Matjaž Potrč
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia; matjaz.potrc@guest.arnes.si
Pascal distinguished between reasons of geometry or reasons of arithmetic and between reasons of finesse or reasons of heart. Ontology is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with whatever exists. There is an account of existence that appeals to reasons of arithmetic, but another account appeals to the reasons of heart. Reasons of arithmetic build upon general patterns, such as categories and predicates. Reasons of heart appeal to unique patterns as grounding the existence. These unique patterns cannot be attained in arithmetical way; they have to be deciphered in their singularity. Then we touch the heart, particularity and non-repeatable nature of whatever exists. The usual and wrong proceeding in ontology is to take whatever is regionally there as falling under normative measure of ultimate existence and under general patterns. It is suggested that the heart of regional existence has to be tackled by particular beautiful patterns. They behold the relevance proper to the particular and not the relevance of the general, which is suitable for general patterns. Special Composition Question allows either for a generalist or again for a particularist answer, the first one being supported by reasons of arithmetic and the second one by reasons of heart.
Pascal’s distinction between reasons of geometry or reasons of arithmetic and between reasons of finesse or reasons of heart
Pascal distinguished between reasons of geometry or reasons of arithmetic on the one hand and between reasons of finesse or reasons of heart on the other hand. If you ask me why the volume of the equilateral pyramid will be bigger in respect to the volume of the cube with the same length of basic sides, I can explain this to you and give you some reasons. These will be then the reasons of geometry. Similarly in the case of arithmetic, I can give you reasons why “7+5=12”. These will then be the reasons of arithmetic. What do these two have in common? The answer is that the common link between those reasons or proofs[1]in the area of arithmetic and geometry is their general value. The geometrical proof that is in value for this triangle does not care about this triangle’s singularity, but is designed for and it is in value for any triangle with the same parameter of properties. Both geometrical and arithmetic reasons may be given by and they are attained via calculation. The reasons and the account construed upon them in the area of geometry or of arithmetic are spelled out in general terms, relying preferably upon universally quantified forms, or laws, which will be in power for each phenomenon falling under this general law or statement.
This is not the case with the reasons of heart. A couple of centuries ago Balthasar Gracien wrote a book about how to behave in the royal entourage. There are no exceptionless proofs that may be calculated there in advance, but only directions, or indications in which way to go. Much is left to the intuition, which needs to be used in the indicated complex social circumstances. As there is no tractable procedure to indicate in advance how exactly to behave in some areas, a lot is left to what you may feel is a proper way to act in a situation, to the finesse of your considerations and to your calculations. Similarly, in the case you are in love, or when you are in train to decide what to do in your life – embarking into a job of a policeman, of a philosopher or of a baker – or what to believe, you cannot rely on any kind of calculation that will bring you to the solutions of general and exceptionless nature, such as they are in place in geometry. The reasons underlying decisions in your practical life will normally not be reasons of a general and calculable nature. It would be simply wrong to calculate in the matters of heart, it would not feel to be an appropriate approach to the area.[2] This is exactly why reasons of heart may also be called reasons of finesse – in order to underline that they are not of a calculable nature.
Pascal himself excelled in calculations. He contributed to the development of arithmetical calculus. On the other hand, he also wrote a bunch of essayistic remarks, such as these that come to the fore in the book that is now known under the title of Thoughts. Although he was very systematic in his work in the area of what may be extensively called arithmetic, this was not the case in the area of his writing that was closer to the impulses of his heart. He did not even care about putting his scribbled notes together in a book form. The editors of these texts only later attempted systematization. In the now mentioned notes he developed and proposed the distinction between the reasons of geometry and between the reasons of heart. In a certain sense, we may feel that there is not any democratic equality in relation between these two kinds of reasons, for reasons of heart dominate the reasons of geometry.[3] But it is also the case that reasons of heart often need the reasons of geometry. The development in a certain area is needed, in a systematic way, in order that there emerges an interesting dominance from the part of reasons of heart. This is shown by Pascal’s wager, where in a curious twist, a calculation is proposed as to whether one should believe in God. The decision to believe in a deity certainly is a matter that should not be calculated, if one’s decision should stay appropriate, similarly as a decision to love somebody will not be appropriate if attained on the basis of precise and extended calculations. This shows us how Pascal, in order to upheld the very distinction between reasons of geometry and between reasons of heart is committed to the dominance of reasons of heart over reasons of arithmetic.[4]
A preliminary characterization of reasons is appropriate here, for we have introduced the distinction between the reasons of arithmetic and between the reasons of heart. We gave reasons as several techniques leading to the goal of explanation or committing ourselves to something. The techniques pertaining to reasons of arithmetic typically consist in calculation and in delivering a general answer or a lawful statement that subsumes several cases and is not primarily directed at any specific case. Techniques proper to the reasons of heart are rather closer to intuitions, which basically consist in a pointed insight upon a very rich and dynamic background.
