Revolutionary cognitivist expressivism
Matjaž Potrč

Error theory consists of experiential cum semantic and of metaphysical parts which together aim at error conclusion. In the hypothetical case where error theory turns out to be correct the question arises how to proceed in practical moral judgment and deliberation. We opt for cognitivist expressivism, which captures ordinary moral judgment in a hermeneutical manner. Under the error theory correctness hypothesis cognitivist expressivism functions as revolutionary proposal. Cognitivist expressivism is a species of cognitivism allowing for ought-beliefs, countering thereby the semantic assumption of just descriptive role of is-beliefs. 

Keywords: error theory, cognitivist expressivism, revolutionary proposal, semantic assumption, ought-beliefs.

In the following short exercise we will first try to point out and somehow elucidate some consequences of the presumed error theory success. We will shortly describe error theory and its presuppositions, claiming that, substituting error theory descriptive cognitivism with the engaged ought-belief cognitivism, cognitivist expressivism offers itself as the most fitting revolutionary proposal.
Error theory (Mackie 1977) is an important metaethics take at moral judgment, which claims that all moral judgments, although genuine moral beliefs, ultimately turn out to be in error. This seems to be embarrassing, for in that case, moral judgments such as “It is morally commendable to help people in need” and “Himmler was a morally wicked character” turn out to be false, in error, and so we are on path of losing our moral compass. So it is understandable that a question imposes itself how to proceed in practical manner in moral area if error theory turns out to be correct. Some people have proposed moral fictionalism as a way out and others expressed their reservations (Husi 2013). Others (Koehler and Ridge 2013) offered expressivism as the best option to follow in practical moral matters if error theory turns out to be correct, given that it preserves the desired functions of moral discourse. We endorse expressivist proposal, specifying though that cognitivist expressivism is the fitting pratical solution once as error theory would turn out to be correct.
	We thus face the question about how to practically proceed in the area of moral judgment and deliberation once as it turns out that error theory is correct. Consider now that this is a conditional, hypothetical question. This means that, in asking this question, one does not subscribe to the truth of error theory, and that one just tries to deliver an answer to a possible imagined scenario.
	It is on time now to say something more about what error theory actually is. The answer is that error theory (Mackie 1977) consists of two main parts:

(1) Description of everyday moral judgment experience and of its commitments.
(2)  Evaluation of metaphysical or ontological commitments pertaining to moral practice.

