

Ethical Issues: Theoretical and Applied

XXth Bled Philosophical Conference

<http://www.bled-conference.si>

June 4th – 8th, 2012

Bled, Hotel Kompas


Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science

Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

<http://www.dafz.si>

Philosophical conferences at Bled (Slovenia) were initiated, on the suggestion by John Biro, in 1993 at first as a continuation of the IUC - Dubrovnik postgraduate course in philosophy but they gradually started a life of their own, with the help, first of Eugene Mills and then Mylan Engel Jr. The first week of June is traditionally reserved for a conference dedicated to various topics in the field of analytical philosophy. ***Ethical Issues: Theoretical and Applied*** is the twentieth Bled Philosophical Conference. All events take place in Hotel Kompas, Cankarjeva 2, Bled (Triglavska and Grajska dvorana).

The 2012 conference is organized by a team consisting of *Alastair Norcross* of the University of Colorado at Boulder, *Matjaž Potrč* of the University of Ljubljana, *Nenad Miščević* and *Danilo Šuster* of the University of Maribor, and *Tea Logar*. The conference is included in the program of the activities of the Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy. A special issue of *Acta Analytica* (<http://rcum.uni-mb.si/~actaana/>) will publish (selected and refereed) papers from the conference.



PROGRAM

Monday, June 4

A.M.

- 9:00-9:10 Welcoming remarks
- 9:10-10:10 Steven Luper, Trinity University
"Retroactive Harms and Wrongs"
- 10:20-11:20 Saul Smilansky, University of Haifa
"The Moral Evaluation of Past Tragedies: A New Puzzle"
- 11:30-12:30 Tea Logar
"Mere Means, Consent, and Exploitation"

P.M.

- 2:30-3:30 Neera K. Badhwar, University of Oklahoma/George Mason University, and
Russell Jones, Harvard University
"Aristotle on the Complete Friendship of Incompletely Virtuous People"
- 3:45-4:45 Molly Gardner, University of Wisconsin Madison, and
Justin Weinberg, University of South Carolina
"How to Count Value"
- 5:00-6:00 Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Lund University
"Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited"
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Tuesday, June 5

A.M.

- 9:00-10:00 (A) Steven Arkonovich, Reed College
"Reasons, Happiness, and Ideal Advisors."
- 9:00-10:00 (B) Boran Berčić, University of Rijeka
"Internalism and Externalism"
- 10:15-11:15 (A) Spencer Case, University of Colorado Boulder
"Copp's Reasons Pluralism: A Response"
- 10:15-11:15 (B) Richard Hofmann, University of Graz
"Weakness of Will and Motivational Internalism/Externalism"
- 11:30-12:30 (A) Scott O'Leary, University of Saint Mary
"Why Passion Is Not Enough"
- 11:30-12:30 (B) Julian Fink, University of Vienna
"Applying Ethical Theory to the 'Content Problem' of Rational Requirements"

P.M.

- 2:30-3:30 (A) Kelly Heuer, Georgetown University
"The Paradox of Supererogation, Revisited"
- 2:30-3:30 (B) Matej Sušnik, University of Rijeka
"Strong Motivational Internalism"
- 3:45-4:45 (A) Iddo Landau, University of Haifa
"Meaning of Life and Happiness"
- 3:45-4:45 (B) Matjaž Potrč, University of Ljubljana
"Nondescriptive Cognitivism and Error Theory"
- 5:00-6:00 (A) Mateja Pevec Rozman, University of Ljubljana
"The Relationship between Virtue and Knowledge: How We Should Live"
- 5:00-6:00 (B) Vojko Strahovnik, University of Primorska
"The Phenomenology of Moral Judgment: Between Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism"
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Wednesday, June 6**A.M.**

- 9:00-10:00 Olga Markič, University of Ljubljana
"Is Neuroscience of Ethics Dangerous for Ethics?"
- 10:15-11:15 Friderik Klampfer, University of Maribor
"Consequentializing moral responsibility"
- 11:30-12:30 Matthew Smith, Yale University/Leeds University
"Bootstrapping and the Authority of Intentions"

P.M.

Free time.

Thursday, June 7**A.M.**

- 9:00-10:00 Brent Franklin, Central European University
"First Contact: Respecting the Cultural Autonomy of Uncontacted Peoples"
- 10:15-11:15 Amber L. Griffioen, University of Konstanz
"Regaining the 'Lost Self': A Philosophical Analysis of Survivor's Guilt"
- 11:30-12:30 Dejan Savić, University of Ljubljana
"Is Traditional Ethics Sufficient for Climate Change Challenges or Do We Need New Ethics?"

