Morphological Rationalism and Morphological Pluralism
Matjaž Potrč

Morphological rationalism states procedural effectivity of reasons or principles in moral judgment. The extension to moral pluralism is argued for from the constitution of the background dynamical landscape such as it exercises its effect upon the total cognitive state involved into moral judgment falling. Plurality of basic reasons at that landscape is introduced in the thin to thick moral concepts continuum. The distinction between judgment falling and the causal background to judgment supports pluralism.

Morphological rationalism
Morphological rationalism states procedural effectivity of reasons or principles in moral judgment.
Morphological rationalism is a position coming from the dispute with the intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Intuitionism (Haidt 2001, 2007) takes moral judgments to be basically emotional gut-reactions, whereas according to it reasons or principles/rules adapted reasonings are nothing but post hoc explanatory confabulations. One important difference involved into this debate is that between (1) the judgment falling and between the (2) causal background to judgment falling. Intuitionism takes it that the causal background to judgment falling consists in emotional gut-reactions produced in situations that lead to and require moral judgment. Rationalism, on the other hand, states that reasons or principles based reasoning supports the act of judgment falling.
	Morphological rationalism agrees with intuitionism that moral judgments appear instantaneously. It also agrees with intuitionism in that reasons based reasoning is not explicitly forthcoming in the cases of judgment-falling. Morphological rationalism's difference with intuitionism is in that this last one takes causal effectivity to be there just in cases of explicitly appearing reasons or of whatever causes judgment-falling in its very act. Whereas morphological rationalism allows for causal effectivity upon judgment-falling, so that this one does not operate in an explicit representation involving manner. This allows reasons or principles to exercise their effect upon the judgment-falling, without that they would be represented at that occasion. What kind of effectivity could that be? The answer is that it may be procedural effectivity.
	If reasons or principles have some effectivity upon judgment-falling, then it may be said that their content is effective in judgment falling. But in what sense may that content be effective? In order to answer this question one may distinguish three cases of content: occurrent content, indirectly dispositional content and directly dispositional content. (Horgan and Timmons 2007). Occurrent content is the content which appears in a cognizer's system at a certain time. Such would be a moral content about the need to repay my debt, the content that occupies my attention as my total cognitive state at the time. Indirectly dispositional content is the content that is available in the background of my system, waiting to be put into action as appropriate circumstances are encountered. So there is disposition for me to form the content about the need for repaying my debt, and indirectness is here in as far as the represented reason/principle that was just stated mediates between whatever causes mu judgment falling and between that act. The direct dispositional content is where I act in accordance with the background reason/principle, without thereby representing that principle. How can this be? The answer is that the principle is effective in judgment-falling not in an explicit, but in a procedural manner. The moral agent acts following the principle/rule, without thereby explicitly representing that reason/principle. Such mode of acting is a case of knowing-how and not that of knowing-that. This is why representation of the underlying reason is not needed. This is then proceduralization following skillful comportment which is there as well in falling of moral judgment. The judgment is then fallen without that the reason/principle on the basis of which it is forthcoming would be explicitly represented. Such a procedural effectivity of reasons/rules is stated for the areas such as mastering of grammatical rules. Speakers of language skilfully master syntactic and semantic rules without that they would need to explicitly represent them. It was conjectured that moral reasoning succeeds upon the basis of such innate or acquired reasons or principles. Such a view may be right, but we do not necessarily subscribe to it. All that is needed for morphological rationalism is acknowledging that reasoning involving reasons or principles is involved into judgment-falling, causing it and thus not only being a case of post hoc explanatory confabulation as intuitionism claims. In this way, the effectivity of reasons is affirmed by morphological rationalism, justifying its title of rationalism. Reasons or rules are effective in judgment falling, although not in an explicit but in a proceduralized way. Morphology refers to the form of the background multidimensional landscape into which these reasons or principles are embedded. Morphology goes together with the background proceduralization conditions. This enables reasons to be effective in judgment-falling, although not in an explicitly represented manner. We have seen that both intuitionism and rationalism distinguish between (1) judgment-falling and between the (2) causal effectivity background to judgment falling. In respect to (2), intuitionism gives weight to emotional gut-feeling related to moral judgment. Whereas rationalism accentuates the role of reasons/principles as supporting moral judgment.

Morphological pluralism background rootedness
The extension from morphological rationalism to moral pluralism is argued for from the constitution of the background dynamical landscape such as it is exercising its effect upon the total cognitive state involved into moral judgment falling.
We may go and side with moral rationalism in the just laid down intuitionism/rationalism dispute about the nature and cause of moral judgment. The accepted thing is then that moral judgment is immediate and reflexive, and that it usually does not go along with representation of principles, at least not at the very moment of judgment-falling. Moral reasons and principles are effective in judgment-falling despite that they are not represented; they rather have proceduralized automatic response effectivity. The claim of morphological rationalism as against intuitionism is supported by the background skillful effectivity of reasons.
	The common ground of both intuitionism and rationalism in respect to moral judgments, as we said, is that there are two levels of moral judgment: the level of (1) judgment-falling and that of (2) the background that is effective in judgment formation. Intuitionism lays accent upon emotional gut-feelings as supporting (1), whereas rationalism prefers rational appearance of reasons as exercising that job.
	Let us grant now that we have accepted morphological rationalism in respect to moral judgment. This position claims that reasons or principles are an effective basis for the support to judgment falling. Morphological rationalism also allows for multiplicity of reasons to be involved into one case of judgment falling. But we would now like to assert that a plausible version of morphological rationalism is pluralism. So we would opt for morphological pluralism (MP) as the appropriate rendition for support of moral judgment and about its nature.
	We have seen that the background to moral judgment formation is decisive in the intuitionism-rationalism dispute. So a look at the constitution of that landscape is appropriate. Proceduralization allowed for effectivity of moral reasons or principles, in a direct dispositional manner, so that, similarly to the knowledge of language, moral agents would automatically display the appropriate comportmental reactions to the situation at hand.
	The cognitive background adapted to proceduralization is opposed to the rule following model of mind based upon atomistic representations, over which exceptionless logical rules exercise their computations. The dynamical system to the contrary is connectionism models adapted, and it deals with distributed representations. The forces in the cognitive background follow the abstracted surface of a multidimensional landscape, so that mathematics is appropriate for modeling of the emerging ever-present dynamics.
	Certainly it seems that a case of (1) judgment-falling is related to the total cognitive state which arises at that occasion. Judgment-falling has not as its main task though to be concerned with the complexity of a specific total cognitive state related to the moral judgment. Judgment-falling requires restricted attention, so that a decision may be taken, in view of a moral action. The (2) effective morphological background of moral judgment consists of innate or acquired reasoning involving activities that are stored there as memory traces. In order for judgment-falling to be effective, it is advised that a limited number of important reasons is available. So at the complex multi-dimensional landscape a restricted plurality of reasons/principles will form as the peaks or inclines at that landscape. Their number should fit short-term memory limitations, which are known to be around seven (seven, plus two or minus two). So although that there is this rich morphological dynamical multidimensional landscape, there will be a limited number, but nevertheless a plurality of basic reasons. We think that Ross prima facie or pro tanto duties present the searched for number. This allows transition from (2) causal effectivity underlying moral judgment, featuring a limited number and nevertheless a plurality of basic reasons or principles, to the dyadic and simple (1) judgment-falling, involving valuative decision in direction of passage to act. At the very moment of (1) judgment-falling, in this manner, principles/reasons will effectively act in judgment dyadic decision, supported by emotional push, in a momentary manner, which agrees with intuitionists. But reasons/principles will have a very scarce content effectivity in the act of moral valuation. Yet they will have that effectivity because they rest upon a limited number of consultation-points at the morphological background. In this manner (1) judgment-falling may target the relevant point in the complex (2) morphological background effectivity that lead to this moral judgment. The content of the overall total cognitive state supporting some reason will still be there in judgment falling, but really very thinly so. The transition form morphological rationalism to explicitly stated morphological pluralism is thus founded in consideration about what may effectively come from the (2) cognitive background to the (1) valuative act of judgment falling.

Basic reasons between thick and thin content
Plurality of basic reasons at the dynamical background landscape is introduced in the thin to thick moral concepts continuum.
The distinction between thick and thin moral concepts claims that there is abundance of content in the first species, and that there is a scarcity of content in the second one. There may be a continuum between thick and thin moral concepts. Morally thick concepts would go with such matters as cruelty and lying. They feature in such principles as Don't lie! Don't be cruel to sentient beings, avoid to cause their suffering! Morally thin concepts would go with valuation, where there are simple dyadic choices, such as morally good / morally bad; morally right / morally wrong. There is no substantial content related to these cases of valuation. And if there is some content in them, it is thin indeed, there is not much of it. At the middle of that thick-to-thin moral concepts continuum, there is the mentioned limited plurality of reasons, mainly the kind that Ross identified as prima facie or pro tanto reasons/duties. Self-improvement is one of the seven (plus or minus two) basic reasons. These reasons or principles are not thin, they are not pure valuations (such as good/bad), for they have more content than that. They are not very thick either. They do not talk about lying or killing. They are just appropriate for the transition from (2) the morphological multidimensional background whose effect is moral judgment to the (1) instantaneous falling of moral judgment. The basic reasons in the inclines/peaks of multidimensional morphological landscape serve as transition points from the rich morphological landscape, which needs to operate procedurally, to the thin valuative moral judgment-falling.

Pluralism in the two level moral judgment account
The distinction between judgment falling and the causal background to judgment supports pluralism.
A main matter which supports the introduction of morphological pluralism is the distinction between the (1) moral judgment-falling and between the (2) cause or effect leading to moral judgment formation. The first of these items is (1) valuative, dyadic and thin. The second one (2) allows for reasoning along long stretches of time, in innate or acquired modes. Its transition to judgment-falling though is enabled by putting some middle-term simplicity at the morphological background memory-traces points. A limited plurality of basic reasons/principles is formed at the morphological (2) background peaks or inclines. It still holds to the rich holistic background content, but it also allows the transition towards the dyadic evaluative (1) judgment-falling, in direction of action. In this way, the distinction between judgment-falling and between its causal background supports pluralism. Taking a glance back at intuitionism, one realizes that evaluative judgment-falling is emotionally driven. By the way, this should now be recognized by morphological pluralism as a species of morphological rationalism. There are emotional forces besides to other forces that may be mathematically characterized in the rich multidimensional morphological background. A moral dynamical cognition is shaping up. So emotions at the level (1) are not identical to emotional forces at the level (2). The relation between the levels (1) and (2) is that of support. The quality changes though from the one to another level. Plurality of basic reasons/principles enables the link between them: between the rich morphological multidimensional landscape and between the needed simple evaluative acts forthcoming in moral judgments. The limited plurality of basic moral reasons needs to be proceduralized so that transition from the (2) morphological thick background to (1) the evaluative thin act of moral judgment is enabled. At the (1) judgment-falling level there is no content or thin content. At the (2) background effectivity of judgment forming level, there is thick content, which has a direct dispositional impact though. The limited plurality of reasons/principles peaks/inclines at the morphological background dynamical landscape relies upon morphological content, so that reasons may affect formation of moral judgments and that their valuation may be forthcoming. Basic plurality of moral reasons relies on morphological content and upon its proceduralized force so that the transition between the background and between the judgment falling may succeed.

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