Metaphysics – Metafizika

IXth Bled Philosophical Conference
IX. Konferenca o analitični filozofiji

4th – 9th June 2001 / Bled, 4.6. – 9.6. 2001
Hotel Kompas

Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science
Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

Ljubljana 2001
Metaphysics – Metafizika

▪ GENERAL INFORMATION

Philosophical conferences at Bled (Slovenia) were initiated, on the suggestion by John Biro, in 1993 at first as a continuation of the IUC - Dubrovnik postgraduate course in philosophy but they gradually started a life of their own. The first week of June at Bled is traditionally reserved for a conference dedicated to various topics in the field of analytical philosophy. Metaphysics is the ninth Bled Philosophical Conference. All events take place in Hotel Kompas, Cankarjeva 2, Bled (rooms [A] and [B]).

▪ ORGANISATION

The conference is organized by a team consisting of Eugene Mills of Virginia Commonwealth University, Matjaž Potrč of the University of Ljubljana, Nenad Miščević of the University of Maribor, and Danilo Šuster of the University of Maribor. The conference is included in the program of the activities of the Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy.

▪ FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Ministry of Education, Science and Sport of Slovenia

▪ WEB PAGE

http://www2.arnes.si/~surdsust/bled.html
## PROGRAMME

### Monday, June 4th

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<td>11:30-12:30</td>
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<td>Howard Robinson ▪ Central European University, Budapest</td>
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<td>William Craig ▪ Talbot School of Theology</td>
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<td>John Tienson ▪ University of Memphis</td>
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**Wednesday, June 6th**

9:00-10:00  Arto Siitonen • University of Helsinki  
*From ‘Overcoming of Metaphysics’ to Analytic Metaphysics* [A]

9:00-10:00  Michael Felber • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München  
*Thoughts about the Metaphysical Ontology of Things* [B]

10:15-11:15  Noa Latham • Reed College  
*Can Psychophysical Property Identity Save Mental Causation?* [A]

10:15-11:15  Marko Uršič • University of Ljubljana  
*Some Epistemological and Metaphysical Aspects of the "Anthropic Principle" in Modern Cosmology* [B]

11:30-12:30  David Sosa • University of Texas at Austin  
*Free Mental Causation!* [A]

11:30-12:30  Alessandra Tanesini • Cardiff University  
*Knowing that One has a Mind: Putnam’s Brains in Vats Revisited* [B]

2:30-3:30  Nenad Miščević • University of Maribor  
*The Structure of Empirical Concepts* [A]

2:30-3:30  Cian Dorr • New York University  
*Composite Objects and Causal Efficacy* [B]

3:45-4:45  Katalin Balog • Yale University  
*Concepts with Qualities* [A]

3:45-4:45  Kathrin Koslicki • Tufts University  
*Constitution, Parthood and Dependence* [B]

5:00-6:00  Richard Grandy • Rice University  
*Objects before Words*

7:30  Group dinner at restaurant Zaka

**Thursday, June 7th**

**STUDENT SESSIONS**

10.00  Adolf Rami, University of Graz, *Why Not Be a Solipsist?*  
Jan Bregant, University of Maribor, *Supervenient Causation*  
Maja Malec, University of Ljubljana, *Why did Lewis not explain laws of nature in terms of possible worlds?*  
Uroš Rošker, University of Ljubljana, *Brentanian Space*  
Vojko Strahovnik, University of Ljubljana, *Horgan’s Package of Limited Metaphysical Realism, Contextual Semantics and Blobjectivism*  
Tea Logar, University of Maribor, *Pornography*


Friday, June 8th

10:15-11:15 Anthony Dardis • Hofstra University
  *Higher Level Property Causal Relevance* [A]
10:15-11:15 Ferenc Huoranszki • Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest
  *Fatalism* [B]
11:30-12:30 Crawford Elder • University of Connecticut
  *The Problem of Harmonizing Laws* [A]
11:30-12:30 Danilo Šuster • University of Maribor
  *Question-begging and Arguments for Incompatibilism* [B]

2:30-3:30 John Hawthorne • Rutgers University
  *Gunk* [A]
2:30-3:30 Daniel Farrell • Ohio State University
  *Kant’s (Non-retributivist) Metaphysics of Punishment* [B]
3:45-4:45 Takashi Yagisawa • California State University, Northridge
  *Minimal Modal Realism*
5:00-6:00 Mark Lance • Georgetown University
  *Defeasibility and Necessity*

Saturday, June 9th

9:00-10:00 Mylan Engel, Jr. • Northern Illinois University
  *The Real Logical Problem Evil Poses for the Theist*

10:15-11:15 W.R. Carter • North Carolina State University
  *Too Many Minds*

11:30-12:30 Eugene Mills • Virginia Commonwealth University
  *Remedial Ontology*
Katalin Balog  
Yale University, U.S.A.

*Concepts with Qualities*

Part one of the paper explores the relationship between two-dimensional semantics and the role of conceptual analysis. I argue that 2-dimensional semantics is merely a framework that is consistent with many different views on the role of conceptual analysis (including the view that there are no analytic claims). Then I go on to explore the strong thesis Jackson claims is a consequence of the two-dimensional treatment of semantics that every truth is derivable from conceptual truths and the full fundamental description of the world. This thesis presupposes a very strong connection between metaphysics and conceptual analysis. I assess whether the connection between concepts at different levels of discourse demanded by Jackson's thesis does as a matter of fact hold, and further, I will claim that even if it did in general (or if there existed creatures for whom it did) it wouldn't hold between phenomenal concepts and concepts belonging to other levels of discourse (neurophysiological, chemical, physical, etc.).

Boran Berčić  
University of Rijeka, Croatia

*Moral Facts and Independent Access*

Moral realists naturalists (or "new wave moral realists" as their opponents call them) claim that: (1) there are moral facts; (2) we don’t have to be now in possession of correct reductive definitions of moral terms; (3) moral claims can be tested against reality; (4) one is justified in assuming the truth of a moral theory; (5) explanations which appeal to moral facts are more general than those which do not; (6) there is independent evidence for moral claims; (7) there are moral observations; (8) theory ladeness of moral claims is not a vicious one; (9) there are moral observations which could confirm moral theory; (10) moral facts can and should be a posteriori identified with nonmoral ones; (11) moral facts are supervenient upon nonmoral ones; (12) moral properties can be conceived on analogy with secondary properties; (13) moral epistemology can be naturalised, (14) moral facts can motivate; (15) the fact that the science itself is value loaded supports the view that there are moral facts.

In this paper I’ll argue that the claim (6) is simply false: we do not have independent access to putative moral facts. The falsity of (6) entails the falsity of (10), and at least seriously undermine claims (2), (7) and (11).
The Problem of Universals

We are sitting in the famous concert hall with the tonight's program in hands. What, exactly, is Bach's "Die Kunst der Fuge"? There are four answers (see Meixner 1997):

(i) An abstract individual - an individual without spatial and temporal dimension ("Die Kunst der Fuge" as a universal).

(ii) An individual with spatial but without temporal dimension (there are, at least, four possible interpretations: three dimensional thing like an Aristotelian first substance from Categories; time-free individuals that have spatial dimension, but are not spatially extended - "zero-dimensional things" like ends of edges; only longitudinally extended time-free individuals - "one dimensional things" - like edges, only superficially extended time-free individuals - "two -dimensional things" - like shadows on the wall.)

(iii) An individual with spatial and temporal dimensions - momentary material individual, which is spatially fully extended but is without time dimension.

(iv) An individual without spatial but with temporal dimension - a performance of "Die Kunst der Fuge"; its first sound.

We take (i) as the most promising answer (cf. Borstner 1996). Therefore, "Die Kunst der Fuge" is a universal and, traditionally, "The Problem of Universals" (TPU) is the problem of showing how numerically different particulars can have the same properties, understood as universals. It is clear that (TPU) is an ontological problem, which includes the following question: How can numerically different particulars be identical in nature, all be of the same type? (One over Many - (OM))

Fregean proposal that universals are "unsaturated" entities is the most important point of our interpretation of (TPU). "Unsaturatedness" does not mean that such entities are ontologically deficient despite their "incompleteness". We combine two basic concept 'saturation' and 'exemplification' in the due course of our interpretation: (SE) Individual a exemplifies universal F iff the saturation of F by a is an obtaining state of affairs.

From (SE) we can interpret (OM) as (SEOM) Several individuals a1, a2, … exemplify the same universal F iff the saturation of F by a1, a2, … are obtaining SOAs (Fa1, Fa2,…).

(SEOM) can be described on the following way: universal F occurs repeatedly at individual a1, individual a2, … just in the case that several individuals a1, a2, … do exemplify the universal F which means that F is saturated by them in obtaining SOAs (Fa1, Fa2,…).

(SEOM) in the combination with the claim that universals are sparse/natural properties represents so called Aristotelian aposterior realistic answer to (TPU). (Armstrong 1978, 1997 as the most prominent figure).

However, if we use the same procedure and changing the perspective from multiplicity of individuals to multiplicity of universals: (SEMO) Several universals F, G, … are exemplified by one and the same individual a iff the saturation of F, G, … are obtaining SOAs (Fa, Ga,…). What we get now is the problem: How can there be oneness (individual a) in the multiplicity (universals F, G,…)? (Many over One - MO) Could we describe this situation on the following way: individual a occurs repeatedly at universal F, universal G. Take three cases
"a is wise", "a is bald", "a is old". We can say that there is a single, numerically one individual, which has three different universals. Multiplicity of universals is somehow disturbing, because an individual is now in some sense many by the given assumption that it is numerically one. A nominalistic answer could not be a solution to the (MO) problem, because what does it offer is just a straight 'individual' and individual 'a' itself could not explain what makes cases like "a is wise", "a is bald" and "a is old" different and sentences about them true. This extra is what (proper) theory of universals (properties) is about.

Literature


Randy Carter
North Carolina State University, U.S.A.

Too Many Minds

Constitutional accounts of the relation between the person Edna and the associated human being Edna* encounter the familiar 'too many minds' objection (TMM). I first argue that Lynne Baker's recent attempt to answer TMM fails. I then consider two alternatives to Baker's constitutionalism, the first of which proposes that Edna = Edna* and the second that Edna is a temporal segment (and a proper part) of Edna*. Versions of TMM arise in opposition both to the identity theory and the temporal segment theory, and this might encourage the conjecture that constitutionalism is no worse off than its competitors when it comes to TMM. I argue against this conjecture in my paper, proposing that the identity theory fares best, and constitutionalism worst, with respect to TMM-like problems.

William Craig
Talbot School of Theology, U.S.A.

The Elimination of Absolute Time by the Special Theory of Relativity

A physical theory is comprised of two components: a mathematical formalism and a physical interpretation of that formalism. Competing theories which differ only in virtue of their divergent physical interpretations can be extremely difficult to assess if they are empirically equivalent in their testable predictions. Considerations which are metaphysical in nature may then become paramount. The Special Theory of Relativity provides a case in point. For the empirical evidence supporting STR is under-determinative with regard to the radically different physical interpretations of the Lorentz transformations given respectively by Einstein, Minkowski, and Lorentz. During the decades in which positivism dominated the philosophy of science these differences tended to be glossed over, since empirically equivalent physical interpretations of the same mathematical formalism were regarded as but
different linguistic expressions of the same theory. But with the collapse of positivism, such indifference toward the fundamentally different ontological structures of space, time, and spacetime which appear in these three interpretations can no longer be ignored. An examination of Newton's doctrine of absolute time discloses that his concept of absolute time is rooted in his temporalist construal of divine eternity. Einstein's critique ignores the metaphysical foundations of Newton's doctrine by endorsing a positivistic epistemology which issues in operationalist analyses of time and space. Given Newton's metaphysical commitments, he was quite justified in accepting the existence of absolute time. The existence of such a time would imply that a Lorentzian physical interpretation of the mathematical formalism of the Special Theory should be adopted. Non-theological considerations reinforce the plausibility of this interpretation.

Anthony Dardis
Hofstra University, U.S.A.

Higher Level Property Causal Relevance

Causal relevance is a relation on properties. Causation is (based on) a pattern of regularities that holds among properties. One property is causally relevant to another iff the pair has a certain kind of place in that pattern. Mill's Methods constitute a least common denominator framework for what the pattern is like. P is causally relevant to Q iff P (as a Mackian inus condition) is necessary and sufficient for Q. If P₁ ... Pₙ supervene on R₁ ... Rₘ, then Mill's methods can't separate them. The P₁ ... Pₙ aren't independent of R₁ ... Rₘ, so they are not complete and independent causes; we could just say all those supervening properties are causally relevant also. But that would let in way too much. Instead, order the set of properties by supervenience. Run Mill's Methods on the first group (the properties which supervene on no other properties) and add the winners to the causal relevance relation. Run Mill's Method's on the second and each of the remainder of the groups, and at each stage, add the winners of the Millian competition to the causal relevance relation.

Marian David
University of Notre Dame, U.S.A.

Do Beliefs Have Their Contents Essentially?

The paper offers some preliminary and rather unsystematic reflections about its title-question. The question looks like it ought to be important, yet it is rarely discussed. Maybe that’s because content essentialism, i.e., the view that beliefs do have their contents essentially, is simply too obviously and trivially true to deserve much discussion. I sketch a common-sense argument that might be taken to show that content essentialism is indeed utterly obvious and/or trivial. Somewhat against this, I then point out that a “sexy” conclusion that is sometimes drawn from Putnam-Burge-style externalist arguments, namely that our mental states are not in our heads, presupposes content essentialism--which suggests that the view is not entirely trivial. Moreover, it seems intuitively that physicalists should reject the view: If beliefs are physical states, how could they have their propositional contents essentially? I distinguish three readings of the title question. Content essentialism does seem fairly obvious on the first two, but not so on the third. I argue that the common-sense argument mentioned
earlier presupposes one of the first two readings but fails to apply to the third, on which ‘belief’ refers to belief-state tokens. That’s because ordinary belief individuation is silent about belief-state tokens. Token physicalists, I suggest, should indeed reject content essentialism about belief-state tokens. What about token dualists? One might think they ought to embrace content essentialism about belief-state tokens. I end with puzzling why this should be so.

Cian Dorr
New York University, U.S.A.

**Composite Objects and Causal Efficacy**

I argue that if there are any composite objects, they are all epiphenomena. I conclude that there are no composite objects. Ordinary claims about composite objects like ‘There exists at least one chair’ are strictly and literally false. Nevertheless such claims are often correct, since they are true according to the mereological fiction which governs our ordinary practice.

Crawford Elder
University of Connecticut, U.S.A.

**The Problem of Harmonizing Laws**

More laws obtain in the world, it appears, than just those of microphysics. There appear to be laws of genetics, evolutionary biology, perceptual psychology, economics. This paper assumes there indeed are some laws in the special sciences, and that they are not just reformulated or scrambled versions of microphysical laws. Yet the objects which obey such laws are composed wholly of microparticles. How then can it be that the microparticles in such an object are bound collectively to act in ways that go beyond the behavior required of them individually by the laws of microphysics? Worse, do the laws of microphysics leave microparticles so little latitude that they cannot obey any additional laws? This paper argues that while both questions seem urgent, the second is confused and the first is a pseudo-question. The reason is that the microparticles in a typical medium-sized object are causally loose-knit. This entails that for the microparticles in a typical medium-sized object to do what is required of them by special-science laws does not conflict with their minding their own microphysics, and also entails that we cannot sensibly ask how it is ensured by their minding their microphysics.
**The Real Logical Problem Evil Poses for the Theist**

Most contemporary philosophers of religion think that the logical problem of evil is dead, that it was laid to rest once and for all by Plantinga’s ingenious transworld-depravity-based free will defense. I argue that there are two distinct logical problems of evil, "the traditional problem" and "the real problem." I show that Plantinga’s free will defense fails to demonstrate the logical compatibility of God and evil and that, as a result, the real problem remains intact. Unless and until the theist can solve this problem, theism is irrational.

**Kant’s (Non-retributivist) Metaphysics of Punishment**

Kant's theory of punishment, as developed in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, is commonly thought to be a paradigm of a retributivist theory of punishment. I try to show that this common view is based on a misreading of Kant’s text and that there are good reasons for believing that Kant was not a retributivist at all but, rather, held a non-utilitarian deterrence-based theory of punishment.

**Thoughts about the Metaphysical Ontology of Things**

Things play a basic role in our "natural" understanding of and relating to the world. I will try to show that what individual things are cannot be fully explained. Nevertheless, I argue that we should not follow the path of those philosophers who deny discrete individual things and the necessity of their concept altogether in order to stick with the picture of the world the natural sciences provide us with. This is where the requirement of a metaphysical ontology (in a strong sense of "metaphysical") comes into play which is not to rival the efforts of natural sciences but to open the prospect of gaining a more comprehensive picture of our world.

**Objects before Words**

Developmental cognitive psychologists seem to have discovered that quite young infants have considerable knowledge about objects. One question of interest is whether adults retain this folk metaphysics? And if it is, is it analogous to folk physics which is Aristotelian, and must
be supplanted by an alternative more sophisticated view, or is it like the infants knowledge about number which is later embedded intact in a more refined view.

Before addressing that question, however, we need to be as clear as possible on the content of the alleged knowledge. In particular, since this knowledge is an early knowledge about generic physical objects, it appears that it may need to be expressed in terms of a count noun which spans many of the familiar essence-giving sortals. This conflicts with the accepted wisdom among philosophers of sortals. Moreover, the infants' objects seem rather like the bodies that Quine disparaged as "both too vague and too narrow" for serious ontology.

In my paper I will focus primarily on the experimental evidence and the alleged content of the infants knowledge. Some preliminary discussion of the further implications will be given in my conclusion.

Anthony Graybosch
California State University, Chico, U.S.A.

American Beauty

Kant's approach to the nature of artworks suggests that art has a metaphysical dimension that accounts for the two major elements of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic judgements are occasioned by experiences of pleasure and have an objective aspect since they are experiences with which other persons are expected to agree. Several recent philosophers have explored the metaphysics of artworks. Arthur Danto has argued that an artwork must be situated in an artworld. Pragmatist aesthetics is opposed to a metaphysics of art seeing aesthetic experience instead as integral to experience and requiring no special explanation other than association with consumatory moments of experience.

I argue that the pragmatist approach is basically correct, that contra Danto, aesthetic experience has no special implications for metaphysics. However, there is a problematic area of experience, which I illustrate, with the idea of American Beauty found in the Work of Ralph Waldo Emerson. The development of "socially objective" standards of beauty presents aesthetics with a problematic type of object amenable to neither physicalist nor pragmatic explanation.

Terence Horgan and Matjaz Potrc
University of Memphis, U.S.A.; University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

Addressing Questions for Blobjectivism

We do accept PROPERTIES and RELATIONS, instantiated by THE BLOBJECT. But we deny that SPATIOTEMPORAL COMPLEXITY requires SPACE/TIME LOCATIONS at which they are instantiated. We propose adverbial constructions as a guide to avoid apparent commitment to putative items to be repudiated in ontology.

There are mental PROPERTIES, INSTANTIATED in spatio-temporally local ways by THE BLOBJECT. The overall phenomenal character of one’s current mental state, which includes
phenomenology of intentionality, is fully precise. We say that M is INSTANTIATED R-ishly by THE BLOBJECT in order to convey and improve on the idea that a phenomenologically precise mental PROPERTY T M is instantiated at the precise homogenous minimal spatiotemporal region R. Intentional PROPERTIES though are vague in their content. Some intentional mental PROPERTIES are INSTANTIATED TRULY (or FALSELY) by THE BLOBJECT. Truth-makers for such intentional PROPERTIES are maximal PROPERTIES instantiable by THE BLOBJECT. The truth is construed as indirect correspondence, if no OBJECTS or PROPERTIES answer directly to the propositional content of the judgment-PROPERTY. Being INSTANTIATED SEMANTICALLY CORRECTLY just is being INSTANTIATED TRULY. It is thus not mandatory to embrace semantic NORMATIVITY.

Ferenc Huoranszki
Ferenc Huoranszki, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

Fate, freedom and contingency

Fatalism is an argument, which attempts to prove that free choice is a logical or conceptual impossibility. The paper argues that the first two premises of the argument are sound: propositions are either true or false and they have their truth-value eternally. But the claim that from the fatalistic premises with the introduction of some innocent further premise dire consequences follow as regards to the possibility of free choice is false. The introduced premise, which establishes the connection between the first two premises (which are about the nature of propositions) and the concept of free choice is not innocent. It creates the impression that the truth of certain propositions can somehow determine the occurrence of certain events. But no proposition can have such an effect since the counterfactuals "If proposition P were true, event E would happen" does not say anything about determination.

The argument for fatalism is, however, not a boring sophism. It does reveal something about the nature of propositional representation. It shows that each proposition represents necessarily the fact what it represents, i.e. it shows that propositions have their truth conditions non-contingently. But from this nothing follows as regards to the contingent nature of the facts represented. On the bases of the first two premises of the argument for fatalism we cannot infer to the impossibility of free choice. The argument for fatalism should not be interpreted as an attempt to prove on purely logical or conceptual grounds that we do not have the ability to influence future events by our choices. But it could be used to show something about the nature of propositional representation.

Prof. dr. Igor Jerman
BION, Institute for Bioelectromagnetics and New Biology, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Living Process Logic

In principle, life is a dynamic phenomenon, which means that dynamics is its generic or primary essence and not something secondary, as is the case with the moving objects. Taking this seriously into account, we can correctly model the properties of life only through a proper logic - logic capable of encompassing inherently dynamic entities, i.e. processes. It could be
called the process logic (not necessarily temporal). The classical 2-value logic operates only superficially, since it represents dynamics only as a paradox or contradiction; under its sway life and other dynamic entities like flows are "frozen" into states.

Any logic has at least two levels: the one of direct statements and the one of statements about its statements (the so-called meta-level). The language of the second level of many logical systems that were composed to overcome various paradoxes like multi-value logic, fuzzy logic etc. is still mainly a 2-value one, therefore the paradoxes are solved only apparently; they appear again on their meta-level. To avoid this trap, a special logic should be developed that would be compatible with the 2-value logic at the meta-level and yet sufficiently inclusive to reflect dynamics on the basic operational level.

After having searched for a way to formulate an optimum logic having the former characteristics, we chose a variant of the 4-value logic in contrast to a common multi-value logic. Geometrically, it is not represented on a line (one dimension) but on a plane (two dimensions). Beside a "real" axis similar to the well-known line between truth (1) and untruth (0) it has also an "imaginary" axis. The latter represents potentiality, this something that does not exist in a strict ontological sense of the word, yet it does have some subtle, or we may even say metaphysical existence. Whatever our opinion about it - as Whitehead aptly concluded - there is no process (dynamics) without potentials. A process always demands a change of something into something else; in any moment something appears (i.e., becomes true) that was not there before - when it was only a potential.

The formulated logic has four values, interpreted as untruth, truth, potential truth and super-truth (meaning the union of truth and potential truth). Furthermore, it has seven non-trivial operators that maintain all four values (in 2-value logic there is only one analogous, namely negation). The logic can be understood as a propositional one or as something similar to the Boolean algebra, which can give it operational power to handle dynamic and potential entities that are not only encountered in life, but strongly present in the world of quantum mechanics as well.

Kathrin Koslicki
Tufts University, U.S.A.

_Constitution, Parthood and Dependence_

Whenever an object constitutes, makes up or composes another object, the objects in question share a striking number of properties and appear to differ with respect to certain other properties. For example, a statue and the piece of clay which constitutes it have the same weight, shape, color, texture, chemical composition, etc.; but they appear to differ with respect to some of their modal and temporal properties (e.g., the property of being essentially a statue or the property of having been in existence before the statue came into existence). Any credible analysis of the constitution-relation must account for both the striking similarities and the apparent differences between an object and that which constitutes it.

The purpose of this paper is to defend a novel account of the differences between constitutionally related objects. I propose that the piece of clay is best viewed as being only a proper part of the statue, viz., its largest material part. (This view takes its inspiration from Aristotle, who held that material substances are compounds of matter and form.) According to
this analysis, material objects such as statues and pieces of clay have non-material parts (viz., certain kinds of *properties*), in addition to their "ordinary" material parts. Thus, even though the statue and the piece of clay occupy exactly the same space at the same time, they do not share all of their parts, and are hence distinct. However, the form of coincidence to which this view is committed is no more disturbing than that which holds, say, between a man and his forearm: just as the man occupies the region of space occupied by his forearm by virtue of having a proper part (viz., the forearm) which occupies this region of space, so the statue occupies the region of space occupied by the piece of clay by virtue of having a proper part (viz., the piece of clay) which occupies that region of space.

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**Defeasibility and Necessity**

This paper clarifies a structure common to several important philosophical concepts. Certain relations appear to be both metaphysically important, and inherently defeasible. One example is the relation of "good-making" as conceived of by such particularists as Jonathan Dancy. On this view, the contribution of any given feature to an action's moral status is ineliminably dependent on the context in which it appears. The fact, say, that an action would produce pleasure can be good-making, bad-making, or of indifference depending on other facts of the situation that cannot be spelled out in any codifiable, helpful way. On this theory, one might agree that pleasure has a default status as good-making, but it can be defeated. More specifically, it can be defeated, not merely in the weak sense of being overridden by a stronger bad-making feature of the situation, but in the strong sense that it can, in the presence of non-standard background conditions, become bad-making.

It is easy to conclude from the essential defeasibility of such connections, that these relations are metaphysically insignificant. If there are situations in which pleasure is bad-making, even worlds in which it is typically so, it may seem that the connection between pleasure and the good is purely contingent, a statistical regularity which just happens, as a brute empirical fact, to obtain in our world. One might be tempted to draw similar conclusions about the epistemic connection between x’s appearing to be F and x’s being F, or heat being applied to ice and the ice melting.

However plausible the view that these relations are merely defeasible, it seems that for at least certain relata, standing in them is a matter of greater metaphysical import. Even the particularist has, we suspect, the nagging feeling that there is a deeper connection between pleasure, honesty, or freedom and goodness, than there is between shoe color and goodness, and that this would remain the case even in a world so deviant that the latter was good-making more often than the former. Similarly, it is hard to shake the sense that even in a systematically deceptive world there is some important and deep connection between appearance and reality. Indeed, all but the most committed particularist will be inclined to think these connections necessary and essential.

In this paper, we explicate a crucial ambiguity in the notion of a defeasible connection to show how it is possible to accommodate both intuitions, to hold consistently that a connection is defeasible and also necessary.
Can Psychophysical Property Identity Save Mental Causation?

Commonsense suggests that my toothache is causally related to my deciding to phone the dentist and to the movement of my body as I lift the receiver and speak into it. Yet many see problems in making sense of such mental causation. One problem is that of understanding causation in such a way that mental properties of mental events are accredited with the causal role that intuition sees them as having. Actually this seems rather easy to do. Counterfactual and rough law approaches to causation readily grant mental properties a causal role, and this is acknowledged by the problem's greatest proponent, Jaegwon Kim. The trouble with such approaches, according to Kim, is that counterfactuals are ultimately analysable in terms of rough laws, and rough laws cannot be assumed to be genuine causal laws rather than spurious laws, such as those relating the movements of one type of shadow to the movements of another. What is needed to generate the problem, then, is an alternative account of causation according to which instantiations of physical properties can be causes whereas instantiations of mental properties that are not identical to physical properties cannot. The problem would then be solved if mental properties could be identified with appropriate physical properties.

Kim doesn't put the problem this way. The most pressing problem as he sees it is causal exclusion--whenever there seems to be a mental cause of some event there is always a physical or neural cause that excludes the mental cause. The reason for this is that the instantiation of the physical property provides a "full causal account (Mind in a Physical World p 65)" of the effect, or is "sufficient (p 43)" for the effect. Hence, there cannot be any work left over for the mental property instance to do once the physical property instance has done its causal work (p 37). This problem, too, would be solved if mental properties were identical to appropriate physical properties. And it is a local, or species-specific, version of psychophysical property identity that Kim offers as his favoured solution to this problem. In this paper I chiefly direct my criticism to his proposed solution of the problem, and more generally to the idea that if mental properties were identical to physical properties of the brain, it would solve problems of mental causation. I argue that if mental properties were identical to physical properties it would have to be to physical properties of small regions of space, and it is hard to find any analysis of causation on which instantiations of such physical properties would be causes while instantiations of mental properties not identical to physical properties would not. The same holds if one talks of reduction instead of identity or if, acknowledging the implausibility of identity or reduction in the light of multiple realisability concerns, one talks instead of local reduction or local identity.

If we work with the notion of sufficient cause that Kim uses to set up the exclusion problem, we see that such a cause would have to be the exemplification of a property of a region covering an entire time-slice of the light cone having the region in which the effect occurs as vertex. Such a physical property cannot be identified with a mental property, so problems of mental causation cannot be solved my making this identification. If we abandon this method of solving the problem but nonetheless insist on this rationale for causal exclusion, we are forced to maintain that all instantiations of macrosopic properties are causally inert.
Are there any other plausible causal notions that could generate a problem of mental causation? Strict law analyses would seem promising as they are objective and might be tied to fundamental laws. But I argue that there are no plausible analyses of this sort. There is an objective notion of causal relevance that can be understood in terms of an objectively construed counterfactual. But this notion readily applies to instantiations of mental properties. And there is no reason to think that the mere causal relevance of a particular has any tendency to exclude the causal relevance of another particular.

Although I claim to have considered the most plausible candidates for causal relations I cannot claim to have been exhaustive. But it can at least be said that the burden of proof lies with Kim and anyone who shares his worry to present a causal relation which generates a problem of mental causation that could be solved by invoking psychophysical property identity.

Barry Loewer
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Natural Properties

David Lewis, David Armstrong, and others posit "natural" properties or universals or tropes to do some heavy lifting in metaphysics. In particular Lewis needs them to make his accounts of laws, causation, and chance work. But the way they are posited makes it unclear how they are connected to science. I try to remedy that in my paper.

Eugene Mills
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Remedial Ontology

Some recent arguments aim to undermine philosophical controversies over the relation between the mental and the physical. These arguments hold that the controversies are pointless, because there is no clear notion of physicality at issue (or perhaps no notion at all). These arguments fail on more than one score, but I rebut them here in the most direct way: I defend an analysis of physicality that does justice to the philosophical disputes.
The Structure of Empirical Concepts

The structure of empirical concepts, in particular natural kind ones (like WHALE), needs to be more closely investigated. The old logical positivist view treats every non-equivalent definition or strict conception of what is intuitively the same referent (fishWHALE, mammalWHALE) as expressing a sui generis finely-grained concept, with a specific set of analytic truths attached to it. The view is counterintuitive and untenable, given the intuitive sameness of their reference. The more recent views in Putnam-Kripke tradition eschew concept-talk, in my view wrongly. They need to be supplemented with a metaphysics of concepts, and here the structural part of it is investigated.

Assuming rough sameness of reference, one can associate the metaphysically correct finely grained concept (mammalWHALE) with a series of metaphysically incorrect conceptions (e.g. fishWHALE) that embody less successful attempts at defining it. Treating those as full-blooded whale-concepts in the positivistic manner, leads to troubles with reference-determining, and is best to be avoided. Further, the ordered n-tuple consisting of the correct conception together with incorrect ones associated with it might be taken as a single coarse-grained concept (e.g. WHALE). The conditions of identity of such a concept need to be further investigated, with continuity and causal connectedness being the most prominent candidates. Main objections and alternatives to the proposal are briefly formulated and discussed in the last section of the paper.

Ways of Being Good

One idea to appease metaphysical worries about evaluative properties is to replace goodness by so-called ways of being good. After investigating Geach’s thesis – ‘Nothing can be simply good or bad, something can only be a good or bad so-and-so’ – I focus on the work of Judith Thomson, the most vigorous contemporary defender of the project to naturalize moral philosophy on the basis of ways of being good. I distinguish between the following two claims of Thomson: (a) Everything that is good has to be good in a way, and (b) There is no such property as goodness. After raising some problems with these claims, namely, first, that the first claim is not unique to goodness and, furthermore, seems to be almost trivial and, secondly, that the two claims seem to be in tension with each other, I argue that Thomson view should best be characterized as the thesis that sentences containing ‘good’, without reference to ways of being good, are semantically incomplete. In the final part of the paper I try to show that Thomson's account of moral goodness doesn't really provide the means to go beyond traditional debates.
Plotinus, Locke and Hume on the unity of individual substances

Plotinus argues for the existence of what he calls 'the One' on the grounds that all objects must possess a unity - one might say 'individual-ness' - and that therefore there must be a corresponding property - unity or individualness. On the one hand, this is a kind of Platonic form, but, on the other, as Platonic forms are self-predicating, this one must instantiate pure individuality and nothing else. Therefore, unlike a form proper it is not a universal, and so neither is it intelligible: but as unity is possessed by everything, it is presupposed by and transcends everything else.

Hume, with Plotinus, accepts the conditional 'if there are individuals, then there is a property, 'individuality'''. But whereas Plotinus works modus ponens on this, Hume works modus tollens - there is no such strange property so there are no genuine (complex) individuals: they are a matter of illusion or convention. Locke, different again, agrees with Hume on artefacts, but, for living things accepts the existence of 'a common life' - a strangely Aristotelian view. My purpose is to see how much sense can be made of the Plotinian view. We will find that it has more mileage than one might imagine - and that it has more contact with Hume's approach than would have been expected.

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Temporal Parts

In 'Postscript to Survival and Identity', David Lewis proposes an argument for temporal parts which depends heavily on a combinatorial principle. The idea is this: take any object or region of space in a world and any distinct object or region in the same or another world. Then there is (yet) another world in which those regions are temporally contiguous, one coming directly before or after the other. By repeated application of the combinatorial principle, Lewis maintains, we can generate a world of stages exactly like the actual world in distribution of natural intrinsic qualities and relations. By his doctrine of Humean Supervenience, according to which any two worlds alike with respect to their distributions of intrinsic natural properties are alike simpliciter, Lewis concludes ours is a world of stages, i.e., one with temporal parts. The details and viability of this argument will be explored.

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From "Overcoming of Metaphysics" to Analytic Metaphysics

Generally speaking, metaphysics, by the nature of its name, could be just another meta-level study which has as its task to lay bare the foundations of physics and to raise questions
unasked in physics but somehow presupposed as answered by the physicists. Historically, its position after the Physics in the corpus of Aristotle’s works confirms this picture. Also historically, however, metaphysics was identified as "speculation stretching beyond the boundaries of possible experience" or "speculation uncontrolled by logic." One may speak of the Kantian criticism and of the logical empiricist criticism of metaphysics. Kant himself was working for a future metaphysics and in favour of metaphysical foundations of natural science. After him, the concept of metaphysics stayed in current usage in German philosophy, although "traditional metaphysics" or "rational cosmology" and "rational theology" remained somewhat suspect. For Carnap and Reichenbach, the very term ‘metaphysics’ became an anathema. Their empiricism was a continuation of Hume’s anti-metaphysical tendencies. This attitude was current in analytical philosophy, until Strawson published his ‘Individuals’, being a study in ‘Descriptive Metaphysics.’(1959). In the recent development, the term ‘Analytic Metaphysics’ has been coined, and the old Aristotelian questions have returned in a possibly transformed fashion into analytic philosophy.

It is my aim to study Carnap’s "pseudo-problems"-approach and his article "Die Ueberwindung der Metaphysik durch die logische Analyse der Sprache" (1931-2), as well as the article "Metaphysik und Naturwissenschaft" (1925) by Reichenbach, and to treat the question of metaphysics in the light of these. Because Carnap’s views are more well-known than Reichenbach’s, it is Reichenbach’s paper that will be at the centre of attention.

David Sosa
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*Free Mental Causation!*

If John McDowell hadn’t already said something similar, I would say that modern metaphysics is beset by a characteristic anxiety. There is something we want, something of value, distinctive; but we’re afraid we can’t have it. I’ll consider the way this anxiety expresses itself in two philosophical problems: the problem of free will and the mind/body problem. These are both philosophical problems about the place of persons in the natural world. And they both involve a threat to our dignity as persons that seems to emanate from an alienated conception of nature. I hope to show that we’re more likely to make progress on each problem if we address them both together.

Danilo Šuster
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*Begging the question and arguments for incompatibilism*

Thirty years of discussion about these arguments for incompatibilism have resulted in frustration and growing disappointment. It seems that every line of reasoning about can be driven to the state of begging the question. But what does it mean to beg the question in this area? McKay and Johnson recently presented a counterexample to the principle of reasoning (transfer of necessity) used in the original (Van Inwagen’s) modal argument. Crisp and Warfield object however, that the counterexample proposed begs the question. I argue that the refutation of the counterexample does not work. Some general issues about begging the
question in arguments for incomaptiblism are raised and analysed with the help of the model of the argument proposed by Parsons.

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Knowing that One has a Mind: Putnam’s Brains in Vats Revisited

In this paper I argue that Putnam’s *ab initio* Brain-in-a-Vat Scenario does not describe a genuine possibility. There are four requirements which are essential to the scenario as Putnam envisages it:

1. **Sameness of Phenomenal Character of Experiences**: The perceptual experiences of envatted and embodied brains can have the same phenomenal character.
2. **Brains in a vat hallucinate**: Brains-in-a-vat’s experiences are hallucinations.
3. **Perceptual content is ‘phenomenological content’**: perceptual content is a matter of how the world seems to the experiencer.
4. **Causal Constraint on Reference**: A subject can have thoughts about things of a given kind only if that subject has or has had causal interactions with them, or with things in terms of which they can be described.

These four requirements, I believe, cannot be jointly satisfied.

A. Given the supposition that brains-in-a-vat have thoughts, there are two different, but related, reasons why the hypothesis is inconsistent. First, it is impossible to find a way of characterising the content of the experiences of the brains in a vat such that we avoid both of the following: (i) attributing to them concepts they cannot have because of the causal constraint; (ii) attributing to their experiences phenomenal characters different from those which we attribute to embodied brains. Second, it is impossible to explain how the brains in a vat could have acquired the concepts they do have.

B. Further, these difficulty cannot be resolved by supposing that although brains in a vat have no thoughts, nevertheless, there is no phenomenological difference between them and embodied brains. This solution cannot be offered because, as I argue, the property of having a mind is transparent.

John Tienson
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Questions for Blobjectivism

Terry Horgan and Matjaz Potrc have recently put forward an intriguing ontological/semantical position that they call ‘blobjectivism’. The ontological thesis of blobjectivism is that there is exactly one concrete object, the universe as a whole—"the Blobject"—which has no concrete parts, but which, of course, manifests a great deal of complexity and local variation. The semantic thesis of blobjectivism is that many ordinary statements—which has no concrete parts, but which, of course, manifests a great deal of complexity and local variation. The semantic thesis of blobjectivism is that many ordinary statements—such as that this apple is red—are (literally) true, because the semantic norms governing their ordinary use require only what Horgan and Potrc call ‘indirect correspondence’ to the world (= the blobject), not direct correspondence. That is, certain conditions have to be met for the statement to be true, but there does not have to be a mind-independent entity answering to the subject term, ‘this apple’.
After briefly extolling the attractions of blobjectivism, I raise two sets of questions. The first set concerns the ontological requirements of the complexity that Horgan and Potrc attribute—rightly, of course—to the blobject. I argue that more is required that Horgan and Potrc have allowed in their ontology. They need to recognize spatial and temporal parts of some sort, points or regions or both—which they deny. The second set of questions has to do with whether the ontological thesis of blobjectivism can provide the resources necessary for the semantical thesis of blobjectivism. Norms pose difficulties for any version of naturalism. But norms are prima facie a special problem for blobjectivism because according to blobjectivism there are no people to have norms. So how can there be semantic norms in the blobject? I do not think that the fact that statements "about people" are true under certain indirect correspondence norms is enough—not to mention its circularity.

Marta Ujvari
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Time, Tense and the 'Indexical Fallacy' in McTaggart's Argument

The tenser-detenser debate has got impetus from the new indexical, token reflexive analysis of tensed language which renders the truth conditions of tensed sentences in tenseless terms. According to detensers like Mellor and Poidevin what McTaggart's argument shows is that the A-series account of time is a misconstrual leading to regress. Tenser E.J. Lowe, however, argues that the A-regress cannot even have a start since it rests on the indexical fallacy of using compound tenses. His claim, roughly, is that temporal indexicals just like any other indexicals cannot be iterated without violating the contextual constraints on the use, as opposed to the mention, of indexicals. Further, Lowe claims that extending McTaggart's fallacious argument to space and personality one could equally argue for the irreality of places and persons.

I will show that Lowe's argument is incoherent. When introducing the indexical fallacy he makes appeal to the analogy between temporal and other indexicals. But when he defends the tensed view he makes appeal to McTaggart's first two premises (1. time involves change essentially; 2. change can be explained only in terms of the A-series) which invite a disanalogy between temporal and other indexicals. So, the indexical fallacy cannot be repeated, pace Lowe, for space and person within the context of McTaggart's argument. Consequently, the threat of the irreality of places and persons does not arise along taggartian lines. The other conclusion with broader implications is that even the indexical analysis shows the specific metaphysical character of time in consonance with the metaphysical tradition.
Some Epistemological and Metaphysical Aspects of the "Anthropic Principle" in Modern Cosmology

This paper deals with one of the basic philosophical questions in modern cosmology: whether the so-called "Anthropic Principle", usually considered as an alternative to the classical teleology of creation, is indeed the most adequate explanation of the evidence that our universe is "well-tuned" for the emergence of life and consciousness. The main problem with this principle is not its presumed teleology, as it is sometimes wrongly supposed, but quite the contrary: its intended role to avoid teleological explanations by including the existence of many universes ("multiverse") into extended cosmological models. After having compared logical and cosmological many-worlds concepts, this paper comes to the conclusion that the ontological reality of the "multiverse" is an even more problematic presupposition as some properly revised version of teleological causality, which in itself does not imply the classical theistic explanation of creation, since it yields also some kind of "pantheistic" explanation of the emergence of life and consciousness in our universe.

Peter van Inwagen
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'Carnap' and 'The Polish Logician'

This paper is a critical examination of an argument of Putnam's, an argument for the conclusion that there can be no such thing as "the number of objects." Putnam's argument appeals to two fictional, or semi-fictional, characters he calls "Carnap" and "the Polish logician." "Carnap" says of a certain world that it contains three objects and "the Polish logician" says of that same world that it contains seven objects, and, we, the audience to whom Putnam is addressing his remarks, are invited to join him in judging that there is, as they say, just no fact of the matter as to who is right. I invite my audience to join me in judging that Putnam's argument is nothing more than hand-waving and whistle-talk.

Takashi Yagisawa
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Minimal Modal Realism

Modal semantics relativizes truth and related semantic notions to possible worlds. Two questions immediately arise: "What are possible worlds?" and "how is the relativization accomplished?" The former is a basic metaphysical question and the latter is a technical semantic question. I am mainly concerned with the former question. Many answers to this question have been given. We can classify most of them into two different types; the concretionist and the abstractionist. The concretionist answers identify worlds as some kind of concrete objects: e.g., mereological sums of concrete particulars (Lewis), states of affairs (Plantinga), situations (Barwise and Perry). The abstractionist answers identify worlds as some kind of abstract objects, usually sets: e.g., sets of sentences (Carnap), sets of
propositions (Adams), sets of situations (Cresswell). I sketch a third type of answer, according to which worlds are neither concrete objects nor abstract objects. It identifies worlds as sui generis points on the alethic modal axis on a par with times, which are temporal points on the temporal axis. The guiding idea is that worlds are exactly what they are supposed to be, viz., alethic modal indices; nothing less, and importantly, nothing more. This is a minimalist view, to which one is naturally led when one realizes that no sooner does one attempt to say something substantive in characterizing worlds than one is led astray. It is also realist, for it takes worlds to be as real as times. I defend this view by sketching a few of its virtues which have bearings on the second question, about the technical details of modal semantics. In particular, I shall discuss the relevance of worlds to modality, Grim’s problem about maximality, the existence of worlds and possibilia, and modality de re (transworld identity).

Student papers

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Why did Lewis not explain laws of nature in terms of possible worlds?

According to David Lewis a theory of plurality of worlds helps to understand a wide range of problematic and difficult concepts: modality, counterfactuals, propositions, properties, causation, supervenience ... But Lewis doesn't give an account of laws of nature with possible worlds. Why not? The problem is a circularity of such an analysis. Unrestricted quantification over possible worlds corresponds to logical modality, but nomological necessity requires a quantification restricted from the standpoint of our world. It is contingent which world is ours; hence what are the laws of our world; hence which worlds are nomologically accessible from ours; hence what is true throughout these worlds, i.e. what is nomologically necessary. The theory of possible worlds can help us in explaining the nature of laws only after we have already established what are the laws of nature in our world. So we need an independent theory of nomological necessity.

I argue that Lewis advocates modal realism because he is Humean. He believes that all there is to the world are facts and sets of facts and that anything else supervenes on the arrangements of facts of this world. But in this way he can not explain modal notions, which are an important part of the total theory of what there is. Therefore he postulates another worlds. The Humean Supervenience thesis (all features of the world supervene on the spatiotemporal arrangement of local qualities throughout all of world's history) also plays an important role in Lewis' modal realism. In his account of modality he could not do without the principle of recombination that prohibits strictly necessary connections between distinct existences. The principle of recombination is actually a Humean modal principle.
Why not be a solipsist?

If we talk about solipsism it is rational and common to distinguish two kinds of solipsism: (A) metaphysical (ontological) solipsism and (B) methodological (epistemological) solipsism. Solipsism (A) represents an ontological conception that puts forward the thesis:

\[ (T1) \text{Everything that exists is one and only one mental substance (= an Ego or Self).} \]

The second (B) is a methodological tool to treat and describe the philosophical problem of (access to) other minds and it represents the epistemological conception that holds the thesis:

\[ (T2) \text{The mind of every person is inaccessible for any other person and therefore every mental process is private.} \]

René Descartes was the first philosopher who gave two powerful arguments in his famous Meditationes that can be treated as plausible justifications of both mentioned kinds of solipsism. These arguments are:

1. The (so-called) Dreaming-Hypothesis
2. The (so-called) Demon-Hypothesis

It is the aim of my paper firstly to evaluate whether these two Cartesian arguments put in fact forward one of the two distinguished kinds of solipsism or not, secondly to discuss possible and yet raised objections against these arguments. And thirdly I will present a Super-Demon-Hypothesis that is a strengthened and combined version of (1) and (2) to justify a specific kind of metaphysical (ontological) solipsism.

Uroš Rošker
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Brentanian Space

We live in space, we work in space and we move in space. But there is a difference between space we live and work in (the objective) space and the space as we perceive it (the phenomenal space). This difference is best seen in case of illusions. What are the basic elements of our perception, so that such differences are possible? There are qualities, such as color red or blue, or a tone. Each sensory organ perceives qualities in a way specific just for this organ. But space is not a quality. The connection between space and quality can only exist between quality and the intensity related to it. What we perceive is concrete, qualitatively and spatially specified and it is individualized only through the whole of these specifications. As space is not a quality it has to be separately specied. Brentano examines the following properties of space:
1. The phenomenal space depends upon the objective space. 2. There is continuity in phenomenal space. 3. This continuity is at least three dimensional. 4. The three dimensional continuity is straight, homogenous. 5. The intensity is fullness of space and not a property of a quality. 6. We can compare distances and other relations in space. 7. The comparison is not done by moving the distances and angles in space, but by dividing distances and angles, and counting their parts. 8. The process of comparing spatial relations cannot be fully accomplished. So there are illusions.

Brentano’s explanation of phenomenal space is strong enough to include qualities, intensity and even illusions. His theory is a serious candidate for explanation of space as humans perceive it.

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*Horgan’s Package of Limited Metaphysical Realism, Contextual Semantics and Blobjectivism*

Besides and contrary to the positions of metaphysical realism and anti-realism Horgan proposes limited metaphysical realism. Limited metaphysical realism accepts the existence of a mind/discourse independent world, but it rejects the other two characteristics of metaphysical realism: strong bivalence and correspondence theory of truth. Contextual semantics denies correspondence theory of truth, distinguishing itself from truth conceived as warranted assertability. Truth is correct assertability. A statement is correctly assertible due to the contribution of the world and of assertability norms. Connection between the world and truth is indirect correspondence, as opposed to direct correspondence. This view situates itself between referential semantics and neo-pragmatist semantics. It has some advantages and explanatory power, although it introduces a rather baroque account of truth, especially if one also adopts blobjectivism. On this view there exists only one thing - the blob. It has no proper parts, no boundaries and it is richly structured. Problems arise with the nature of the contribution of the world as a part of the truth-making relation and also with denial of strong bivalence, especially if one claims that there is no vagueness in the world. Such a position together with contextual semantics and blobjectivism is fairly unclear and potentially unstable.