Epistemic Virtue and Value

Epistemska vrlina in vrednota

XVII\textsuperscript{th} Bled Philosophical Conference
http://www.bled-conference.si

June 1\textsuperscript{st} – June 6\textsuperscript{th} 2009
Bled, Hotel Kompas

Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science
Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti
http://www.daf-drustvo.si

\textbullet\ GENERAL INFORMATION

Philosophical conferences at Bled (Slovenia) were initiated, on the suggestion by John Biro, in 1993 at first as a continuation of the IUC - Dubrovnik postgraduate course in philosophy but they gradually started a life of their own, with the help, first of Eugene Mills and then Mylan Engel Jr. The first week of June is traditionally reserved for a conference dedicated to various topics in the field of analytical philosophy. \textit{Epistemic Virtue and Value} is the seventeenth Bled Philosophical Conference. All events take place in Hotel Kompas, Cankarjeva 2, Bled.

The 2009 conference is organized by a team consisting of Wayne D. Riggs (University of Oklahoma), Matjaž Potrč of the University of Ljubljana, Nenad Miščević and Danilo Šuster of the University of Maribor. The conference is included in the program of the activities of the Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy.

\textbullet\ FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Slovenian Research Agency and Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy
PROGRAM

Monday, June 1st
(All talks will take place in the combined room Grajska-Triglavska)

9:45-10:00 Welcoming Remarks
10:00-11:00 Christian Piller, “Aptness and Epistemic Normativity”
11:00-12:00 Adam Morton, “Paradoxical Virtues”
12:00-2:00
2:00-3:00 Klemens Kappel, “Epistemic Expressivism and the Value of Knowledge”
3:00-4:00 Sarah Wright, “Internalist Virtues and Knowledge”
4:00-4:15
4:15-5:15 Matjaž Potrč & Terry Horgan, “The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content”
5:15-6:15 Wayne Riggs, “What is Epistemic Value, Anyway?”

Tuesday, June 2nd

9:00-10:00 Tim Chappell, “On not proportioning your belief to the evidence,” (Grajska)
10:00-11:00 Uriah Kriegel, “Two Notions of Mental Representation” (Grajska)
Baron Reed, “Who Knows?” (Triglavska)
11:00-11:15
11:15-12:15 Jennifer Lackey, “Acting on Knowledge” (Grajska-Triglavska)
12:15-2:15
2:15-3:05 Anne Baril, “A new approach to the problem of significant truths”, (Grajska-Triglavska)
3:05-3:55 TBA
3:55-4:45 Marko Weilguny, “The Bliss of Ignorance?” (Grajska-Triglavska)
4:45-5:00
5:00-6:00 Valerie Tiberius, “Wisdom and Wide Reflective Equilibrium” (Grajska-Triglavska)

Wednesday, June 3rd

9:00-10:00 Igal Kvart, “Cognitive Norms, Cognitive Virtues and Embedded Knowledge” (Grajska)
Michael Brady, “Curiosity and Intellectual Virtue” (Triglavska)
10:05-11:05 Friderik Klampfer, “Luck, Moral and Epistemic” (Grajska)
Boran Bercic, “Epistemic Luck and the Lottery Paradox” (Triglavska)
11:10-12:10 Jason Kawall, “Testimony, Epistemic Egoism, and Epistemic Success” (Grajska)
Declan Smithies, “Moore’s Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification” (Triglavska)

Thursday, June 4th

9:00-10:00
Mark Kaplan, “Why We Care What We Know and Why That Matters” (Jezerska)
Peter Graham, “Epistemic Virtues: Dispositions or Design?” (Riklijeva)

10:00-11:00
Matthew Chrisman, “Why Knowledge is Better” (Jezerska)
Stephen Grimm, “Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides” (Riklijeva)

11:00-11:15
11:15-12:15
Alan Millar, “What is it that Cognitive Competences are Competences at Doing?” (Jezerska)

12:15-2:15

2:15-3:15
Jack Lyons, “Perception and Virtue Reliabilism” (Jezerska)
Erik Olsson, “The Value of Reliabilist Knowledge: Repeatability and Stability” (Riklijeva)

3:15-4:15
Michael Ridge, “Getting Lost on the Road to Larissa” (Jezerska)
Daniel Breyer, “Reflective Luck and Belief Ownership” (Riklijeva)

4:15-4:30

4:30-5:30
Ernest Sosa, “Intuitions: What Are They? What Do They Prove?” (Jezerska)

Evening
Conference Dinner (time and location to be announced)!