There is a difference between giving reasons and having reasons. Usually, we give reasons in a general, atomistic and as short as possible form, unless a further explanation is explicitly required. I ask you why you came to the lecture. And you answer to me that you came because you wanted to hear this lecture about the distinction between reasons of arithmetic and between reasons of heart. This is what you give as your reason, and this answer of yours comes in a general, simple and atomistic form. In fact however, the reasons why you came are much more complex and intertwined. You came to this lecture because it this series is renowned by your palls as being kosher, because you wished to encounter some of these palls of yours that are also coming here, because you thought it well placed or profitable to show your presence to the professor who will be there, because you think it is better to go to the lecture than to help you aunt shopping, and you just hate to shop with her, and many other considerations, some of which you are conscious about, and some of which you are not. Now all these complex reasons that constitute your reason-having are much too intricate to be delivered in the activity of your reason-giving. It is simply sensible and profitable for you to give your reasons in as short a form as possible (“I wanted to hear that lecture”), for otherwise your explanation would be too boring for your audience. If you would give all your reasons, these accessible to your consciousness and also the unconscious ones, you could finish up writing something as A la recherche du temps perdu, where eating of a donut triggers a whole complex novel extended over several volumes.[5]
Perhaps Pascal did not think about his reasons in terms of reason giving and reasons having. But here is a point. The reasons that you have are naturally offering themselves as being accessible to the intuition, and so they are closer to the heart. And the reasons that you give might tend to be of a more calculative sort. You are inclined to calculate what is appropriate to say in the circumstances. The complexity of the heart is closer to what is unique and not repeatable. While the ordered tracing of the arithmetic procedure seems to be more adapted to the generalizable techniques that may be in value for larger and less individual areas, for example for kinds of situations. These procedures tend to have some lawful impact.
The distinction between reasons of arithmetic and between reasons of heart will be applied to the existence, as the title of this piece promises. Now, the philosophical branch that has to do with whatever exists is called ontology or again metaphysics. Aristotle determined metaphysics as having to do with the most general categories, the categories that over-determine the specific categories of any other discipline, such as biology or physics. Biology has to do with whatever exists in the sense of the living, and physics has a larger range, for it has to do with whatever exists in the sense of the physical. But as far as we know everything that is alive is also physically realized, and of course much more than just the living is physically realized.
Usually we would take it that only the physical things exist. But some people believe that angels exist, and that they are not physical. And that a God exists, and that She is not necessarily physical either. Philosophers distinguished between several kinds of existence. Some things, such as our world, exist in a physical manner. Other things, such as concepts, exist in a non-physical manner. They have Platonic kind of existence, say. From this point of view, conceptual entities are even more persistent and worthy of our attention as the physical kinds. For each physically existing cat, or table, may eventually perish. But concepts of a cat or of a table will not perish that easily. Additionally, there are some entities that exist in such a way that they cannot possibly exist.[6] Then they certainly exist in a Platonic sense, but they could not having existed in a physical or in some similar sense. So the concept of existence certainly requires some clarification.
It is not clear in ontology, either, in which sense the existence has to be taken in the case where we talk about the ultimate ontological constitution of the world, or again about the regional constitution of the world. Sometimes this difference tries to be captured as the difference between the ontological and between the ontic questions. Ontological questions, according to this reading, apply to the world as it ultimately is. Whereas ontic questions apply to whatever we find or encounter in the world, on a daily basis, say. You can then see that ontological questions are metaphysical in a genuine sense, whereas in the case of the ontic questions there is a hybrid intermingling between metaphysical and epistemic ways of assessing that what exists.[7] The confusion of taking ontic questions as ontological questions is widespread in the ontological literature. Even more, this confusion or this misguided cipher[8] is laying the foundations of the ontological literature. This question was not even well tackled in the immense amount of the writings having to do with metaphysics. The prolegomena will be sketched down here.