P.M.

2:30-3:30 Adam Hosein, University of Colorado Boulder
"Contractualism, Politics and Morality"

3:45-4:45 Nenad Miščević, University of Maribor
"Social Contract as a Thought Experiment"

Evening

Conference dinner, location TBA

Friday, June 8

A.M.

9:00-10:00 Tom Douglas, University of Oxford
"Parental Partiality and the Intergenerational Transmission of Advantage"

10:15-11:15 Katrien Devolder, Bioethics Institute, Ghent University
"Killing Discarded Embryos and the Nothing-Is-Lost Principle"

11:30-12:30 Eugene Mills, Virginia Commonwealth University
"Abortion and the Ontology of Persons"

P.M.

2:30-3:30 Mylan Engel Jr., Northern Illinois University
"Do Animals Have Rights, and Does It Matter if They Don't?"

3:45-4:45 Alastair Norcross, University of Colorado Boulder
"Subjects of a Life, Marginal Cases, and the Argument from Risk"

4:45-5:00 Closing remarks

ABSTRACTS

Steven Arkonovich, Reed College
Reasons, Happiness, and Ideal Advisors

A common way of developing a subjectivist account of practical reason is to hold that what an agent has reason to do is what she *would* want to do if she were fully rational. A common way of developing a subjectivist account of happiness is to hold that an agent is happy if her life goes according to a life plan she *would* endorse if she rationally reflected upon it. Both theories make use of subjunctive conditionals in their definitions. Both, therefore, are vulnerable to the same sort of error — the error of committing the so-called “conditional fallacy.” The conditional fallacy is committed whenever a subjunctive analysis yields a mistaken result because realizing the antecedent of the conditional changes the state of affairs being analyzed. For example, we might think Joe has reason to go to the library because he is ignorant of some fact. Yet trying to analyze Joe’s reasons by appeal to what Joe *would* want if he were fully rational will yield the wrong result. If Joe *were* fully rational, he would not be ignorant of the relevant fact, and so would not want to go to the library.

These difficulties have persuaded philosophers to move to what I call “ideal advisor” accounts. Such accounts do not ask, “What *would* the agent be motivated to do or endorse in certain counterfactual circumstances?” Rather, the accounts tell us to imagine an idealized counterpart of the agent, the ideal evaluator, and ask, “What would the ideal evaluator want the actual agent to do in the actual circumstances?” Michael Smith and Peter Railton give such an account of reasons. And Jussi Suikkanen has recently given a variation of a life satisfaction theory of happiness that appeals to ideal advisors.

I want to argue that in both cases an appeal to an ideal evaluator does not improve matters. This is because both an agent’s reasons and her happiness are crucially tied to a first-personal deliberative perspective, as expressed in the capacity to recognize her own reasons, or endorse her own life plans. Ideal advisor accounts overlook this. They end up ascribing reasons that agents could not recognize as their own, and specifying conditions for happiness that they could not endorse. I claim, therefore, that these accounts should be rejected.

Neera K. Badhwar, University of Oklahoma/ George Mason University,
 Russell Jones, Harvard University
Aristotle on the Complete Friendship of Incompletely Virtuous People

“[C]omplete friendship,” says Aristotle, “is the friendship of good people similar in virtue” (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1156b 7). Differences of age and status, or the inability to spend time together, can prevent two people from becoming friends even if they are virtuous (VIII.7). And if friends are separated by distance, their friendship becomes hard or impossible to maintain (VIII.5). But in the absence of these barriers of age, status, time, and distance, all that is required for a complete friendship, Aristotle often suggests, is virtue, because to love another for who she is, for herself, is to love her for her virtues. This strikes us as a psychologically unrealistic and incomplete conception of complete friendship. There is more to a person’s identity, and more to her desirability as a friend, than merely her virtues. To love an individual for who she is is to love her not only as a virtuous human being, but also as someone with certain likes and dislikes, interests and activities, and certain personality traits. If we loved our friends only for their virtues, we could potentially love all virtuous people equally. But although

there are no psychological barriers to admiring all virtuous people equally, it seems implausible to hold that we can love all of them equally, can desire to be friends with all of them equally, even if we meet them at the same time and there are no barriers of age, status, or distance. It simply is *not* the case that all virtuous people can be each other's "other selves," as Aristotle insists they must be to be friends. Elijah Millgram attempts to explain this fact without appealing to non-moral properties, but his explanation just pushes the problem one step back. A plausible conception of friendship must acknowledge that there is more to a shared life than merely shared virtue. And, indeed, attention to certain neglected texts in the *NE* reveals that this richer, more plausible picture of friendship, though not recognized by commentators, is embedded in Aristotle's account, and needs only to be highlighted.