Friday, June 5th

(All talks will take place in the combined room Grajska-Triglavska)

9:00-10:00
Sandford Goldberg, “The Social Virtues: Two Accounts”

10:00-11:00
Christopher Lepock, “Metacognition and Intellectual Virtue”

11:00-11:15
Juan Comesana, “Proportional Weight and Total Evidence in the Epistemology of Disagreement” (Grajska-Triglavska)

11:15-12:15

12:15-2:15

2:15-3:15
Danilo Šuster, “Circles of Argumentation, Circles of Justification”

3:15-4:15
J. Adam Carter, “Sosa on Skepticism, Circularity and Moore’s Proof” (Grajska-Triglavska)

4:15-4:30

4:30-5:30
Terry Horgan & David Henderson, “Epistemic Superpositions and Easy Knowledge” (Grajska-Triglavska)

Saturday, June 6th

(All talks will take place in Jezerska)

9:00-10:00
Nenad Miščević, “Reflective Virtue”
10:05-11:05  Guy Axtell, “Epistemic Value and Diachronic Rationality”
11:10-12:10  Joshua Orozco, “I Can Trust You Now, But Not Later”
12:15-12:30  Closing Remarks
Abstracts

Guy Axtell // Radford University, USA [ ]

Epistemic Value and Diachronic Rationality

This paper challenges and rebuts attempts by internalist evidentialists to treat only “synchronous rationality” as properly epistemic, and “diachronic rationality” as ‘merely’ moral or pragmatic. From the evidentialist standpoint advocated by E. Conee and R. Feldman, it is solely the relationship, at a given time, between one’s evidence and a target proposition that is of epistemic importance and the source of properly epistemic norms. Such accounts are quintessentially belief-based and leave little or no central epistemic role for inquiry-guiding intellectual virtues or active choices among problem-solving strategies. I examine and reject these authors’ account of epistemic normativity and what it means to maximize epistemic value. Inquiry-focused versions of virtue epistemology, by contrast with internalist evidentialism, allow us to recognize the value of diachronic epistemic rationality, and the needed balance that this brings to an account of the nature and sources of epistemic value. They allow recognition that an agent’s reliability, synchronic epistemic rationality, and diachronic epistemic rationality are each indispensable sources of epistemic value. I argue that virtue responsibilism of the inquiry pragmatist sort has important further benefits with respect to understanding the source of norms to inform a philosophically sound “ethics of belief” and “epistemology of peer disagreement”: Whereas the account of Conee and Feldman that derives epistemic obligations only from consideration of whether an agent continuously maximizes synchronic epistemic rationality will tend to undermine a) the possibility of reasonable disagreement among evidence-sharing epistemic peers, and b) the thesis of “reasonable pluralism” among peers/citizens that is crucial to John Rawls and to theories of deliberative democracy (for example, Gutmann, Misak, Talisse), the inquiry pragmatist approach I argue is well-able to support both of these important and advantageous theses.

Anne Baril // University of Arizona, USA [ ] // (grad student)

A new approach to the problem of significant truths

Appealing to apparently non-epistemic considerations to solve problems in epistemology may seem…well, unappealing. Yet if we allow such appeals we make possible some very natural and plausible solutions to some stubborn problems in epistemology. In this talk I explain one such solution to one such problem. I propose a eudaimonist solution to the problem of significant truths: the problem of explaining why some truths are more significant than others. I argue that an appeal to a conception of human flourishing can be part of a solution to the problem of significant truths without an objectionable reduction of the epistemic to the non-epistemic.

Boran Berčić // University of Rijeka, Croatia [ ]

Epistemic Luck and Lottery Paradox

If belief is true by chance it is not knowledge. If justified belief is true by chance it is still not knowledge. (A guy believes it is 22oC because thermostat shows 22oC, it is 22oC, but thermostat is blocked at 22oC. A guy believes he has 1/2 tank of gas because fuel indicator shows 1/2 tank, he has half tank of gas, but fuel indicator is blocked at 1/2.) However, even cases of genuine knowledge contain element of luck. (Another guy believes it is 22oC because thermostat shows 22oC, it is 22oC, and thermostat is fully operational. Another guy believes he has 1/2 tank of gas because fuel indicator shows 1/2 tank, he has half tank of gas, and fuel indicator is fully operational.) What is the difference between fist two guys and other two? First two guys do not know, while other two guys do know! How is that possible? Internally there is no difference between them, the epistemically relevant difference is external. First two guys have bad epistemic luck, while second two guys have good epistemic luck. Although there are several different senses of epistemic luck, we can define relevant sense of epistemic luck in terms of epistemic duties: A subject has good epistemic luck iff after (because) he performs all of his epistemic duties to find out whether p, he knows that p. A subject has bad epistemic luck iff after (because) he performs all of his epistemic duties to find out whether p, he still does not know that p. In the Lottery case: first guy knows that his ticket will not win, second guy knows that his ticket will not win, ... nth guy does not know that his ticket will not win because his ticket will win. The nth guy has bad epistemic luck, but he compensates it with good financial luck. This shows that even when we know, we cannot know that we know.

Michael Brady // University of Glasgow, UK [ ]

Curiosity and Intellectual Virtue

Sometimes we desire to know the truth on some question or issue, not for any ulterior purpose, but simply for the sake of knowing the truth. This is a desire that is grounded in our intellectual interest or curiosity. If we think (following Hurka) that virtue involves having a favourable attitude towards what is intrinsically valuable, or (following Adams) that virtue
involves being for what is intrinsically good, then we might regard curiosity as an intellectual virtue. For being curious about the truth for its own sake would seem to be a way in which we favour, or are for, something of intrinsic value.