Most of the literature having to do with ontology or metaphysics is dealing with general categories. So the existence, which the literature proposes, comes in the form of general claims. But there is also a possible intuition that whatever exists really exists in a unique and not repeatable way. The situation is such that this intuition needs to be spelled out first. Perhaps the existence has to do with uniqueness, with whatever exists in a unique manner. But if this is the case, then such a way to the ontological existence has to be paved first by the criticism of the exclusive generalist approach to ontology, in terms of categories, and of general lawful statements concerning existence.[9]
Whatever started to be tackled here, we may preliminary conclude as follows. Metaphysics or ontology has to do with whatever exists. But there are several ways, regions or levels at which one may conceive existence. And there are some other foundational decisions to be cleared before one starts to engage himself in respect to what exists. Would one be interested, first of all, in the ultimate ontology or in the regional ontology? And there are eventual confusions to be cleared, such as that of the impact of metaphysical and epistemic questions upon the ontological investigation itself. We will dedicate ourselves to start tackling this later question.
One kind of account of existence appeals to reasons of arithmetic, but another account appeals to the reasons of heart.
We have laid out two things up till now: the distinction about reasons of arithmetic and between reasons of heart, and then ontology as the investigation of the area of what exists or of what there is. The idea is to bring these two together and to claim that there are two accounts of what exists: one closer to the reasons of arithmetic, and another close to the reasons of heart.
But here is a preliminary question to be addressed. Reasons are something normative, they have to do with the normative standards that are applied to a case. If I approach my lover in the manner by mostly calculating or applying arithmetic reasons, you can feel that there is another kind of normativity applied here as there is in the case of reasons pertaining to the heart. Thus, different kinds of normative pressures, or reasons, may be applied to the same case. The assessment of the case will then be quite different for various normative pressures, and the difference will also be underscored by the variability in qualitative feelings going along with it.[10] It is a basic idea here, which was not appreciated to a sufficient extent yet, that the questions of existence or of ontology should be indeed approached by reasons and thus by the variable normative pressures applied to them. The failure to do so leads to the often-used wrong presupposition that matters of ontology do not have to deal with normative issues. It is forgotten thereby that the issues of ontology do not usually have directly to do with what exists, but with the discourse about the existent, and with various normative pressures exercised upon this discourse. If this is the case, then reasons and other normative considerations are indeed an integral part of ontology or of philosophical discipline concerned with that what exists.
If somehow one may accommodate oneself to the thought that reasons and the normative stuff have something to do with ontology, then additional unusual thought opens itself, namely that reasons of heart have something to do with ontology. The idea here is that one may somehow be prepared to buy classifying of the kinds of being, by using categories as applied to what there is. But why would just the intuition or your feeling, which is natural for reasons of heart, give you an access to the area of what exists?
There are approaches to what exists or to ontology that belong to the hearty kind however. It is natural for somebody like Boethius to come within reach of what exists from the part of reasons of heart. One may be simply amazed that there is the world, without the attempt to classify the kinds existing in the world. Ontologies that have to do with the world as it is, recognized in its complexity, but also in its simplicity, without classification, are of this sort. One such ontology would be simply the teaching of what there is, of the world, as opposed to what we find on our everyday basis in the world.[11]
There are thus two basically different accounts of existence. The first of these accounts appeals to reasons of arithmetic, which means to several techniques how to classify the categories of whatever exists in the world. There is the accounting and classifying of several kinds of existent involved here. This approach usually comes along with some general criteria about how to order classification of the kinds of existent.
Another approach, already hinted at above, addresses whatever exists with reasons of heart. Here is the place then for wondering that the world exists, and that it exists in several given ways. We have to clarify to some more extent the two approaches to what exists.
Reasons of arithmetic build upon general patterns, such as categories and predicates.
Reasons of arithmetic try to provide the calculated, general answers of tractable nature to the question about what exists. How is this achieved? One first looks for general patterns that could be laid over whatever exists, such as patterns of categories or predicates. Categories may comprise substances and accidents. Between the accidental properties, one may again distinguish predicates of various kinds. First, there is substance of the cat, and then there are the cat’s accidental properties, say. Then, there may be hierarchy of properties, and properties or categories may also distinguish themselves for the different areas in which they appear. The most general property common to cats is different from the property common to dogs.