Boran Berčić, University of Rijeka

Internalism and Externalism

Externalists hold that the conceptual impossibility of the amoralist is an absurd consequence of the internalism and that therefore we should reject internalism and accept externalism. However, just as the conceptual impossibility of the *amoralist* is a consequence of the internalism, the conceptual impossibility of the *moralist* is a consequence of the externalism; if beliefs cannot move to action, then it is *impossible that anybody does X just because he believes he has to do X*. The consequence of the externalism is not only that moral beliefs are sometimes not sufficient for moral acting, but that they are *never* sufficient for moral acting. Therefore, *the mere logical possibility that the moralist exists is sufficient to show that externalism is untenable*. However, it seems not only that the moralist is a conceptual possibility, but that *in fact* there are innumerable cases of a moralism.

It is obvious that we do many things because we believe we have to do them, no matter whether we desire to do them or not. Doctor on a vacation does not need a desire to help a man who has a heart attack; policeman does not need a desire to prevent a disorder; professor does not need a desire to give a C; etc, they all do that because they believe they have to do it. It would be nice that our desires always coincide with what we have to do, however, unfortunately that is often not so. Hence, no matter whether the amoralist is conceptually possible or not, acting out of duty is in fact very widespread and the internalist model of the moral motivation is *in fact* true. It is a further question whether that model should be a raw model for building ethical theory, that is, should insight of one's own duty be the only relevant basis for ethical theory or we should rely on desires, emotions, character traits and other non-cognitive states and properties.

Spencer Case, University of Colorado Boulder

Copp's Reasons Pluralism: A Response

David Copp has defended a version of Reasons Pluralism according to which all practical reasons are bound to "standpoints." That is, reasons may be compared in terms of normative weight with other reasons within the same standpoint, but they can't be compared with reasons of different standpoints. Since Copp believes that morality and prudence are different standpoints, he is committed to the view that moral reasons and prudential reasons cannot be compared in terms of absolute normative weight. I disagree. Here, I present an explication and critique of both Copp's conception of normativity and his argument for Reasons Pluralism.

Katrien Devolder, Ghent University

Killing Discarded Embryos and the Nothing-Is-Lost Principle

A widely held view holds that it is permissible to conduct destructive research on embryos discarded following fertility treatment, but not on embryos especially created for research. One argument in support of this view appeals to the nothing-is-lost principle. It holds that because discarded embryos will die soon in any case, and something good is expected to come out of using them for research, it is presumptively permissible to do so. It is then claimed that no equivalent justification can be adduced in support of destructive research on embryos especially created for research. I argue that, on a standard formulation of the nothing-is-lost principle, this argument fails. I consider whether other plausible variants of the principle render the argument sound and argue that they do not.

Tom Douglas, University of Oxford

Parental Partiality and the Intergenerational Transmission of Advantage

Parents are typically partial to their own children. They typically direct more time, effort, money and emotional support to their own children than to other children. This partiality can confer unfair advantages on the child. Nevertheless, many philosophers have defended it, maintaining that it is often legitimate to be partial to one's child even when this can be expected to result in unfair advantages.

Defenders of parental partiality frequently attempt to establish its legitimacy by appealing to the special relationship that obtains between a parent and child. In this talk, I raise a problem for such relationship-based defences of parental partiality. Since economic and social advantages are often reliably transmitted across generations within families, when a parent confers an advantage on her child through parental partiality, she frequently thereby also confers advantages on her grandchildren, great-grandchildren and so on. I argue that the conferral of these 'transmitted' advantages calls for justification and that relationship-based defences of parental partiality are not able to furnish this. I then briefly consider the implications of my argument for (i) the legitimacy of parental partiality, and (ii) the legitimacy of other kinds of partiality that are frequently justified by appeal to special relationships.

Mylan Engel Jr., Northern Illinois University

Do Animals Have Rights, and Does It Matter if They Don't?

