Matjaž Potrč, University of Ljubljana, matjaz.potrc@guest.arnes.si
There is a common opinion that generalities guide our life and that accordingly they have normative authority. Two presuppositions of this opinion are spelled out: that particularist patterns are impossible, and that only generalities are able to underpin the area of the evaluative. It is argued that both of these claims may be undermined and that they have to be reversed. First, particularistic patterns are possible, and actually they are the only interesting patterns. Second, it is probable that at least some particularist patterns are able to underpin the area of the evaluative. Generalized form of this claim then concedes normative authority of the particular to all interesting cases. Normative authority is thus with particularist patterns. Generalities are not rejected, they just do not have normative authority and they can figure as mere epistemic generalizations.
The opinion that
generalities guide our life and that accordingly they have normative authority
Nothing seems more
natural and accurate as the claim that our life and actions that we undertake
are all the time governed by generalities, and accordingly that these
generalities have normative authority over our decisions to act. “Why did you
tell the truth?” “Well, I told you the truth because lying is wrong and of
course I followed this general pattern.” Why are we talking about patterns
here? Well, there is this generality, which is given by expression “Lying is
wrong”. This expression captures a huge number of cases where general rule is
applied. But it does not just capture these cases as their common denominator.
It is able to capture them because it also gives reasons about why the action
happened the way it did. So generality has the epistemic summary power over a
huge number of cases, and it has this power because it serves as a reason to
act in these cases.
I concede to the first point, namely that generality may
serve as summary generalization over a number of cases. But I take it that this
is all the work that generality is able to do. Generality is a mere epistemic
generalization over a number of cases. It cannot serve as the reason for these
cases to come about. In other words, generality does not have normative
authority.
In order to demonstrate this, it is first worth to
articulate the mentioned opinion:
(O) Generalities have normative
authority.
Considering now that
generalities are understood as being opposed to particularities, (O) may be
spelled out in the following negative form:
(NP) Particularities cannot have
normative authority.
Having normative
authority means that whatever has it is relevant. If, according to (O), generalities
have normative authority, then they are relevant for several particular cases
to come about exactly as they do. It is because of this general principle
“Lying is wrong” that you decided to tell the truth. So the mentioned general
principle has the normative authority in how your action has turned out, and
therefore it is the relevant thing to quote as the action gets explained.
The (NP) now claims that there cannot be any
similar normative authority ascribed to the particular circumstances. The reasoning
may go as follows. Take it that something other than generalities is
responsible for your telling the truth. Take it that this was just the
consequence of your opinion and of your particular judgment in this particular
situation. So you acted by following this particularist judgment of yours in
this situation that happened just once in its singularity and that cannot be
repeated. Once you bought this explanation, you bought the normative authority
of the particular. But such a normative authority of particular just cannot be
right. For it is a straight one way ticket to anarchy. In order to have some
reason, of some relevance, we need to have generalities. For otherwise we will
finish with bunch of arbitrary and utterly diversified reasons. But already
because of their diversity, such reasons will not be able to function as
reasons, they will not be relevant. How should your particular opinion in a
particular situation be right, and how can it support anything at all? Such
particularities are just not able to function as reasons and they cannot be
relevant. For once we allow for their authority, each particular person will
have her right to change reasons, for each slightly different situation. But
this will inevitably lead to conflict, when the arbitrary subjective opinions
will be promoted as relevant reasons. So particularities are just unable to
have normative authority.
And here is another take at the same conclusion
that particularities just cannot have normative authority. In order to have
normative authority, we first need to have some evaluative matters or facts,
say “wrong”, such as it figures in “Lying is wrong”, or “right”. Now, these
evaluative facts, according to the uncontroversial naturalist opinion,
supervene on the descriptive facts, as far as their metaphysical nature is
concerned. But now if we take particularist departure, each particular
descriptive situation D will be completely different from its peers, so that
there will be no pattern leading from D1, D2, …, Dn
to E:
D1, D2, …, Dn → E.
In the best case there
will be a pattern from D1, D2, …, Dn to E1, E2, …, En:
D1, D2, …, Dn → E1, E2, …, En.
Thus there will be a
bunch of cases
D1 → E1
But this just means
that each particular descriptive case will give rise to a different evaluative
case. And this confirms the insensibility of the particularist depart that will
not allow for a unique evaluative value E, which we need in order to be able to
get reasons as supports for our actions. So this proves that particularism is
wrong and that the (NP) thesis is right. We just cannot live with this
arbitrariness of diversified evaluations. They just cannot be guides to our
actions; they cannot give reasons for them or be relevant for them in any way.
I will argue that all this is wrong, despite that
it may appear as a good minded common sense opinion according to the thesis
(O). And I will argue for the correctness of the contrary to the thesis (NP):
particularities may have normative authority.
The presuppositions
of the opinion concerning generalities: A. particularist patterns are
impossible, and B. only generalities are able to underpin the area of the
evaluative
There are some
presuppositions that merit to get spelled out as underlying the opinion (O).