Why do these categories belong to the reasons of arithmetic? The answer is that the reasons of arithmetic require something that may be put in some kind of order and in determinate ranges, something over which the tractable procedures may be exercised. Arithmetic asks for the elements and for categories of operators (1, 2, 3, … +, -, =) in order that the tractable accounts of calculations may be then performed. (1+2=3). In a similar sense, the ontology exercised according to the reasons of arithmetic will use categories and the ways to put these categories together. Categories may be substance and accidents. Putting these together will produce an individual, say cat, by joining (cat bare particular or Substance, property of eating Bread, of having Fur, of drinking Milk: SC (B, F, M). Everyone acquainted with the basic elements of this kind of ontology will be able to find out that this points to the substance of cat being adjoined by properties B, F, M such as specified above.[12]
Reasons of heart appeal to unique patterns as grounding existence.
If one wonders that the world is, that it exists, one is close to the activity proper to the side of reasons of heart in the area of ontology.
The normative approaches to the existence were sometimes quite different however. The famous Quine’s criterion of existence is as follows: “To be is to be a value of a bound variable.” This just means that whatever may be recognized to exist will be such that it will fall under a general schema and that it will subsequently fill up the place waiting to be taken in this schema. We may say that at least one philosopher exists. So there exists something that satisfies the open predicate expression Ex Px. Let us say that Aristotle is a philosopher, and lets use the name a for Aristotle. Now we substitute the bound variable x in the schema above with the name a and we will get Pa, which means that “Aristotle is a philosopher”. The expression “Px” would not be well formed, because a quantifier (a universal or an existential quantifier, such as it appears in our case) is still necessary to bind the variable “x”. Once we substitute the value of a for the bound variable “x” in Ex Px, then we get the affirmation of existence Pa. Notice though what went on in this procedure. We first introduced the general category of variable “x”, and of the predicate “P”, and additionally we introduced the syntactically well formed formula Ex Px. And now, following the generally determined and tractable rules, we have substituted the constant expression a for the bound variable x. We can see from this example that the approach to the existence according to the reasons of arithmetic is only possible over the path of generality, and that it succeeds by the use of some tractable procedures, the procedures that we in principle are capable to follow. We have used general patterns in the approach of what exists according to reasons of arithmetic.
In counterdistinction to the above, reasons of heart appeal to the unique patterns that ground the existence. If we wonder that there is the world, or that something exists, we are not trying to classify whatever exists by the usage of generalist patterns. The Heideggerian idea of ontology, as opposed to the area of ontic concerns, may be a case in point.[13] From this perspective, the job of ontology does not consist in any classificatory effort. It is rather the directedness at the quest for whatever exists, at the quest for Being. Whatever the Being is, it is something that exists and is not to be easily classified. The quest for Being does not subscribe to the arithmetical normativity, and in fact it denies its appropriateness. It would be a mistake though that the reason of heart in ontology should be content to satisfy itself with the criticism of the calculating reason. No, the reason that it is able to give should rely upon something positive, upon the patterns that are different from the generalist patterns in the approach that proceeds according to the reasons of arithmetic. These are unique singular patterns that are not performing any classification but are relevant nevertheless. This idea is so strange to the ontological tradition that it needs perhaps be underlined how there exist such unique patterns in the area of existence, pertaining to the reasons of the heart. The dispute between Quineans and Heideggerians would have generalists and arithmetic inspired reasoners on the Quinean side. But it is not so clear that Heideggerians would be unanimously reasoners of the side of heart, for it might be that they still lack a positive account of a unique pattern structure.
Unique patterns cannot be attained in arithmetical way; they have to be deciphered in their singularity.
If the world is singular – as I believe that it is – it cannot be really appropriately accounted for in arithmetical way. A suitable first approach is to wonder about the uniqueness and beauty of the world, or about whatever appears in the world.
If we do not have an arithmetically shaped approach to the world, what resources do we have to reach to the world at all? The answer is then that no general answer will really be sufficient. But we can approach the world by using the relevant patterns of its singular regional structure. These relevant patterns would be the ones that offer to us some equivocation; by the help of which we can feel or intuit that we have touched the world. These patterns may be attained by our unique experiences related to the works of art, of some thoughts attained in philosophy, and in other areas that do not thrive upon classificatory approaches.
A picture may show or present to us a unique experience of the world. Reading of a novel and following its plot may also demonstrate us something that resonates in our experience about how the world is like. Being immersed in a philosophical problem may give us the same singular experience concerning what the world is like.
