeds in the area of morality. As the job of achieving the virtuous state certainly has to do with balancing several considerations in given circumstances, this is not far from acknowledging the need for normatively changing parameters in the process of establishing the desired state. Close to this, therefore, come contextualist epistemologies, which relativize knowledge to the changing contextual circumstances. Similarly as the predicate flat is correctly used in everyday circumstances for characterizing the property of this road, the same predicate flat is not appropriately used anymore in circumstances figuring substantially higher requirements, when the physicist determines absolute flatness of a surface. The parameters determining the proper usage of the predicate have changed. In epistemology, I may well know something in the situation governed by normative conditions proper to the everyday circumstances. But the same knowledge will be shattered if the high normative requirements of daemon hypotheses or of the skeptical brain-in-a-vat hypotheses are put into work.
I take it that this historical panoramic overview of the development of epistemology in the last decades has shown us that clearly need has arisen to step out of the purely definitory projects of delivering conditions for knowledge – by embracing the naturalistic, the a priori, virtues and contexts. The stress was increasingly put upon the need for inclusion of the normative into determining of knowledge. The normativity in question is opposed to the algorithmic generalist normativity that establishes conditions for classical analysis and definitions.
If one wishes to acknowledge the normativity underlying the claims of knowledge, one would be well off in stressing the recognition of reasons of heart (as dominating reasons of geometry) in the area of knowledge. The above was not enough. Real reasons of heart in the area of knowledge are the ones brought by the relevance of particular patterns. On the other hand, it seems reassuring to see that the historical development in the area of epistemology has struggled to recognize that there are not only the reasons of geometry – tractable and definitory algorithmic procedures – that are appropriate for securing conditions for knowledge, but that there are tendencies closer to the reasons of heart and to the relevance, and that these should be really embraced as dominating the former ones in a viable account of knowledge that brings the relevance of knowledge into the center of discussion.
Thus reasons of geometry cannot really provide an appropriate account of knowledge.
The definitory and tractable conditions for knowledge in the classical algorithmic accounts of justification are reasons of geometry, according to Pascalian lingo. But reasons of geometry cannot provide an appropriate account of knowledge. The large Gettier industry did not really provide any. This must then hang on the nature of knowledge itself, which started to reveal itself by the recent tendencies to include intuitions and normativity into the enterprise.
It is hard to beat the definitory conditions for knowledge as justified true belief if one stays at the level of definitions – at the level proper to the reasons of geometry. But it will be somehow felt that an appropriate account of knowledge cannot really be obtained at this level.
Reasons of geometry – definitory endeavors and tractable procedures – underlie the main available accounts of knowledge.
Definitory endeavors and tractable procedures – the reasons of geometry – continue to dominate the discussion of conditions for knowledge, even in the cases of knowledge conceived as requiring an a priori justification, justification construed as a virtue, or contextually supported justification. Both foundationalist and coherentist approaches to determining knowledge try to support definitory accounts of knowledge. Just that I heard lately that Keith Lehrer as one main coherentist embraced another activity – painting of artistic pictures.
Reasons of geometry are supported by generalist repeatable patterns, whereas reasons of heart are supported by the particularist unique beautiful patterns.
Keith Lehrer may be right. Embracing beautiful unique patterns may be the way to go. Although I presume that he would be reluctant to acknowledge his painting activity to support his epistemic search. I think that nevertheless this is the way he should have thought about it. The definitory and algorithmic means to establish definitory conditions for knowledge – reasons of geometry – are not to be straightforwardly rejected. But they need to be seen as only the necessary and not as sufficient means for accomplishing the job. Reasons of geometry will just establish generalist, thus generally and objectively verifiable patterns, the patterns that will extend the conditions for knowledge over all the cases or over most of the possible cases. But there is no relevance secured by this move for this case of knowledge, for a certain specific case. Now, in order for there to be knowledge, this relevant accent of the particular pattern should dominate the conditions for knowledge established by generalist definitory means. Only in such a case knowledge will follow.
Reasons of geometry such as those establishing definitory conditions are supported by generalist repeatable cases. The basic presumption there is that definition, say, will range over all cases that fall under it, and that there are several such cases. In this manner, definition assures a repeatable pattern. Reasons of heart do not go for generalities. If you enjoy this piece of art, your unique experience will underlie it, a non-repeatable structure. There is no presumption here that the same experience will be identical for each subsequent case of artistic enjoyment. How comes? The reason may be that there is a structure here, but a structure happening in a multi-dimensional space figuring intersection of the rich unique pattern supporting the work of art in question and of the rich unique cognitive background of your experiences. Such landscapes attuned to the reasons of heart also support cases of knowledge.
