

Evidence, Reliability, and Group Epistemology

Dokazila, zanesljivost in epistemologija skupin

XXIst Bled Philosophical Conference

<http://www.bled-conference.si>

June 3rd – June 7th, 2013

Bled, Hotel Kompas

Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science

Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

<http://www.dafz.si>

▪ GENERAL INFORMATION

Philosophical conferences at Bled (Slovenia) were initiated, on the suggestion by *John Biro*, in 1993 at first as a continuation of the IUC – Dubrovnik postgraduate course in philosophy but they gradually started a life of their own, with the help of *Eugene Mills*, *Mylan Engel Jr.*, *Wayne D. Riggs* and *Alistair Norcross*. The first week of June is traditionally reserved for a conference dedicated to various topics in the field of analytical philosophy. *Evidence, Reliability, and Group Epistemology* is the twenty-first Bled Philosophical Conference. All events take place in Hotel Kompas, Cankarjeva 2, Bled (*Grajska-Triglavsko*).

The 2013 conference is organized by a team consisting of *Jack Lyons* (*University of Arkansas*), *Matjaž Potrč* of the University of Ljubljana, *Nenad Mišćević* and *Danilo Šuster* of the University of Maribor. The conference is included in the program of the activities of the Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy.



PROGRAM

Monday, June 3rd

9:45 – 10.00

Welcoming remarks

Grajska

Triglavska

10:00-11:00

Trent Dougherty:

Peter Baumann: Lucky Knowledge?

11:00-11:20

Break

11:20-12:20

Igal Kvat: The Steering Role
Knowledge: The Pragmatics of
Knowledge

Ruth Weintraub: A New Solution to the
Problem of Peer Disagreement

12:20-2:20

Lunch

2:20-3:20

Christopher Lepock: "To Reliability
and Beyond"

Claudio de Almeida: Testimony and
Paradox

3:20-3:40

Break

Grajska/Triglavska

3:40-4:40

Christoph Kelp: Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology

4:45-5:45

Jennifer Lackey: What Is Justified Group Belief?

Tuesday, June 4th

Grajska

Triglavska

9:00-10:00

Carla Bagnoli: Objectivity and
Fairness: a Kantian-Constructivist
Approach to Epistemic Responsibility

Joe Cruz: Irrational Thought

10:05-11:05

Catherine Z. Elgin: The
Commonwealth of Epistemic Ends

Robert Beddor: Prospects for a
Reductive Account of Justification

11:05-11:25

Break

11:25-12:25

Allan Hazlett: Intellectual Autonomy

Indrek Reiland: Seeings and Seemings

12:25-2:25

Lunch

2:25-3:25

Baron Reed:

Marion David: Propositional
Justification First

3:25-3:45

Break

Grajska/Triglavsko

3:45-4:45	Nenad Mišćević: Aspiring and thought-experimenting
4:50-5:50	Joel Pust: Beauty, Temporally Indexical Knowledge and Updating

Wednesday, June 5th

	<i>Grajska</i>	<i>Triglavsko</i>
9:00-10:00	Nikolaj Pedersen: Disagreement and Action: An Argument Against (Strong) Non-Conformism	Kelly Becker: Anti-Individualism as a Theoretical Framework for Reliabilist Foundationalism
10:05-11:05	Mikael Janvid: Fallibility and Defeasibility Revisited	Mikkel Gerken: Warrant by Testimony in Contexts of Epistemic Disagreement and Diversity
11:05-11:25		<i>Break</i>
11:25-12:25	Clayton Littlejohn: Knowledge, Reasons, and Causes (Again)	Nikolaj Nottelmann: In Search of a Proper Explanandum for Robust Virtue Epistemology
Afternoon		<i>Free time</i>

Thursday, June 6th

	<i>Grajska</i>	<i>Triglavsko</i>
9:00-10:00	Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč: Morphological Content and Rational Disagreement	Jeroen de Ridder & Rene van Woudenberg: Scientism Scrutinized
10:05-11:05	Mylan Engel: Evidence, Reliability, and Luck	Maja Malec: Against the Psychological View of Intuitions
11:05-11:25		<i>Break</i>
11:25-12:25	Peter Graham: The Reliability of Testimony and Social Norms	Klemens Kappel: The Gettier Problem and Process Reliabilism
12:25-2:25		<i>Lunch</i>
2:25-3:25	Brendan Dill: Inquiring Together	Georgi Gardiner: The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement
3:25-3:45		<i>Break</i>

Grajska/Triglavska

- 3:45-4:45 Elizabeth Fricker: Unreliable Testimony
- 4:50-5:50 Alvin I. Goldman: Social Process Reliabilism: Addressing Justification Problems in Collective Epistemology