In this paper I’ll raise doubts about this purported connection between intellectual curiosity and intellectual virtue, on the grounds that what rightly attracts our interest or curiosity can diverge from what we rightly find epistemically important, significant, or valuable. In order to make this argument, I claim first that curiosity is an emotional response, and therefore involves a certain pattern of appraisal. I then propose that the appraisal structure of curiosity or interest does not involve an appraisal of importance or significance, which suggests that we are often curious about or interested in acquiring truths that we don’t regard as epistemically valuable. If so, however, intellectual curiosity does not necessarily involve loving the good. If the general account of virtue proposed by Hurka and Adams is correct, it follows that intellectual curiosity is not necessarily a virtue.

Daniel Breyer // Illinois State University, USA [ ]
Reflective Luck and Belief Ownership

A belief is reflectively lucky if it is a matter of luck that the belief is true, given what a subject is reflectively aware of. As epistemologists have discovered, reflective luck is difficult (if not impossible) to eliminate. Yet, it seems desirable to eliminate it, as various thought-experiments purport to show. As a result, it seems that we face an epistemic crisis, what Duncan Pritchard calls epistemic angst: although we recognize that reflective luck cannot be eliminated, we nonetheless yearn to eliminate it. My paper argues that we need not feel any anxiety over reflective luck, because the arguments that purport to show that we must eliminate it don’t obviously motivate that conclusion. To show this, I first distinguish between two kinds of reflective luck arguments in the literature: local arguments and global arguments. I then show that local arguments are best interpreted as demanding, not that one be reflectively aware of the reliability of the sources of one’s beliefs, but that one’s beliefs be attributable to one as one’s own. Next, I argue that global reflective luck arguments make illegitimate demands on epistemologists and knowers, because they require that knowers be ultimately answerable for their beliefs. In the end, then, my view is that what we should really be interested in is epistemic attributability, rather than ultimate answerability. This is an important shift in focus, because it allows epistemologists to ignore many traditional problems (including some challenging skeptical puzzles) and to spend their energy, instead, exploring neglected dimensions of cognitive agency and epistemic normativity.

J. Adam Carter // University of Edinburgh, UK // (grad student)
Sosa on Skepticism, Circularity and Moore’s Proof

Tim Chappell // The Open University Ethics Centre, UK [ ]
On not proportioning your belief to the evidence

Evidentialism says, following David Hume, that "a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence": our level of confidence in any proposition should be proportionate the strength of support that that proposition gets from the evidence for it. Supporters of evidentialism have suggested numerous ways of spelling out the ideas of "levels of confidence", "proportionality", "support", and "evidence", making evidentialism a sophisticated family including a very wide range of possible positions. Critics of evidentialism have pointed to:

1. the possibility of forgetting the evidence that originally justified one's belief; 2. the impossibility of choosing to believe (even to believe in proportion to the evidence); 3. the bad prudential consequences of some well-evidenced beliefs; 4. our natural tendency to adopt the epistemic attitude, to some propositions, of default belief in them—we believe them unless we find (decisive) evidence against them, not because we have (decisive) evidence for them; 5. the obvious problems involved in trying to 'operationalise' epistemology by giving any kind of numerical or Bayesian account, of the kind favoured by some though not all evidentialists, of what it is to proportion belief to evidence, or to try to measure degrees of credence/ confidence or weight/ quantity of evidence.

I shall have something to say about how we should define evidentialism (briefly: the issue is verbal; what matters is to understand the distinctions that are being made), and about these critical lines of thought (briefly: some of them refute no worthwhile form of evidentialism, and none of them refutes every form of evidentialism-not that this latter failure matters too much, since as I say, we shouldn't get too obsessed with the word 'evidentialism').

I will then focus will be on a different kind of objection to evidentialism, of which, it seems to me, not enough has been made in the literature. One very good reason for not proportioning our belief to the evidence in any very direct way comes from our research investment in particular epistemic programmes. Suppose we have a programme of inquiry up and running, which we set up for good reasons and at substantial cost (sometimes literal financial cost). In such a case, it
seems clear that we are entitled (both prudentially and epistemically) to stick with that programme even when the weight of the evidence begins to turn against it. Of course there is a tipping-point: we are not epistemically entitled to persist with an evidentially embattled research programme indefinitely. But we are entitled to persist with it for a while. (If epistemology in general can’t be operationalised, as it surely can’t, there probably aren’t any clear rules about how long this ‘while’ should be.) And this alone is enough to raise a serious doubt about the basic idea of evidentialism, the idea of proportioning our belief directly to the evidence. If evidentialism is a theory that leaves out the importance of research investment in justifying our beliefs or non-beliefs, then it misses something of crucial importance in normative epistemology.

The application of this point about the importance of research investment to scientific knowledge-claims is obvious, and I shall spell it out a little. What may be less obvious is that the point can also be made relevant to other sorts of knowledge-claims: historical, for instance, and—more controversially!—religious. Towards the end of my paper I shall apply the point so as to propose what I take to be a significant and philosophically interesting conception of religious faith. On this the religious believer is (often) evidentially embattled, but sticks to his beliefs, not because he is epistemically obtuse or irresponsible, but because he has an epistemically validated research investment in a certain world-view, and rightly takes the counter-evidence now coming his way to be insufficient to push him past the ‘tipping point’ at which epistemic rationality says that he should write off that research investment. This kind of persistence (or even, to paraphrase C.S.Lewis, obstinacy in belief is not necessarily an epistemic vice in the religious believer, any more than it is in the research scientist. Such faith in your research investment is clearly not blind or unquestioning faith; but it is not necessarily belief proportionate to the evidence, either.

