Matjaž Potrč
University of
Ljubljana, Slovenia; matjaz.potrc@guest.arnes.si
Moral generalist
presents the particularist as someone rejecting patterns, thereby embracing
arbitrary classificatory decisions. The productivity argument is proposed then,
according to which potential production of an infinite number of novel cases on
the basis of a finite number of encountered cases is only possible with the
assistance of a codifiable pattern assuring projectability. It is argued that
the generalist presentation of the particularist undertaking is unjustifiably
limited to codifiable tractable procedures leading to the formation of
evaluative judgment. Particularist has no problem with the relevance if each
occasion of a judgment formation is supported by a non-tractable rich pattern requiring
intuitive judgment. A list of such holistic particular judgments cannot be
unified by an underlying tractable pattern, but each of the items on the list
still presents an individual rich holistic pattern belonging to the same
cognitive system.
Generalists believe
that there exists an indispensable link between normativity and generality.
General patterns enable projectability and therewith the extension to novel
cases. Productivity argument claims that only codifiable kinds of patterns
assure extension to a virtual infinity of novel cases on the basis of a
restricted number of consulted cases. We judge in some instances that these
singular acts are morally right. General pattern enables projectability of the
same kind of judgment.
Productivity argument is directed against
particularism, which does not recognize general patterns. The argument starts
with the statement of arbitrary and non-relevant nature of particularism’s
descriptive basis. It opts for codifiable patterns that enable finite
creatures’ projectability to reach a potential infinity of novel cases.
Contrary to this generalist view it may be argued
that particularism is well compatible with the existence of general patterns,
but that it cannot recognize the general patterns’ normative authority. There
is no reason for general patterns to be indispensable in the formation of
evaluative judgments. Reasons it is not so involve nature of the cognitive
system that follows principles of dynamical cognition. A standard explanation
why this is so comes from the failure of confirmation theory. Here to the
contrary the richness and noncodifiability of the system functioning
holistically in a quasi-synchronic manner is used as a direct support for
particularism. The study of judgments belongs to the area of cognition. List of
appropriate cognitive transitions is not fully systematizable. Potential
cognitive transitions that follow the nature of morphological content outstrip
general principles.
The generalist argument presented here is inspired
by the paper “Ethical Particularism and Patterns” by Jackson, Pettit and Smith.
Patterns in ethical
monism, pluralism and particularism are preliminarily introduced and surveyed.
Some usual examples of patterns are given with an eye on the question whether
they involve generality.
Patterns are important
for an account of relations between ethical generalism and ethical
particularism.
Ethical generalists such as monistic utilitarians believe
that
X is right if X maximizes expected happiness
and this provides to
them the pattern with the help of which to fall the judgment whether an act is
right. Utilitarians also believe that this pattern provides a surveyable or
codifiable tractable manner for determining the rightness of an act, although
the application of the principle in concrete cases may involve several
considerations.
Ethical pluralists are a species of generalists.
They believe that there exist several patterns belonging to the prima facie
duties related principles. One of these is the duty of improving oneself and
another is the duty of gratitude. Actual duties differ from the prima facie
duties. They have to be observed in concrete situations where several prima
facie duties come together and where it is impossible to fully respect them
all. In this concrete situation I decide to respect the duty of improving
myself even if this happens at the cost of not being simultaneously able to
fulfill the duty of gratitude. This kind of frequently and even regularly
encountered situation presents a case where two general patterns come into one
hopper and where they compete against each other. There may be even more than
two patterns coming together and molding themselves in concrete cases. The
overall pattern applied to the situation and underlying the decision about
which act is right will then not be so clear cut as this was the case for the
monist. Because of this blurring of the pattern, more weight is put on the
context bound intuition in forming of the judgment. The contextual pressure in
concrete situations blurs the shape of each tractable pattern as several of
them come together. Nevertheless pluralist does not abandon the clearness and
therewith the authority of each of the patterns based on the prima facie
duties. Pattern belonging to the duty of the gratitude, in his view, will stay
perfectly sharply cut as prima facie duty, despite that it was overridden or
even silenced in the situation where the duty of self-improvement won the
prize. Pluralist will not wish to deny that pattern belonging to the duty of
gratitude is worth to be respected as the prima facie duty, despite that it was
overridden in the situation of the actual duty.
Ethical particularists, so it seems, argue against
the existence of any tractable patterns that would apply in concrete
situations, such as these that are encountered by us on the daily basis. So
they embrace the pluralists’ contextual leaning towards the intuition-based
judgment in concrete situations, whose ground are actual duties’ blurred
patterns. Contextual pressure makes it hard to respect the tractability of the
pattern. Particularists certainly disagree with general projectible patterns
that are characteristic for the monists. Their main position is that, even if
there are patterns, they do not have any normative authority. We are constantly
confronted with specific particular situations in which we have to fall
intuitive evaluative judgments. The disagreement is thus between generalists and
particularists, and it involves the importance that each of them attributes to
patterns. While generalists argue that an appropriate judgment is not possible
without the presence of tractable or codifiable patterns, particularists rather
embrace a list of situations where judgments are made without any underlying
grid or shape.
Before specifying the
role of patterns in ethical reasoning and especially in particularism, it is
appropriate to take a look at some cases of patterns outside that area. As the
main claim of the generalist is that patterns are deeply intertwined with
generality, we will try to establish whether patterns as encountered outside
the realm of moral reasoning display this inkling towards generality. The
result will be that at least some of patterns are not substantially bound to
generality.
The first example of a pattern that comes to the
mind is the famous duck/rabbit illusion example. In the basis of the phenomenon
is a certain shape, a line of specific form drawn on a piece of paper. As you
encounter the shape you immediately grasp it as the pattern representing a
duck. You do not need the time for reflection; you rather intuit the pattern
momentarily. You are psychologically glued to the pattern, as at the moment you
cannot help to grasp the shape otherwise as the duck pattern. At the time you
are attuned to perceiving the shape as a pattern representing a duck, you are
pattern-blind as to the possibility of perceiving pattern as a rabbit. Once your
starting position is being attuned to the duck pattern, some effort and some
pattern-switch is necessary in order for you to perceive the shape as the
pattern representing a rabbit. The whole phenomenon centers on the pattern
switch. And each of the states in the switch is related to the very forceful
intuiting of one pattern at the exclusion of the other. Both patterns may be
recognized though – although not simultaneously – on the basis of the same
shape. Is there some generality in this pattern recognition? There is just
powerful intuiting of a particular way for me to see the shape. Just to repeat
it: there is pattern switch between two ways of seeing the shape, accompanied
with deep intuitive grasp of one of the patterns, to the exclusion of the other.
But it does not seem that there is any generality involved into the example of
duck/rabbit, or any projectability. There is no projection involved from duck
to rabbit, and there is nothing general involved into the transition between
them. One may claim that once you grasp the pattern of a rabbit, this may help
you to project the pattern to other similar cases. But this is not the point of
the example. In general, the pattern is not there in order to enable you the
projection to further cases. Just the singular intuition based experience is
what matters.
Some people working in aesthetics claim that
grasping a work of art consists in grasping of the pattern involved in this
work. Or maybe it consists in grasping of one among the patterns involved into
work of art, for there may be many of these constituting it. This would then be
a generalized case of pattern switching. It may happen that you hear a symphony
for the first time and that you recognize a pattern in it. Then you have some
aesthetic pleasure. But as you come back listening to the same symphony again,
such as Brahms symphony number 2, you may recognize several patterns on several
different occasions of listening to it. Each of these will bring you a
different kind of aesthetic pleasure. Perhaps after a while this will allow you
to intuit a further pattern at a higher level, which will become present to you
in an intuitive flash. Patterns may be comparatively easily recognized in some
works of arts such as pictures. But take an opera such as Mozart’s Don Juan
that involves ballet, the orchestra, several singers and changing scenery. You
may be able to intuit a pattern involved into this performance of opera at some
level if you will be careful to follow several of various pattern threads.