Conference dinner, location TBA

<i>Friday, June 7th</i>

Grajska***Triglavska***

- | | | |
|------------------------|--|--|
| 9:00-10:00 | Emily McWilliams: Re-Evaluating Belief Polarization | Danilo Šuster: Modal stability and restricted sensitivity |
| 10:05-11:05 | David Christensen: Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity | Jan Willem Wieland & Maarten Van Dyck: Epistemic Rationality and The Unquiry Problem |
| 11:05-11:25 | <i>Break</i> | |
| 11:25-12:25 | Gerhard Schurz: Social Spread of Knowledge: The Epistemic Surplus Value of Justification | Jack Lyons: Unconscious Evidence |
| 12:25-2:25 | <i>Lunch</i> | |
| <i>Jezerska</i> | | |
| 2:25-3:25 | Sarah Wright: The Epistemic Virtues of Groups | |
| 3:25-3:45 | <i>Break</i> | |
| 3:45-4:45 | Darrell Rowbottom: Social Epistemology of Science, Group Level Probabilities, and Identification | |
| 4:50-5:50 | Thomas Grundmann: How Reliabilists Should Think About the A Priori - A Posteriori Distinction | |

Closing remarks

Abstracts

Carla Bagnoli (University of Modena, Italy)

Objectivity and Fairness: a Kantian-Constructivist Approach to Epistemic Responsibility

This paper argues that there is a constitutive relation between epistemic authority and fairness as complementary dimensions of objectivity in testimonial knowledge. The argument starts with the case of practical knowledge and is extended to testimonial knowledge. First, I take into account the expert model, which represents knowledge as a social good and thus refocuses the debate on the power relations that affect the production of knowledge, rather than solely on failures in the distribution of epistemic goods. Second, I argue that this model does not provide an objective standard of rational justification and is still inadequate to address some fundamental failures of epistemic justice. My point here is that such failures are also failures to provide objective and authoritative rational justifications. Finally, in alternative, I offer a constructivist view of rational justification, which is based on the mutual recognition of accountability of finite and interdependent rational agents. It is because we are mutually dependent, finite beings that we need to construct reasons that our interlocutors can address as such. The basic claim is that for rational justification to exert authority, reasoners have to relate to their interlocutors as their peers. The key (Kantian) features are the reliance on the salience of others, and the definition of epistemic parity and accountability through the affective category of respect.

Peter Baumann (Swarthmore College, USA)

Lucky Knowledge?

It is a widely held view that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck (of a specific, interesting kind). In this paper I argue against this view. I start by considering a set of variations of Russell's stopped clock case which is often used to illustrate the alleged incompatibility of knowledge and luck. Certain variations of this case, however, suggest that there can be lucky knowledge. I argue that a probabilistic form of reliabilism (plus some contextualism) about luck and knowledge can explain in what sense the two are compatible and what sense they aren't.

Kelly Becker (University of New Mexico, USA)

Anti-Individualism as a Theoretical Framework for Reliabilist Foundationalism

Some epistemological internalists believe that reliabilism about knowledge and justification changes the subjects. Bonjour, for example, argued that the problem with reliabilism is that it abandons the metajustification requirement and therefore misses the point, taken as basic, that justification is a matter of fulfilling one's epistemic duty. So Bonjour's dialectic looks like this: Knowledge requires internally accessible reasons, which immediately rules out (externalist) reliabilism. He then investigates internalist foundationalism, which founders on the problem of the given. Interestingly, in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Rorty seems to have reversed this argument. Rorty seems to have thought that if there *were* basic perceptual states that had genuine representational content, they *would* be epistemically relevant, even if not as cognitively accessible reasons. However, he thought that only language could confer content because only through language can we take things to be one way or another, potentially incorrectly, and *therefore* only something like a belief, something conceptually structured, has the requisite normative status to ground belief. Here's the Rorty dialectic: Reliabilism (not so-called, of course) founders on one horn of the dilemma of the given, so only a belief, an internally accessible reason, can justify a belief.

Reliabilism may never satisfy internalists who insist on epistemic duty fulfillment. But it would go some way toward responding to Rorty's and his followers' concerns if the story about basic reliabilist warrant involved perceptual states with genuine representational content. Anti-individualism is precisely what the reliabilist needs. These are large and heady issues, so in this paper I'll only attempt to sketch them. I will then comment on the nature of anti-individualist warrant, and wrap up not only by endorsing Jon Altschul's (2011) argument that anti-individualism provides reliabilists with a response to the New Evil Demon problem, but also by going further and arguing—on Burgean grounds, whether or not Burge would agree—that anti-

individualism is compatible with the view that a BIV *who's always been a BIV* can have perceptual warrant for its beliefs.

Robert Beddor (Rutgers University, USA)
Prospects for a Reductive Account of Justification

A number of epistemologists have sought to furnish reductive accounts of justification; they've sought to explain what it is for a belief to be justified without employing any epistemic terms in the explanans. In this paper, I argue that all reductive accounts of justification face a serious challenge: the challenge of explaining defeat in non-epistemic terms. I begin by focusing on process reliabilist accounts of justification, since process reliabilists have been perhaps the most vocal in their reductive aspirations. I argue that the standard process reliabilist account of defeat – the alternative process account – is subject to counterexample; what's more, none of the most natural alternatives fare better. But process reliabilists aren't the only ones who lack a promising reductive account of defeat: I go on to show that evidentialists face much the same difficulty, though it surfaces in a slightly different form. I conclude by discussing what moral we should draw from these failures.