The qualitative side of these unique experiences of the world, as approached from the side of the reasons of heart, shows that we have to do with something that touches us in the world, in a direct way. We are confronted with patters coming to us with the world as a puzzle, or better, with world as something to be touched or deciphered via a puzzle. The activity of deciphering is one of trying to solve, to untie the puzzle that we are confronted with and that shows in certain non-general patterns. The puzzle provides a unique pattern, which offers to be deciphered. Notice that perhaps there is no final objectively attainable result as an answer to the cipher or to the puzzle. There is no tractable procedure, and activity of deciphering comes into the first line.
Beautiful patterns touch the heart, particularity and non-repeatable nature of whatever exists.
We are very much accustomed to talk about general patterns, and then we somehow automatically think that these general patterns are the only ones that are relevant. Yes, they are relevant, but their relevance is that of generality, of items being proven to belong under general patterns. This being a cat seems to be relevant because it belongs under a general pattern of something being a cat, such that this pattern covers the range of Ex Cx, where E is for existential quantifier and C is for cat.
But particular patterns do exist as well, and they are relevant. These are patterns that we encounter in literature, in painting, music and in other works of art. But they are also to be found everywhere where a singularity has the chance to be relevant. This is where the reasons of heart come to the fore.
As already indicated, it is really difficult even to make the audience attentive that there exists these particular patterns, and besides to this it is then difficult to claim that these are relevant. Why should the particular patterns – or beautiful patterns, because they find themselves in a distinguished manner in the works of art – be relevant in the area of ontology? The following will be a short illustration of this point.
The usual and wrong proceeding in ontology is to take whatever is regionally there as falling under normative measure of ultimate existence and general patterns.
Let us look again at what philosophers are usually doing in the area of ontology. We will introduce the distinction between ultimate and regional ontology in order to be able to proceed with our investigation.
The ultimate ontology has to do with the world as it ultimately is. The regional ontology has to do with the world such as it rather appears in our everyday activities. The labels of ultimate and regional ontology have to do with the question about what kind of normativity, or what kind of reasons, are used in our approach to what exist. Ultimate ontology uses high normative standards, such as these are to be found in our talk about the world in the setting of the philosophical seminar. Then we will just be attentive at the world in its entirety, and not to any details. The regional ontology, to the contrary, will be concerned with the unique regional outfit of the world. Ultimate ontology will have to do with the general, repeatable patterns, whereas regional ontology will have to do with unique patterns.
Now there is the following wrong proceeding usually implemented: the features actually belonging to the regional ontology are measured with the normative standards of the ultimate ontology. If we are talking about the cat, we give the general schema Ex Cx, and we substitute the free variable with the name a, for Albert, to get Ca, which means that Albert is a cat. We have used a generalist procedure, and we have employed reasons of arithmetic. We are also treating Albert the cat as something that ultimately exists. So we take a chunk of the world and we treat it by applying the standards of ultimately existing world to it. And we apply generally induced categories. But this cannot be the case. Just the world does exist in an ultimate sense. The cat does not exist in an ultimate sense. As we refer to the cat and say something about it, the sentences we express may express the truth, but the truth will be used in an indirect sense, and not in a direct sense. Talking about the cat, namely, we refer to the world, but we refer to the world in an indirect manner, by referring to the regional chunk of the world.
The usual wrong procedure in the ontological literature is thus to operate with predicates and other general categories in an area of regional ontology, taken as if it would be the area of the ultimate ontology. General patterns, such as kinds of properties, are then taken to be the tools pertaining to the ultimate ontology. But this is not clear. It may well be that the reasons of arithmetic, the classificatory procedures in ontology such as they are mainly practiced, do not really fit to regional ontology nor to ultimate ontology. They do not fit to the ultimate ontology because classification is not really adapted to give an account of the world as it ultimately is. The reasons of heart are closer to approach the world as it ultimately is. The generalist classification in terms of categories does not give an appropriate account of the regional ontological stuff either, because the reasons of heart will be touching the regional ontological stuff indeed, but over and above this stuff, they will touch the presence of the world as it is, and this will not be really able to succeed via generalist categories again. So what are generalist categories such as natural kinds, substances and predicates actually designed to do? They are designed to promote the regional ontological stuff (cats, philosophers) as if they would be the ultimate ontological stuff, applying the strict ultimate normative measures to them. But this is a wrong normative procedure.