These patterns will come together from various directions and they will unite
in an overall form supporting your aesthetic pleasure and the judgment that you
form on its basis. Opera certainly shows an example of a complex pattern, whose
intuiting, at the time you grasp it, will probably happen in a flash, in a
moment full of experience. Now ask yourself if the pattern involved into the
opera is there in order to allow you the projection of similar experiences at
other occasions? This does not seem to be the case. Pattern is involved in your
aesthetic enjoyment and this is why it is so tightly connected to the
intuition.
This brief survey of two examples involving
patterns that may first come to the mind shows us first that several patterns
may be intertwined and multiply involved into a single phenomenon, giving the
occasion for appearance of some superimposed pattern. And it also shows that
there is no projective role involved into the grasping of the pattern.
The case of the opera has shown us that on the basis of the
pattern, which you discover in it, you just form judgment about the goodness of
this performance. There exists a very complex descriptive basis for formation
of this judgment. But there is no generalization involved. The judgment is
about this specific performance. It may be claimed that the forming of this
judgment allows you to project similar judgments in the possible subsequent
cases. But what are similar judgments? Certainly some skill of judgment
develops along your opera involving experiences, but still it may be seen as
concrete application of judgment to each separate particular case. So there is
no clear role for projectability here, and thus no clear role assigned to the
general.
We took a look at a couple of patterns. The result
is that these patterns do not involve any tractability and that they rather
depend on intuitions. One shape can be apprehended and intuited in several
different ways.
Now look at the following case. A person opens the
door for you, greets you, and offers you a drink. At some moment the pattern
you intuit is that the person behaves friendly in respect to you. Adding some
relevant information, at some further moment you intuit that this behavior is
designed to profit from you in some unexpected area. The first pattern has judgment
of goodness attached to it; the second has judgment about incorrect behavior
related to it. Patterns change and sometimes they may even appear on the basis
of the same kind of descriptive behavior. And it is hard to see the role for
generalization in this case as well.
A list of cases that
may be supported by patterns is presented. Then a list of evaluative cases
follows, with the question being asked whether it needs to be systematized by
exceptionless principles.
It may be claimed that
examples of patterns above do not involve projectability, and that therefore
they are not the kinds of examples the discussion of particularism needs to be
involved with.
Here is a kind of example pointing into this
direction that does not belong to the realm of morals, but should show us the
usefulness of patterns in enabling general conclusions and projectability, the
ability to extend our judgment to novel cases.
Presume you do not know the meaning of expression
“being taller”. In order to get the meaning of the expression through to you, I
offer you the following diet of examples (compare Jackson, Pettit and Smith):
If X has 170 cm and Y has 180 cm, then Y is taller
than X.
If X has 190 cm and Y has 200 cm, then Y is taller
than X.
….
If X has 150 cm and Y has 140 cm, then Y is not
taller than X.
We can claim that the
diet of examples is offered here in order for you to grasp the pattern, and
once you grasp the pattern – once you understand the meaning of expression –
this enables you to extend it to novel cases. There is thus a possible
projection involved into the grasping of the pattern.
But what has happened? While being confronted with
the first two examples, you may not have grasped the pattern yet. Then, because
of some similarity or because of some particular feature, you intuit the
pattern in a recognizing flash.
You can now apply the concept to novel cases. This
is then a case of projectability.
But now ask yourself: Do you apply the concept to
novel cases because you have grasped the concept? In a sense yes: The
understanding of the concept allows you to use it again. But each particular
case will have to be judged by you in respect to whether the predicate can be
applied. The generalist suggests that this just means subsuming of the case
under a pattern.
But each particular case on the list above may be
seen just as a particular item.
I made the effort to get you acquainted with the
meaning of “being taller than”, and this is a kind of teaching. Not all
teaching is done by the usage of generalizations though. Teaching may involve
the acquisition of skills. Skills also enable us to use our knowledge in
subsequent situations. But this is not because of the generalizations involved
in apprehending skills.
Take again the teaching of children involving
visiting museums and galleries. There do not need to be generalizations
involved in the activity. Teacher would just point to a feature on the picture,
as a way of presenting an example about what a good work of art is. It does not
seem that any real generalization is involved into the procedure. If several
pictures are consulted and not just one, this list still does not give place to
any tractable projectable generalization or to a tractable pattern unifying
them. But something is learned nevertheless.