David Christensen (Brown University, USA)
Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity

Conciliationism holds that when we face disagreement by those we have reason to respect epistemically, it often substantially undermines our rational confidence in our opinions. Uniqueness principles say that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to any given batch of evidence. Conciliatory views of disagreement are often seen as closely tied to Uniqueness principles about rational belief. This paper argues that they're much less closely connected than has often been supposed—particularly when the pressure to conciliate is motivated by the agent's worries about the reliability, rather than the rationality, of her own thinking. However, shifting the focus away from rationality does not remove one of the disturbing aspects of Conciliationism: that it sometimes requires agents to violate rational ideals.

Joe Cruz (Williams College, USA)
Irrational Thought

The investigation of irrationality in epistemology has been remarkably sparse. There seem to be two attitudes taken by epistemologists to irrationality. The first is that it consists in beliefs that, for whatever cause, fail to conform to one's preferred theory of *rationality*. This negative analysis foregoes a chance to understand better the nature of rationality that can come from investigating failures of reasoning. The second attitude is to borrow uncritically the accounts of irrationality given by cognitive psychologists, where a competence/performance distinction is leveraged to claim that resource limitations yield irrational beliefs or where reasoners misapply heuristics to problems that are outside of that heuristic's scope. In this paper I argue that these two accounts of irrationality fail to explain the fact that ordinary irrational beliefs are articulate and persistent. I defend an alternative view. Irrationality, I claim, results from the unskilled selection of processes to use in reasoning. Like all procedural knowledge, the cognitive process selection skill is susceptible to specific kinds of interference but can get better over time and can improve with training.

Marian David (University of Graz, Austria)
Propositional Justification First

The epistemology of justification (warrant, etc.) can be divided into two subareas: propositional justification and doxastic justification. The "Propositional Justification First"-program says, contra reliabilism et al., that propositional justification is more fundamental, doxastic justification is to be explained in terms of

propositional justification plus the proper-basing relation plus considerations concerning relevantly available evidence, etc.

An account of propositional justification--P is justified for S--again divides into two parts:

(A) Theories of abstract support/confirmation relations, e.g. deductive logic and inductive logic (objective/logical probability), which have nothing at all to do with any subjects or their mental states.

(B) Issues concerning the question of how to apply the abstract support relations to subjects and their mental states, i.e. the theory of the "for-S" in "P is justified for S".

Under (A) there is the interesting question whether all support relations are proposition to proposition relations, or whether there are non-proposition to proposition support relations. Accounts of support relations sometimes work by "converting" non-propositional evidence into propositional, thereby creating the mistaken impression that all support relations are proposition to proposition.

Claudio de Almeida (Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil)

Testimony and Paradox

Moore's Paradox poses a nasty problem for belief revision based on testimony -- but only to those whose epistemology of testimony is non-reductionist.

Jeroen de Ridder & Rene van Woudenberg (VU University Amsterdam, Netherlands)

Scientism Scrutinized

Don Ross, James Ladyman and David Spurrett have made a case for what they call a scientific stance in metaphysics. The case includes the advancement of the following points:

- (1) The single task for metaphysics is to critically elucidate consilience networks across the sciences
- (2) In order to perform this task, metaphysicians should adopt a non-positivist version of verificationism, that consists of two claims:
 - a. No hypothesis that current science declares to be beyond our capacity to investigate, should be taken seriously;
 - b. Metaphysical claims should be exclusively motivated by the service they would perform, if true, in showing how at least two scientific hypotheses, at least one of which is taken from fundamental physics, jointly explain more than the sum of what is explained by the two hypotheses taken separately

The aim of this paper is to bring out a number of epistemological problems these points face.

Brendan Dill (MIT, USA)

Inquiring Together

We inquire together when we jointly seek out the answer to a question about what is the case. When you and I argue about how the Red Sox will do next season, or speculate about what the weather will be like tomorrow, we are inquiring together, engaging in an activity I will call *joint inquiry*. Though joint inquiry pervades our daily lives and epistemic practices, it seems to have gone largely unnoticed by philosophers, who have instead focused on the solitary activity of individual doxastic deliberation. Even social epistemology has so far focused on the act of communicating or transmitting knowledge already acquired from one person to another, mostly neglecting the equally important social activity of jointly reasoning to new conclusions from the evidence we have already shared.

In this paper, I try to fill this gap, investigating the phenomenon of joint inquiry. The body of the paper discusses the question of how joint inquiry is possible: how can two or more people count as engaging in a single process of reasoning? A thorough investigation of this question yields an account of the elements involved in joint inquiry. I end the paper by applying this account to the more traditionally investigated phenomena of assertion and testimony, suggesting that these epistemic speech acts are best understood as moves internal to the activity of joint inquiry.

Trent Dougherty (Baylor University, USA)
TBA

Catherine Z. Elgin (Harvard University, USA)
The Commonwealth of Epistemic Ends

Much contemporary epistemology is tacitly committed to two principles: epistemic independence and mind-world attunement. Epistemic independence is the view that states of an individual agent – her beliefs, her perceptions, her a priori insights, testimony she is privy to – justify her beliefs. Mind-world attunement is the view that the considerations that justify an agent's beliefs do so by properly attuning her to their objects. I argue that these commitments are misguided. Read as a study in epistemology, Orwell's *1984* shows how socio-political machinations that make interlocutors mutually untrustworthy impede epistemic agency. It thus affords reason to believe that successful epistemic agents are interdependent. They must be properly attuned not just to the objects of their beliefs but to one another. Minimally, the lesson is that knowledge is possible only if the epistemic milieu is free of socio-political interference. More strongly, I suggest, intellectual communities generate epistemic supports of a sort that individuals cannot have in isolation.