The distinction between regional and ultimate ontology, however, may have started to put the discussion in matters of ontology in its proper place. These questions are not really studied and assessed in the ontological literature, although they are widely present in ontology or metaphysics.
The heart of regional existence has to be tackled by particular beautiful patterns.
One way to proceed is to acknowledge that the regional existence is really what is accessible to us. And if it is accessible, it comprises an important epistemic ingredient. So ontology is actually an epistemic enterprise, it is the matter of discourse being applied to what exists. But then the general patterns, such as properties, cannot be really taken as ultimate ontological stuff. They really should be recognized as linguistic and conceptual, thus as epistemic stuff.
The regional existence is then in question, and this regional existence should be approached not by any generalist categories (such as properties and kinds) but by particular beautiful patterns.
Particular patterns behold the relevance proper to the particular and not the relevance of the general, suitable for general patterns.
It was already said that there are two kinds of relevance, the relevance of the general and the relevance of the particular. The problem seems to be that the relevance of particular is not really recognized.
Now, relevance of the general comes from subsuming a certain item under the general pattern. This cat is a token of the general category including cats. But is this really relevant? If it is relevance, it is not the one that would touch your heart. It is just the classificatory, arithmetical kind of stuff.
The relevance of realizing that there is a cat here may belong to and come from the particular pattern. This is rather the relevance through which you may feel or intuit the presence of the world, but in an indirect manner.
Special Composition Question allows
either for a generalist and again for a particularist answer, the first one
being supported by reasons of arithmetic and the second one by reasons of
heart.
One question
about what exists is articulated as Special Composition Question (SCQ)[14]: “When do a bunch of entities compose an
entity?” One may hold it that there exist elementary particles as they are
acknowledged by the science of physics. Then these are our entities. These
elementary entities then seem to compose other entities such as tables and
cats. But it may be claimed that just being-together of elementary entities is
not always sufficient for the existence of a new entity.[15]
If the two of us shake hands, it will not be the case that a new entity will
necessarily come into existence. Our intuition is that there is no such entity
over and above myself and yourself in such a case. Again, if there is a pile of
sand in the desert, this pile needs not necessarily be seen as an entity. It
may be just something that is arbitrarily stacked together. So we need a
criterion for an answer to the SCQ. Such a criterion may be a certain
principle, the principle called Life, say, so that elementary entities will
only compose a new entity in the case where these will be put together
according to the principle of Life. This would then mean that only living beings
really exist. Whereas tables and mountains do not really exist. But here is
another criterion: “Vague entities cannot compose anything.” If all of
elementary particles, mountains and cats are vague entities, then they cannot
exist, according to this last criterion. But if the world is a non-vague
entity, then it will exist. But if there exists just the world and one world,
then this world will be extremely complex. And if this is the case, then an
answer involving particularist patterns will be needed. In fact, there will not
be any multiplicity of entities. There will be just the one non-vague world
that will compose the world. Well, it will not really compose it, because it
will be one entity. It will be the sole existing complex and dynamical entity.
But we will still be able to recognize particular patterns existing in
the complexity of this world.[16]
References
Aristotle. Metaphysics.
Brentano, F. 1933. Kategorienlehre. Leipzig: Meiner.
Dancy, J. Forthcoming. Ethics Without Principles.
Dancy, J. 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.
Horgan, T. and
Potrč, M.
2000. Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence. Facta Philosophica 2,
249-270.
Horgan, T. and
Potrč, M. 2002. Addressing Questions for Blobjectivism. Facta Philosophica.
Lakatos, I.
1976. Proofs and Refutations. The Logic of Mathematical Discovery.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Materna, P.
and Jespersen, B. 2003. Are Wooden Tables Necessarily Wooden? Acta Analytica
28. 115-150.
Meinong, A. 1899. Ueber Gegenstaende hoeherer Ordnung und deren
Verhaeltniss zur inneren Wahrnehmung. Zeitschrift fuerPsychologie und
Physiologie der Sinnesorgane 21: 182-272.
Pascal, B. Pensees.
Potrč,
M. Forthcoming. Beautiful Patterns.
Quine, W. V.
O. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press.
Routley, R.
1969. Some Things Do Not Exist. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 7:
251-276.
Tienson, J.
2002. Questions for Blobjectivism. Facta Philosophica.
Van Inwagen,
P. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Verdiglione,
A. 2003. Artisti. Milano: Spirali.
Williamson, T.
