Unique Reasons
Matjaž Potrč
Moral reasons fork into motivational reasons and normative reasons. There is a feeling that these are interdependent. Countering this intuition are cases of motivational reasons without normative reasons, and cases of normative reasons without motivational reasons. The puzzle about the explanation of action brings this into focus as the kind of situation where intentional explanatory aspects are in mismatch with the deliberative explanatory aspects of reasons. Normative reasons do and again do not involve desires. Puzzle leans on cases featuring disjoined motivational and normative reasons. These cases are under the spell of high score disjunctive requirements. Upon this basis, a solution urges to determine to which extent the reason based deliberation can be practical, proposing ideal conditions as the criterion for bringing motivational and normative reasons together. It sounds that the reasoning here succeeds under too high score requirements and as removed from the contingencies of everyday life. In human practices there is a discrepancy between motivational and normative reasons indeed, although not a dramatic and exclusive disjunction one. Such discrepancy requires lower contextual score for measuring the impact of reasons. A lower contextual divergence of reasons which affects our everyday behavior allows both kinds of reasons to involve a common cognitive background. The presupposition that needs to be countered is that of a direct and explicit functioning of reasons as guides to actions. Rather, the motivational and normative reasons may be epistemically differentiated, although they apply to the situation at hand through the falling of a judgment, in an indirect and implicit manner. Unique motivational and normative factors involving reasons chromatically illuminate the given situation, from the common morphological content involving cognitive background. Both kind of reasons are intertwined in the cognitive background from which they illuminate the stage. Everyday mismatch low key contextual cases show that motivational and normative reasons are both involved, yet one or the other is in the foreground, as it may be clarified by the explanatory aspectual means.

Keywords: motivational reasons, normative reasons, intentional and deliberative explanation, morphological content, chromatic illumination.

1. Moral reasons fork into motivational reasons and normative reasons.
One usual distinction is that between motivational and normative reasons. Motivating reasons provide psychological push for the agent to engage himself in some activity. The question is what is the reason for the agent being engaged into the action φ. This allows for the agent's direct, his desire including involvement into the situation. Normative reasons, on the other hand, provide reflection aiming at the agent's engagement into that action. Is the agent following rational scores as he pursued the action φ? Did he follow rational requirements as he embraced the action in question? If you try to explain these approaches, you can realize that motivational reasons will tend to go along with the intentional explanation of action, whereas normative reasons, on the other hand, will tend to go along with the deliberative explanation of action. Intentional explanation of action will involve causal story, such as the one that desire and belief lead to an action. Deliberative explanation of action will involve normative matters, such as the question under what conditions the agent would involve himself into the action φ if he would be fully rational. One could go on. Although the basic idea of the distinction between motivational and normative reasons is simple, it seems to bring along a lot of related stuff that we have just started to scratch. One can say that there are several dimensions of moral reasons involved, of which our distinction presents just a single dimension. The study of this specific dimension however will bring additional dimensions with it.
	But what actually are moral reasons? The answer is that they are a subclass of reasons for action. Reasons for action allow for division into motivational and normative reasons as well. If I took a sip of tea, one may ask what has motivated me to engage into this direction. And besides to this one may ask the question about the rationality of my involvement into that action. Should I perhaps think about not drinking the black tea and rather drink herbal tea instead, as this would be better for my health? Moral reasons are specific reasons for action, the ones that assign more weight to normative considerations. Whereas drinking tea or some other kind of my practical engagement may be approached with normative reasons questions, typically the weight will be upon motivation and causal explanation. In cases of moral reasons, falling of judgment will be required as the entrance into evaluating the moral action that one engages in. The action, as well, will be evaluated as morally good or as morally inappropriate in this second kind of cases. The shortcut though for the difference between practical and moral reasons as their subclass is that the second ones involve moral judgment as precondition of engagement into action.
	Coming to the basic question now about what reasons actually are brings us to the realization that there is not just one reason or two reasons, or perhaps two kinds of reasons, but that there is a multiplicity of reasons. Especially this is patent in moral reasons case where several aspects are involved into a judgmental decision under which an action will be performed. Reasons involve a pluralist situation, and this one requires the agent's insight and his falling of judgment. This is required because of the richness and dynamics of reasons that are involved into some specific situation. Judgment as basic for moral reasons, particularly, gives us yet another interpretative possibility. Judgment gives a certain accent, certain specific stress that fits the actual situation. But judgment it is also a holistic matter, for it brings various reasons together, in the sense that it figures as those reasons' resultance in that specific situation. So the mentioned plurality, richness and dynamics may also be the guide to realize that reasons are unique. They are unique in the sense that they have to be intertwined in some area from which the judgment then arises. In some sense thus and in some area, reasons all exist together. So there is a tension between reasons' plurality and between their uniqueness resulting in a judgment that needs to be fallen on their basis, as a reason for action, and specifically as a specific reason for moral action.  