Matthew Chrisman // University of Edinburgh, UK [ ]

Why Knowledge is Better

Many people think that knowledge is better than mere true belief. Two strategies for explaining this can be called "action-guiding accounts" and "achievement accounts". The action-guiding account accounts hold, roughly, that that knowledge can better guide our action. The goal of believing may be truth, but this goal is embedded within our more general practical goals, and often it seems that believing knowledgeably will better serve our practical ends over the long run than having a mere true belief. By contrast, the achievement accounts hold, roughly, the following three ideas. (a) While some things are merely instrumentally valuable, others are finally valuable. (b) One of the things that is finally valuable is achievements. (c) Knowledge is a cognitive kind of achievement. These explain why knowledge is better than mere true belief: knowledge, unlike mere true belief, has a special kind of value – final value – since it is an achievement, and achievements have final value. I think both accounts are unsuccessful. In this paper, I argue against them and seek an alternative.

Juan Comesana // University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA [ ]

Proportional Weight and Total Evidence in the Epistemology of Disagreement

How should you react to disagreement with another subject? According to what I shall call the “Proportional Weight” view, you should change your opinion in accordance with your previous degree of trust in that subject. According to what I shall call the “Total Evidence” view, you should, in addition, take into account the nature of the evidence on the basis of which you formed your opinion prior to the disagreement. In this paper I argue that the Proportional Weight view and the Total Evidence view, far from being competitors, are equivalent.

Sandford Goldberg // Northwestern University, USA [ ]

The Social Virtues: Two Accounts

The topic of this paper is the social (epistemic) virtues – those virtues bound up with our attempts at knowledge acquisition when these attempts involve social routes to knowledge. (Testimony is one example of such a route, but it is not the only one.) I will offer two distinct accounts of these virtues. One is what I call an ‘individualistic’ account of the social virtues, according to which (1) we can fully characterize the nature of such virtues independent of the sort of social factors that are typically in play when these virtues are exemplified, and (2) even when a subject’s route to knowledge is social, the only epistemic virtues that are relevant to her acquisition of knowledge are those she herself possesses. The other account is what I call a social (or anti-individualistic) account of the social virtues: the strongest version denies both (1) and (2), but a weaker version is available which accepts (1) but denies (2). I will offer some reasons for thinking that the individualistic account is not acceptable, and that one or the other social account provides a better understanding of the sort of virtues that are at issue. My arguments are not fully decisive, but they strongly suggest that the social dimension of social epistemic virtues is not fully characterizeable in individualistic terms.

Peter Graham // University of California, Riverside, USA [ ]
Epistemic Virtues: Disposition or Design?

Warrants ground or support belief. Justification and entitlement are two kinds of warrant. Reliability theories of entitlement are now commonly couched in terms of cognitive virtues or faculties of the believing subject. I argue two kinds of entitlement arise when a belief-forming virtue, faculty or process has the etiological function of forming true beliefs reliably. Entitlement thus depends on the history of the faculty, and relies on teleological notions. I go on to critically examine Ernest Sosa's account which relies on ahistorical dispositions to form true beliefs reliably in certain circumstances. I suggest that the account is not obviously entitled to its use of teleological notions. And I explore two possible advantages: a better account of the intension of entitlement, and a better account of the new evil demon case.

Stephen Grimm // Fordham University, USA [ ]

Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides

We can think of intellectualism in epistemology as the view that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends exclusively on truth-related factors, and we can think of practicalism in epistemology as the view that whether a given true belief amounts to knowledge depends on the satisfaction of certain non-truth related factors—in particular (it seems), that it depends on whether or not the belief is appropriately responsive to the practical costs of being wrong about the question at issue. Defenders of practicalism need to address two main problems. First, practicalism seems to imply that knowledge might come and go quite easily—in particular, that it might come and go along with our variable practical interests. But knowledge does not seem to come and go in this way. Instead, the thresholds relevant to knowledge seem remarkably stable and robust; even with respect to questions that we could care less about, knowledge still requires a high degree of reliability, etc. We can call this the stability problem for practicalism.

Second, there seems to be no fully satisfying way of explaining whose practical interests matter. To say, in a vague way, that knowledge is tied to “our” practical concerns and interests is one thing, but recent attempts to be more precise about the extent of this “our” have all met with serious problems. Thus Hawthorne and Stanley, for example, are quite clear that their “subject-sensitive” view needs to adopt an error-theoretic explanation of at least some of the recalcitrant cases, and they are quick to say that “attributor-sensitive” views are in the same boat. We can call this the “whose stakes?” problem for practicalism.