Forthcoming. Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism about Judgement.
[1] Lakatosz retraced the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry by proofs and refutations. This shows that the reasons or proofs which are at disposal in geometry are far from simplistic and that they do allow for dynamicism. Their main attitude of performing an abstraction over and above examples and being in value for all the cases falling under given parameters is not shaken thereby.
[2] Perhaps there is indeed some sort of calculation going on in the matters of heart, but it is quite a different sort than calculation of your everyday scheduler appointments. If nothing else, there is a whole range of emotional issues going on here that are not necessarily present in the case of your routine based tasks.
[3] In many practical situations, it often feels weird if reasons of geometry dominate the reasons of heart.
[4] This touches the question of the philosophical point of departure. All the arguments should possibly proceed in a flawless argumentation order. But the basic instinct also has to be there, independent of the arguments’ order, and relying on intuitions. An argument against the importance of basic intuitions underlying philosophical investigation was lately attempted by Timothy Williamson.
[5] My friend Bernard Bayonnette wrote his thesis about the logic of assemblages in the bourgeois salons as described in this work of French writer Marcel Proust. This is just one of the ways to put an interpretative net over the rich novel. Bernard delivered a lecture about this point in Ljubljana some twenty years ago. He also dedicated himself to artistic photography.
[6] Meinong expressed this thought in the following way, as I remember: “Es gibt die Gegenstaende, so dass es solche Genegnstaende nicht gibt.” For Meinong, each content of a thought has an object correlated to it. If this is the case, also the impossible objects – such as round square, which is conceptually impossible – has an object correlated to it. Of course, this is not a physical object, but a rather Platonic kind of Meinongian object. These objects were introduced by Meinong in order to defend the basic intentional idea of the necessary directedness of contents at something – at objects in our case.
[7] Heideggerians understand ontological questions to target the Being all in itself (the existence in the largest sense), whereas ontic questions for them are directed at whatever-of-the-existing-is-found-in-the-world. I would say: “das innerweltlich Bestehende”. I am certain you like the sound of this expression – even more so in the case where you may not completely understand German language. So I do not translate it for you.
[8] There are puzzles that really are not guiding us in the right directions. This is why I call the now mentioned stuff a misguided cipher or puzzle. There are other kinds of puzzles or ciphers that lead us to relevant issues. These relevant ciphers are well worthy to lend them our ears and activity. By the way, consider that there is no ultimate unique answer to some puzzles, such as Delphi puzzle: “What is walking at four legs in the morning, at two legs at noon and at three legs in the evening?” You can say that the answer is “A human.” But this answer is so thin that it is really left to each one individually to find an answer to this puzzle or cipher, to de-cipher it.
[9] As already mentioned, Aristotle considered ontology or metaphysics in generalist terms, in terms of categories and of general lawful statements considering the existent. This heritage was not just taken over by Aristotelian adepts such as Brentano (Kategorienlehre; Ueber die mannigfaltige Bedeutung des Seienden beim Aristoteles), but also by others. Platonists are perhaps even more attracted by generalities as this is the case for Aristotelians, because Platonists naturally aim for the existence of pure concepts.
[10] The main idea is that quality is constitutive for the application of the normative relation, and that it is not just accompanying it. What is claimed here for cases of normative variability also applies to a sub-case of the variability in the intentional constitutive normativity.
[11] This is the distinction between the ontological and the ontic, pointed at in the footnote above.
[12] An uneasy question is how to position substance as a bare particular. A materialist should recognize this as a futile task. Platonist, to the contrary, will not find any trouble in this. I am indebted to the discussion concerning this point to Pavel Materna.
[13] Heideggerian approach is right to address the question of what exists, of Being (i.e. the Blob or the World) in a new way, as something that cannot be approached by the broadly taken rationality and reasons of arithmetic. However, look at Heideggerian work about categories – there has to be some – which would put him on the side of reasons of geometry, of classification: but he also must have some punch in favor of heart in this respect. His problem is though that he does not go for the structure. So it is wrong not to propose any positive side of this hearty project, and a positive proposal may be one that underlines the unique emerging patterns.
[14] Peter van Inwagen. 1990. Material Beings.
[15] This is claimed by Peter van Inwagen.
[16] A question appearing here is how it is possible to have a multiplicity of vague entities upon the non-vague world. A short answer is that vague entities will be recognized, and that they are epistemic, language and thought dependent.