This may incite us to ask the following: Even if we
assume that generalizations are built into patterns – is the extension to the
future cases secured? If the extension is of a tractable codifiable kind then
it may require some parameters that are hard to be confidently applied to the
situations. Because such tractable/codifiable extension would have unwanted
consequences in several cases, the judgment involving patterns cannot be fallen
mechanically; rather the formation of judgment requires centering of attention
at the specificity of particular cases.
Take the list of examples illustrating the case of
“being higher as”. There is indeed a list of examples here. At some point one
intuits that there is a pattern. But it would be perhaps premature to simply
believe that this is a tractable pattern, or that generality has the authority
here. Generality does not have exceptionless authority, which is for certain –
inductive reasoning is not exceptionless and it always allows for
counterexamples. But also, our judgments are fallen on the individual basis.
The main question is perhaps whether the list is
confidently systematized by exceptionless principles. At least this is not the
only possibility there is. One may observe the list in several ways. From one
perspective, one may systematize the list in a general exceptionless way
involving each particular case, but there are also possible systematizings that
allow for exceptions or even for singular instances to preserve and affirm
their authority.
The above example of
“being higher as” is a descriptive one. Moral theorizing on the other hand is
concerned with evaluative terms.
The problem may be then put in terms of transition
from “is” to “ought”, the transition between the descriptive and the evaluative
realms: D → E.
Particularists do not deny that evaluative
supervenes on the descriptive, at least in the weak sense. In order to put the
story in terms of properties: If there is an evaluative property E, it may be
assumed that there is a descriptive subvenient basis D upon which the property
E supervenes.
Taking this line of thought brings us to a number
of different cases where E supervenes on D. These cases are then naturally put
in the form of a list:
D1 → E1
D2 → E2
…
Dn → En
Particularist thus
agrees with the supervenience of E upon D for each particular case. What she
does not agree with is the idea of the existence of unifying underlying general
pattern that would unite all these cases.
In any case, given that we have a list, it may be
systematized by several standards of tightness. The tightest form of
systematizing would involve exceptionless principles. Some more relaxed form
would involve generalizations that allow for exceptions. And the most relaxed
form of the list would not introduce any underlying pattern at all; it would
just leave particular cases with their complete individual authority.
So, it is at least possible that list is not
systematized by general principles. But the thought should be surveyed now
whether the list should be systematized by general principles at all.
One main problem about this comes in terms of
relevance. Is relevance better served if one proceeds by exceptionless
systematizing, by systematizing allowing for exceptions or by individual cases
using no general pattern?
The first thought is that relevance would be better
served and that it would be best determined by exceptionless general
systematization. But a powerful consideration against this is the frame problem.
The problem of where to put the frame around an area to achieve its relevant
functioning surfaces exactly because exceptionless general tractable rules are
employed in order to systematize the area. Tractability thus does not solve
relevance, but gives us an encounter with it in the form of a problem.
It also seems that relevance is only achieved in a
wimpy way if there are general rules with exceptions. The situations in which
we make evaluations involve an irreducible complexity most of the time. But we
do not fail to be relevant in those situations on the basis of particularly
based decisions. On the other hand, if one follows tractable rules in one’s
decisions for actions, one’s judgment often airs a mechanistic handling. This
all shows that lists of evaluative terms or properties should better not be
systematized by exceptionless rules. General patterns unifying single cases may
be far sooner harming than bringing any benefit to the nature of evaluative
terms. The reason seems to be simple. Evaluative terms are related to
judgments, and judgments are rather tied to intuition than to the exceptionless
rules. This is at least one reason why particularism would be better of than
the practice of putting general projectible patterns under the list in order to
systematize it.
There are
several ways of withholding the normative authority of the general. Just
pointing to a feature in teaching does not involve the usage of any generality.
Epistemic normativity may be important because of retroactively after the fact
cashing in the generalities. But this kind of generality is epistemic, it just
explains, and so it is without normative authority. From this point of view the
epistemic normativity and its link to lists and to the semantic normativity may
be surveyed.