In my paper I will argue that both problems can be addressed in roughly the same terms. More exactly, I will suggest that by first clarifying the whose stakes? problem an answer to the stability problem naturally falls out.

David Henderson & Terry Horgan // University of Nebraska-Lincoln, [ ] and University of Arizona, USA [ ]

Epistemic Superpositions and Easy Knowledge

Stewart Cohen has posed a problem which is said to plague any epistemological position that posits basic knowledge. The problem of easy knowledge takes two forms—here we focus on the bootstrapping version of the problem. We draw on several ideas that we have developed elsewhere.

First is the idea that, in managing well one’s epistemic chores, one typically makes use of rich information that has been acquired in the course of one’s life—information that one may possess, and to which one may be sensitive, without explicitly representing it. Yet it can be accommodated in cognitive processing in a way that subserves two epistemic functions: (1) it can be accommodated so as to condition what belief comes to be generated by the process (for example, in an episode, it can condition whether one forms a perceptual belief, and just what perceptual belief is formed), and (2) it can be accommodated in a way that gives one a sense for the confidence one should have in a belief so generated in the circumstances obtaining. This is functional superpositioning.

We readily admit that one’s cognitive system cannot come to have information bearing on the reliability of its processes without some form of bootstrapping. Drawing on ideas in Glymour’s venerable bootstrapping model of confirmation in the sciences, we argue that the form of bootstrapping exhibited in the training up of the human perceptual system is more than benign, it is wonderful!

However, one may wonder whether our response changes the subject, no longer having to do an epistemology positing basic knowledge. We intend our account to make sense of the default entitlement structure that Burge thinks is fitting in connection with perception, memory, and testimony. Pryor’s dogmatism also seems to suggest such a structure. The default entitlement they envision certainly seems to fit Cohen’s characterization of “basic knowledge.”
Mikael Janvid // Stockholm University, Sweden [ ]

*The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement*

The notion of entitlement plays an important role in some influential epistemologies. Often the epistemological motive for introducing the concept is to accommodate certain externalist intuitions within an internalist framework or, conversely, to incorporate internalist traits into an externalist framework. In this paper two prominent philosophers will be used as examples: Tyler Burge as a representative of the first option and Fred Dretske as one of the latter. However, even on the assumption that the notion of entitlement is sufficiently clarified, accomplishing these results is easier said than done – especially if we also want to ascribe epistemic value to entitlement. It will be shown that the epistemic value of entitlement is either granted at the expense of the epistemic value of justification or the value ends up below the level of value that epistemologists employing the concept of entitlement are aiming at.

Mark Kaplan // Indiana University, USA [ ]

*Why We Care What We Know and How that Matters*

Much epistemology proceeds on the assumption that all that is really essential to S’s knowing that P—and so all that an epistemology needs to concern itself with insofar as it is concerned with propositional knowledge—is P’s being true and S’s being suitably positioned with respect to P. The assumption is that it is by appeal, and only by appeal, to considerations having to do with what it takes for a person to be so positioned with respect to a true proposition, that we can determine what general constraints might govern propositional knowledge. I want to suggest otherwise. I want to suggest that, if we but take seriously enough why, as inquirers, we care which propositions we know to be true and which we don’t, we will see that there is something else essential to propositional knowledge—something our epistemology can exploit to its gain. By way of illustration, I mean to show how attention to this feature of knowledge makes it possible to see how one might coherently (i) hold the view that you don’t need to know that what you just saw was not simply a hologram in order to know it was a goldfinch, yet (ii) recognize in a thoroughgoing way the impropriety of your saying of yourself (or anyone’s saying of you) the following version of what Keith DeRose has labeled “The Abominable Conjunction”: that you know that it was a goldfinch but, for all that, don’t know that it was not merely a hologram.

Jason Kawall // Colgate University, USA [ ]

*Testimony, Epistemic Egoism, and Epistemic Success*

It is generally acknowledged that testifiers play creditable roles in the production of knowledge in others. But is such credit a form of epistemic credit (rather than merely moral credit, for example), and is an agent more successful qua epistemic agent insofar as she is a successful testifier? I argue that, with some minor qualifications, agents deserve equal epistemic credit for their role in producing knowledge (or other valuable epistemic states) in others to that which they would receive for a similarly salient role in acquiring such knowledge for themselves. I respond to a number of objections to the proposal, and in the closing section of the paper I consider more general implications of the proposal for our assessment of epistemic agents.

Klemens Kappel // University of Copenhagen, Denmark [ ]

*Epistemic Expressivism and the Value of Knowledge*

Friderik Klampfer // University of Maribor, Slovenia [ ]

*Luck, Moral and Epistemic*

The paper explores possible connections between moral and epistemic luck. These have been the focus of philosophers’ attention for a while. Nagel’s and William’s original treatment of the phenomenon of moral luck seems to have been motivated by concerns over the threat that the very possibility of veritic luck poses to our ordinary claims to knowledge. If knowledge is incompatible with genuine veritic luck, the worry goes, then moral assessment of agents will also be jeopardized by the role luck plays in the formation of our characters and the shaping of circumstances and outcomes of our choices. Other authors (Greco, for example) have identified structural similarities between the two, without claiming priority for one of them over the other. Still others (Rescher, Richards, Thomson) have offered accounts of moral luck which effectively explain it away as a subspecies of epistemic luck.

