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Moral Phenomenological Reduction
Matjaž Potrč

Phenomenological reduction is methodology introduced by phenomenology Husserl style (PH) as underlying transition from the psychological empirical area towards the ideal science. PH is different from Phenomenology (P) as qualitative what-it’s-like experience. From PH perspective, intentionality and phenomenology both belong to the psychological empirical area. P approach is important for philosophy of psychology and nearby enterprises. In the area of morals,  the lesson to be embraced from PH approach is that phenomenological reduction leads to the relevant ideal point of reference, which is aimed at by various forces from the dynamical holistic moral landscape. Moral phenomenological reduction uses phenomenology as a bridge between the dynamical holistic everyday level of moral engagement towards the ideal point of reference level. Brain in a vat skeptical scenario may be attained through phenomenological reduction. External world is thereby put under parentheses. This kind of reduction does not aim at the ideal level but stays at the experiential world embracing narrow lower level of experiential engagement.

1.	Phenomenological reduction is methodology introduced by phenomenology Husserl style (PH) as underlying transition from the psychological empirical area towards the ideal science. 
People sometimes get confused by the usage of the expression “phenomenology”. Increasingly, the expression is used in philosophical community as referring to the what-it’s-like qualitative  experience, which will be abbreviated as (P) usage of Phenomenology and will be somewhat more explained in the next section. But the expression “phenomenology” is as well used to point out a specific philosophical project established by Husserl. This second usage of expression “phenomenology” merits to be clarified, given that its specificity and aims are usually explained in a rather convoluted manner. As we deal here with Phenomenology Husserl style, we will abbreviate it by (PH), in order to mark its difference to (P).
	Phenomenological reduction is a central species of methodology for the (PH) approach. Reduction is not elimination. If there is discourse referring to witches or to the phlogiston, we are invited to eliminate the posits of witches and of phlogiston, following the insights of contemporary science. Reduction however retains posits it deals with, just that it provides a supposedly more adequate reductive basis for them. If we happen to be reductive materialists in respect to the realm of the mental, say, then we will reduce the talk about mental events to what appears to be essential in our view, namely to the physical events. Reduction thus retains the targeted posits, all in trying to find what it sees as more relevant reductive basis for them. In a similar manner, PH uses methodology of phenomenological reduction in order to lead us to what from its point of view is relevant. For Husserl, that was transition from the psychological empirical area towards the ideal phenomenological area:

psychological empirical area	--phenomenological reduction transition towards-> 	ideal science 	

Husserl’s summary of his project is to be found in his “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft”, which we propose to be read as “Phaenomenologie als strenge Wissenschaft” booklet, for the gist of the message is the idea of phenomenology as an ideal science. Let us call it PH manifesto. The right hand area of the ideal science (in the diagram above) is what Husserl aims for. It needs to be stressed that Husserl started as a mathematician and only later on engaged himself into philosophy. Similarly as Brentano and several pupils of that master, Husserl had an interest in psychology as empirical science. Brentano’s most important book is entitled “Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint” (PES). Brentano engaged himself into empirical experimental psychology, as did Meinong who established the first experimental psychology laboratory in Austria. But Meinong aimed at the ideal Platonic science over and above these empirical psychology engagements of his, as did Husserl. The hypothesis is that this stretch into the area of the ideal was the main disagreement between Brentano and these pupils of his, for he mostly stayed in the realm of “descriptive psychology”, despite that he also enabled research into the metaphysical, closer to the ideal realm area. Anyway, here is a table showing the discussed situation:

psychological empirical area 	phenomenological reduction transition towards	ideal science 	
Intentionality, Phenomenology:
Brentano “Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint” (PES) 	effectuate transition from the empirical psychology area (“psychologism”) towards the area of ideal science 	mathematical style ideal science:
Husserl: “Philosophy [Phenomenology] as Serious/Rigorous Science”	