2. There is a feeling that motivational and normative reasons are interdependent.
We have just stated a tension. First, reasons fall into separate categories, such as motivational and normative reasons. Second, reasons also seem to be interdependent, which comes into focus as we take a look at reasons as unique, which means that motivational and normative reasons would come in an intertwined setting, together with other sorts of reasons. Besides to this, motivational and normative reasons are interdependent. If I took a sip of tea, my motive for that action may be that it will wake me up and so I will feel alert enough to type this paper. Also, an additional motive may be related to the normative consideration that drinking tea is good for my health. The presumption here is that an appropriate action will not just be psychologically motivated, but that it will also be normatively motivated. This will then hold to even a bigger extent in the case of moral reasons, as compared to just practical reasons. If I judge that I should help her it is not just motivation that should be in place, but also normativity. If I take facts to guide normativity, say, it will not be just my desires that I should help her but also the objective facts that should guide the appropriateness of my moral action. There is thus the feeling that motivational and normative reasons are interdependent, if one simply thinks about what is involved into action, be it a practical or more specifically a moral action. If one acts appropriately, then one's motives and normativity should be effective together, as it seems. And normative deliberation seems to be sometimes efficient in our decisions to go with a certain action.

3. The interdependency of motivational and normative reasons thesis gets challenged through cases figuring motivational reasons without normative reasons, and normative reasons without motivational reasons.
One may say that motivational reasons go together with one's desires, and perhaps one may even claim that they should go together with one's desires. This ought-requirement already shifts us into the realm of normativity. One's motivation, involving desires, and one's normativity seem to be interdependent, at least in cases of relevant or appropriate action, especially of moral action. Such is not always the case.
	There are cases that speak against the interdependency of motivational and normative reasons. They come in two brands. Sometimes motivational reasons are present without the normative reasons. And sometimes normative reasons are not matched with their expected corresponding motivational reasons.
	Let us first give some cases of the first kind, namely where motivational reasons are forthcoming without normative reasons, in an action. They may be spelled out in terms of desiring and valuing. If one has motivational reason, then one may say that one desires something. And if one has normative reasons then one may say that one values something, some action. So the cases in point may be presented as the cases involving desires, coming without the corresponding expected valuations. Notice as well that desires may figure in intentional or causal explanations of actions, and that valuing may be forthcoming from deliberative explanations of actions. Here are some of these intentional-with-deliberative explanation diverging cases:

	“The kleptomaniac does not go through any process of deciding whether or not to steal. Or rather, if he does go through such a process, it is irrelevant to its behavior. Whatever he resolved to do, he would steal all the same. And it is this that distinguishes him from the ordinary thief.”