Generalist patterns turn out to be constitutionally devoid of relevance, for they only cling to the repeatable.
Generalist patterns just establish general conditions for there being knowledge. Justified true belief accounts are of this species. Generalist patterns are repeatable in the sense that they are in place for all cases or for most of the cases. But they do not per se establish any link to this case in question.
Compare the well-known inference “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. So Socrates is mortal.” An additional presupposition of existence of Socrates is needed in order that the first general premise can become relevant for this case. But general pattern in its own understanding only determines a list of cases that fall under it. The relevance in the universal inference is that of asserting the relevance of general pattern in extending its reach over all the cases. The general pattern is not yet thereby established as relevant for any of the particular cases in question. The relevance of the particular is quite another story. It also comes from a pattern, but in this case from a particular pattern, from its unique structure. Indexical elements are needed in the practical syllogism in order to make a conclusion relevant for a certain case. “Everyone that is hungry will eat a cake. I am hungry. Here is a cake. So, I’ll eat it.” Despite that the inference is fallible (it allows for counterexamples, such as the one of somebody finding out that the cake is impregnated with a dangerous poison), the indexicals show the way to action by the help of hooking-up reasoning to the unique circumstances. Indexicals show the way to particular patterns. Indexicals cannot repeat themselves just in the way the good old generalist propositions do.
Salience and uniqueness of particularist patterns, on the other hand, brings relevance.
Knowledge is not just something that may be established upon the general pattern conditions. Knowledge brings an accent with it; it brings a salient unique background or structure that is just to be had by the help of particular unique patterns. If you get to know something, this will be something new, a new Gestalt will come into place, and there will be reshuffling of your background cognitive space.
Salience and relevance is also brought into place by unique patterns proper to works of art and proper to their experience. As already hinted at, the idea here is that something similar is going on in acquisition of knowledge as there is going on in experience of works of art. Both are underpinned by unique particular patterns. The suggestion further here is that we are not just dealing with epistemic conditions for knowledge in discussing this, such as with experiences of patterns. The experiences and qualitative phenomenological feelings of knowledge are established upon the basis of the structure of a particular pattern itself, and this is not only the experiential but the ontological relevant structure.
Frame problem has shown us that relevance cannot come as the result of tractable procedures and of generalized algorithms. The structure of repetition, or of extension of general pattern over a multiplicity of cases does not assure the relevance that we are interested in. It only assures the relevance of the general, i.e. of repetition of the same schema over a multiplicity of cases, only relevant in as far as they do all fall under this schema. The relevance of the particular, to the contrary, does not have to do with the repeatable, but with the salience of unique structures.
Justification giving follows those reasons that are best rendered by narration and not by tractable explanatory procedures, which are rather customary for the area of philosophy of science.
How do you know that your paper was accepted for presentation? Well, I just know it. Typically, I do not engage into laying out definitory ingredients for knowledge. I just rely on the background cognitive unique pattern that supports my assertion. Justification giving is best given by narration, following the salience of the background structure. It is the structure that underlies my reasons in knowing something. In other words, in justification giving one does not follow any tractable and definitory procedures that are characteristic for explanations in the area of science and in philosophy of science. Narration is an explanation that is rather closer to (ideographic) sciences that have to do with the particular, such as the science of historiography. It would be indeed difficult to proceed wholeheartedly by deductive-nomological means of explanation in such areas as historiography.
Narration involves stories. Propp tried to lay out the background structure of story systems and story telling in his work Morphology of the tale. He refers to morphology that specifies the form of the background structure, a form that was also envisaged by Goethe.
In terms of content, there seems to be some kind of such background structure – call it morphological content – that shows how justification is to be given, and that determines those ways in which it is appropriate to give justification.
Morphological content is a natural support for non-algorithmic explanatory endeavor.
We have reached morphological content as an ontologically appropriate background structure that determines the justification giving as an explanatory endeavor. Consider now that morphological content as such a background structure allows some of reasons to be the salient ones, as I narrate the story, although there may be other, deeper reasons, that are even more important in structuring the case of knowledge.
Morphological content in the non-classical models of mind substitutes algorithms at the middle level of a system’s description as whatever determines the appearance of the total cognitive state such as belief at the higher level of cognitive system’s description.