Mylan Engel (Northern Illinois University, USA)
Evidence, Reliability, and Luck

I develop and defend a version of reliabilism – *Internal Reasons Reliabilism* – that (i) requires internalistic evidence for justification, (ii) successfully rules out veritic luck, (iii) is immune to the generality problem, and (iv) allows us to retain epistemic closure.

Elizabeth Fricker (Oxford University, UK)
Unreliable Testimony

Reliability, aptly explicated, is an uncontroversial necessary condition on knowledge. However I argue that consideration of examples of testimony suggests that a simple modal reliability condition on knowledge is too strong. I suggest a novel variant, Approved List reliabilism. According to ALR, a belief is counted as knowledge by the folk if it issues from a folk-approved source; and sources get on the folk list in virtue of their perceived general reliability.

Georgi Gardiner (Rutgers University, USA)
The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement

Conciliatory views of peer disagreement hold that when an agent encounters peer disagreement she should conciliate by adjusting her doxastic attitude towards that of her peer. In this paper I distinguish different ways conciliation can be understood and argue the way conciliationism is typically understood violates the principle of commutativity of evidence. Commutativity of evidence holds that the order in which evidence is acquired should not influence what it is reasonable to believe based on that evidence. I argue that when an agent encounters more than one peer, and applies the process of conciliation serially, the order she encounters the peers influences the resulting credence. I argue this is a problem for conciliatory views of disagreement, and suggest some responses available to advocates of conciliation.

Mikkel Gerken (University of Copenhagen, Denmark)
Warrant by Testimony in Contexts of Epistemic Disagreement and Diversity

The epistemology of testimony and its relationship to disagreement and diversity has been debated at least since Mill forcefully defended freedom of speech by appeal to the epistemic benefits of disagreement and diversity. The ensuing debate has inherited Mill's focus on ways in which epistemic diversity and disagreement is epistemically beneficial. For example, disagreement and diversity has been argued to promote truth-conducive debate and improved understanding of the reasons and structure of justification for an assumption. More recently, the occurrence of disagreement has been argued to provide an opportunity for revising one's fallible beliefs in a truth-conducive manner (Christensen 2007). The extent to which one should revise one's belief in the face of disagreement is debated. But the assumption that disagreement is often an epistemic benefactor is widely agreed upon.

In contrast, I will discuss how both disagreement and diversity may defeat or diminish testimonial warrant. I do not oppose the view that there are epistemically positive aspects of epistemic disagreement and diversity. What I will argue, however, is that a balanced assessment of the epistemic significance of disagreement and diversity requires a better understanding how and when disagreement and diversity is epistemically bad news. In consequence, the negative epistemic impact by contexts of disagreement and diversity requires a far more careful treatment than it has received. In particular, there is a need for diagnosing the circumstances in which disagreement and diversity is epistemically problematic. Furthermore, it is important to come up with strategies for how to deal with their problematic aspects. While my main aim is diagnostic, I will conclude by considering such strategies.

The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, I argue for an important, but often ignored, distinction between disagreement and diversity. In Section 3, I consider some epistemological problems of testimony in contexts of epistemic disagreement. In Section 4, I consider some epistemological problems of testimony in contexts of epistemic diversity. In Section 5, I briefly consider what measures we may take in order to avoid the noted epistemological problems with testimony in contexts of disagreement and diversity.

Alvin I. Goldman (Rutgers University, USA)

Social Process Reliabilism: Addressing Justification Problems in Collective Epistemology

Most of the philosophical literature on collective, or group, activity concerns the nature or metaphysical status of the entities in question and their propositional attitudes. This paper focuses on the justificational status of group beliefs. Supposing that groups have beliefs, what is required for them to be justified? Specifically, how does the justificational status of a group belief relate to the justificational statuses of its members' corresponding beliefs? Comparisons and contrasts are drawn between the dependence of a group belief's J-status on its members' beliefs' J-statuses and the dependencies of individual J-statuses on other individuals' J-statuses. A generalized version of process reliabilism is advanced to provide a theory of group justifiedness.

Peter Graham (University of California, Riverside, USA)

The Reliability of Testimony and Social Norms

Testimonial warrant depends on the reliability of testimony, and so the information processing and transmitting capacities of other people. What explains why the communication channel reliably transmits accurate information? What causal structures underlies and explains its effectiveness? I explain how pro-social, cooperative social norms of informative truth-telling causally underwrite the reliability of testimony.

Thomas Grundmann (University of Cologne, Germany)

How Reliabilists Should Think About the A Priori - A Posteriori Distinction

A priori justification is typically defined as justification that is independent of sense experience. Nevertheless, many paradigm cases of a priori justified beliefs are such that they depend on sense experience somewhere along their cognitive prehistories. In order to reconcile the prima facie tension between these initially compelling claims, we need to establish a criterion that tells us when experiential parts of the cognitive

processing are epistemically relevant to the output belief and when they are not. In my talk I will suggest a criterion that the reliabilist should use to draw this line. In short: we have to find out whether the reliability of the terminal phase process depends (in the relevant sense) on the reliability of sense experiential processes. If it does, the belief in question is a posteriori justified, otherwise it counts as a priori justified.