So, how far does the analogy between moral and epistemic luck stretch? Does luck play pretty much the same or a somewhat different role in our respective accounts of knowledge and moral responsibility (desert, merit, and so on)? What, in the light of this, can we conclude about the prospects for finding a single, universal cure for this disease? In particular, how plausible is the view that luck can never affect the agent’s initial moral standing, all it can do is provide
further, more compelling evidence for (or against) it? I attend to these questions by way of deploying some of the distinctions that other authors have drawn between different types of luck and control. I specify the kind of moral judgment that I believe is most susceptible to the adverse effects of luck. Finally, I present my own version of the epistemic reductionist account of moral luck and defend it against some recent objections.

Uriah Kriegel // University of Arizona, USA

Two Notions of Mental Representation

In this paper, I argue that there are two notions of mental representation (which I call objective and subjective), that distinctively philosophical interest in both is well grounded, and that while familiar theories of mental representation are more naturally interpreted as concerned with one notion, our understanding of the other lags behind.

Igal Kvart // Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel

Probabilistic Knowledge, Cognitive Modeling, Cognitive Assertibility, and 2nd Order Knowledge

In this talk I present a chance-based analysis of knowledge ascriptions for perceptual and memory-based knowledge as well as for embedded knowledge ascriptions. The main insight regarding this analysis is that knowledge is, at the core, a matter of high token indicativity. When it comes to perceptual knowledge, an additional element, discriminability, is present. Yet, the condition I present for indicativity is implied by the discriminability condition. I will also briefly present a conception of philosophical analysis (such as the above) in terms of cognitive modeling, and in particular cognitive simulation. I will briefly address what I call the cognitive norm of assertion, which is a derivative of a weak version of Moore's paradox. The processing of terms such as 'know' requires cognitive responsibility, or accountability, calling for distinct norms – cognitive norms -- which are neither epistemic nor pragmatic, but are rather conferred by the pertinent competence. The analysis of embedded knowledge ascriptions will be a natural extension of the indicativity condition, keeping in mind the simulation modeling and the requisite cognitive norms.

In the last part I extend this analysis to embedded knowledge (of such 1st order knowledge). That is, I offer chance-based conditions for knowing that one knows. The main thrust is a 2nd order indicativity condition, which reflects adequate 2nd order monitoring of the 1st order processing.

Jennifer Lackey // Northwestern University, USA

Acting on Knowledge

A common view in the recent philosophical literature is that knowledge is sufficient for practical rationality. More precisely, it is frequently argued that if one knows that p, then it is epistemically appropriate for one to use the proposition that p in practical reasoning, to act as if p, and to act on p. This thesis not only has intuitive plausibility and theoretical power, it is also said to explain the value or distinctive importance of knowledge. In this paper, I argue that this thesis is false. In particular, I show that there are cases in which an agent clearly knows that p and yet does not have the proper epistemic authority to use the proposition that p in practical reasoning, to act as if p, or to act on p. Knowledge is not always epistemically sufficient for practical rationality and thus this sufficiency claim fails to capture what is valuable or distinctively important about knowledge. I then offer a diagnosis of what is salient in the cases challenging this claim and suggest a broad feature that needs to be accounted for in any view of the norm governing practical rationality.

Chris Lepock // University of Alberta, Canada

Metacognition and Intellectual Virtue

I propose that intellectual virtues are capacities for metacognitive control, the monitoring and regulation of one’s own cognitive processes. This approach allows us to explain why not all possible reliable processes yield knowledge. It also provides a general structure uniting many different types of putative intellectual virtues. What constitutes effective metacognitive control can be determined by a combination of reflection and empirical observation, and I briefly outline how this can be done.

Alan Millar // University of Sterling, UK

What is it that Cognitive Competences are Competences at Doing?

The discussion is in a framework in which it is assumed that an adequate account of propositional knowledge should have a central place for a notion of cognitive competence. On some conceptions of cognitive competence, as, for instance, in Ernest Sosa’s work, it is held that a competence can be manifested when knowledge is not acquired and that,
accordingly, to acquire knowledge the implicated true belief must be sufficiently due to the manifestation of relevant competence. I outline a conception of some cognitive competences on which they are nothing less than abilities to acquire knowledge and their exercise is the acquisition of knowledge. Such an ability amounts to mastery of a way of telling that something of a certain sort is so. I argue that this conception can be developed in a way that is philosophically illuminating, in keeping with common sense, and preferable to accounts on which the manifestation of a cognitive competence is not an acquisition of knowledge.

Lack Lyons // University of Arkansas, USA [ ]
Perception and Virtue Reliabilism

Nenad Miščević // University of Maribor, Slovenia & CEU, Hungary [ ]
Reflective Virtue

Adam Morton // University of Alberta, Canada [ ]
Paradoxical Virtues

Many virtues can also be described so they sound like vices. Courage is knowing when not to fight, too, and there is a lot to be said for knowing when to run away. There are virtues of cowardice, panic, laziness, inattention to detail. Or at any rate there are virtues which we can describe in these terms. I shall defend the existence of such paradoxical virtues, and the value of their vicious labels. And I shall argue that a large class of intellectual virtues are particularly susceptible to this labeling.