I develop and defend a conditional proof that animals have negative moral rights including the right to life, the right to bodily integrity, the right not to be tortured, and the right not to be harmed. I argue that most people are rationally committed to the view that animals have such negative rights, on pain of inconsistency. I then consider what duties we have to animals, if the condition on which I predicate my conditional proof of animal rights fails to obtain. I conclude that even if animals don't have rights, we still have stringent duties not to harm or kill them.

Julian Fink, University of Vienna

Applying Ethical Theory to the 'Content Problem' of Rational Requirements

Suppose rationality requires Daniel to intend to A whenever Daniel believes he ought to A. Call this requirement R. Suppose Daniel believes that he ought to drink less coffee, yet he does not intend to drink less coffee. Obviously, Daniel violates an instance of R. But what is the exact content of the requirement Daniel violates? Is it (i) Daniel intends to drink less coffee? Or is it (ii) if Daniel believes that he ought to drink less coffee, then Daniel intends to drink less coffee.

This paper seeks to settle the question whether R takes (i) or (ii) as its content. I will argue we can solve this question by applying ethical theory to this problem. In particular, I will show that the theoretical distinction between teleological and non-teleological ethical theories proves useful in order to decide whether (i) or (ii) states the correct content of R.

Brent Franklin, Central European University

First Contact: Respecting the Cultural Autonomy of Uncontacted Peoples

First contact is a term from anthropology and science fiction that refers to the first encounter with a culture or society that was previously unaware of your own. The decision whether to initiate first contact is a decision that is necessarily unilateral since involving the other culture in the decision would require already establishing contact. This poses a problem for their cultural autonomy, insofar as cultural autonomy is defined to include the right to steer the development of one's own culture and since first contact can have serious repercussions on a culture's worldview. A first concern is that the decision to initiate first contact would be made without the consent of the culture which will be impacted. A second concern is that if contact is made, the ensuing influence would itself be an imposition that violates autonomous cultural development. I argue against each of these concerns, concluding that initiating first contact does not intrinsically impede cultural autonomy.

I frame the discussion in terms of *Star Trek's* fictional Prime Directive policy, as a thought experiment that lets us focus on idealized cases with perfectly isolated cultures. I also look at applications to Brazilian policy regarding contact with isolated indigenous peoples and discuss circumstances that alter the assumed conditions of the above discussion.

Molly Gardner, University of Wisconsin Madison

Justin Weinberg, University of South Carolina

How to Count Value

How do we determine the quantity of value in a state of affairs? One common answer to this question is:

The Actual View: The quantity of value in a state of affairs is equivalent to its *actual value*, namely, the sum of all of the positive value actualized in that state of affairs minus the sum of all the negative value actualized in that state of affairs.

The Actual View is unsatisfactory. While it agrees with our considered judgments in some cases, in other cases it leads to problems, such as Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion

and his Mere Addition Paradox, and a newer problem that arises from the Non-Identity Problem, which we call False Equivalence.

In this paper, we develop an alternative account of how to quantify the value of states of affairs. We argue that this account is more successful in confronting the three aforementioned problems and that it also helps explain our judgments in various other cases in which the Non-Identity Problem arises. Further, it accomplishes this without raising greater problems, such as the rejection of the transitivity of the “better-than” relation. Our account works by taking into consideration two factors that *The Actual View* does not, which we call *ideal value* and *modal distance*. “Ideal value” is the highest net value that could have been realized. “Modal distance” measures how different the world would be if the ideal value were realized. Discounting ideal value for modal distance yields *modally adjusted ideal value*. This latter idea plays a central role in our account, which we call:

The Non-Ideal View: The quantity of value in a state of affairs is equivalent to its *non-ideal value*, namely, the *actual* value of that state of affairs minus the difference between its modally adjusted ideal value and its actual value.

In addition to its problem-avoiding capacities, *The Non-Ideal View* has independent intuitive appeal. It embodies two widely held ideas about assessing value, namely that how good or bad a state of affairs is depends in part on how things otherwise might have been, and that missed opportunities count for more in our understanding of the quality of our lives the nearer the miss.