I will then argue that with this criterion in our hands, we can quite easily explain why paradigm cases of a priori justified beliefs which involve sense experience are properly classified this way. Moreover, I will argue that the criterion helps us to meet recent challenges to the a priori - a posteriori distinction that were put forward by John Hawthorne and Timothy Williamson.

Allan Hazlett (University of Edinburgh, UK)
Intellectual Autonomy

Is it good to be intellectually autonomous? If it is, in what way is it good? In this talk I defend the value of intellectual autonomy by appeal to the value of non-testimonial knowledge. I criticize some other accounts of the value of non-testimonial belief, and defend the value of non-testimonial knowledge by appeal to the value of independent belief-formation in democracies.

Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč (University of Arizona - USA and University of Ljubljana - Slovenia)
Morphological Content and Rational Disagreement

Often, one cannot articulate the full justificatory basis for a given belief that one justifiably holds, because that basis is holistic in Quineian/isotropic ways and is informed by a rich body of morphological content. And, when two people disagree even though they are focusing on the same 'articulated' considerations, their disagreement is apt to reflect differences in full body of pertinent considerations that one of the people is drawing upon, in comparison to the full body of such considerations that the other person is drawing upon. The differences can include differences in epistemic sensibility too, concerning how one judges the net epistemic import of a full body of pertinent considerations. These kind of considerations could be harnessed as important in defending the claim that it can be perfectly rational to maintain one's belief even in the face of disagreement with one whose knowledge and intelligence one respects, and even after each side has heard out the other side.

Mikael Janvid (Stockholm University, Sweden)
Fallibility and Defeasibility Revisited

This paper investigates the epistemic properties fallibility and defeasibility. Although it is almost universally acknowledged that the otherwise positive epistemic status of being warranted is fallible and defeasible, it is not completely clear what being so amounts to. Therefore, the first of the three aims of this paper is to clarify both these epistemic properties. The second aim, related to the first, is to distill internalist constraints that often, more or less tacitly, are attached to these properties. Such an endeavor paves the way for the third and final aim, which is to present an externalist model of defeaters as part of a unified externalist account of warrant and defeat.

Klemens Kappel (University of Copenhagen, Denmark)
The Gettier Problem and Process Reliabilism

A striking feature of the Gettier Problem is the ease with which cases of the sort invented by Edmund Gettier can be generated. Another notable feature is the difficulty of finding a solution to the Gettier Problem. How can it be that that an apparently easily understandable defect of a definition of such a commonly used concept is so difficult to unravel? In this paper I address this question by proposing a unified perspective on

the Gettier Problem. This includes a diagnosis of the problem, and a solution to the problem. While I believe that the solution is generic, I apply it here to process reliabilism.

Christoph Kelp (KU Leuven, Belgium)
Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology

This paper aims to develop a novel account of knowledge and justified belief, which combines knowledge first epistemology with virtue epistemology. It is virtue epistemological in that it ventures to analyse justified belief in terms of exercises of cognitive abilities. It is knowledge first epistemological in that, unlike traditional virtue epistemology, it does not unpack the notion of a cognitive ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know, thus offering a definition of justified belief in terms of knowledge. Finally, this paper aims to show that this knowledge first virtue epistemological account of knowledge and justified belief offers promising solutions to a number of central problems in epistemology, to wit, the new evil demon problem, the problem of clairvoyant cases and the notorious Gettier problem.

Igal Kwart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel)
The Steering Role Knowledge: The Pragmatics of Knowledge

In this talk, I lay out an account of the pragmatics of Knowledge, which handles the standard examples propelled by Epistemic Contextualism and Pragmatic Encroachment approaches, and offer, I submit, an alternative to them and a better account of the semantics of knowledge ascriptions, which has been widely discussed in Philosophy over the past couple of decades. Epistemic Contextualism and Pragmatic Encroachment (most notably represented by Subject-Sensitive Invariantism – SSI) offered accounts of knowledge in which contextual standards or stakes play a major role in the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. These accounts were propelled mostly by examples that seemed to require a pragmatic component in the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions in order to be accounted for.

By contrast, I offer a pragmatic account which, I claim, explains the examples in question, and specifically their clear pragmatic character within the pragmatic field, obviating the need for introducing pragmatic ingredients into the semantics of knowledge ascriptions that invoke contextual standards or stakes. The main pragmatic components I employ are that of rational assertibility and especially what, I argue, is a specific pragmatic role of the use of knowledge, notable mostly when joint deliberation is invoked, which resorts to the Practical Inference heuristic. By accounting for the intuitions associated with the paradigmatic examples, this account offers new insights and constraints on the methodology of using intuitions as evidence for semantic features, with a variety of repercussions vis-à-vis other logical and methodological issues.

Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University, USA)
What Is Justified Group Belief?