Erik Olsson // Lund University, Sweden, [ ]
The Value of Reliabilist Knowledge: Repeatability and Stability

Reliabilism is essentially the view that knowledge amounts to true belief acquired through a reliable process. According to the swamping objection, reliabilism cannot explain the extra value pertaining to knowledge in contrast to mere true belief. In the paper, I provide and defend two arguments to the effect that reliabilism is in fact not vulnerable to the swamping objection. One argument, referred to as the “conditional probability solution” in Goldman and Olsson (2009), focuses on the prospect of acquiring further true beliefs by repeated application of the same reliable process. The other argument, which was proposed in Olsson (2007), states that a true belief that is reliably acquired thereby becomes more stable. The two arguments are compatible and complementary.

Josh Orozco // Rutgers University, USA [ ]//(grad student)
I Can Trust You Now ... But Not Later

Children learn and come to know things about the world at a very young age through the testimony of their caregivers. The challenge comes in explaining how children acquire such knowledge. The reason is that children come to know things about the world from testimony despite having gullible characters, and most accounts of knowledge require that a belief be reliably formed. Since children indiscriminately receive testimony, their testimony-based beliefs seem unreliable, and, consequently, should fail to qualify as knowledge. Greco formulates the problem as a triad of inconsistent propositions:

1. Young children can learn from the testimony of their caregivers; i.e. they can come to know through such testimony.
2. Testimonial knowledge requires a reliable consumer of testimony; i.e. the hearer can reliably discriminate between reliable and unreliable sources of testimony.
3. Young children are not reliable consumers of testimony.

If we want to retain the intuition that children acquire testimonial knowledge, then we either have to reject either 2 or 3. In this paper I discuss some attempted solutions by Sandy Goldberg and John Greco that reject 3. I argue that their solutions fail. I go on to suggest that what generates the problem is a hidden assumption supporting 2, that the standards for testimonial knowledge should be invariant between children and cognitively mature adults. I propose that in order to adequately explain how children acquire testimonial knowledge we should reject this hidden assumption. I then argue that understanding knowledge in terms of intellectual skills gives us a plausible framework to do so.

Christian Piller // University of York, UK [ ]
Aptness and Epistemic Normativity
I will investigate one or both of the following two ideas. First, if by doing something I achieve my aim and if the way I have done what I did shows that I have done it well, then nothing seems to be missing. Sosa, however, introduces a further category of normative and/or evaluative significance, namely aptness, i.e. the causal connection between the exercise of one’s abilities and success. I will investigate whether such a category is important in the evaluation of performances. Secondly, I will discuss whether Sosa’s account of epistemic normativity, which, in my view, rests on an attributive theory of goodness, is a plausible basis for understanding epistemic normativity.

Matjaž Potrč & Terry Horgan // University of Arizona, USA [ ] and University of Ljubljana, Slovenia [ ]

The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content

Morphological content is information that is implicitly embodied in the standing structure of a cognitive system (the system’s morphology) rather than in the form of an explicit representation, and is automatically accommodated during cognitive processing without first becoming explicit (cf. T. Horgan and J. Tienson, Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, MIT, 1996). We maintain that much belief-formation in human cognition is essentially morphological: it draws heavily on large amounts of morphological content, and must do so in order to tractably accommodate the holistic evidential relevance of the background information possessed by the cognitive agent. We also advocate a form of experiential evidentialism concerning epistemic justification—roughly, the view that the justification-status of an agent’s belief depends upon the character of the agent’s conscious experience. (The thesis of essentially morphological belief-formation and a version of experiential evidentialism are both defended in D. Henderson, T. Horgan, and M. Potrč, “Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism,” Acta Analytica 22 (2007), 281-300.)

In this talk we explain how experiential evidentialism can be smoothly and plausibly combined with the thesis that much of the cognitive processing that generates justified beliefs is essentially morphological. The leading idea is this: even though epistemically relevant morphological content does not get explicitly represented during the process of belief-generation, nevertheless the implicit accommodation of morphological content affects the character of conscious experience. For instance, typically the resulting occurrent belief is experienced as being “evidentially fitting” rather than as “popping into one’s mind out of nowhere”; also, typically the belief is accompanied by the conscious sense that one has the ability, if called upon, to bring explicitly to mind pertinent justificatory considerations that support the belief and contribute to its fittingness.

Baron Reed // Northern Illinois University, USA [ ]

Who Knows?

Michael Ridge // University of Edinburgh, USA [ ]

Getting Lost on the Road to Larissa

I examine the arguments that epistemologists need to satisfy a set of value constraints in analyzing key epistemic concepts. I argue that properly understood the only ex ante constraints in this area are extremely weak. The key point here is to distinguish attributive and predicative readings of value predicates. I then explore what I take to be the best arguments for and against the distinctive epistemic value of knowledge and the understanding, with special attention to ‘pointless truths’.

