


Particularism - Partikularizem

XIIIth Bled Philosophical Conference

13. Blejska filozofska konferenca


June 13nd – 18th 2005 / 13. 6. – 18. 6. 2005

Bled, Hotel Kompas



Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science

Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti



Ljubljana 2005

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Program / Program

Monday, June 13th / Ponedeljek, 13. junij*11:00 Welcoming Remarks / Uvodni nagovor*

11:30 - 12:15 Christian Piller "Dancy's Reasons"

12:15 - 13:00 Rebecca Stangl "Particularism and Moral Principles: Are Heuristic Principles or Default Reasons Enough?"

lunch break

15:00 - 15:45 Vojko Strahovnik "Deliberative Relevance, Normative Relevance and Particularism"

15:45 - 16:45 David Bakhurst "Particularism and Moral Education"

coffee break

17:00 - 17:45 Anna Bergqvist "Particularism and Moral Understanding"

Tuesday, June 14th / Torek, 14. junij

8:45 - 9:30 Josep Corbí "Moral emotions, principles, and the locus of moral perception"

9:30 - 10:30 Jonathan Dancy "Defending the Right"

coffee break

10:45 - 11:30 Ulrik Kihlbom "Ethical Particularism and the Triple Job of Response-Dependency"

11:30 - 12:15 Arto Laitinen "Cluster atomism and that's it: a stable resting place between generalism and particularism?"

12:15 - 13:00 Simon Kirchin "In Defence of Default Valency"

lunch break

15:00 - 15:45 Gianfranco Pellegrino "Practical particularism and moral particularism"

15:45 - 16:45 Michael Ridge, Sean McKeever "Particularism and the Contingent A Priori"

coffee break

17:00 - 17:45 Bojan Žalec "Dancy's moral particularism and teleology"

Wednesday, June 15th / Sreda, 15. junij

8:45 - 9:30 Božidar Kante "Particularism in Aesthetics"

9:30 - 10:50 Terence Horgan, Matjaž Potrč "Particularist Semantic Normativity"

coffee break

11:10 - 11:55 Sabine Roeser "A Particularist Epistemology"

11:55 - 12:40 Elvio Baccharini "Attribution of moral status, generalism, particularism"

lunch break

15:00 - 15:45 Mark Lance "Where the Laws Are I"

15:45 - 16:45 Margaret Little "Where the Laws Are II"

coffee break

17:00 - 17:45 Claus Beisbart "How a moral particularist can make use of principles"

Thursday, June 16th / Četrtek, 16. junij

8:45 - 9:30 Jeffrey Brand-Ballard "Favoring, Polarity, and Particularism" "

9:30 - 10:30 Nenad Mišćević "Particularism, thickness and anti-dispositionalism: uneasy bed-fellow"

coffee break

10:45 - 11:30 Ferenc Huoranszki *TBA*

11:30 - 12:15 Marta Moreno Pinazo "Variability of moral Features as a dispensable Idea"

12:15 - 13:00 Miroslava Anđelković "On instance ontology"

lunch break

15:00 - 15:45 Benedict Smith "Particularism, Perception and Moral Epistemology"

15:45 - 17:15 David McNaughton, Piers Rawling "Moore's Doctrine of Organic Unities"

19:00 - *Conference dinner*

Friday, June 17th / Petek, 17. junij

8:45 - 9:30 John G. Quilter "Ethical Particularism, Metaethics and Practical Ethics: Making Particularism Matter More"

9:30 - 10:30 Anthony Price "Was Aristotle a Particularist?"

coffee break

10:45 - 11:30 Mark A. Brown "Particularism and Contracts"

11:30 - 12:15 Friderik Klampfer "Moral particularism and the scope of legitimate moral criticism"

12:15 - 13:00 Smiljana Gartner "The Particularist and Regret"

lunch break

15:00 - 15:45 Constantine Sandis "Dancy Cartwright: Particularism in the Philosophy of Science"

15:45 - 16:30 Brendan Larvor "Particularism and scientific practice"

Saturday, June 18th / Sobota, 18. junij

9:45 - 10:30 Lubomira Radoilska "Is moral imagination particularist?"

10:45 - 11:30 Manuel Hernández Iglesias "Principles Without Foundations"

Concluding remarks

Introduction / Uvodnik

Bled Particularism Conference 2005

Philosophical conferences at Bled (Slovenia) were initiated, on the suggestion by John Biro, as a continuation of the IUC – Dubrovnik postgraduate course in philosophy (Epistemology and cognitive science). But they gradually started a life of their own, with the help of Eugene Mills. The first week of June at Bled is traditionally reserved for a conference dedicated to various topics in the field of analytical philosophy. More than 200 active participants have so far taken part in the conferences. The first conference, in the summer of 1993, was focused on Connectionism and Philosophy of Mind. It was followed by conferences on Ethics and Political Philosophy (1994), Metaphysics (1995), Truth (1996), Modality (1997), Vagueness (1998), Epistemology (1999), Philosophical Analysis (2000), Metaphysics (2001), Rationality (2002), Ethics (2003) and Contextualism (2004).

This year's event starts a week later than usual. June 13-18th, 2005 Bled conference will be dedicated to the topics of Particularism. One main converging point is provided by the book *Ethics Without Principles* (Clarendon: Oxford 2004). The book is written by Jonathan Dancy who will also attend, besides to other proponents involved into controversies. Moral reasons, holism, the question of default values, reversibility/silenceability, systematizability and the nature of laws, but also several ways to understand particularism will be discussed, as well as the possibility to extend it to various areas of philosophy such as semantics, aesthetic, epistemology, ontology and philosophy of science. Conference's aim is to present the actual state of particularism and pave the ways for its further development.

Matjaž Potrč, Vojko Strahovnik

Blejska konferenca o partikularizmu 2005

Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti (DAF) že od svoje ustanovitve leta 1991 organizira redna srečanja s predavanji in mednarodne simpozije. Na Bledu od leta 1993 v juniju potekajo mednarodni simpoziji s področja analitične filozofije. Pobudo je sprožil John Biro, ki je simpozij predlagal kot nadaljevanje podiplomskega študijskega programa (*Epistemologija in kognitivna znanost*), vendar je simpozij kmalu prerasel to vlogo, tudi s pomočjo Genea Millsa. Prvi teden v juniju je tako tradicionalno rezerviran za konferenco, ki se posveča različnim področjem in temam analitične filozofije. Na konferenci je sodelovalo že več kot 200 aktivnih udeležencev. Prva konferenca v poletju 2003 je bila osredotočena na *Konekcionizem in filozofijo duha*, sledile pa so naslednje: *Etika in politična filozofija* (1994), *Metafizika* (1995), *Resnica* (1996), *Modalnost* (1997), *Nejasnost* (1998), *Epistemologija* (1999), *Filozofska analiza* (2000), *Metafizika* (2001), *Racionalnost* (2002), *Etika* (2003) in *Kontekstualizem* (2004).