Amber L. Griffioen, University of Konstanz

Regaining the “Lost Self”: A Philosophical Analysis of Survivor's Guilt

While there is significant philosophical literature on shame and guilt, there has been woefully little written on the topic of survivor's guilt (except as a problem case that should be distinguished from other cases of guilt). In this paper, I hope to remedy this lack of discussion by looking at the connection between the guilt experienced by trauma survivors and various forms of irrationality. The causes of trauma (be they personal perpetrators of physical or emotional violence or impersonal events beyond the agent's control) almost inevitably impede or even annihilate the agency of their victims (either as an intended aim of the violence itself or as the necessary consequence of the traumatic event(s) in question). I will argue that survivor's guilt of the type in question often stems from a motivation on the part of the survivor to attribute to herself in memory precisely the kind of autonomy that the traumatic event(s) precluded her from exercising at the time and that survivor's guilt serves the function of allowing survivors of trauma to escape the shame of victimhood and powerlessness by retrospectively attributing a sense of responsibility (and therefore of agency) to themselves. I will examine the connections between the “irrationality” of the emotion of survivor's guilt and other, more garden-variety forms of irrationality, such as wishful belief, superstitious/magical thinking, and self-deception, and will use this discussion as a springboard to raise a few questions about the “morality” of survivor's guilt and its implications for the therapeutic treatment of survivors.

Kelly Heuer, Georgetown University
The Paradox of Supererogation, Revisited

This paper reconsiders the paradox of supererogation—how some normative domain can fail to identify as ‘to-be-done’ the thing which is, by its own lights, best—by contrasting our most plausible accounts of non-moral supererogation, structurally, with our best cross-theoretical understanding of moral supererogation. I argue that a particular structure characterizes standard accounts of moral supererogation, a structure that poses challenges for other normative domains which lack this structure. These obstacles shed light on recent attempts to defend the possibility of epistemic and rational supererogation—especially rational—a light which those defenders should find unflattering indeed. The analysis allows us to see both why the phenomenon of rational supererogation has appeared plausible, and why those appearances are, most likely, illusory.

Richard Paul Hofmann, University of Graz
Weakness of Will and Motivational Internalism/Externalism

I will focus on the question whether the phenomenon of weakness of will understood as intentional and avoidable action against the own better judgment has (some) impact on the debate between motivational internalism and externalism. Motivational judgment internalism claims that there is a conceptually necessary connection between sincere first person normative judgments (‘I ought to do F’) and being motivated to act accordingly (do F). Motivational judgment externalism denies this connection: not every sincere normative judgment implies corresponding motivation. Motivational reasons internalism is a claim about the relation between normative reasons and motivational states of agents. I will only consider the relation between motivational judgment internalism and weakness of will.

My thesis is that the phenomenon of weakness of will has due to its controversial and doubtful character hardly any impact on this debate. The force of any argument which starts from weakness of will as one of its premises or as a counter-example to these theories can easily be rejected by doubting a) the existence of the phenomenon or b) the alleged description of the phenomenon. Despite this negative result I will criticize some weak versions of motivational internalism for taking too easy the challenge weakness of will provides. Especially I will consider the importance of proportionalism, the idea that the motivational force of normative judgments is proportional to the degree of belief of the agent or the strength of reasons acknowledged by the agent.

Adam Hosein, University of Colorado Boulder
Contractualism, Politics and Morality

I discuss Rawls' contractualist theory of social justice and Scanlon's extension of it to provide a theory of "rightness", or morality more generally. I argue that while there is some justification for adopting a contractualist theory of social justice, this justification does not support a contractualist theory of rightness. This is because social justice is centrally a matter of cooperative fairness whereas rightness is not.

Friderik Klampfer, University of Maribor
Consequentializing Moral Responsibility

Moral responsibility is one of our core moral notions. It figures prominently in our concept of moral agency as well as in some influential accounts of moral wrongness and justice (mainly retributive, but also distributive). Still, in the last century or so the idea that we are (at least sometimes) genuinely responsible – in the sense of being praise- or blameworthy – for what we think, feel and do, has increasingly come into disrepute.

In the paper, I survey some powerful reasons for questioning the traditional alliance between moral responsibility and moral desert. Desert-based accounts of moral responsibility, though no doubt more faithful to our commonsense notion of moral responsibility, tend to run into trouble in the face of challenges posed by a deterministic picture of the world on the one hand and the impact of luck on human action on the other. Besides, grounding responsibility in desert seems to support ascriptions of pathological blame in cases of moral dilemmas as well as of excess blame in cases of joint action. Desert is also notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to determine (or at least to determine with sufficient precision). And finally, though not least important, recent empirical research on people's responsibility judgments revealed the commonsense notion of responsibility to be easily manipulated and hopelessly confused.

So perhaps it's time to rethink our inherited theory and practice of moral responsibility. Our theoretical and practical needs may be better served by a less intractable, more forward-looking notion of responsibility. The aim of the paper is to contrast the predominant, desert-based accounts of moral responsibility with their rather unpopular rival, the consequence-based accounts, and then show that the latter deserve more careful consideration than usually admitted by their opponents. In the course of doing so, I pay close attention, and ultimately reject, the so-called wrong-reason objection against consequentializing moral responsibility. This, I contend, is a lesson that we learn from comparing the practice of praising and blaming agents with a related, yet in certain ways importantly distinct, practice of rewarding and punishing them. Even if my criticism doesn't amount to a compelling case in favor of a revision of our traditional notion of responsibility, it nevertheless presents the consequentialist alternative as a worthy contender to our often unreflective and uncritical ways of thinking about moral responsibility and/or desert.

Iddo Landau, University of Haifa
Meaning of Life and Happiness

Various authors who write on the meaning of life seem not to distinguish between meaningfulness and happiness. I argue that, notwithstanding similarities, the two values should be discerned. After presenting examples of meaningful but unhappy lives, and happy but meaningless ones, I show how the relation of happiness and meaningfulness to other values explains why happiness and meaningfulness in some cases augment and in other cases diminish each other. I claim that we should not always try to increase meaningfulness, or happiness, in our or in other people's lives, and point at some principles for deciding between happiness and meaningfulness when the two values compete. I argue that the analysis holds for both subjectivist and objectivist understandings of the meaning of life.

Tea Logar

Mere Means, Consent, and Exploitation

Kant's *Humanity Formula* (2nd version of the *Categorical Imperative*) requires that one should never treat another person as a mere means, and most interpretations of this requirement focus on the notion of consent: to treat someone as a mere means is to treat someone in a way to which one did not or could not rationally consent. Deception and coercion are offered as obvious instances of such treatment, but it is less clear whether the *Humanity Formula* could also help explain the wrongfulness of exploitation. On the one hand, exploitation seems to be almost synonymous with using people as a mere means to a certain end; on the other hand, it seems clear that people often do consent to being exploited (and that their consent is rational under the circumstances), so the interpretation of the *Humanity Formula* which relies on consent then won't be able to shed much light on exploitation.

If treatment as a mere means has to be in fact understood as something people cannot consent to, then exploitation cannot be defined as an instance of such treatment. The aim of this paper is to expose tensions that arise because of consent-based interpretation of Kant's formula.

Steven Luper, Trinity University

Retroactive Harm

According to the immunity thesis, nothing that happens after we are dead harms or benefits us. If the immunity thesis is true, our prudential horizon is limited to things that happen during the time we exist, and not a moment beyond. Once we die, it makes no sense for others to do anything, like carrying out our final wishes, out of concern for our interests. Meeting our final wishes may even be impossible, since, on one view, it is impossible to fulfill any of our desires after we die. These charges fail if people may be benefitted, and their desires fulfilled, retroactively.

Olga Markič, University of Ljubljana

Is Neuroscience of Ethics Dangerous for Ethics?

The advancements in neuroscience make it possible to get new insights about mental processes that are fundamental for moral reasoning and deliberation. Although we learn more about the biological basis of moral behavior some authors worry that deterministic neuroscience explanations will enhance unethical behavior, as shown in a study by Vohs and Schooler (2008). I will argue against simplistic reductionist and deterministic viewpoints that are mainly supporting concerns about neuroscience of ethics and suggest a pluralist perspective and a careful interpretation of neuroscientific research.

Eugene Mills, Virginia Commonwealth University

Abortion and the Ontology of Persons

You and I are beings endowed with "personal capacities"—the capacity for reason, for a concept of self, perhaps more. Among the ontologically salient views about what else we

are, I focus on the “Big Three.” According to *animalism*, we are animals that have our psychological properties, including our personal capacities, only contingently. According to *psychologistic materialism*, we are material beings that have at least some psychological properties essentially. According to *substance dualism*, we are either immaterial, mental beings or composites of such beings with material ones. It’s natural to think, and it has been argued, that the moral status of abortion depends partly on which of these ontological doctrines is correct, because they yield different verdicts on when we come into existence and consequently different assignments of moral status to developing fetuses. I argue that this is a mistake: none of the Big Three yields different assignments of moral status to the fetus from any of the others, and consequently the moral status of abortion doesn’t depend on which (if any) of these views of personal ontology is correct.

Nenad Miščević, University of Maribor

Social Contract as a Thought Experiment

The paper concerns the methodology of ethico-political thought experiments. Rousseau presents his social contract as a hypothetical construction; we can take it as a thought experiment. The paper looks at the issue of the “control of variables” in such a political thought experiment; it argues that various moral decisions about the political structure sneak into the thought experiment determining basic variables highly relevant for the outcome. Issues that have historically been presented as inner contradictions in Rousseau’s thought thus get articulated within a very general meta-philosophical framework

Alastair Norcross, University of Colorado Boulder

Subjects of a Life, Marginal Cases, and the Argument from Risk

In his seminal work, *The Case for Animal Rights*, and elsewhere, Tom Regan’s criterion for inherent value is being the “experiencing subject of a life” (ESL). This involves more than just sentience, in Peter Singer’s sense of the ability to feel, but requires some cognitive sophistication. An ESL has a welfare that has importance to it, wants and prefers things, believes and feels things, recalls and expects things, has ends of its own. All ESL’s have inherent value, and have it equally. It is highly unlikely that fetuses or newborn mammals (including humans) satisfy the requirements for being an ESL. It doesn’t follow, though, that we should treat fetuses and newborns as if they don’t have inherent value. Regan gives an argument from risk to the conclusion that we should treat these beings as if they have inherent value, even though it’s likely that they don’t have it. I critique this argument, and suggest that a combination of Regan’s subject of a life criterion and Singer’s sentience criterion might give a more satisfactory account of moral status. An ESL is such that it is wrong to kill it without serious justification, and a sentient being is such that its suffering (and flourishing) should be considered equally with the like suffering of other sentient beings. It follows from this position that (painless) infanticide is probably permissible, but that is a bullet worth biting.

Scott O'Leary, University of Saint Mary
Why Passion Is Not Enough

Recently, several philosophers have used emotions to solve the motivational problem, the problem of maintaining that moral judgments are cognitive and motivating. These authors claim emotions are cognitive and affective states, refuting the Humean psychology of mind. Yet, these philosophers all conflate affectivity with conativity. Although emotions are affective, an additional argument is needed to secure the claim that they are motivational states. I argue that McDowell, Zagzebski and Döring each fail to provide a convincing argument for emotions' intrinsic motivational role. Emotions are intimately linked to motivation and practical reasoning, but they are not directly motivational. While I might flee out of fear, I might also aggressively fight back, or "freeze like a deer in the headlights." There is no conceptual connection between a token emotion and a particular motivational response. Thus, emotions fail to solve the motivational problem on these two separate accounts.

Matjaž Potrč, University of Ljubljana
Nondescriptive Cognitivism and Error Theory

Nondescriptive cognitivism is a form of cognitivism, claiming that moral judgments are genuine beliefs and so it tends to lean towards a cognitivist and realist interpretation of morality. On the other hand, by denying moral judgments their descriptive role and by denying the existence of moral properties it is also a form of irrealism. Putting these together, one gets an error theory, with its two ingredients: the embracing of common sense direct realism, and then the irrealist denial of its metaphysical commitments. The resulting theory is incoherent. This may be assessed from the dialectics involved into the phenomenology argument, which at its thetic phase jumps from phenomenological data to metaphysical realist conclusion. Both common sense realism and error theory at the antithetic stage of the phenomenology to metaphysical consequences transition in phenomenological argument stick to the presupposition of strong realism being the only available option. But there is also possibility of weak realism. It is a transglobal realism honoring the nature of the phenomenological argument.

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Lund University
Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited

Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of it being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. However, recently such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason notions rather than only one. The general idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis- à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour the object *on account of* those properties that provide reason for favouring the object in the first place—where "favouring on account of" refers to the agent's so-called motivating reason. This paper discusses this novel approach to fitting-attitude (and buck-passing) analysis: should those considerations (facts or features) that constitute the reason for favouring also be included in the intentional content of the favouring. In other words, should fitting-attitude analysts require a reference to the agent's motivating reason in the analysis? While this enlargement of the original

proposal might seem intuitive given that favourings are discerning attitudes, it is nonetheless argued that proponents of the fitting-attitude analysis are in fact not served by such an expansion of the classical analysis.

Mateja Pevec Rozman, University of Ljubljana

The Relationship between Virtue and Knowledge: How Should We Live?