Phenomenological reduction is thus the methodological shift from the psychological empirical area, which includes Intentionality (Brentano introduced Intentionality into the modern debate) and Phenomenology in the qualitative what-it’s-like sense towards what is seen as essential, the relevant matter from the ideal science HP project perspective. From this HP perspective, as it was already hinted at, Intentionality and Phenomenology are not part of the ideal science. They just provide the overridable psychological empirical basis for ideal HP science to come about. Husserl distinguishes several layers of reduction in his enterprise, all of these aiming at the relevant, essential, which is extrapolated from the psychological empirical area. Reductions to the ideal, to the essences, to what is relevant for phenomenology as science, all point towards the ideal area. One can see that from the point of view of PH project, Intentionality and Phenomenology are not the area of the ideal, of the relevant or of the essential. They figure just as the basis for phenomenological reduction, which points into the direction of the essential, of the relevant from its point of view. 

2.	PH is different from Phenomenology (P) as qualitative what-it’s-like experience. 
In the previous section we pointed out the ideal science PH project that is based upon phenomenological reduction in the generic sense (involving as well reduction in direction of essences, say). This was important as the convoluted form of PH project in its innumerable guises turns our view away form the essential. The P, i.e. Phenomenology project seems to be closer to what is understood under this title. Phenomenology namely is largely understood as qualitative what-it’s-like experience. Intentionality and Phenomenology are condition for each other, without that they would be separated (Horgan and Tienson 2002). Phenomenology as P project is understood as qualitative experience, which varies along several dimensions. Phenomenology of touch is different from the visual phenomenology and from several others, although they come together in an experiential whole.

3.	From PH perspective, intentionality and phenomenology both belong to the psychological empirical area. 
As we have already hinted at, both Phenomenology and Intentionality belong to the psychological or empirical area, which from the PH project perspective does not attain the surroundings of what is essential, ideal or relevant. This shows that the aims of PH project and of the P project (exploring the impact of Phenomenology and Intentionality, in their mutual conditioning) are quite different.

4.	P approach is important for philosophy of psychology and nearby enterprises. 
Notice that the P approach is important for philosophy of psychology, with its impact upon morphological content say, epistemology understood as transglobal evidential reliabilism project, and similar stuff. It is a part of what may be called research into consciousness as the hard problem (Chalmers 1996), with its many diversified directions. So does this mean that PH project aiming towards ideal area as that which merits to be called scientific is a doomed enterprise?

5.	In the area of morals,  the lesson to be embraced from PH approach is that phenomenological reduction leads to the relevant ideal point of reference, which is aimed at by various forces from the dynamical holistic moral landscape. 
We came to the point where we realized that P phenomenology project is a commendable project with innumerable worth to be pursued directions. This kind of makes us skeptical now in respect to the legitimacy of the PH project, aiming at the phenomenological reduction attainable ideal realm. But notice now that there is difference between the area of philosophy of psychology and between the philosophy of morals and ethics. 
	In the last mentioned area we can embrace the lesson from the HP project. Not the one about the ideal realm, but the one that one should aim from the contingent towards the ideal, in fact that one should aim towards what is relevant. This one can be used in the following approach to the philosophy of morals or ethics.

(1)	dynamical holistic encountered moral landscape	numerous forces from the lower (1) level aim at the upper (2) ideal level  --->

following the request from the lower (1) level forces the upper (2) level ideal point of reference (Value, Reason) illuminates the lower level forces and their surrounding moral landscape <----	(2)	ideal point of reference (Value, Reason)	

Moral philosophy or ethics is different from philosophy of psychology and related areas in that it does need an ideal point of reference, and therewith may comply with the PH project. The situation is that there is dynamical holistic moral landscape that one encounters, upon which one can distinguish several forces, each of these aiming at what may be called one ideal point of reference, Value or Reason. Multiplicity of forces at the psychological dynamical holistic encountered lower level may be called reasons, and they are of psychological empirical nature (prima facie duties may be a case in point, so they are not one ultimate Reason). They aim at the upper level ideal point of reference. One may say that, following the request from the lower empirical level of forces, the ideal point of reference (moral Value, Reason) illuminates the forces at the lower level and their empirical experiential surroundings.

6.	Moral phenomenological reduction uses phenomenology as a bridge between the dynamical holistic everyday level of moral engagement towards the ideal point of reference level. 
Describing some key points involving the relation between two levels of moral engagement, we may now ask whether moral phenomenological reduction would be a case in point. The answer is yes. Namely, moral phenomenological reduction leads towards the ideal point of reference. Its point of departure is dynamical holistic everyday moral engagement level. The forces formed upon this level are protruding points into direction of the ideal point of reference (moral Value, Reason). Does this mean that we deal with P or with PH project? We may talk about moral phenomenological reduction, which clings to the direction of the relevant or of the essential involving the encountered moral phenomenon. But this reduction is not full scale reduction now, for it stays compatibilist. Pointing into direction of the ideal level does not really reduce the psychological Phenomenology P project area. It complements it with the relevant or the essential ideal point of reference, which happens to be engaged into the lower level psychological area along a dialectics described in the last table. The forces at lower level are aiming at the ideal point of reference, and this one illuminates these forces and the area around them, using such matters as morphological content in the process. Moral phenomenological reduction thus establishes a bridge between the dynamical holistic everyday level of moral engagement towards the ideal point of reference level, in a dialectical feedback manner.
7.	Brain in a vat skeptical scenario may be attained through phenomenological reduction. External world is thereby put under parentheses. This kind of reduction does not aim at the ideal level but stays at the experiential world embracing narrow lower level of experiential engagement.
A residual issue that deserves to be briefly discussed here involves brain in a vat (BIV) skeptical scenario. You are reading these lines and you have impression that this happens in a real surrounding world. But it just may be the case that you are in the BIV position. This is the skeptical challenge. Now notice that there is intuition how such a BIV scenario may be attained through phenomenological reduction. You aim at the ideal, at the essential in the encountered world, and you stay with whatever is relevant here, with the BIV compatible world. But this is wrong, in as far as the relevant world would be understood as being an ideal world. How this is not the case may be seen from the fact that your BIV experience involves the entire Phenomenology (P) and Intentionality (I) experience. Being BIV, you stay with your worldly engagement, with your community engagement and obligations, with the qualitative feeling due to you wearing a shirt right now, and many more. Thus P and I remain in support of the BIV scenario, whereas ideal science is not involved. Moral phenomenological reduction is compatible with this kind of engagement, as this is presented in the last delivered table.

Literature
Brentano, Franz. 1968. Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Hamburg: Meiner. (PES) 
Chalmers, David. 1996. The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: OUP.
Henderson, David, Horgan Terry and Potrč, Matjaž. 2007. Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 22: 281-300.
Hirgan, Terry and Potrč, Matjaž. 2010. The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content. Acta Analytica 25: 155-173.
Horgan, Terry and Tienson, John. 2002. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In Chalmers, David ed. Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: OUP.
Horgan, Terry and Timmons, Mark. Illuminating Reasons. Project. Internet available.
Husserl, Edmund. 1911. Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft.
Husserl, Edmund. 1913. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie.
Husserl Edmund. 1923-24. Erste Philosophie. Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion.
Potrč, Matjaž. 1999. Morphological Content. In Matjaž Potrč, ed. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Acta Analytica 22, Philosophy and Psychology, Josef H. Röll Verlag, Dettelbach: 133-49.
Potrč, Matjaž. The Guiding Light. Internet available.
Potrč, Matjaž. Two Moral Levels. Internet available.
Potrč, Matjaž. The Rich World of Dasein in a Vat: Brain in a Vat’s Equivalence to your Experiential World. Internet available.
Potrč, Matjaž. Bogati svet tubiti v kadi: enakost možganov v kadi vašemu izkustvenemu svetu. Internet available.