Letošnja konferenca se pričinja teden kasneje in bo potekala med 13. in 18. junijem. Posvečena bo temi partikularizma, knjiga *Ethics Without Principles* (Clarendon: Oxford 2004) Jonathana Dancya pa bo ena izmed osrednjih točk razprav. Moralni razlogi, holizem, vprašanje privzetih vrednosti, dinamika razlogov, vprašanje moralnih načel, različni načini razumevanja partikularizma... To je le nekaj tem, ki se jih dotikajo letošnji referati, ki bodo partikularizem razširjali tudi na druga področja, poleg etike še ne semantiko, estetiko, spoznavno teorijo, ontologijo in filozofijo znanosti. Konferenca bo pregledala stanje na področju partikularizma in načrtala pomembne smernice njegovega nadaljnjega razvoja.

Matjaž Potrč, Vojko Strahovnik

List of participants / Udeleženci

- Miroslava Anđelković "On instance ontology"
- Elvio Baccarini "Attribution of moral status, generalism, particularism"
- David Bakhurst "Particularism and Moral Education"
- Claus Beisbart "How a moral particularist can make use of principles"
- Anna Bergqvist "Particularism and Moral Understanding"
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Bojan Žalec "Dancy's moral particularism and teleology"

Abstracts / Povzetki

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On instance ontology

Abstract: Some claims are directly about individuals while some refer only indirectly. For example, when we say that Scott is mortal, we speak about Scott, but when we say that all men are mortal, we say something about Scott as well indirectly: if Scott is a human, Scott is mortal. So, the latter proposition might be true even if Scott does not exist, while the former appears to be true only if Scott does exist. But would this be the case if we say that Scott is not mortal, are we again bound to claim that Scott exists? And, if we are, does this mean that for the truth of both "Scott exists" and "Scott does not exist" Scott's existence is needed? This is paradoxical. Of course, this is an ancient question, which has been approached by many philosophers. Most famous and broadly accepted view is Frege's, that is the view, we can find in Kant as well, that existence is not the first order predicate. This means that existence is not a property of a thing in the same way as being human is. Existence is rather a quantifier, so we have famous view, not originally Quine's but expressed by him as follows: To be is to be the value of a variable. I see this as the first dogma of analytic philosophy. Here I would defend the view that existence is the first order predicate, that is a real property of individuals.

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Attribution of moral status, generalism, particularism

The main concern of the paper is to establish the subjects of moral status in the public domain (i.e., in front of the basic institutions of a political society). Traditionally, the solution of the problem is looked on the traces of a master concept (or a set of master concepts), with the power of attributing the moral status (the very restrictive requirement of rationality, the more inclusive requirement of capacity to enjoy pleasure or pain, or other features). The debate is, traditionally, mainly generalist in its form: a general feature is identified, and, then, the moral status is mechanically attributed to specific categories of subjects, well seen as deserving moral status, or not.

James Rachels offers reasons for thinking that this picture is too simple, and wrong. It is not possible to identify precise categories of subjects with clearly determined moral status. The reason is, according to Rachels, empirical: Darwinism indicates that there are no clear-cuts among species, but complicated nets of differences and similarities between individuals. This indicates the requirement of more specific attribution of moral status.

However, the solution is still generalist in its form. The solution proposed by Rachels identifies features that are related to specific moral answers, but these features must be applied in the same way to all situations. So, if a human being is protected from torture in virtue of her capacity to suffer (which, according to Rachels, is clear in the case of humans who do not possess the capacity of rationality), non-human animals must be protected, as well, in virtue of the same capacity.

My criticism is that this generalist form of argumentation is wrong. There is no mistake in limiting the generalization, not permitting a feature to have the same role in one case, and not in the other cases. In particular, I argue for this in a contractualist model of argumentation, where a contracting party can take the capacity to suffer as of limited relevance, in the sense that it has moral relevance when related to the damages it can make to the life plan of a subject, but has no moral relevance when not related to a subject who cannot have a life plan.

This, in my opinion, shows the limits of generalism. However, the present discussion is not sufficient to establish moral particularism, because, in the contractualist model, some general answers must be found when dealing with the question of attribution of moral status. Nevertheless, the general answer at this basic level does not deny the possibility of a particularist model in argumentation for more specific questions, even in a contractualist model.

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Particularism and Moral Education

Some opponents of ethical particularism maintain that particularists cannot give a plausible account of moral education. After considering, and rejecting, a number of arguments to this conclusion, I focus on the following objection: particularism, at least in Dancy's version, has no account of moral education because it lacks a substantial account of moral competence—particularists, by Dancy's own admission, can say little more than that a competent agent "gets things right case by case". I respond to this objection by reflecting on how we want our children to turn out, morally speaking. I argue that we can tell a compelling story about our aspirations for our children's moral development that is consistent with particularism and that provides the beginnings of a plausible account of the competences we look to moral education to instill.

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How a moral particularist can make use of principles

Moral particularists deny that there are general moral principles that hold independent of the situation. They further refuse to say that to act morally means to act for principles. In my paper I argue that there are principles of a specific kind the particularist actually needs. In a way these principles are already present in the particularist framework, and making them explicit will help to strengthen the particularist position.

1. What are these principles?

The principles I mean do not tell what one ought to do or what action is right or what contributory reasons there are in specific situations. Rather they spell out how reasons hang together and how they relate to action. For this reason I call them formal instead of material principles. One example is Davidson's principle of continence. There are also formal principles of a moral flavor. For example, if there is a reason that A phis, then there also is a reason for me to accept A's phiing. Formal principles never create reasons from scratch, but at least involve two reasons. This can be further made clear by appealing to Broome's notion of a normative requirement.

2. Do these principles fit into a particularist framework?

Formal principles are not too worrisome for the particularist. First, they do not touch the central claim of the particularist, if it is interpreted as saying that there are no *material* moral principles. I argue that the particularist has a strong case against material principles, but not against formal principles. Second, in a sense these principles are already part of the particularist position, as they enfold the grammar of reasons, as I call it.

3. Why does the particularist need those principles?

Appealing to formal principles helps to strengthen the particularist's position, because formal principles can help us to find out what reasons there are in a particular situation. If I do not know the moral reasons present in a certain situation, it may help me, for instance, to think about what would be acceptable from the others' point of view. In this case I apply one of the above-mentioned principles. This helps to strengthen the particularist position in the following respects

- a. Appealing to formal principles broadens the particularist epistemology.
- b. Formal principles help us to reconstruct the rationality of morality.
- c. Formal principles help us to reconstruct why acting morally appears to be acting for principles.

d. Formal principles are important for understanding other people's actions in terms of normative reasons.

Summarizing my recommendation for particularists is: no material principles, but formal principles.



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Particularism and Moral Understanding

The topic of this paper is the particularist conception of moral judgement and moral understanding as essentially a matter of successfully employing a skill to discern the moral import of the particular case, rather than the mechanical application of moral rules or principles. Although particularism in this broad sense is a position that is explicitly endorsed by ethical intuitionism, the focus of this paper is the intuitionist objection that particularism cannot account for the rational structure of moral reasoning and moral judgement. According to McNaughton, Rawling, and Little, for example, unless particularism endorses the claim that patterns and generalities are yet central to moral reasoning it cannot make sense of the fact that rational moral judgement requires a sense of what patterns *tend* to be morally relevant. This paper rejects this claim, and also sketches an outline of moral understanding and moral judgement that is consistent with particularism.

My approach to the debate between Dancy and McNaughton begins with Simon Kirchin's tentative suggestion that the debate between generalism and particularism is best read as one of two different conceptions of the nature of so-called thick moral concepts¹. On this interpretation, the argument between generalism and particularism hangs on the issue as to whether adequate moral understanding and responsible moral judgement presupposes that the evaluative aspect of so-called thick moral concepts such as *cruelty* or *kindness* is necessarily invariant (generalism) or, rather, context-dependent (particularism). While it is agreed on both sides that thick moral features or concepts *are* central to moral understanding and moral judgement because these features provide us with *reasons*, the issue concerns how we should best understand their *centrality*.

According to intuitionism, unless we take thick moral concepts to have constant relevance, their centrality to moral thought and judgement qua *moral* concepts is rendered unintelligible. I argue that this claim is mistaken. In my view, the fact – if it be a fact – that one needs to be able to *recognise* the particulars of the moral situation as such, as *cruel* or *kind* say, in order to form an accurate moral judgement of the present case, does not support the generalist conclusion that their relevance qua thick moral

¹ Kirchin, S., 'Particularism, Generalism, and the Counting Argument', *European Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 11, no. 1 (2003), pp.54-71, p.57

concepts is constant across cases. I develop an argument in support for this claim on the back of the notion of *merited response* that figures in an early Dancyan defence of the centrality of thick moral concepts for moral thought and judgement².

What we need, I shall argue, is an account of moral judgement as the capacity to *recognise* reason-giving instances of thick moral concepts and their moral import in the present case, which requires an *appreciation* of their overall normative force. I hold that moral appreciation is not merely a cognitive matter because it requires the moral judge to *emotionally engage* with the situation conceived as a whole. The idea that I will develop is that when an agent discerns the normative outcome her emotional response influences how she interprets the moral situation, and determines her appreciation of the morally appropriate response.

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Favoring, Polarity, and Particularism

In recent writings, including his long-awaited book, *Ethics without Principles* (Oxford 2004), Jonathan Dancy defends strong versions of two particularist theses. First, Dancy denies that there are any true, general principles asserting that a certain type of feature supports a certain moral verdict. Secondly, he maintains that all morally relevant features can change polarity or valence. This includes even “thick” features, such as cruelty.

Dancy responds to many critics in the book. This paper focuses on his reply to those whom he classifies as “expansionists,” a group that includes Roger Crisp, Joseph Raz, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, David McNaughton, and Piers Rawling. Expansionists argue that the polarity-variance Dancy observes only obtains because Dancy mischaracterizes morally relevant reasons. The simple features Dancy has identified, the critics claim, are what Crisp calls “non-ultimate reasons,” such as borrowing or fun. Contrary to Dancy’s characterization, generalists never believed that *non-ultimate* reasons had invariant polarity. Rather, Dancy’s critics claim, the features to which generalists ascribe invariant polarity are more complex features, such as “being a borrowing of justly acquired property,” “being fun and not cruel,” or features still more complicated.

Dancy now defends himself by distinguishing “favorers” from “enablers” and arguing that only favorers count as genuine reasons. Suppose Jack promises to Φ and his promise is not given under duress. The promise and the absence of duress are both relevant to Jack’s Φ -ing. Dancy insists, however, that the promise functions as a favorer while the absence of duress functions as an enabler, not a favorer. The absence of duress does not favor Φ -ing, it merely enables the promise to favor Φ -ing. The polarity of favorers, Dancy insists, is context-variant.

² Dancy, J. ‘In Defence of Thick Moral Concepts’, French, P., Uehling, T. E. Jr., and Wettstein (eds.) *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 20: *Moral Concepts* (1995), pp. 263-279

In response to Dancy's parry, I defend generalism from a new direction. Rather than criticizing Dancy's conception of a reason, I present an alternative picture of the "poles" with respect to which those reasons are polarized. I propose a new move for generalists to make in response to Dancy's use of the favor/enabler distinction, without disputing the significance of the distinction. Rather than expanding my conception of a reason to include favorer/enabler combinations, I accept Dancy's challenge to argue that favoring properties, not combinations, have invariant polarity. I offer an alternative conception of the object with respect to which reasons retain invariant polarity. A morally relevant feature, on this view, is polarized with respect to a certain *disjunctive action family*. It favors Φ -ing, not Φ -ing, or nothing. This may not be the sort of invariant polarity generalists have traditionally sought, but it is all they need.

My view suggests an unexpected way in which the moral realm might take a natural "shape," thereby supporting generalism against Dancy's most recent attack. I conclude that Dancy gives us no reason to reject generalism, though his challenge forces us to develop a more complex account of what moral generalizations really mean.

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Particularism and Contracts

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Moral emotions, principles, and the locus of moral perception

This paper explores some aspects of the dispute between moral generalists and moral particularists. There is surely an *ambitious generalist project* which aims at rendering the normativity of moral judgements consistent with the idea that the world as it is independently of us, has no moral (and, in general, no value) properties. This project assumes the main thesis of moral subjectivism (i.e., that moral judgements derive their content from the way we respond to a non-moral world) and seeks to specify a set of general principles in terms of which the correctness of such judgements is to be assessed. A crucial feature of this ambitious project is that,

(AG1) apart from the non-moral empirical data, *only* principles could help us in assessing moral judgements.

There is, of course, an even *more ambitious generalist project* according to which

(AG2) moral dilemmas are only apparent, since any possible conflict between moral principles can be solved by appealing to other, more general principles that may mediate between them.

I have argued, in 'Normativity, Moral Realism and Unmasking Explanations',³ that both (AG1) and (AG2) are highly implausible. There are, however, some philosophers who, despite rejecting (AG1) and (AG2), insist on calling themselves 'generalists'.⁴ They acknowledge that not only general principles, but also moral perception play a crucial role in moral deliberation, whereby they reject (AG1). And, in a similar trend, they doubt (AG2), since they no longer want to deny there are real moral dilemmas. It seems then that the generalist character of this proposal reduces to this:

(G1) Moral general principles play *some* role in moral deliberation.

It follows from the dismissal of (AG2), that the strongest claim that the weak generalist can make with regard to the nature of moral principles, goes like this.

(G2) all moral principles are *prima facie* principles, that is, principles that can be overridden, on a given particular occasion, by other relevant *prima facie* principles.

The problem is that, as they stand, (G1) and (G2) do not look like two very interesting philosophical theses. Much work needs to be done in order to figure out the role that principles must play in moral deliberation. We will need to specify, firstly, what other elements must participate in moral deliberation and, secondly, how these elements relate to each other, what their respective roles are. This paper constitutes an attempt at advancing in that direction.

More specifically, I will, firstly, seek to identify the locus of moral perception as placed between a response to a particular situation and a response to all situations of a certain ethical kind. This will lead us to see that the moral agent is necessarily a man with a character, where ethical emotions such as guilt and shame can find a place. Moreover, a proper description of the structure of such emotions and their significance for our ethical lives, will lead us to put into proper focus the role of moral principles in the life of an ethical agent. These remarks brings to light that, even if (G1) and (G2) are literally true, the insistence on them is rather misleading, since they, as we shall see, hardly capture the core of ethical deliberation.

³ *Theoria*, v. 19/2, no. 50, pp. 155-172.

⁴ They typically present themselves as Rossian Generalists.

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Defending the Right

In this paper I will consider two points, the treatment of which in my book I now think of as inadequate. They are the way to understand default reasons, and the distinction between two normative relations, the favouring relation and the right-making relation.

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The Particularist and Regret

According to the generalist the reason why a feature, which is supposed to be always morally relevant in the same way, is not such in certain situations is that it is overridden by some other feature. Because of this we can still talk of atomism. But the particularist answers that in such a situation the feature is not overridden but silenced. If this is so the background of her answer is holism. How can we then solve the dispute between these two accounts which, however, suggest the same outcome? One way to go is to appeal to the notion of *rational regret*. If it is true what particularism suggests, i.e. that in such situations reasons are silenced rather than overridden, then we should not feel any regret for the feature in question. In this paper I argue against Timmons' claim that the notion of regret cannot solve the dispute.

The notion of rational regret causes problems also in theories of the good. According to Hurka regret can be rational in monistic as well as in pluralistic theories of the good. But Dancy, on the other hand, rejects the idea that monism gives us a proper explanation of regret. However, he strongly believes that particularism can keep regret as part of its doctrine. I argue also against this.

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Principles Without Foundations

Generalism is the view that moral thought and judgment depend on moral principles. This view is strongly supported by the intuition that, for something to count as a reason for anything, it must also work as a reason in other relevantly similar cases.

Particularism is the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgment does not depend on the existence of moral principles. Dancy has defended particularism and his defence is based in the following claims:

1. Holism of reasons: a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another.
2. Holism is incompatible with generalism: the general principles we have in mind when we express our generalist intuitions (e.g. 'Lying is wrong') are defeasible and the attempts to formulate them in a not defeasible way lead to impracticable complexities.

We face then the following conflict: for a feature to be a reason at all, it must be projectable in virtue of some general principle or rule (generalist intuition), but reasons are variable, for they have different polarity in different contexts (holism), and this variability is incompatible with general principles (particularist intuition).

Most defences of generalism criticise the variability of reasons. But in this paper I will argue that, even if we accept Dancy's holism, we cannot understand moral reasoning without appealing to *prima facie* principles. My argument is the following:

1. There is an obvious asymmetry in the burden of proof in moral reasoning (that I illustrate in the paper with several examples) that shows that moral reasons have a default polarity.
2. *Prima facie* principles are required to account for this asymmetry.

Moreover, I claim that particularism, like the extreme generalist approach (the subsumptive view), faces serious difficulties in giving sense to moral regret, and even for moral imbecility.

An important difficulty with *prima facie* principles pointed by Dancy is that they essentially involve *ceteris paribus* clauses that are neither eliminable neither fully specifiable. My response is that this apparent *impasse* is that the conflict between the holism of reasons (and its counterpart, the defeasibility or not fully statability of principles) and generalist intuitions is rooted in a foundationalist view of ethics and of rationality in general. Foundationalism leads to the view that, for principles to play an essential role in reasoning, they must be universal, either because they are categorically true or, if they are hypothetical, because the antecedent conditions can be fully specified. A nonfoundationalist dialectical (as opposed to demonstrative) perspective shows that this is a false dilemma and allows principles of *prima facie* reason to play an essential role in argumentation. This vindication of principles is compatible with the holism of reasons while doing justice to our generalist intuitions.

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Particularist Semantic Normativity

We sketch the view we call contextual semantics. It asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability under contextually variable semantic standards, that truth is frequently an indirect form of correspondence between thought/language and the world, and that many Quinean commitments are not genuine ontological commitments. We argue that contextualist semantics fits very naturally with the view that the pertinent semantic standards are particularist rather than being systematizable as exceptionless general principles.

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Particularism in Aesthetics

Dancy has argued that that for which the object is approved, is no longer a purely descriptive feature. The 'evaluation' partially determines the 'description', since the only way to specify the nature of the object of which we approve was to say that it has these or those features in the (or a) right way. In my paper, I will try to prove that the essence of, for example, "gaudiness" is not a judgement of disapproval on the observer's part but instead a kind of appearance. This appearance is a perceptually manifest effect one can discern independently of any evaluative assessment of or attitudinal reaction to that effect. There are, in other words, core aesthetic impressions of qualitative sort, distinguishable from reaction of approval or disapproval. It seems there will always be a look or appearance that an object is fitted to afford.

In the second part of my contribution I will consider Dancy's example of friendship as we find it in the film *The Truman Show* where everyone, except Truman, is aware that they are actors. Dancy states, 'what is of value about a friendship would have no value if that friendship was a sham, but that it is not a sham is not part of what makes the friendship worthwhile. Genuineness is an enabling condition here, not a ground'. The idea is that the value of the friendship in this particular context can change from its normal value

without there being any change in the grounds or features of the relationship that make it a friendship but on the basis of something else about this context, namely that it is a pretence. I will survey the consequences of such a view for the so called "fictional emotions", that is, emotions we experience in our reactions to an artwork.

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Ethical Particularism and the Triple Job of Response-Dependency

The principal thought of Ethical Particularism is that a non-moral feature that constitutes a grounding moral reason in one situation may lack or have contrary moral valence in another. What moral valence it will have, if any, will depend upon the situation in a way that is uncodifiable in principle. This is incompatible with universalism in ethics which claims that there are some non-moral properties which function as grounding moral reasons wherever they occur, i.e., that there are true or sound universal moral principles. But the incompatibility only holds if the particularist can draw the distinction between the moral reason and the situational factors (that enable a feature to be a moral reason) in a way that is non-relative to situations or to individual interests. If not, universalists can easily accommodate the chief claim of particularism.

In contrast to prominent versions of particularism, it will be argued that a response-dependence account of moral reasons, according to which moral reasons are those non-moral features which morally competent persons would apprehend as morally salient, does not only promise to (i) establish this distinction in the desirable objective way, but also to provide some of the crucial characteristics of (ii) moral motivation, and (iii) of moral competence.

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In Defence of Default Valency

In recent work, soon to be published, Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge attack the notion of default valency. They argue that it is a notion central to particularism but that on closer examination it is questionable. More specifically they identify three readings of the notion: a metaphysical reading, an epistemological reading and a pragmatic reading. They claim that the first two readings (which they associate with Jonathan Dancy, and Mark Lance and Maggie Little respectively) are, in different ways, untenable. They argue that the third reading is acceptable but does not do the work that particularists require.

I agree with McKeever and Ridge that the notion of default valency is central to particularism, but disagree with the conclusions that they then reach, particularly as

regards the metaphysical reading. In this paper I (a) describe briefly why default valency is so important; (b) outline McKeever and Ridge's argument against the metaphysical reading of default valency; (c) show where their argument goes wrong; and (d) from all of this, show why particularists, at least those who favour a metaphysical reading of default valency, are in a good position to account for the varieties of valency types that reason-generating features might possess.



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Moral particularism and the scope of legitimate moral criticism

The aim of this paper is to explore some of the more practical implications of moral particularism (MP). Since MP has become an umbrella term for many related, yet distinct epistemological and ontological views, making it thereby harder to identify unifying/common features, I will take, as its central claim, the idea that a descriptive feature of an act or situation which constitutes a moral reason for taking a particular course of action in one case, may fail to do so (or even provide a moral reason against the same course of action) in another.

If this were correct, then particular moral judgments could not be transported or projected from one context to another, or from more to less familiar situations; neither could they be generalized or universalized and ground, in the form of general moral rules, charges of inconsistency or arbitrariness that still pervade large segments of ongoing moral disputes. The role of arguments from analogy between those cases in which our moral judgment is pretty much fixed, and the ones where it is not, would also appear to be undermined. It comes as no surprise, then, that particularist accounts of moral reality, reasoning and knowledge have invited criticisms to the effect that they both fail to make sense of moral discussion and room for certain types of perfectly legitimate moral criticism. In the paper I assess the merits of such a complaint and its implications for moral particularism as a professed alternative to predominantly generalist moral theories.



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Cluster atomism and that's it: a stable resting place between generalism and particularism?

This paper discusses the questions what it is for a feature to be a reason, and what it is for a way of acting to be required by reasons overall.

Jonathan Dancy has made several crucial distinctions in the theory of reasons and theory of right-making (right-making *vs* favouring, favouring/right-making *vs* enabling, contributory *vs* overall, normative role here *vs* normative role in other situations, resultance base *vs* supervenience base).

With the help of these distinctions he formulates and defends holism in the theory of reasons and right-making, concerning both single features and clusters of features. Holism states that a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another. Further, what here is the 'resultance base' for rightness (cluster of relevant features from which the overall property of rightness results) need not be such that the re-occurrence of the resultance base elsewhere guarantees the same overall result. Dancy thinks that we get such a guarantee only if we artificially expand what here is the resultance base to include extra safeguards, and that in such a process of expanding there is no 'stable resting place', before we reach the whole supervenience base and have included all the irrelevant features as well. And anyway, he asks, why try to find such a stable resting place?

One powerful motive is provided by the requirement of intelligibility. The requirement is that moral differences are not arbitrary, random, inexplicable: there must always be a further morally relevant difference to explain, and make intelligible, a moral difference between two cases. Do holism in the theory of reasons, and holism about 'resultance bases' of rightness, preserve intelligibility?

I will try to show that there is a bigger difference between favouring and overall right-making than Dancy allows. It is indeed intelligible that the polarities of single features change holistically. For any polarity change, there is always an explanation in terms of 'reversing considerations', which guarantees intelligibility. Is it artificial to focus instead to clusters which include enablers? It may be in the theory of reasons, as the relation of favouring holds between single features and actions. Favouring is something that each contributory reason does on their own "perfectly well, and completely" (2004, 99). "They are not hopelessly trying to do something else, namely something that can only be done by several considerations acting together"(2004, 99). It is intelligible that the polarity of a complete favourer would be reversed elsewhere.

By contrast, I try to show that in the context of right-making the requirement of intelligibility requires "*cluster atomism with 'that's it' - clause*", and thus rules out any form of holism that is not compatible with it. Unlike favouring-relations, the ought-determining relations do not link directly each feature to each action, but there are two logical phases: first each feature contributes to the "overall case" (the complete normative shape), and secondly the overall case determines and distributes situation-specific overall statuses to each action, (providing the monadic properties of 'right', 'ought', 'second best', 'impermissible' *etc* to the different available actions). The term 'right-making' is ambiguous and can stand for the two-phase whole, or for either phase. Complete ought-determiners are clusters of considerations, including all reasons for and against all alternative actions, so they include the whole 'resultance base', including a 'that's it' -clause. ("There are no further relevant features"). Including the "that's it" – clause is not an unmotivated extra guarantee for the purposes of generality, it is introduced to get the overall results in the situation to begin with: there are *no* overall oughts at place independently of the 'that's it' assumption. Dancy, too, seems to admit

that 'that's it' is a special kind of enabler, which enables the move from the contributing 'premises' to the overall 'conclusion'. Without the 'that's it' clause *no* overall statuses are distributed, and with it, there is a guarantee against polarity change. Cluster atomism, with the 'that's it' –clause, is thus the right view concerning "right-determiners". Complete right-determiners cannot intelligibly be reversed.

This means (*pace* Dancy) that there is after all a stable resting place between two extremes of what guarantees generality or universality of overall oughts: one (false) extreme relies on single conclusive feature alone, the other (true but vacuous) extreme includes the whole supervenience base. It is clear that when the resultance base is understood as here, in terms of "cluster atomism with the 'that's it'-clause", the resultance base provides the same result wherever it occurs. *Nothing less* can constitute rightness in one situation, and *nothing more* is needed to guarantee generality across situations. In practice, this does not amount to more than the somewhat trivial view that when all the relevant considerations are exactly same, the overall verdict is the same. I will end with a comment on a slightly stronger idea of specific 'pockets of universalizability' where universalizability is supposed to hold between cases which differ slightly in some relevant respects.



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Where the Laws Are

Exceptions pepper theoretical generalizations in all sorts of disciplines, from biology to semantics, aesthetics to epistemology, and, most especially, ethics. According to standard philosophical views, such exceptions are ultimately antithetical to genuine or complete explanation. Their presence calls for us to purify the accused generalization in one of several ways -- to refine its claim, or delimit its scope; to weaken its quantifier into statistical form, or mark it as merely useful shorthand. At best, it requires grounding the generalization's theoretical bona fides on the truth of some further generalization, located at a "deeper" level, which is finally free from exception.

We first summarize a series of recent papers in which we set out a new account of so-called defeasible or hedged generalizations, according to which such generalizations must be understood as involving essentially normative content. *Ceteris paribus* generalizations, we claim, often function by telling us what happens in conditions that are "privileged" in various ways; their understanding requires a rich grasp of these conditions as well as the difference that deviation from them makes. We provide a typology of such "privileging" moves, a formal semantics for the generalizations, an explanation of the epistemic skills needed to understand them, and explore its implications for normative ethics. Ultimately, we argue, the current debate between "moral particularism" and "principlism" embraces

on both sides a pernicious presupposition that the viability of ultimate moral laws hinges on the ability to expunge exceptions, with particularists abandoning laws and principlists abandoning exceptions.

We then turn to the metaphysics such a view implies. We explain, first, what it would be for laws governing the structure of morality to be genuinely defeasible at their deepest level. Drawing on recent work in the philosophy of science, we offer an inferentialist conception of law-likeness – one in stark contrast to both shallowly pragmatist and brutally metaphysical understandings of laws. On such an understanding, defeasibility itself – and the exceptions it embraces – is no threat to lawlikeness. Building on this approach, we argue for the provocative claim that the essences of some objects are defeasible in nature; we argue, that is, that there exist natural kinds governed by inherently defeasible laws.

Given that there is no incompatibility in principle between a generalization's being lawlike and its being defeasible, we explore the marks of those practices, such as morality, whose ultimate – rather than proximate – laws are in fact defeasible. We argue that the existence of such laws is a sign of a domain structured in complex but essential ways around interests. Neither shallowly conventional practices – those where anything we say goes – nor “fully objective” practices – that is, those whose point is to characterize a reality in no way constitutively dependent on social convention, if such there are – will be plausible candidates. Those, then, who believe that morality is shot through and through with defeasible generalizations – as we do – are committed implicitly to a metaphysics of morality that is deeply practice based. Far from arguing that this pushes us toward irrealism, we raise the question of whether it is even possible to embrace defeasible moral laws, in our sense, while at the same time embracing irrealism.



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Particularism and scientific practice



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Particularism and the Contingent A Priori

How should a particularist understand basic moral facts and our knowledge of them? Since the particularist eschews moral principles, basic moral facts presumably must be facts about particular cases, e.g. that the fact that it would be pleasant was a reason for her to play the game. This knowledge must not itself be based on some antecedent moral principle which would apply to other cases. Such basic moral facts are of course

contingent. It need not have been the case that her playing the game would be pleasant at all, much less need it have been the case that the fact that it would be pleasant itself be a reason given the particularist's context-sensitive conception of how reasons function. On the plausible assumption that knowledge of contingent facts is a posteriori, it would be natural to infer that such knowledge is a posteriori, in which case all moral knowledge is a posteriori. An entirely a posteriori moral epistemology is, however, problematic for familiar reasons and is especially problematic when combined with particularism. Jonathan Dancy's recent defense of particularism instead maintains that knowledge of basic moral facts is all contingent a priori. In this paper we explore some problems for Dancy's proffered epistemology.

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Moore's Doctrine of Organic Unities

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Particularism, thickness and anti-dispositionalism: uneasy bed-fellow

In several papers Dancy argues against response-dispositionalism about moral properties, for the centrality and ubiquity of thick concepts, and for a particularist reading of them. Since thick concepts essentially and inextricably appeal to responses or attitudes, they seem to suggest response dispositionalism for moral properties as well. I argue that this is the line the particularist should take, and conclude with the following problem: in areas like color response-dispositionalism is usually connected to *ceteris paribus* laws. An analogy with moral properties would then suggest a hedged generalism as the best solution, rather than particularism of Dancy's stripe.

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Practical particularism and moral particularism

Dancy's version of holism relies on the distinction between reasons and *enablers*. Holism in the theory of reasons, according to Dancy, is mirrored in the realm of right-makers:

accordingly, the distinction between reasons and enablers can be repeated there. The paper aims to show that such a distinction cannot be exported.

Dancy rightly notices that also in the realm of rightness some features behave as enablers: they enable other features to have normative relevance. Judgements on rightness, however, are merely verdicts on morally relevant features. To say that something is right involves to say that it is right since it is honest, or just, or fair, and so on. But we establish what enables a feature to result in a moral feature only in the light of the allegedly normative significance of the moral feature itself. For instance, we establish that malicious interests are not to be helped out of beneficence, since beneficence amounts to helping not malicious interests. Enablers are fixed by what is enabled. But this involves also that we select among differently relevant features by considering what could disable or enable the present feature, in several hypothetical cases. The presence of malicious interests disable beneficence, but it can enable some other right action – for example, blaming. The identity of what is enabled is fixed by surveying possible enablers.

If enablers are so closely dependent on enabled features, and vice versa, then what right-makes an action is precisely the agglomerate *enabled + enablers*, at least in the sense that they should be both fixed and both mentioned in order to establish whether a given action is right. In judging the rightness of an action we should mention the agglomerate in order to fix the judgement, namely in order to explain it. Conversely, in explaining our actions done for a reason, we can only mention the reason, coming to the enablers only if asked the very different question concerning whether such a reason can always be a reason.

Reasons-explanations of actions should not be complete ones (as Dancy rightly emphasizes): the mere mention of what rationalizes is enough. Rightness-explanations, conversely, do not reach their goal by mere mentioning features of the situation: they need to establish their specific normative relevance (where reasons-explanations do not deal with normative relevance at all, even though they presuppose it). In the rightness case, the question whether some feature is what right-makes an action entails, firstly, having established where such feature can right-make actions, namely which are the enablers the presence of which could allow the feature to have a given normative relevance – importantly, this must be done in the light of the feature itself –, and secondly, having established the presence of the feature itself. This seems a pattern closely similar to a version of Rossian generalism.

Dancy's particularism admits comparative judgements on hypothetical cases, and perhaps requires them. What particularism rules out is a complete assessment of all the possible enablers, out of which we can gain an answer to the question whether a given feature always is capable of right-making an action. It is questionable that the kind of pattern above sketched requires such a complete survey of possible cases. Dancy's particularism, however, needs holism, and Dancy supports it by distinguishing enabled features from enabling ones. Since this distinction is viable only concerning reasons, Dancy's particularism is only a practical one.

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Dancy's Reasons

At the basis of Dancy's argument for moral particularism lies his distinction between favourers and enablers (and intensifiers). He needs this distinction to support what he calls 'holism', his view that features that are reasons for something in one case can be reasons against the same thing in another case, which in turn supports particularism. I will try to show that the favouring relation is all we need to distinguish between favourers and enablers (and intensifiers), and I will explore the consequences of this claim for Dancy's position.

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Variability of moral Features as a dispensable Idea

Dancy has offered at least two ways to justify the idea that polarities of moral features may change according to the context. I will be contending that none of them can be proved to be completely successful. The first is claiming that holism of reason entails the variability of moral features: against this idea, I contend that only from a variantist approach of the *ceteris paribus* clause it can be said that epistemic features are variable. The other way in which Dancy argues for variability is by posing some examples. My idea is that it is not possible to determine whether what happens in those examples is that polarity has changed or rather that other features in the situation have blocked it. Furthermore, I will also argue that variability, even in those cases where it could seem natural to say it holds, leaves important moral facts unjustified. Particularly:

- (a) the distinction between "having a reason to x" and "ought to x" (it doesn't apply naturally if the case is described as one in which the polarity of a feature has changed);
- (b) the compensatory acts required when one is not able to do what she promised (this would lack justification if uncapability to do x changes the polarity of the promise to do x);
- (c) closely related to (a), the interest in seeking better ways to do necessary things;
- (d) the existence of moral predicaments that cannot be described as moral dilemmas (because the competing views are not equally strong);
- (e) the possibility to misuse a good action.

For all this, I claim that it is better to dismiss with variability and explain those examples by saying that the normative force of those moral features at stake remains the same, though it has been blocked by other relevant features in the situation.

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Was Aristotle a Particularist?

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Ethical Particularism, Metaethics and Practical Ethics: Making Particularism Matter More

In this paper, I want to argue that typical, "top-down" discussions of Ethical Particularism fail to represent the issue at stake as making a very deep point about the nature of moral thought. The point the Particularist wants to make, if right, is worth making, but it does not take us very far. I want to begin by trying to situate this debate within a set of other concerns in "top-down" Moral Philosophy about the nature of moral thinking. In its stead, I want to explore the possibilities of a more substantial debate over Particularism and Generalism, that takes its starting point from an approach to ethics that is, at once, more ethically substantive than typical metaethical theories, but also more ethically neutral than typical philosophical normative ethical theories and than conceptually rich, culturally embedded ethical traditions. The approach in question goes back, arguably, at least to Aristotle and is perhaps best known from the literature about Aquinas' moral theory, in the so-called "method of object, end and circumstance". We will examine aspects of the question whether a Particularism in practical ethics is defensible.

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Is moral imagination particularist?

In his article 'The role of the imaginary cases in ethics', Jonathan Dancy argues that generalist moral theories cannot make sense of the use of such cases in moral reasoning.

Dancy offers the following solution: imaginary cases are not revealing which properties *are* morally relevant in the actual case, but that some properties *can* be so.

I will argue that this conclusion cannot be established on the basis of an account of imaginary cases so conceived. Instead, it requires a broader account of the role of imagination in ethics.

I will sketch such an account of moral imagination, according to which moral imagination is a complex virtue, both ethical and epistemic, and its scope is moral possibility. By moral imagination being a complex virtue I mean that it encompasses four relatively autonomous functions: motivational, cognitive, liberating, and heuristic.

The motivational function covers both the ability to think of what is non-actual as desirable and the ability to conceive other people's moral stances as meaningful.

The cognitive function of moral imagination concerns the way in which values become accessible to us. In fact, their accessibility can be conceived both as the upshot of counterfactual reasoning and as revealed through emotions. In the later case, emotions would be considered as forms of awareness of the discrepancies or the overlap between our values and the world.

The liberating function amounts to the use of common moral concepts in building up unconventional moral arguments.

The heuristic function helps refine moral judgments so that they would not stop at stating trivial and therefore minimal obligations. In Kantian terms, the heuristic function would uncover the realm of 'imperfect duties', i.e. the realm of virtues.

The proper use of moral imagination would require the appropriate display of all the four functions. The question of what such a display might be like can be better answered indirectly, by stating the kinds of imperfection that moral imagination is vulnerable to. Following Aristotle, I would consider moral imagination, in so far as it is as a virtue, to be the mean between two opposite vices, the default and the excess with regard to the same type of object, i.e. moral possibility.

However, as moral imagination is a complex virtue, there would be not only two opposite vices, but two pairs of opposite vices. Thus, the default of imagination would give two vices, the one being epistemic, i.e. subservience to the factual and the other being ethical, i.e. subservience to the convention. The excess of imagination would also split into two vices: wishful thinking on the epistemic side and wishful valuing on the ethical side.

In conclusion, I will examine the question whether the outlined conception of moral imagination implies moral particularism or is merely compatible with it.

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A Particularist Epistemology

In the last twenty years or so, Jonathan Dancy has developed a very refined theory called ethical particularism. Dancy has argued extensively for the metaphysical part of his position. However, the accompanying epistemology is not yet completely clear. In this paper I will sketch a particularist epistemology that is consistent with Dancy's particularist metaphysics, although my approach differs in certain respects from epistemological claims Dancy has made. I will defend an epistemology which has two features: it involves intuitions and emotions. I will call this approach 'affectual intuitionism'. Dancy rejects both claims, but I will argue that his arguments against these claims are not convincing.

1. Our moral beliefs are based on intuitions. To be able to make a moral judgment we must first assess the relevant non-moral base properties as thoroughly as possible, a procedure which requires normal empirical observation. Once we have assessed the base properties, we will be able to make a moral judgment. The moral judgment is not an inference from these observations, but it needs these observations as input. Because the final moral judgment is non-inferential, it can best be characterized as intuitive. I will argue that a holistic normative metaphysics will force us to take all kinds of normative judgments as non-inferential or intuitive.

2. We need emotions in order to have moral knowledge. Emotions have cognitive and affective aspects. I will argue that with properly functioning moral agents, moral experience initially takes place in particular situations and through sympathy.

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Dancy Cartwright: Particularism in the Philosophy of Science

This paper examines the similarities and differences between Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism and Nancy Cartwright's particularism in the philosophy of science. Motivated by a common Aristotelian belief in the richness and variety of the concrete and particular, both philosophers defend a kind of error theory with regard to any principles and/or laws which are commonly thought to pervade their respective areas of enquiry. But whereas Dancy only aims to show that morality *doesn't require* any regularities or laws, Cartwright insists that all general theoretical laws (of physics) are *necessarily false*. Moreover, Cartwright finds the laws of physics false *because they explain*, whereas Dancy's point is that moral principles *explain nothing*. I argue that Cartwright is wrong to suggest that falsehoods of any kind are capable of explanation, concluding that the scientific particularist would do better to take a leaf from Dancy's book and claim that the laws of physics cannot explain anything.

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Particularism, Perception and Moral Epistemology

Particularism has typically appealed to some form of perceptual account of moral knowledge. Nonetheless, in order to avoid the Myth of the Moral Given, perceiving that here is a moral reason to ϕ must not be understood as an ethical equivalent to a 'knowing-in-presence' (Sellars). Knowledge by perception must respect metaphysical holism about reasons and it must eschew atomistic empiricism. To satisfy these constraints, particularism has construed moral knowledge as judgemental and has rejected the thought that moral knowledge is enjoyed by merely looking and seeing. I suggest that a relational account of moral perception is appropriate on two counts; one concerns the objective purport of moral perception, the other concerns the aspectual nature of that perception. Constitutive of what Aristotle and Wittgenstein referred to as 'seeing aright' is judgemental expertise. That correct judgement requires episodes of seeing aright suggests that a form of perception is central in the metaphysics of moral knowledge, and in a way that is supportive of particularism. My paper suggests that thinking of moral perception as a form of experience that is aspectual and irreducibly relational, is an important element in particularist epistemology.

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Particularism and Moral Principles: Are Heuristic Principles or Default Reasons Enough?

When we judge that a particular action is morally right, we often cite a general moral principle in support of our claim. Perhaps we judge that the action in question will be the only one that will treat all parties equally, and we therefore justify the judgment by appeal to the principle that it is right to do what treats all parties equally. Similarly, when a dispute arises about what would be the right thing to do in situation, we may expect that the parties to the dispute will proffer reasons for thinking their various judgments are in line with plausible moral principles. On one straightforward interpretation, these practices presuppose the truth of at least two claims. They assume both that there are substantive general moral principles and that the appeal to general moral truths can play a significant role in the justification of particular moral judgments.

According to defenders of radical versions of moral particularism, the first of these claims is false. Appearances notwithstanding, there are no substantive moral principles. And yet,

few particularists wish to deny that something very like moral principles do indeed play a significant role in our everyday moral practice. Loathe at dismissing this as mere error on the part of everyday moral agents, particularists have proposed a number of alternative accounts of the practice. The aim of all of these accounts is to make sense of our appeal to general moral truths in both reaching and justifying our particular moral judgments without thereby violating the particularists' stricture against *substantive* moral principles. In this paper, I argue that two of the most prominent non-substantive accounts of moral principles appealed to by radical particularists – the heuristic account and the default reasons account – fail in this aim; if radical particularists wish to capture the place of general moral truths in the reasoning of ordinary moral agents without resort to substantive moral principles, they have yet to discover how to do this.



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Deliberative Relevance, Normative Relevance and Particularism

The main subject matter of my discussion is the relationship between moral intuitionism and moral particularism. The starting point is Robert Audi's proposal of certain distinctions that would presumably help to bring together moderate intuitionism and particularism. Audi claims that a careful introduction of distinctions such as that between deliberative relevance and normative relevance of a certain consideration could lend a hand in accommodating genuine holism into a broad intuitionistic and pluralistic background and explain away the cases of silencing and valence-shifts of reasons that particularism points out. He calls this position moderate particularism.

I argue that this middle position between intuitionism and particularism is unstable. Firstly, the distinction between deliberative relevance and normative relevance is implausible in the light of the notion of a reason as a basic normative concept. Secondly, it cannot account for all cases of silencing and reversal of valence. Thirdly, even if intuitionism could accommodate a sort of holism about overall duty and a non-subsumptivist (in an epistemic sense) view of moral judgments, this does not suffice to surpass its atomistic nature regarding normativity or give justice to the essentially holistic and reason-bound phenomena of silencing and reversal that particularists point out. We are left with two choices: (a) pluralistic intuitionism, or (b) genuine normative particularism.

Still, there remains the question of the motivation behind such proposals. I believe that the central point is that particularism, to a large extent, fails to give credit to our common-sense intuitions about morality as an ordered and stable realm. Here the notion of default reasons and the "thick-to-thin" regularities play a crucial role. Finally, I pose the question whether pluralistic intuitionism based on *prima facie* duties can find some other way to embrace a more holistic picture of reasons and I examine the possibility of implementing the common-sensical appeal of intuitionism into moral particularism.

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Dancy's moral particularism and teleology

There are two central claims in Dancy's theory of morality: (1) Particularism: the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles. (2) Holism in the theory of reasons: a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another. The author of the paper tries to make two points: (I) To point to the limitation of Dancy's theory of morality arising from the Dancy's method »my intuitions through several cases« and from the fact that there are different (factual) moralities or moral practices. (II) We are better off in a theory of (moral) normativity and in a discussion of it if we introduce teleological concepts (for instance *proper function*). Dancy seems to disagree with (II).

• General information / Na kratko o simpoziju

Philosophical conferences at Bled (Slovenia) were initiated, on the suggestion by John Biro, as a continuation of the IUC - Dubrovnik postgraduate course in philosophy (*Epistemology and Cognitive Science*). But they gradually started a life of their own, with the help of Eugene Mills. The first week of June at Bled is traditionally reserved for a conference dedicated to various topics in the field of analytical philosophy. More than 200 active participants have so far taken part in the conferences. The first conference, in the summer of 1993, was focused on *Connectionism and Philosophy of Mind*. It was followed by conferences on *Ethics and Political Philosophy* (1994), *Metaphysics* (1995), *Truth* (1996), *Modality* (1997), *Vagueness* (1998), *Epistemology* (1999), *Philosophical Analysis* (2000), *Metaphysics* (2001), *Rationality* (2002), *Ethics* (2003) and *Contextualism* (2004).

Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti (DAF) že od svoje ustanovitve leta 1991 organizira redna srečanja s predavanji in mednarodne simpozije. Na Bledu od leta 1993 v juniju potekajo mednarodni simpoziji s področja analitične filozofije. Pobudo je sprožil John Biro, ki je simpozij predlagal kot nadaljevanje podiplomskega študijskega programa (*Epistemologija in kognitivna znanost*), vendar je simpozij kmalu prerasel to vlogo, tudi s pomočjo Genea Millsa. Prvi teden v juniju je tako tradicionalno rezerviran za konferenco, ki se posveča različnim področjem in temam analitične filozofije. Na konferenci je sodelovalo že več kot 200 aktivnih udeležencev. Prva konferenca v poletju 2003 je bila osredotočena na *Konekcionizem in filozofijo duha*, sledile pa so naslednje: *Etika in politična filozofija* (1994), *Metafizika* (1995), *Resnica* (1996), *Modalnost* (1997), *Nejasnost* (1998), *Epistemologija* (1999), *Filozofska analiza* (2000), *Metafizika* (2001), *Racionalnost* (2002), *Etika* (2003) in *Kontekstualizem* (2004).

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