The fluid postmodern times in which we are living have brought uncertainty in a number of areas of human life. The global recession and economic crisis combined with the low level of political culture (in many EU countries and also in Slovenia) etc. are factors which have greatly affected society in general and human relationships in particular. The challenges we are facing are not merely economic or political, but social and ethical. We can most certainly say that postmodern man is forced to confront the problem of surviving, not only in the material or economic but also in the philosophical sense. How should we live in order to survive in this crisis; how we should live to survive with self, other and another?

Philosophers have offered a variety of solutions (theories) to these questions. In this article we shall consider the proposal offered by virtue ethics. Our thinking will follow three main lines of inquiry: 1. The concept (conceptions) of a virtue. 2. The connection (relationship) between virtue and knowledge. 3. An attempt to answer the central question of virtue ethics: how people should live.

Dejan Savić, University of Ljubljana

Is Traditional Ethics Sufficient for Climate Change Challenges or Do We Need New Ethics?

There is widespread opposition among the advocates of environmental ethics to traditional anthropocentric ethics. Accordingly, most environmentalists proclaim an urgent need to invent a radically new, environmental ethics. Despite there being a number of areas where our moral intuitions require immediate action, and yet traditional ethics seem to imply no corresponding moral obligation, I argue that the insights of traditional ethics are sufficient to address the most important moral issues arising from the challenge posed by global climate change. New eco-centric approaches and related strands of environmental ethics may be useful for reconstructing the frame of mind that brought us into our current predicament in the first place, but this is far from proving traditional ethics outdated or obsolete. The paper aims to show that, once carefully and thoughtfully revised, traditional ethics has the potential to meet the moral challenges posed by the degradation of natural environment and the change of climate.

Saul Smilansky, University of Haifa

The Moral Evaluation of Past Tragedies: A New Puzzle

The past is full of terrible tragedies, including slavery, World War I, and the Holocaust. Morality would clearly appear to support the preference that *the victims of those calamities would have lived free and peaceful lives*. And yet, a Zeno-like puzzle or even a paradox appears to be lurking here. Moral evaluation can be either *personal* or *impersonal*, yet neither one of these two perspectives nor any other prevalent moral evaluation of events

appears to yield the morally expected conclusion. To the best of my knowledge, this puzzle has not been discussed before.

Matthew Smith, Yale University/ University of Leeds

Bootstrapping and the Authority of Intentions

There is an oft-rehearsed objection to the claim that intentions to do something are themselves reasons to do that thing. The objection runs as follows: An intention to ϕ cannot be a reason to ϕ because that would allow for an objectionable form of bootstrapping, where an agent simply intends herself into having a reason where she previously lacked one. This is often called the bootstrapping objection. The bootstrapping objection is meant to support skepticism about intentions having a certain kind of normative significance. If the bootstrapping objection is correct, a person's intentions have, at best, only a contingent bearing on the reasons she has.

The bootstrapping objection is commonly taken to be a matter of first-order philosophy of action. In this essay, I argue that while it has major consequences for the philosophy of action, the bootstrapping objection really expresses a distinctive view about what can ground reasons. That is, it is a view in normative explanation. I then argue that the bootstrapping objection (so understood) can be defeated.

Vojko Strahovnik, University of Primorska

The Phenomenology of Moral Judgment: Between Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism

Recently we witness an increased interest in moral phenomenology as a basis for metaethical debates. Although controversial, appeals to phenomenology of moral experience and phenomenological arguments accompanied the debates in moral theory from the very beginning. An interesting problem arises in cases of conflict where different phenomenological arguments support competing positions. A case of this kind is presented, starting by an argument in support of cognitivism claiming that moral judgments are beliefs because they share fundamental generic, phenomenological and functional features of beliefs. On the other hand, noncognitivists often appeal to cases of moral conflict arguing that these reveal phenomenology of moral judgments as more analogous to desires than to beliefs. In fact both strategies rely more on the psychological than on semantic aspect of (non-)cognitivism. The proposal is to use indirect phenomenological arguments in striving to resolve disputes on the semantical side. One such argument in favour of cognitivism is presented.

Matej Sušnik, University of Rijeka

Strong Motivational Internalism

Strong motivational internalists claim that the relation between moral judgement and motivation is necessary. It is widely accepted that SMI is false because it can't accommodate various phenomena from common experience. In order to make room for these phenomena, motivational internalists usually propose the weak formulation of their thesis. In the first part of the paper I differentiate between several versions of both strong and weak motivational internalism. In the second part I argue that the reasons for endorsing weak motivational internalism of any form are not compelling.