The kleptomaniac follows his immediate desire to steal, without that he would engage himself into the deliberative process that could determine whether his act is appropriate or rational. So he follows these reasons that underlie his immediate, direct motivation, whereas he leaves aside the reasons that would fit this motivation with normative reasons, thus making it appropriate or rational. A conclusion seems to follow. Kleptomaniac's actions, precisely, are not appropriate or rational. Under the process of deliberation which would also explain his actions, he would most probably not engage into that action at all. But as he lacks access to the deliberative process, one may range his action outside the area of the usual behavior. Kleptomaniac's behavior is deviant.
	Here is the next case figuring motivational reasons without their expected accompanying normative reasons, dealing with a heroin addict who

	“... hates his addiction and always struggles desperately, although to no avail, against its thrust. He tries everything that he thinks might enable him to overcome his desires for the drug. But these desires are too powerful for him to withstand, and invariably, in the end, they conquer him. He is an unwilling addict, helplessly violated by his own desires.”

The heroin addict thus is even more powerfully than this was the case for kleptomaniac guided by the direct push of his desires. He may envision the rational solution of his condition to engage in deliberation and into ensuing rational behavior. But his desire based motivational reasons are as powerful as to block any attempt to cede to them; normative reasons go down the drain as far as his action is concerned.  Again, it would seem that under ideal rational conditions of deliberation he would abandon his motives and consequently his actions. But as it goes, his actions present a mismatch in respect to the leveled approach: they present clear cases of motivational reasons acting without that normative reasons would be in sight.
	Here are some even more dramatic cases of motivational reason excluding normative reasons based actions:

	“Consider the case of a woman who has a sudden urge to drown her bawling child in the bath; or the case of a squash player who, while suffering an ignominious defeat, desires to smash his opponent in the face with the racquet. It is just false that the mother values her child's being drowned or that the player values the injury or suffering of his opponent. But they desire these things none the less. They desire them in spite of themselves. It is not that they assign to these actions an initial value which is then outweighed by other considerations. These activities are not even represented by a positive entry, however small, on the initial 'desirability matrix'.”

In that last quoted case the motivational reasons or their related desire excludes normative reasons and deliberation based rational explanation as it comes to action. This action is impulsive and against the valuing being involved at all in respect to the agent's passage to act. Again, normative reasons would preclude exercising of actions in question. But this is out of question for the compulsive immediate desire provenience based actions. All the just quoted cases challenge interdependency of motivational and normative reasons that would fit to the rationally shaped appropriate kind of actions. They are all deviant cases, and as we will see, they come under high contextual standards for measuring the disparity of motivational to normative reasons.
	We may now switch to the mirror cases in respect to the just preceding ones, which figure normative reasons without motivational reasons that underlie passage to action, or better say, the absence of the passage to action, its opposition. These are the cases where “we may think ourselves rationally justified in acting in a certain way without desiring to act in that way”. So now we deal with “depressions”, involving such matters as “spiritual or physical tiredness”, “accidie”, “weakness of body”, “illness”, “general apathy or despair”, “inability to concentrate”, “a feeling of uselessness or futility”. These cases, contrary to the previously considered category, exactly display the problem with absence of motivating reasons, all in that normative or valuation reasons may well be present. A depressive person knows that she should engage into everyday activities, such as going out of house, cooking a meal, do her work, socialize with friends. But she is blocked in these respect by the absence of motivational reasons. She may deliberate what to do, but under her spell she will not be able to switch over to the motivational reason underpinned intentional action. Again, we have as the result actions that diverge from ideal rational conditions. So again, we do not have to do with normal, but with the deviant behavior. This seems to confirm, in a negative manner, that normal rationally supported action is a balanced interrelated coming to the fore of both motivational and normative reasons.

4. The puzzle about the explanation of action brings into focus the independency of motivational or normative reasons as the kind of situation where their intentional explanatory aspects are in mismatch with their deliberative explanatory aspects.
The possibility of cases where motivational reasons come without normative reasons and where normative reasons come without motivational reasons leads us to a puzzle, which may be categorized as a puzzle about the explanation of action. Notice for starters that action is a broader category in respect to moral action. And it centers upon normative reasons.

	“The puzzle, then, is to explain how it can be that accepting normative reason claims can both be bound up with having desires and yet come apart from having desires. In other words, the problem is to explain how deliberation on the basis of our values can be practical in its issue to just the extent that it is.”

If an agent desires something, then he seems to value that very thing. And valuing is a part of what is going on with normative reasons. Now, normative or valuative reasons seem to be coming along with desires if the action would be balanced. But the cases that we just quoted in the previous section show that normative reasons will come without motivational reasons, as it happens with depressions. And motivational reasons are there without the support of normativity, which is shown by compulsive actions and addictions.
	The issue is not just straightly spelled out in terms of reasons but in terms of explanations. So we may presume that the just quoted puzzle deals with explanations of actions, and not straightly with reasons for actions. One can distinguish intentional explanations and deliberative explanations of actions, which may be called two perspectives that one can take upon actions. From the first perspective, one can take a look at an action in an intentional sense, which may then be specified as causal, beliefs and desires involving matter. Let us stress here that this is one perspective thus that may be shed in respect to reasons, that we are dealing with an epistemic matter here, with a view upon reasons, and not with reasons themselves, as they are there independently from this specific access to them. One asks why she went to the fridge. And the answer is that she believed that there is beer in the fridge, and that she desired to have a beer. So she went to the fridge. That's an intentional explanation of action. There is yet another explanation of action, namely a deliberative one. Was her action sensible? Shouldn't she abstain from drinking that beer given that she has to drive her car on her way back home from the party? And there may be other considerations similar to that one. The deliberative perspective is another possible view upon action, and thus it is another epistemic kind of access to action.
	Intentional and deliberative explanation of action, as it seems, are close to motivational and normative reasons. Now, normative reasons involve deliberative kind of explanation. They go together with desires, if desires come along with valuing. Valuing again may be seen here as a perspective that one takes in respect to some action. Normative action may be seen though as coming without desires, if normativity is proceeding without the relation to motivational reasons. But it may again come along with desires, if motivational reasons are supporting it.
	Normative reasons can come up as being bound with desires, or again as coming without desires. Now, one may say that normative reasons involve two possible epistemic approaches to them: the intentional and the deliberative one, so that the first involves desires, and that the second one does not involve them, especially if it is interpreted as being close to normative reasons.
	Deliberation is an epistemic view on values, on normativity, a specific perspective on normative reasons. If it is taken to go along with normative reasons, it may be seen as not involving any desires and thus as not being practical. If deliberation and normativity come along with desires though, practical action will be supported. The deviant cases seem to show that the connection between motivational and normative reasons may well come apart. So the question is how can normative reasons lead to action.
	The question posed by the puzzle about explanation of action also seems to be to what extent the deliberation can lead to action, to what extent it can be practical. One can ask whether the deviant cases may be a guide in a search for reply to this question.

5. Normative reasons do and again do not involve desires.
Normative reasons, and their related deliberation, seem to involve desires in some cases, and again they do not seem to involve them in some other cases. Here the question looks like the one about the difference between Humean and non-Humean approach to normative reasons. Humean approach will take desires to be a guiding principle, whereas non-Humeans will not take desires, but something such as beliefs to be related to actions.
	There are views trying to show that normativity, or valuing, is desiring, or that it may be reduced to desiring. So one may point out the difference between beliefs and desires. Whereas beliefs may be assigned truth values of truth and falsity, this will not be the case for desires. Desires rather involve evaluative matters. Reduction of valuing to desiring seems to bring motivational and normative reasons together, and thus to establish harmony between them.
	Here one can point out the earlier stated deviant cases which cut the relation between motivational and normative reasons. And this seems to count against the just mentioned reductionist proposal.
	Another option that is open is that of reduction of normativity to beliefs, which is a non-Humean way to take. We will take a look at this option in the following sections.

6. Puzzle leans on cases featuring disjoined motivational and normative reasons. These cases, it is argued, are under the spell of high score disjunctive requirements.
We may now take another look at the cases of disjoint motivational and normative reasons. Especially as it seems that they are related to the formerly stated puzzle about the explanation of action. It is not difficult to see that the reported cases are all deviant, and that they do not happen in everyday conditions under which most people act. Happily, most of population are not kleptomaniacs or heroin addicts, and there are comparatively very few cases of mothers drowning their babies. So it seems that after all, there has to exist a firm link between motivational and normative reasons, in most cases. Similarly it goes for cases of heavy depression which impede agents to act despite their deliberative knowledge about what would be appropriate to do in a situation. If thus seems that this goes in direction of support for internalism, which has motivational and normative forces well entrenched with one another. So one may conclude that the deviant cases of motivation/normative reasons disjoined states are just extreme occasions that are not there in the everyday. If this is true, internalism may be defended, for in most cases motivational reasons will still be joined with normative reasons. Deliberation will come along with desires. However, reduction of valuing to beliefs will sever this junction, and so the deviant cases will gain in their importance.
	But now notice that the deviant cases are just what they are said to be: happily they are deviant, out of most people's everyday practices cases. If this is true, then some form of externalism may be defended, according to which there is no necessary connection between the motivational and normative reasons. Perhaps an appropriate form of externalism will be weak, so that there will be some disjunction existing between two kinds of reasons (motivational and normative reasons). This will then be opposed to the heavy disjunction between motivational and normative reasons that is hinted by the deviant cases. One may say that these cases, being out of everyday practices for most of the people, point out that they are made under heavy, strong disjunction requirements. Concentrating on deviant cases namely brings high contextual scores along with it. And this is different from the everyday, lower contextual normative scores.

7. A solution of the puzzle urges to determine to which extent reason based deliberation can be practical, proposing ideal conditions as the criterion for bringing motivational and normative reasons together.
Deviant cases bring high contextual scores along with them. Similarly, it looks, is the solution of the puzzle proposing reduction of valuing to beliefs. It also goes with hight contextual scores.
	What is thus one way to look at the deliberation and its being reason for action? One may go with the platitude that the appropriate action should succeed under ideal conditions. These are the conditions that a fully rational agent would endorse herself. Here is an argument in this direction. If one would need an advise about how to act, in the case of indecision, one should ask a friend or a trusted elderly person. But taking a closer look at the situation will reveal that the best advisee is just the person itself that finds herself in the state of indecision. She will have to look at the ideal rational situation that will be able to deliver an advice for a proper action, given the circumstances.
	Certainly ideal rational situation will bring motivational and normative reasons together. But the ideal rational situation also seems to happen under high contextual scores. This is then just a high score contextual positive proposal how to bring motivational and normative reasons together, countering the negative high contextual score deviant cases of motivational and normative reasons disjunction.
	The question was to what extent the reason based deliberation should be practical. One may ask what aspects of normativity will be appropriate to lead to action.  

8. It sounds that the reasoning of the proposed solution succeeds under the too high score requirements and as removed from the contingencies of everyday life.
Let us say that the proposed solution offering ideal rational conditions as guidance for appropriate action may aim to determine to which extent reason based deliberation should be practical. Ideal rational situation though is certainly not an everyday one, and so it seems to succeed under very high score contextual requirements that most of the people in their everyday practices just do not and mostly cannot satisfy. Yet it would be wrong to say that no rationality, no normativity is involved into people's usual practices. Just an opposed situation seems to be the case. For, many times people show their attachment to normativity: they follow rules and obligations, they often comply to religious and other normativity involving practices. Many times people regret something and they aim at some achievements that they set for themselves as their normative goals. So people do follow normative reasons, but very seldom they do that in an ideal rational high contextual scores involving manner. The extent to which they follow their deliberation may be important, but it is not an ideal one.

9. In human practices, it is argued,  there is discrepancy between the motivational and normative reasons indeed, although not a dramatic and exclusive disjunction one. Such discrepancy requires lower contextual score for measuring the impact of reasons.
The conditions of ideal rationality tried to bring a high score contextual underpinned internalism, i.e. a kind of necessary connection between the motivational and normative reasons into the focus. This move was motivated by opposing the disjoint state of motivational and normative reasons, again under high contextual standards, just in the opposite direction. Following deviant cases we may conclude in direction of strong externalism (motivational and normative reason coming as heavily disjoint), and this is what ideal rationality conditions are aimed to block. So there is the play between two opposed high contextual scores involving reasons.
	A look at the usual everyday human practices will show though that motivational and normative reasons are disjoined indeed, but mostly not to a dramatic or deviant extent. Many times we act without deliberating. So we follow our desires, it may be said, without deliberating. How this is an important and even profitable insight may be understood if one looks at the practices of publicity, of advertisement. There is a huge marketplace involving publicity and advertisement procedures. And what does it aim at? It aims to seduce us into buying things on the basis of our immediate instincts or desires without being engaged into deliberation at all. Why did you buy this fruit? A TV advertisement seduced you, without that you would really know. And why did you buy this car, and that tablet? Again, publicity seems to be responsible for this, persuading you to buy things that you perhaps would not buy at all if you would rationally deliberate under ideal conditions. As just said, the publicity aims at your immediate desires, at triggering your motivation to act (to buy), without deliberation. That was just one example. But we people many times act upon our desires, without really deliberating. And it seems to us that we are acting appropriately, and indeed we mostly are. In most cases, we do not engage into deviant behavior though, as for that matter.
	Take another lower score contextual practice that many people most of the time engage into as well, without being deviant, but being just nice everyday folks. Under ideal rationality conditions, I would have written this paper a long time ago already, and I would have written it in a much better shape that it finds itself in now. Again, look at an app that leads you to delay the actions that you should do now to tomorrow. Many times, we do some things, but we wait till the last moment to do the things that we ought to do. And many people just do not ever do the things that they ought to do. They just delay matters, watching more TV and not engaging into important issues that await them. It is a psychologically confirmed fact that people will delay the required actions till the last moment, or that they will skip on them, if there is not some authoritative instance menacing them with some other dimension. This is why institutions such as army function as efficiently as they do. This is just to remind us that many times we know what would be rational for us to do, what is required for us to do, but we just do not take the passage to the required action. So on everyday basis most of us embrace normative reasons without also following the required motivational reasons. But this does not put us into the heavy weight state of depression. We mostly do not succumb to high contextual disjoint state between normative and motivational reasons, but just to the quite benign everyday contextual score rendition of it. We may say that we are often lazy. And some people who achieve a lot may still feel that they could have achieved a lot more. Hawkins is one of these, as he says that he uses just a very tiny part of his abilities. So obviously he has to believe that there are normative reasons, deliberation, that he fails to follow. If he is a case in point, what about the rest of us? The disjunction of normative and motivating reasons seems to be quite ubiquitous, but not under high score contextual and rather under lower contextual normative conditions. If this is true then some kind of motivational externalism, of a weak kind, seems to be true as well.

10. A lower score contextual divergence of reasons which affects our everyday behavior allows both kinds of reasons to involve a common cognitive background.
Both strong motivational externalism aiming deviant cases involving proposal and strong motivational internalism aiming ideal rationality conditions proposal treat motivational and normative reasons as being two different kinds of entities, say, which come apart in the first case and which are joined in the second case.
	This picture is wrong however. Deep down, reasons form one, unique unity, in the metaphysical sense. This is somehow strange, because reasons are cognitive. If I have a reason to do something, this is not just psychological or cognitive in the motivational case. The normative case is related to psychology and cognition as well, for otherwise normativity would be just out there, without the impact of language and thought. But this is just not the case. Reasons are there in a common cognitive background of an agent. This is where psychological characters come from. Some people are reliable, and some are pleasant. During quite a long time of experience, the memory traces accumulate. Everything that I have experienced shapes my unique psychological profile, and also my character. I may be decisive, or reluctant in my behavior, and I may be judged by others to be like that. Everything that I experienced then is my holistic background of reasons, or perhaps one may say that it is a holistic metaphysical unity of reasons in my cognitive background, of dispositional quality. One may then say that this is a unique reason. This unique reason is quite complex and dynamical in its status. But it is also monistic and metaphysically existing in my background. In a simple manner, we may say that motivational and normative reasons engage the same metaphysical background, in an agent's cognitive system.

11. The presupposition that needs to be countered is that of a direct and explicit functioning of reasons as guides of our actions.
Take a look at reasons now as they usually tend to be presented. They are presented as atomistic entities, and as a bunch of these, that may enter in some kind of mutual relations. If the former picture is right, then this way to see reasons has to be wrong. If one goes atomistic, reasons are not just divided into motivational and normative, but also in many other dimensions. And these reasons are presupposed to be metaphysically existing as independent from one another, which just allows them to enter into mutual complex relations.
	But reasons are neither metaphysically atomistic entities, nor are they exercising a direct atomistic impact upon the situation at hand. The very fact that action mostly succeeds on the basis of judgment, which does not necessarily need to involve deliberation, even less ideal rational kind of deliberation, shows the realistic side of this situation.
	If weak externalism is right, then reasons are best taken to neither function directly, nor explicitly.

12. Rather, the motivational and normative reasons may be epistemically differentiated, although they apply to the situation at hand through the falling of judgment, in an indirect and implicit manner.
Let us suppose that there is this unique reason, or that there is a monistic metaphysical entity that may be called unique reasons, in the agent's cognitive background. And yet we talk about motivational reasons, and again about normative reasons. How is that? The answer is that these are not reasons at all. What is coming forward, also in our puzzle about the explanation of action, are some explanatory, and this means some epistemic matters. The presumed atomistic reasons are nothing but epistemic aspects of the unique reason. Everything that we have experienced is there in our cognitive background. Out of this complex holistic entity though, by the usage of judgment, several aspects of this unique reasons are sorted out, in a judgmental fashion, just as the situation requires. This starts to explain how these presumed atomistic reasons that are actually epistemic aspects of a unique reason, are indirect and implicit in their effectivity. They are indirect, for they are just aspects. And they are implicit, because they do not come alone. At least there is some light that is shed upon them by the unique reason background that they come from.

13. Unique motivational and normative factors involving reasons chromatically illuminate a given situation, from the common morphological content involving cognitive background.
The metaphysical cognitive background of unique reasons has the effect of chromatically illuminating a situation at hand where the passage to action needs to be deliberated. An epistemic aspect of the unique reason holistic background may function as an atomistic reason, motivational or normative. Now, if we take a look at the holistic cognitive metaphysical unique reason, we can see that there is a huge cognitive background. This cognitive background is not directly given to the agent's conscious access. Rather it is the background of morphological content in a very complex and dynamical environment that has the disposition to lead from one point to another, as the point of the Total Cognitive State that then may lead in direction of action. This TCS may be seen as atomistic, but it is actually an aspect of the unique background metaphysical reason. As presumed atomistic reasons are actually aspects of the unique reason background, they chromatically illuminate judgmental situation from this background.

14. Both kind of reasons are intertwined in the cognitive background from which they illuminate the stage.
Turning back to the distinction between motivational and normative reason, we may now say that there are several dimensions of unique metaphysical reasons that are lodged in an agent's cognition. But if we presume for a while that there are these kinds of reasons out there, they display the fact that they are aspects of a unique background metaphysical reason, the aspects of an epistemic sort, in the manner in which they come illuminated by that background, as they enter the stage.

15. Everyday mismatch low key contextual cases show that motivational and normative reasons are both involved, yet one or again the other is in the foreground, as this may be clarified by explanatory aspectual means.
We may turn out to the cases of everyday mismatch between motivational and normative reasons. And we may realize that the puzzle about explanation of action was really epistemic, showing that the presumed atomistic reasons may well be epistemic aspects of metaphysical unique reasons. The puzzle was stated in terms of intentional explanation and deliberation explanation, which may be counterparts to motivational and normative reasons. But in fact they are just epistemic aspects of unique metaphysical background reasons. Everyday non-deviant cases of motivational and normative reasons mismatch show that both kind os reasons are intertwined and involved into the metaphysical unique reasons background. But aspects may come into the foreground, in Total Cognitive State's judgment guiding manner, now under the stress of this, and then again under the stress of another aspect which will fit the situation.

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