Wayne Riggs // University of Oklahoma, USA [ ]

What is Epistemic Value, Anyway?

Declan Smithies // Ohio State University, USA [ ]

Moore’s Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification

This paper defends a classical form of internalism, according to which one has a special kind of epistemic access to facts about which propositions one has justification to believe. I begin in part one by arguing that the accessibility of justification is best understood as an epistemic thesis, rather than a psychological thesis, which I go on to defend against various objections. In part two, I argue that anyone who denies the accessibility of justification is thereby faced with an epistemic version of Moore’s paradox. In part three, I employ this version of Moore’s paradox in order to diagnose the intuitions prompted by BonJour’s (1985) clairvoyance cases and to explain what is wrong with the kind of externalist treatment of these cases given by Goldman (1986). In part four, I propose a deeper theoretical rationale for the internalist commitment to the accessibility of justification by arguing that it is crucial for understanding the role of justification in the practice of critical reflection. In part five, I conclude with some brief discussion of the way in which the accessibility of justification imposes substantial constraints on a theory of the nature of justification.
Ernest Sosa // Rutgers University, USA [ ]

**Intuitions: What Are They? What Do They Prove?**

The first main topic is the nature of intuitions and their place in our cognitive economy. The paper then turns to whether *all* intuitions have proper epistemic standing. If not all do, finally, we then consider what distinguishes those that do from those that do not.

Danilo Šuster // University of Maribor, Slovenia [ ]

**Circles of Knowledge**

The paper is about Ernest Sosa's latest book ("Reflective knowledge"). According to Sosa a threat of circle or regress is a main problematic, perhaps the main problematic of epistemology. He argues that some circles are unavoidable, but not all are vicious. I agree with his general stance with respect to the desire for a fully general, legitimating, philosophical understanding of all our knowledge. But I have problems with specific solutions. Sosa's Neo-Moorean argument for the reliability of perception seems to have the same structure as certain problematic and circular arguments (Bootstrapping, Moorean arguments, Easy knowledge ...) so it is difficult to see how to defend Sosa's preferred solutions.

Valerie Tiberius // University of Minnesota, USA [ ]

**Wisdom and Wide Reflective Equilibrium: A Case Study In Methodology For Normative Theorizing**

Reflective equilibrium has been the default method for philosophers working in ethics for decades. The method is coherentist; it seeks to reach an equilibrium among our considered judgments (intuitions) and principles. But reflective equilibrium is not without problems. Concerns about the possibility of coherent but erroneous systems of moral judgments were raised early on. Recently, the concern that our intuitions are unreliable, unstable, and subject to manipulation has taken center stage. It has been suggested that to solve some of the problems for RE, we ought to seek a wide reflective equilibrium, that is, one that includes background theories in the mix. It may be true that paying attention to background theories (including empirical psychological theories) will help meet objections to reflective equilibrium, but as of yet little work has been done to show just how a truly wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) would work. Our aim in this paper is to articulate a specific version of wide reflective equilibrium using the virtue of practical wisdom as a case study. In explicated this method, we aim to show that WRE is not just the method we're stuck with because we don't have anything better in normative theory. Instead, WRE (or at least a suitably precisified version of it) has a positive advantage, namely, that it helps to capture the normativity of ethical notions such as wisdom. This is so because, as we will argue, our method connects the philosophical analysis of wisdom to norms and ideals that people already care about.

Marko Weilguny // University of Ljubljana, Slovenia [ ]//(grad student)

**The Bliss of Ignorance?**

The main attention of this paper is dedicated to the question of knowledge in possession of the absolute truth. Can knowledge ever be in possession of the total truth? Can there be knowledge at all? Could knowledge possibly in some instances be absolved of this ubiquitous demand? Are there more kinds of knowledge?

These questions are regarded through the prism of the theories of E. Sosa and T. Horgan & D. Henderson. Virtue epistemology and transglobal reliabilism lend their apparatus to the investigation of the necessity of truth in founding knowledge. And the way that matters evolve in this paper is a way towards a knowledge with less rigorously determined requirements. As to the bliss of ignorance – it certainly has its charms and it certainly has its pitfalls.

Sarah Wright // University of Georgia, USA [ ]

**Internalist Virtues and Knowledge**

What role can intellectual virtues play in an account of knowledge when we interpret those virtues internalistically, as depending only on states of the cognizer? Though it has been argued that internalist virtues are ill suited to play a role in an account of knowledge, I will show that, on the contrary, internalist virtues can play an important role in recent accounts of knowledge developed to utilize externalist virtues. The virtue account of knowledge developed by Linda Zagzebski is intended to be supplemented by her version of the intellectual virtues which require an external success component. However I show that internalist virtues are just as effective as a component of Zagzebski’s definition of knowledge. I then turn to the credit accounts of knowledge developed by John Greco and Wayne Riggs. The concept of
credit involved in these accounts can be explained in terms of virtues. But what sort of virtues can play this role? Although Greco explains credit in terms of externalist virtues, I show that internalist virtues can do this job as well. Thus, although internalist virtues’ do not require a reliable connection to truth, they can still play an important role in defining the truth-requiring concept of knowledge.