These are deep entrenched presuppositions in the discussion concerning the
overall value of particularistic approach, as criticized by the generalist
thesis (O):
(O) Generalities have normative authority.
The first
presupposition of (O) is as follows:
(A) Particularist patterns are impossible.
The second
presupposition of (O) may be stated as:
(B) Only generalities are able to underpin the area
of the evaluative.
Here is some reasoning
in support of (A). If there are patterns around, those will be patterns covering
several cases. Thus it is just insensible to talk about patterns that cover a
singular case. Structure may be just something that discovers a generality as a
common trait or feature of several particular cases. Structure is thus
necessarily of general nature. But a particular case just cannot have
generality built into it, by definition. So, there just cannot exist any
particularist pattern.
The reasoning in support of (B) may go as follows:
Let us suppose that the evaluative supervenes on the descriptive, so that the
Evaluative follows from the Descriptive: D → E. But we need one unique E
as the result of generalization over several D’s. So E has to be general and it
should not fragment itself into a bunch of cases E1, E2,
…, En. So something common to several descriptive situations D1,
D2, …, Dn is
needed. This common feature may only be of general nature. If there is an
evaluation around, or any other kind of normativity, it just cannot be
underpinned by anything else as generalities.
I will argue that both
presuppositions underlying the opinion (O), namely the presuppositions (A) and
(B), may each be undermined. Neither (A) nor (B) remain plausible once we take
a closer look at them. They are just whatever underlies an opinion, and as the
features supporting opinion they have no immediate claim to truth.
But I will not only argue that these
presuppositions may be undermined. I will also argue that they may be reversed
into their opposites. Just the contraries of these presuppositions turn out to
be true, under a close examination. Particularist patterns are possible and the
complement of generalities – namely particularities – do underpin the area of
evaluative. My argument will be thus in support of normative authority of the
particular.
Contrary to the
presupposition (A), I will first claim that particularist patterns are at least
possible. The generalist wishes to deny this. In this respect, his reasoning
may go as follows. If there are patterns, they should subsume a bunch of cases.
If there is just one singular case, there cannot be any pattern. For there will
be no structure. Structure just comes from generality. This was the generalist
talking.
Contrary to this, I would just like to claim as the
first thing that particularist patterns are at least possible. This means that
there are at least some cases of structure, where this structure will not be
repeatable in its quality, but it will still be counted as a pattern. Well, I
remember one such pattern: the picture of Mona Lisa. Nobody would deny that
there is structure involved into this picture. Indeed, it is a rich and
intertwined structure, including figure, background and many other
particularities. And I would myself certainly call this structure a pattern. It
seems an important pattern to me. There are many more such particularist
patterns inherent to each single work of art, including such complex works of
art as operas. But I take it that such particularistic patterns also exist as
the basis for reasons to act, at least in some cases.
It seems to me hard to deny, anyway, that
particularistic patterns are at least possible. But there is more. There are
many of them around; they surround us.
This claim is stronger
as the previous one. The expression “interesting” that figures in it should be
clarified first. What is interesting, it seems to me, is relevant. Relevant
reasons for an action are also the interesting reasons for an action.
General patterns are the opposite of
particularistic patterns. Now, are they interesting? Here is a quick
quasi-logical demonstration that they cannot be. It is well known in predicate
logic that general statement does not imply existence. “All men are mortal”
does not imply the existence of Socrates, or of any other singular man. You
have to introduce additional existential presupposition if you wish to derive
existence from the general statement. It seems that there is a similarity
between this and the general principles, such as “Lying is wrong”. It seems
that these principles as general principles just cannot be in force for any
singular situation. Well, at least such general principles cannot be in force
for any interesting particular situations. The situations where we do moral
deliberation are complex by necessity. For if there is no deliberation, there
is no moral decision to be taken. And this goes for cases where general principles,
such as “Lying is wrong” apply automatically. So, just single complex cases
remain as interesting cases. And these are particular cases, and not the cases
where general principle applies. So relevance of the general principle as
reason for action seems to be ruled out on the basis of logic. Reasons tend to
be complex, but generalities do not really harbor any complexity.
Once general patterns are ruled out as interesting
patterns, and just particularist patterns turn out to be interesting, it will
seem that only particularist patterns are able to act as reasons.
There are many of them; a huge amount of
particularist patterns is all around. The life is interesting.
Ad B 1. It is
probable that at least some particularist patterns are able to underpin the
area of the evaluative
You probably have to
admit the following. At least once in your life, you have acted on the basis of
a very particular situation, and your gut feeling was that you were acting
right (or wrong, as for that matter). You just know that it was right. There
was no general rule or pattern involved into your decision. If you did not have
such experience, then at least you will not deny that some other human being
had a similar experience at least once throughout history. At least you should
not deny that this is possible.
This single case will be enough to undermine the
claim of the presupposition (B) according to which generalities only may
underpin the evaluative. You are convinced now that at least some particularist
patterns may underpin the evaluative.