In respect to the list
of evaluative items the particularist claim seems to be simply that there is no
pattern involved. For the example of the descriptive to the evaluative
conditionals one could build a complex conditional
D1 v D2 v …→ E
From the disjunction of
all the descriptive items in the list, one is entitled to derive the evaluative
judgment or property, as for the matter.
This may seem to be a generalization. But notice
that it will be a kind of generalization that should not respect any pattern,
for we are dealing with the particularist. There will be no “and so on” at the
end of the story. And if no pattern is respected, the thought is here that
there will be arbitrariness in the choice of items. Isn’t this exactly what
characterizes the lack of pattern: the arbitrariness of choice? The trick is
though that despite of arbitrary procedure, one is still able to classify
things, say in the rubrics of acts that are right and in the rubric of acts
that aren’t right.
In order to show how this is possible, generalist
introduces a device that according to his taste and understanding produces the
effect of dual classification on an arbitrary basis. The machine is thus
designed to classify the shapes that it encounters into the ones upon the
presence of which it will blink and into the ones upon the presence of which it
will not blink. The principle according to which this is effectuated is as
follows: Blink if there is appearance of the shape on the even occasion, and do
not blink if there is appearance of the shape on the odd turn. You get the
following two conditionals that take care of the distribution:
If presented object has shape … or … or …, then
the light will blink.
If presented object has shape … or … or …, then the
light will not blink.
Compare this to the following two conditionals:
D1 v D3 v …→ E+
D2 v D4 v …→ E-
Here the disjunctive
antecedents lead to the positive evaluative term (right) in the first case and
to the negative evaluative term (not right) in the second case.
The fact is that in both cases, the classification
of items on the list into two oppositely valued categories was obtained on the
basis of an arbitrary – without any pattern – selection of items. So, there is
indeed categorization of shapes that trigger the blinking of light and of those
that don’t into two large sets. And the same goes for the sets of right acts
and of the acts that are not right according to the understanding of the
particularist and according to his way to classify the matters. The main idea
is that the members of a category are obtained, but they are obtained on a
completely arbitrary basis.
Just take a look at the objects whose shapes are
united in the category according to which the machine’s light will blink. At
the end of the day, is there any other criterion around as the one that says how
these are the shapes such that the light does blink in their presence? Exactly
this last one is the criterion that stays, and nothing else.
From this point of view, the particularist will be
in the same position. Because there is no pattern involved in his
categorization choice, the only criterion for the right acts to find themselves
in their own category is just that they are right acts. But this seems to be
arbitrary and actually it seems to involve circularity of the right acts’
understanding.
The situation is a good
departure now for the productivity argument as proposed by the generalist in an
effort to criticize the particularist for his lack of patterns. Here is a form
of the productivity argument.
P1 Classifying the
right acts on an arbitrary basis just as the right acts is circular.
P2 Something more is
needed for classification: a projectability enabling codifiable pattern.
P3 Only codifiable
pattern allows for the productivity, i.e. the grasping of a potential infinity of
elements on the finite basis of presented samples.
.: Thus, a pattern is
necessary for productivity to be obtained.
The first premise was
already introduced by explanation of the weirdly blinking machine. The main
claim of the premise is about the classification’s arbitrary basis. And the
conclusion of the premise is that the arbitrariness leads to circularity. The
only uncomfortable thing is that the premise is itself a kind of circular in
respect to the argument in its entirety, for it seems to presuppose the
embracing of pattern in opposition to arbitrariness. Because of this, this
first premise may not necessarily be seen as figuring as a constitutive block
of the argument. In a way it just prepares us for what follows. A questionable
point in this first premise is the presupposition that the particularist
classification is arbitrary. The dilemma seems to be offered in the following
way: either some tractable codifiable principle, or arbitrariness and anarchy.
The second premise
introduces the need for something more as some arbitrary criterion if
classification is to be effectively obtained. One could agree that something
more is needed if particularist classification is completely arbitrary, just
according to the tastes of something like the weirdly blinking machine. But
this may not be the case at all. Consider that the particularist endorses
richness and holism of the situation and of the cognitive constituency that
enables him falling normative judgment concerning the situation. Even the monist
may go for some reversals as he deals with situations. But monist and
generalist will care about tractability and codifiability of the criteria
applied in situations. And it is possible that arbitrariness is introduced by
the criteria proper to the taste of the generalist in this respect. Take a
closer look at the weirdly blinking machine. It may begin to look as a parody
of the particularist position. Arbitrariness is there indeed if the rules for
choice involving members of classificatory set are tractable and arbitrary. In
this respect the weird blinking machine is in fact designed according to the
taste of the generalist insisting on codifiability. The presuppositions of the
particularist may be differently shaped. And indeed, if particularist is holistic
to the point of essentially not embracing codifiability and tractability, then
the relevance may come to her even without a tractable pattern, but on the
basis of the rich structure of each particular judgment forming. The relevant
judgment will be fallen on the basis of each single pattern involving the whole
of the structure at a time. This just involves taking a look at the cognitive
system contributing to the judgment. The structure is proper to each single
instance of evaluative judgment formed upon the basis of the rich
non-codifiable system as a whole in its entirety, at a time. Codifiability even
cannot be achieved because of the richness of the structure at a time. And in
this way, we obtain a list of situations, where no single situation comes
arbitrarily. Each of the situations is still obtained relevantly, although they
are not connected between themselves. Is there a pattern in the system as a
whole at a time? Even if there is, these patterns molding to the whole are not
tractable in the entirety of the situation. We are not talking just about a
single codifiable case of reversal here. If all of this is right – as I suppose
it is – then the mistake of the generalist in as far as this point is concerned
may be put in very simple terms. Generalist presupposes that there are just
single patterns involved in the judgment formation, and that these single
patterns unify them. But this is unrealistic for any real shape of a cognitive
system. Each item on the list would find its place somewhere on a single
pattern through time, in an atomistic manner. As against this, the picture of
relevance proper to particularist offers radically different holistic patterns,
appearing as entirely different to each other on each occasion in time.
Generalist Particularist
P IP1,
IP2 … Ipn
I1, I2 … In
Generalist has one
single pattern P for a kind of judgment to which the different instances of
judgments I1, I2 … In get attached through time, just in a way as so many darts
gather on a single board to which they get thrown. This picture seems to be
static in time and atomistic in the manner instances get stuck onto it.
Particularist on the other hand proceeds with
repeated usage of the whole system. The presupposition is here that the system
is the same, but it changes through time in a dynamical manner so that each
pattern comes together with the instance and so that it is particular in this
sense. Each of IP1, IP2 … Ipn do indeed happen in a single cognitive system.
But the rich uncodifiable system changes to the extent that each instance of a
pattern should be taken as a single organic unity.
Generalist thus just does not see that
arbitrariness is not the right word for characterization of particularism. The
rightness and wrongness classification of several judgments is not the cause,
it is maybe a retroactive explanation of what has to be presented in holistic
manner. In the case of the holist we have the same old and rich cognitive
system coming back, but always in a new manner. This is the ewige Wiederkehr
des Gleichen that the generalist fails to see because of his codifiable
simplified assumptions. Particularist does not need more. It already has plenty
of more, of richness, of the same – in abundance.
Is the projectability needed here? If you look at
the particularists’ procedure as described right now, it would not bring any
more of relevance to make the pattern projectible. Indeed, what would a
projectible pattern of an intractably rich system look like? It is hard to
imagine. But we as cognizers are such systems. Perhaps we sometimes do need
patterns then, but with no normative authority, just for retroactive
explanatory reasons.
The third premise is a
further twist, which defends and presupposes codifiable pattern as the only
entrance to productivity. We have seen implausibility of codifiable pattern in
as far as our cognition is concerned in the former premise. But what is
productivity? And, is productivity possible without a codifiable pattern?
The most known example of productivity is offered
by the hypothesis of transformational grammar. The hypothesis presupposes a
structure of grammatical competence, an inborn structure that enables us to
take a limited finite linguistic input and to transform it in a virtual
infinity of ways. So we have “grasping of potential infinity of elements on the
finite basis of presented samples”.
Notice now that the example discussed, the list of
D→E’s, presents a far too simple structure as compared with the dealings
and with the structure of our cognitive system.
Tractable structure will just find no way to
circumvent the richness of the cognitive system. But if this is like that, then
again there are not codifiable patterns that insure generalizations. There is
richness of the whole system on different occasions that involves the whole
rich structure at a time. This is why intuitions about linguistic
correctness (grammaticality, ungrammaticality) are the main tools of linguistic
research. No single pattern is needed. Notice the immense complexity of
the structure enabling knowledge of language and linguists’ partial empirical
accounts of it.
Presupposing that there is this innate structure,
the explanation of the phenomenon known as productivity comes after the fact.
But phenomenon and explanation itself deal with nontractable matters. Even
more, the particularist noncodifiable way of achieving productivity in the area
of the evaluative seems to be appropriate. Again, if the hypothesis of innate
structure is right, then the particularist approach to it seems the most
appropriate.
The fact is that the innate structure promoted by
the transformational hypothesis is so rich that the same system deals with
situations as particular rich wholes appearing on several occasions in time.
So, if there is a
pattern necessary for productivity to obtain, it will be a non-codifiable
pattern of the whole of the rich system structure that gives itself to us in an
always-new way. Particular singularity is in power for output as well. So,
productivity does not involve one simplified pattern through time, on which
atomistic cases may be pinned. Productivity is rather the effect of the ewige
Wiederkehr des Gleichen, i.e. of the same rich structure making its
holistic appearance in rich particular instances. Always the same, and always
different in its instances.
Relevance is not a
problem for particularist, because it is the product of a rich and intractable
structure. It is a problem for the generalist though whose parody of
particularism in the form of a weird codifiable blinking machine displays the
generalists’ own codifiable inklings.
Some further remarks and objections to the generalist are
given here:
-
Inductive
generalization is presented by the generalist as the generalization that
results in the (deductive) exceptionless principle. But this is not compatible
with the nature of inductive reasoning.
-
Is the machine a
parody of particularism? Yes. Why? Because it is a machine construed with
respect to the tractable codifiable procedures. But this is not how our
cognition works. The blinking machine is weird because it is tractable. It also
does not take account of the relevance. But relevance is not possible on the
tractable basis. The relevance is otherwise easily achieved by nontractable
dynamical cognition principles.
-
The insight is
that there is the structure based on the richness of cognition and not upon
codifiable transitions. And there seems to be a problem lurking here for the
particularist: Recognizing the structure, does not he therewith embrace
patterns, perhaps something like Rossian ceteris paribus generalizations, and
therewith generalism?
The first answer is that some generalizations, even if they
are there, are just explanatory and after the fact epistemic ones,
without normative authority (they are not metaphysically supported).
Another and more basic reply is that the recognition of the
structure cannot be harmful to particularist, provided that it is not a
codifiable simplistic wimpy kind of structured pattern. Rich cognition and rich
contextual surrounding involve the whole structure at a time (not tractable but
something such as experienced time, say). In this way, because of its richness
and intractability, this structure pushes into direction of presenting itself
according to the particularist ways.
Literature
Jackson Frank, Pettit
Philip, Smith Michael. (2000) “Ethical Particularism and Patterns”. In Hooker
Brad and Little, Margaret, Moral Particularism. Oxford: University
Press.
Haney, Mitchell (1999).
“Dynamical Cognition, Soft Laws and Moral Theorizing.” Acta Analytica
22. Dettelbach: Roell Verlag. 227-240.
Horgan Terry, Henderson
David. (Forthcoming.) “Morphological Content and Justified Belief”.
Horgan Terry, Tienson,
John. (1996). Connectionism and Philosophy of Psychology. Massachusetts:
MIT Press.
Little, Margaret
(2000): “Moral Generalities Revisited”. In Hooker Brad and Margaret Little, Moral
Particularism. Oxford: University Press.
Potrč, Matjaž (2000). AJustification Having and
Morphological Content@ Acta Analytica 24. Dettelbach:
Roell Verlag. 151-173.