If morphological content as complex intractable background determines cases of knowledge, it will be natural for it that it will not allow all the tendencies that are in work in it to be presented in an explicit way. However, even the things presented as epistemic explanations only will have their salience. The background structure of the morphological content is non-algorithmic, and so it is not apt to provide the generalist, but a particularist relevance. There is epistemic relevance here and metaphysical relevance, just as in my usual reason giving activity. If you ask me why I helped her, I may give you a reason, such that it is an appropriate thing to always help people in need. This general reason is relevant, but it is not the ultimate relevance providing reason. The ultimate relevance may be much more complicated, it will usually depend on this particular complex intertwining of reasons, some conscious, some not conscious, and some not even accessible to consciousness, that determine the forces finally leading to my action in question. I agree that the description of this structure would be much more elaborated, and perhaps even not feasible, unless I engage into writing something like A la recherché du temps perdu about my reason of helping her. But in most cases this would be perhaps rather a waste of time. This is why the epistemic shortcut of giving reason that you should always help people in need will do in the practical circumstances.
Compare now that the situation provided by particular morphological content underlying justification in epistemology may be rather similar. Still, it may be claimed that the underlying structure of morphological content does provide not just the means for justification giving, but also support for justification.
Justification having, as well, is naturally supported by non-classical multi-dimensional landscape proper to the morphological content.
Justification having does not just depend on what one narrates. One has to have justification independently of what one says about it. It is clear from our previous discussion that justification having will be in most cases more complex than justification giving, for morphological content determining someone having justification is more complex than most attempts of justification giving. Justification having is thus even to a larger extent and more naturally supported by non-classical multi-dimensional landscape proper to morphological content than the justification giving. And morphological content provides a relevant beautiful pattern, it is of the side of reasons of heart. One result of our discussion is that reasons of heart are only uneasily given in their proper transparent form. The very form they prefer to be given in is the one of complex narrative structure. This narration reflects to some extent whatever one has that supports in its background this particular case of knowledge.
Being justified comes from having justification and having it for a good reason.
Being justified does not just depend on someone having justification. The additional requirement is that justification has to be there for a good reason. And this is an additional normative requirement.
Morphological content is one candidate for whatever sustains the non-classical and non-definitory account of knowledge.
We have seen that morphological content is one candidate for whatever sustains the non-classical and the non-definitory account of knowledge. The main lesson of this brief overview is that definitory and algorithmic accounts of knowledge are not enough. Something additional is needed. In the Pascalian terminology, the reasons of geometry provide only necessary and they do not provide sufficient conditions for knowledge. These last conditions are provided by reasons of heart. And heart is in the background of our actions, as well as in the background of our knowledge.
Morphological content delivers a structure that requires unique particularist patterns and intuition as its support, and thereby it provides relevance to knowledge. This is not possible for generalist patterns.
Morphological structure is a structure. It is however not a generalist repeatable structure. Exactly the fact that this structure is unique gives it the relevance. The relevance does not come now from repeatable patterns (which is impossible anyway) but from the salience in the multi-dimensional landscape of this structure. Intuition will be then a more natural support of such endeavor. This unique non-repeatable structure provides relevance to the cases of knowledge.
Relevance is at the heart of particularist account of knowledge.
What remains to be told? The main bet is that relevance is at the heart of knowledge. If this is true, then according to our analysis, this cannot be the generalist relevance, but just the relevance of the particular. This has as the consequence then that particularism, as it is now elaborated mostly for the area of morality, becomes crucial for epistemology. One insight is that holism in the area of epistemology is asserted, and that the atomistic way to proceed in securing the ingredients of knowledge, such as “justification”, “truth”, “belief” must be taken not necessarily as something misguided, but as something that should be dominated by the reasons of the epistemic heart.
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[1] Dancy, 2000. Dancy, forthcoming.
[2] There is also a computer program with the name Pascal.
[3] “My paper was accepted for presentation” may be rendered by the usage of the propositional abbreviation p. Going this way though, the dimension of judgment that is involved into the claim to knowledge tends to be obliterated, and with it also the possibility of integrating qualitative constitutive characteristics into it. Brentanian tradition conceived knowledge as judgment and a fortiori as including the qualitative dimension.
[4] The analysis of knowledge as justified true belief started with Plato, and it has achieved unpredictable heights in the twentieth century analytic philosophy.
[5] BonJour.