But there is more. And
it follows from (A2). In (A2) we tried to determine in outline what is
“interesting”, namely what can figure as an interesting or relevant pattern. We
have argued that as a matter of quasi-logical reasoning, there are no
interesting general principles. This means that general principles, when
followed, will be followed automatically, kind of mechanically, and thus they
will not allow space for moral deliberation. So space for moral deliberation
stays with cases of particularist patterns.
What about the cases of pluralism, where several
general principles are involved? Are they not interesting cases of moral deliberation,
all in still being generalities? The answer is here that what makes something
interesting in pluralism cannot be generalities and their normative authority,
but judgments, and these judgments belong to the particularist incline of
pluralism. The only interesting patterns are particularist patterns.
If the above short
reasoning is right, then the reason given in moral deliberation comes from the
part of the particular, from the part of particularist patterns. Each situation
in which we deliberate is different. Many times we take deliberative decisions
in a flash. And we just know that we have reached an evaluative outcome on this
basis. We just know that we did something right or that we did not do it right.
If particularist patterns are the only interesting
ones (A2), and if these particularist patterns underpin the evaluative matters
in all of the interesting cases (B 2), then normative authority has to reside
within these particularist patterns. There is no place then for normative
authority of the general.
Generalities are not
rejected, they just do not have normative authority; they can figure as mere
epistemic generalizations
After
all of this, one may well think that particularist would be inclined to reject
generalities. But this does not need to be the case at all. Particularist
allows an important place for generalities in epistemic summaries about reasons
for someone’s actions. Why is that? The reason seems to be quite simple: it is
conceptual economy. In the same manner as we use the expression “dog” in order
to subsume all the immense variance of particular dogs, we use the mere symbol
“Lying is wrong” for post festum covering of many different cases, that by the
way do not have any viable descriptive basis qua generalities. Generalities are
handy. Where would we come if we would give the full description of each
particular dog instead of using the general name “dog”? Where would we end up
if we would give the whole intertwined narrative description for each reason to
act? Any time we would sink the donut in our coffee we would have to write a
kind of “A la recherche du temps perdu” as the reason giving of this act.
Causes are more complex as this is many times taken to be the case: they
contain a lot of intertwined background. Reasons are good candidates for being
even more complex. So instead of giving all this crap, we just say “dog”, and
we just summarize “Lying is wrong” as the reason of our actions. But these are
no reasons for our actions. These are just mere symbols that summarize a
general one-dimensional view of several cases. They do not do any grounding;
they are just epistemic tools.
It would be wrong though to
confuse these beneficial summary symbols activities with the real grounding,
motivating and normative authority that they are supposed to exercise, as does
the generalism. Generalities are mere epistemic stuff; they just do not have
any normative authority.
Two eventual worries
for particularist confronted
As
we discussed the transition from the descriptive (D) to the evaluative (E), we
have given two schemas that will be now assigned numbers for the ease of
exposition:
(1) D1
→ E1
(2) D1, D2, …, Dn → E
The
problem for particularist is that the general evaluation E seems to result so
nicely from all these descriptive bases D1, D2, …, Dn.
But the particularist has in his support that this nice result just
covers whatever is general, without thereby covering motivation or reasons.
Evaluations cannot be others
as particularly grounded.
The generalist argument against
particularism claims that there is no viable Descriptive to Evaluative, D
→ E transition, for particularism. This argument may be reversed against
the generalist: exactly for generalist there cannot be any D → E
transition (remember Moore’s non-naturalism). On the other hand, authority
comes from the particularist patterns (whose very existence has to be
acknowledged first, against the generalist prejudice).
References
Horgan,
Terence and Timmons, Mark (1992). “Troubles for New Vawe Moral Semantics: The
‘Open Question Argument’ Revived”. Philosophical
Papers, Vol. XXI,
No. 3, 153-175.
Horgan,
Terence and Tye, Michael (1985). “Against the Token Identity Theory”. In Actions and Events: Essays on the Philosophy of
Donald Davidson,
ed. By E. LePore and B. MCLaughlin. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Dancy,
Johnathan (2000), “The Particularist’s Progress”. In Hooker, Brad and Little,
Margaret, eds., Moral Particularism. Oxford: University Press.
Jackson,
Frank, Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael (2000). “Ethical Particularism and
Patterns”. In Hooker, Brad and Little, Margaret, eds., Moral Particularism. Oxford: University Press.
Little,
Margaret (2000). “Moral Generalities Revisited”. In Hooker, Brad and Little,
Margaret, eds., Moral Particularism. Oxford: University Press.
Potrč, Matjaž (Unpublished). “Beautiful
Patterns”.
Potrč, Matjaž (Unpublished). “Evaporism and
Particularist Normativity”.
Potrč, Matjaž (Unpublished). “Metaphysical
Disputes”.
Potrč, Matjaž (Unpublished). “Particularism
and Productivity Argument”.
Potrč, Matjaž (Unpublished). “The Abundant
Cause of Because”.
Potrč, Matjaž (Unpublished). “The Last
Judgment”.
Smith,
Edward (1988). “Concepts and Thought”. In Sternberg, Robert and Smith, Edward,
eds., The Psychology of Human
Thought.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19-49.