Groups are often said to believe things. For instance, we talk about PETA believing that factory farms should be abolished, the Catholic Church believing that the Pope is infallible, and the U.S. government believing that people have the right to free speech. Some of these beliefs amount to knowledge while others do not, with at least one of the features distinguishing these two categories being epistemic justification. But how should we understand a group's justifiedly believing that *p*? Perhaps the most intuitive answer is what has come to be known as *summativism*, according to which the justification of a group's belief is understood simply in terms of the justification of the individual members' beliefs. Recently, summativism has come under repeated attack from *divergence arguments*, which purport to show that there can be a divergence between the justificatory status of a group's beliefs and the status of the beliefs of the group's members. In particular, it is claimed that a group may justifiedly believe that *p*, even though not a single one of its members justifiedly believes that *p*. If this is the case, two conclusions are said to follow—a negative and a positive one. The former is:

Non-Summativism: A group, G , justifiedly believing that p cannot be understood in terms of some or all of G 's members justifiedly believing that p .

The positive conclusion is:

Inflationism: A group, G , justifiedly believing that p is understood in terms of the group itself justifiedly believing that p , where this is over and above, or otherwise distinct from, any individual member of G justifiedly believing that p .

In this paper, I will argue for three theses: (1) current inflationary, non-summative accounts of the justification of group beliefs succumb to a devastating objection, which I call the Illegitimate Manipulation of Evidence Problem, (2) classic divergence arguments fail to undermine summativism, and (3) the justification of group beliefs should be understood in broadly summative terms.

Christopher Lepock (University of Alberta, Canada)

To Reliability and Beyond

Mark Alfano and others have argued that people are too susceptible to situational influences for them to have robust intellectual virtues of the sort championed by responsibilists. I am willing to concede the apparent nonexistence of global cognitive traits, but situational influences still do not preclude using responsibilist virtue terms to evaluate agents. Having broad capacities - being able to acquire true beliefs over a range of situations and problems - is epistemically valuable. Breadth is a matter of degree, and I will argue that virtue-talk commends agents for having relatively broad capacities rather than for having global character traits. One interesting feature of this approach is that it subsumes some accounts of virtues that are presented as alternatives to traditional virtue theory, such as Alfano's "factitious virtue".

Clayton Littlejohn (King's College London, UK)

Knowledge, Reasons, and Causes (Again)

A standard view about epistemic reasons is that they're states of mind. A standard rationale for this statist view is that it's needed to understand the basing relation, the relation that holds for one's beliefs and the reasons for which one believes. There are two problems with the statist view. It's false and it's unmotivated. I'll explain why the standard causalist argument for statism fails. (The argument can be traced back to Davidson's defense of causalism, but Davidson's work on causal relations gives us good reason to reject the argument.) On the statist view I'll reject, having a reason is really just a matter of having an attitude. On the factualist view I'll defend, we need a more complicated account of having a reason. I'll offer an account of what reasons are, what it takes to have them, and explain why this account threatens to undermine some orthodox views about the relationship between justification and knowledge.

Jack Lyons (University of Arkansas, USA)

Unconscious Evidence

What, if any, epistemic role can be played by beliefs that are not consciously tokened? I argue that some, but not all, unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence. Which ones can serve as evidence? Roughly, those that occur outside of modular systems, which are roughly those to which the agent has in-principle access, which are roughly those that are, in Henderson and Horgan's terms, nonmorphological. This proposal makes sense on intuitive grounds as well as on theoretical grounds having to do with the personal/subpersonal distinction. I contrast it with proposals by Feldman, Henderson and Horgan, and Smithies.

Maja Malec (Central European University)

Against the Psychological View of Intuitions

In several articles, Alvin Goldman has defended the psychological view of intuitions, on which philosophers

rely when validating a philosophical theory. According to him, when philosophers engage in philosophical analysis, they try to shed light on the concepts behind interesting predicates, that is in-the-head psychological entities, which he primarily understands as personal psychological concepts. In their elucidation we rely on the application intuitions we have concerning actual and hypothetical cases – e.g. the intuition that Gettier's examples are not instances of knowing. Since these intuitions constitute evidence for personal psychological concepts, Goldman claims that it is easy to explain the reliability of intuitions and their place within the naturalistic framework. In this talk I will show that the psychological view of intuitions is based on the wrong understanding of philosophical analysis – its target are not our (personal or commonly shared) concepts of things, but the nature of things themselves. However, if intuitions are only reliable evidence for the content of our concepts (e. i., our concept of knowledge), then how do we know that our concepts “mirror” reality (e. i., the real nature of knowledge)?

Emily McWilliams (Harvard University, USA)
Re-Evaluating Belief Polarization

In his paper, “Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization”¹, Tom Kelly identifies a phenomenon that he refers to as *belief polarization*. It is an empirical phenomenon that happens when subjects who disagree about some non-straightforward matter of fact are exposed to a mixed body of evidence that bears on the disputed question. While we might expect that mutual exposure to common evidence would tend to mitigate a disagreement (since the evidence available to subjects comes to consist increasingly of common items), this is in fact the opposite of what happens. Exposure to the mixed batch of evidence makes the subjects' initial disagreement even *more* pronounced; that is, their beliefs become *polarized*. Kelly's paper aims to identify the mechanisms that underlie this phenomenon and to assess the normative, epistemic issues that arise from it. Ultimately, he arrives at the conclusion that the polarized beliefs are in good epistemic standing; that is, that the justificatory status of the subjects' beliefs is not undermined by their being the result of the mechanisms that underlie polarization. I will take on board Kelly's basic description of the mechanisms that underlie polarization, but will challenge his view of how we should think about the normative issues that arise from it.

Nenad Mišćević (Central European University and University of Maribor, Slovenia)
Aspiring and thought-experimenting

The epistemology of political theorizing points to the central importance of thought experiments in political philosophy. The paper sketches a mini theory of such thought experiments, stressing the role of understanding (as opposed to mere particular items of knowledge) provided by good and famous historical thought experiments, from Plato to authors like Rawls, Dworkin and G.A. Cohen.

The second part of the paper addresses the lines of discussion dealing with issues usually addressed by thought experiments, but under different headings, and most often not mentioning them explicitly. It concentrates upon a recent debate about *utopophobia* and aspirational theory, centered around the work of David Estlund, and tries to link it explicitly to the problematic of thought experiments.

Nikolaj Nottelmann (University of Southern Denmark)
In Search of a Proper Explanandum for Robust Virtue Epistemology

According to one of its most persistent critics, Duncan Pritchard, Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) understands knowledge as cognitive success that is because of cognitive ability. Pritchard has argued that on a closer inspection this conception fails properly to respect anti-luck intuitions pertaining to knowledge. He has also argued that tinkering with the notion of cognitive ability cannot help RVE deliver a more satisfactory account of knowledge. In this paper I argue that even if Pritchard is correct in his latter diagnosis, the time has not yet come to abandon the RVE program: So far, in the RVE context, cognitive success has been conceived of rather minimally, as simply the achievement of true belief in the relevant target proposition. But reflection

on a number of key cases will show that RVE is better served with a more substantial and sophisticated notion of cognitive success; the expandum to which a manifestation of cognitive ability must be relevantly related in order for knowledge to obtain on the RVE account. This enhanced notion of cognitive success will offer new resources with regard to gaining a proper perspective on anti-luck intuitions. Or at least so I shall argue.

Nikolaj Pedersen (Yonsei University, South Korea)

Disagreement and Action: An Argument Against (Strong) Non-Conformism

Recently there has been a surge of interest in the intersection between epistemology and action theory, especially in principles linking justification (or rationality) in thought and justification (or rationality) in action. Recently there has also been a surge of interest in the epistemic significance of perceived peer disagreement: what, epistemically speaking, is the rational response in light of disagreement with someone whom one regards as an epistemic peer? First, I will turn to the idea that the normative standing of our actions depends on the normative standing of our beliefs. This is an idea that I endorse. More precisely, I will endorse a principle according to which adequate epistemic justification for beliefs pertaining to success conditions for a given goal-directed action is a necessary condition on rational execution of that action. Second, against the background of this principle, I offer a criticism of strong non-conformism—a view that has received considerable attention in the literature on disagreement.

Joel Pust (University of Delaware, USA)

Beauty, Temporally Indexical Knowledge and Updating

After a brief account of recent work on the Sleeping Beauty Problem, I discuss and criticize a new attempt to defend the thirder solution.

Baron Reed (Northwestern University, USA)

TBA

Indrek Reiland (University of Southern California, USA)

Seeings and Seemings

Contemporary philosophers working on perception focus on the large part on the following three questions: (1) *What is it to perceptually experience?* Is it to be *presented* with objects instantiating properties out in the world (*Naïve Realism*) or is it to stand in a *sui generis* propositional attitude to a proposition that *represents* objects *as* having properties out in the world (*Representationalism*)? (2) *Which properties can we perceptually experience?* Can we perceptually experience only low-level properties like color and shape (*Low-Levelism*) or also high-level properties like natural and functional kind properties (*being a pine tree, being a computer*) (*High-Levelism*)? (3) *Are perceptual experiences conceptual or non-conceptual?* Is what we can perceptually experience unconstrained by what we can think about (*Non-Conceptualism*) or does perceptually experiencing something already involve the employment of our conceptual capacities (*Conceptualism*)?

On the face of it, those opting for *Naïve Realism*, *Low-Levelism*, and *Non-Conceptualism* often motivate their views in intimately connected ways (examples to be given). Similarly, those opting for *Representationalism*, *High-Levelism*, and *Conceptualism* also motivate their views in intimately connected ways (examples to be given). Thus, on a naïve way of looking at the above three questions, there are two sets of answers which belong naturally together because they've been motivated on intimately connected ways. However, it should also be clear that each set has been motivated in very different ways. Those adopting the first set of answers tend to look more to *philosophy of mind* or perception itself. In contrast, those adopting the second set of answers tend to look more to *epistemology* or perception as input to belief and knowledge. It's therefore natural for somebody not antecedently committed to either set of answers to think that perhaps the disagreement is based on a false assumption and that both sides are right, just not about the same thing.

In this paper I will suggest that the disagreement is indeed based a false assumption, the assumption

that perception consists of a single conscious mental event, *perceptual experience*. Instead, I'll present an independently plausible view on which perception involves (at least) *two different types* of conscious mental events, *seeings* and *seemings*, and argue for it by showing how it enables both sides in the above debates to be right, each about one these two events. The upshot is a view, the *Seeing-Seeming* view, which shows both how perception is special in being more fundamental than propositional attitudes, but doesn't make it puzzling how it can provide us with reasons for our empirical judgments and beliefs."

Darrell Rowbottom (Lingnam University, China)
Social Epistemology of Science, Group Level Probabilities, and Identification

In this talk, I will provide an overview of some of my work on social epistemological issues over the past three years.

First, I will defend my conception of scientific method as a group level issue, as discussed in Rowbottom (2010 & 2013b). This not only dispels old debates about what the ideal scientist should be like, e.g. critical or dogmatic, but also heralds a new computational research programme.

Second, I will present some novel group-level theories of probability, and defend one in particular, following Rowbottom (2013a).

Third, only if time permits (really!), I will outline a new game-theoretic model of identification, which avoids problems with existing alternatives and provides resources for capturing the notion that identification comes in degrees (following Rowbottom 2012).

The new tools introduced in the second and third parts of the talk – the theories of probability and model of identification, that is to say – feed into the research programme outlined in the first. More particularly, they promise new simulation possibilities.

Gerhard Schurz (University of Düsseldorf, Germany)
Social Spread of Knowledge: The Epistemic Surplus Value of Justification

A necessary and sufficient condition for the spread of knowledge within a community of epistemic agents is their capability to distinguish between reliable information (coming from genuine experts) and non-reliable information (coming from pseudo-experts).

For this purpose it is necessary that expert-information is not only reliable (which is required by the externalist concept of knowledge), but that there exist indicators of reliability which are epistemically accessible to the individuals of the community.

I argue for three points: (1) Indicators of reliability are eventually based on meta-inductive inferences. Meta-induction can be shown to be universally optimal, and to be reliable in a broad class of environments.

(2) The significance of justification - the internalist condition of knowledge - consists in providing reliability-indicators.

(3) The epistemic surplus value of the condition of justification in the concept of knowledge consists in making it possible that knowledge can spread in a community of social learners.

I will illustrate my theses by computer-simulations about the spread of knowledge in social networks of epistemic agents.

Danilo Šuster (University of Maribor, Slovenia)
Modal stability and restricted sensitivity

I explore the condition of restricted sensitivity as a proper reliability condition for non-accidental connection between our belief and the truth of our belief. "When it is seriously possible for you to falsely believe that p," that is a good reason for denying that you know that p. Sensitivity within limits requires that we consider more possible worlds (all within a sphere of serious or relevant possibilities) than classical sensitivity, but not the worlds outside this sphere. The idea of modal stability combines robustness (benefits of safety) with responsiveness to facts (benefits of sensitivity).

Ruth Weintraub (Tel Aviv University, Israel)
A New Solution to the Problem of Peer Disagreement

In this paper, I defend a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement: how should you respond when you learn that your “epistemic peer” disagrees with you about some issue (tomorrow’s weather, the permissibility of abortion, the existence of universals)? I consider three (familiar) test cases that together impugn every extant theory about peer disagreement. I present my own solution, show that it delivers the intuitive verdict in the test cases and argue that it is not *ad hoc*, merely designed to accommodate the test cases, but arises from independently motivated (albeit contentious) assumptions about 2nd-order evidence and justification. Finally, I address some objections.

Jan Willem Wieland & Maarten Van Dyck (Ghent University, Netherlands)
Epistemic Rationality and The Unquiry Problem

According to Feldman's influential evidentialism, epistemic rationality requires that we follow the evidence we have at the time. A main problem with this view, which we call the Unquiry Problem, is that it allows us to avoid our epistemic obligations by avoiding evidence. At present, two resolutions to this problem have been proposed: dropping evidentialism in favour of virtue epistemology, or sticking to evidentialism and denying that there really is a problem. In this paper, we explore a third way that both acknowledges the problem and yet proposes solutions that remain within evidentialist boundaries. According to the position that we will defend, epistemic rationality should not be too hard (requiring that we adjust our beliefs to all evidence that is objectively available), yet it should not be too easy either (requiring that we adjust our beliefs only to evidence that is subjectively available).

Sarah Wright (University of Georgia, USA)
The Epistemic Virtues of Groups

How do epistemic virtues, ordinarily applied to individual cognizers, apply to groups acting for epistemic purposes? In this paper I will lay out two very different types of epistemic goals, based on a distinction from the ancient Stoics between the *telos* of our lives and the *skopos* of our actions. I will examine the ways that aiming at these two types of epistemic goals interact in the individualistic epistemic virtues, and then extend this model to cover group epistemic virtues. In particular, the *telos* of a group seems to have a different structure from the *telos* of a human epistemic life. Since the epistemic (or non-epistemic) *telos* of a group is often freely chosen, stated explicitly, and can be wildly variable between different groups, it may appear that there is no fixed *telos* of groups to which we can appeal. I argue that, at least for groups composed of human beings, human nature sets some limits on the possible *teloi* of that group, giving a more unified approach to group *teloi* and resulting in at least some features that must be shared between epistemically virtuous groups. As for the specific goals that are our individual epistemic *skopoi* of obtaining true beliefs in particular areas of inquiry, I will argue that a natural extension of the *skopos* of the individual to the *skopos* of the group allows for a focus either on epistemic states of the collective group or on epistemic states of its members (or both).