As about (1), error theory claims that usual moral judgments aim towards objectivity, which makes them committed to the existence of such matters as objective moral values. The underlying assumption of (1) is that moral judgments are beliefs, whose role as beliefs is the description of the reality they point to, such as moral values. So if these moral judgments are true, this implies the existence of objective values in the world.
	In fact, part (1) of error theory thus involves phenomenological argument, which is characterized by drawing conclusion involving metaphysical or ontological reality upon the basis of phenomenological experience pointing to that reality. A simple form of phenomenological argument would involve my visual experience of this book as the basis about conclusion that there exists a book in the world, in front of me, and not a cat, say. Similarly, one is tempted to conclude, if my moral judgment experience shows to me the existence of objective values, then it is a sensible metaphysical conclusion that there exist such values in the world (McNaughton, Mackie). Stage (1) of error theory thus involves phenomenological argument, which concludes from phenomenological experience in direction of metaphysical or ontological reality (of moral values in our case).
	What about part (2) of error theory? This is the most known and discussed part of error theory, which proposes a plausible sounding metaphysical irrealist stance: values and other moral entities do not exist in the ultimate ontology. Mackie used arguments from relativity and various, as he called them, queerness arguments, in order to support his conclusion. If such objective values as part (1) of error theory aims at, would ultimately ontologically exist in the world, this would be quite strange entities, which would have, say, to-be-pursuedness built into them. 
	Here is error theory conclusion from its parts (1) and (2) brought together: .: Given that our experience points to the existence of objective values (1), but that (2) no such objective values ultimately ontologically exist in the world, all moral judgments are in error (they affirm the existence of something that does not exist).
	As we just pointed out, a consequence of error conclusion is that all moral judgments are in error. So if I say "Helping people in need is a morally commendable activity", I am in error. So I do not claim anything sensible. But this certainly seems to go against the received wisdom that the assertions such as the one that we singled out are sensible. As we said, again, if error theory turns out to be correct, we seem to lose our moral compass. But this is not a good outcome. So the persisting question pops out about what should we do under the hypothetical presumption that error theory turns out to be correct.
	Let us turn again to the mentioned parts of error theory. Part (1) of error theory, as we said, describes usual moral practice. One starts with phenomenological experiences of objective values, concluding towards metaphysical existence of such values, which is a  phenomenological argument. Here is the assumption to which error theory subscribes: Phenomenology related to the experience of moral judgments shows that moral judgments are beliefs, with their main role to describe the world. These beliefs are true if referred entities do exist in the world. Then comes the part (2) of error theory which denies such ultimate ontological existence of objective values in the world, following queerness arguments.
	Here is an important assumption of error theory’s part (1): Moral judgments are beliefs that describe some reality, and given that these are beliefs, cognitivism is endorsed. But now part (2) of error theory follows: If the described reality does not exist, the error of moral judgment follows.
	One can argue against the assumption though upon which error theory is built, in the following manner. One can well recognize moral judgments to be beliefs and so endorse cognitivism. But now: One can say that moral judgments are genuine beliefs without thereby endorsing descriptive function. One can say that moral judgments are ought-beliefs and not is-beliefs. This seems to fit well with moral practice as we know it. The view under consideration that proposes the introduction of ought-beliefs as a species of genuine beliefs (challenging thereby the exclusivity of descriptive is-beliefs as underlying cognitivism) has the name of cognitivist expressivism (Horgan Timmons 2006, 2008). Ought-beliefs express one's attitudes and they do not describe; yet they are still beliefs, ought-beliefs.
	Notice now that error theory was built upon the shift

 experience -> metaphysics

Error theory namely claims, as we have pointed out, that the experience and its phenomenology point to the existence of objective values, but such values do not exist in the ultimate ontology. This is just the negative conclusion of the same shift which phenomenological argument promotes in a positive manner. 
	Once as ought-beliefs come into the picture though the “experience -> metaphysics” shift is not needed anymore. The objectivity to which ought-beliefs point is namely an experienced objectivity. So the shift that we deal with is now better described as “phenomenological experience -> objective normativity”. Under such circumstances, error theory is put into question. 
	One can propose cognitivist expressivism as practical advice what to adopt if error theory turns out to be correct. As cognitivist expressivism builds upon moral judgments being beliefs, ought-beliefs describe practice in a manner in which moral engagement happens, hermeneutically. But if error theory is true, then not just expressivism but cognitivist expressivism is the most plausible revolutionary proposal, suggesting how one should alter moral practice. By this move, there are not just functions that one takes care of to support one’s revolutionary proposal (Koehler and Ridge 2013). Phenomenology, which is crucial in the experiential part (1) of error theory enters the stage.
	Phenomenology is important indeed in part (1) of error theory. But it is usually not considered in such a role because one buys semantic assumption of belief describing the world, following thereby the path that leads to error theory conundrum situation. Once as ought-beliefs are introduced, one can stress part (1) of error theory as against widely discussed part (2) of error theory. This is compatible however with one’s irrealist leanings, a topics that is just briefly mentioned here.

References
Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. 2006. Cognitivist Expressivism. In T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.) Metaethics after Moore. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. 2008. What does Moral Phenomenology tell us about Moral Objectivity? Social Philosophy and Policy, 25 (1): 267-300.
Husi, S. 2013. Against Moral Fictionalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 )(1): 80-96.
Koehler, S. and Ridge, M. 2013. Revolutionary Expressivism. Ratio. 26 (4): 428-449.
Mackie, J.L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin