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Preface

In 1997 a comparative European project under the title »Managing the Mix Thereafter: Comparative Research into Mixed Communities in Three Independent Successor States (Estonia, Slovenia, Ukraine)« started. The title¹ reflects the status of the three countries in the post-communist order of the Central and Eastern Europe. Since the collapse of the multi-ethnic federations of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, researchers, involved in European Studies and European Comparative Research had to find new ways, new perspectives and new questions. It is from this reorientation that several networks, promoting communication among researchers interested into the multicultural and ethnicity issues, developed. In view of the joint project team of researchers from Estonia, Slovenia and Ukraine, the activities of the UNESCO Network *Management of Cultural Pluralism in Europe* and *International Network for the Comparative Study of European Mixed Communities*, are crucial. The idea for a comparative research on the mixed communities had a longer history, going back to a seminar organised by the Vienna European Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences and the Inter-University Centre Dubrovnik, in May 1990, co-ordinated by George Muskens. Among other contributions, models of bilingual education in Slovenia were presented there by Albina Nečak Lük. The attendants considered the bilingual model from Prekmurje an example of good policy and practice. The debate on the contribution from Slovenia, brought about an idea that an outline of a theory on ethnic and national relations that goes beyond the recognition of minority rights and protection, should be developed. Prekmurje, as it was stated, could be seen as an important example of a »mixed community« in which different

¹ Suggested by George Muskens.

groups live together on the basis of a »grassroot multiculturalism« in practice and a balanced educational policy of bilingualism for all. With this aim, - it was suggested - ideas should be elaborated by the Western and Eastern attendants of the seminar via joint and comparative research as well as policy papers directed towards educationalists, local and national policy makers and European authorities². Interdisciplinary approach, in which the presence of sociolinguistics and sociology of ethnic and national relations was indispensable, was esteemed crucial for such a comparative research.

It was encouraging that the idea about a comparative research on the theme of good policy and practice in mixed communities was supported by international bodies on several occasions: at the UNESCO Synthesising Conference on Multilingualism and Ethnicity (Bratislava 1993) the idea was launched of a common project for the first time; on the conference on »Management of Cultural Pluralism«, organised by Swedish UNESCO Commission and Centrum för invandringsforskning-CEIFO, Stockholm University (Gimo, March 1995), researchers from Slovenia, Estonia and Ukraine reacted with enthusiasm on a preliminary proposal by George Muskens. The proposal was elaborated at a meeting in Ljubljana in November 1995 (supported by the National UNESCO Committee of Slovenia). An important impetus for proceeding with the plan on an international comparative project should be ascribed to the fact that there was a general consent among the researchers that in the foreseen international project, the already existing theoretical and methodological framework, elaborated since 1990 in the project »Interethnic relations in the Slovene ethnic areas« (project headed by A. Nečak Lük at the Institute for Ethnic studies in Ljubljana, and funded by the Ministry of Science and Technology of Republic of Slovenia), could have been applied. Preparatory work could start due to a special grant on behalf of the World Decade of Cultural Development of UNESCO for years 1996 and 1997, grants by the National UNESCO Committees of Slovenia and Andora, by the Estonian Language Strategy Centre for international expert meetings in 1995 and 1997.

All this encouraged the research teams in the three countries to overcome the institutional obstacles and to go forward with their applications. In May 1997, funding for comparative research for two years was obtained from the Research Support Scheme of the Soros Foundation. The three teams started the work in Prekmurje, Uzghorod and Sillamäe, the results of which are published in this book.

It is our wish that outcomes and findings presented here would not only contribute a piece of knowledge on the investigated communities, but also excite further research on the interethnic relations and

² For details see Ager, Muskens, Wright 1993.

communication in mixed communities from a comparative perspective. We would like to express our thanks to everybody who supported our work, either with expert advice and opinion or by material support. Special thanks goes to our respondents in the three countries who did not refrain from answering our questions and thus provided the basic material for our analyses.

Albina Nećak Lük
George Muskens
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Ljubljana, December 2000

Introduction to Mixed Perspectives*

Hardly any European sociologists use the concept of the mixed community in describing the special social configuration of a community consisting of two or more subcommunities in general and two or more ethnic subcommunities in particular. Through the concept of the mixed community the co-existence, conviviality and ethnic relations between two or more subcommunities are directly linked to the classical theories of community and society of Tönnies, Durkheim and Weber, and indirectly to that of the imagined community as a modern variant of the traditional community (Anderson 1983). The community-concept regards pre-modern (or post-modern?) group phenomena. We may refer, for instance, to placing the collective identity above an individual identity, or placing local bonds before cosmopolitan bonds, or to the dependence on ascribed resource allocation instead of the modern practice of resource allocation by achievement. We daresay that for many people who have to cope with complex ethnic relations in their direct and everyday environment, as well as for their (local) leaders the »community-outlook« of collective ethnic identity, local bonds and ascribed resource allocation is a kind of »natural habitus«. It brings stability and order, and makes the solutions for the problems that arise much more simple.

The concept of the mixed community stresses, however, that the communities are not homogeneous groups (in terms of e.g. ethnicity, religion, language, nation, xenophobia, etc.), but include a variety of at least two or more subgroups, which have to live together, for better or for worse. The subgroups differ in terms of recognised and recognisable ethnic markers like language, religion, nation, history and genealogy, culture and folklore, etc. The subcommunities are unequal. Parallel to

* Chapter by George Muskens (p. 9-16).

cultural difference the subcommunities may have developed inequality in power, status, wealth, etc. Within the community at large, however, certain mechanisms regulate a balance of power between the subcommunities. Primordial dependence of one subcommunity on another is the one extreme, harmony between them being the other. The subcommunities can also be or become recognised subcommunities, e.g. according to the same criteria with which minorities are recognised and protected against forced assimilation, exploitation, ethnic cleansing and other forms of one-sided power exertion. Minority recognition and protection regards rights that are included in international treaties and agreements about minorities and minority rights, as those for indigenous ethnic minorities which are recognised in a national constitution. A recognised indigenous minority has a strong claim on the national majority and the national authorities to receive e.g. mother tongue education. The recognition the minority finds, may lead to a reluctant approval of mother tongue education under restrictive conditions, but also to a more comprehensive approach that integrates mother tongue education in the national or regional curriculum, encouraging minority people to preserve their mother tongue, but to become a bilingual person too. The latter is common, usual good practice in minority-majority relations, which is reflected in the theoretical apparatus of »ethnic and minority studies«.

It is most challenging and unavoidable to speculate about new perspectives on policy and practice that could emerge from the comparative study of mixed communities. It is unavoidable because the concept of a mixed community is, in a high degree, a normative concept, or a concept loaded with normative connotations. It is about »good« and »bad« practice, and about policies that should endorse »good practice«. However objective the phenomenon of a mixed community is (as its demography is made up of different subcommunities) and however empirical the researchers' standpoints are (i.e. focussing on controlled data, documented history and reliable sources), the researchers involved want to solve problems and to mobilise cultural resources, to the advantage of the people living together in mixed communities. It represents a challenge for many members of the academic community who are involved in research and expert advice on »management of cultural pluralism« (Dacyl 1995), »urban multiculturalism« (Rex 1996), »social integration« (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports 1997), and similar topical issues.

My expectations about the new perspectives that could emerge, follow some systematic order. First point in this systematic order is that the ultimate norm for good practice and policy refers to »best practice and policy« as its most ideal type. This terminology is the terminology of professional welfare and community work, and is as fuzzy as these fields

of professional intervention mostly are. Nevertheless, as others (e.g. Daswani, 1995) I use it in the present discourse on mixed communities for clarifying reasons. The concept of »best practice and policy« may clarify the relevance of certain practices and policies in mixed communities, i.e. if those who assess the practices and policies make clear in how far these are »good« or even »best«, including in this effort the clarification of the assessment criteria they use. Assessors can be the actors involved, outsiders or (scientific) observers. All contribute in their way to the emerging judgement on what is good or bad. In the light of the above it may be repeated that problem solving and cultural resource mobilisation belong to my criteria set.

Second point in the systematic order is the distinction between practice and policy. As such the distinction is nonsense because there is no policy without practice, i.e. without policy making in the literal sense of the word. Policymaking is a practice consisting of writing up white papers, organising consultative rounds and drawing up conclusions that are binding for a number of (different) actors. Policymaking is, however, not limited to its own practice. Beyond the practice of policy making it pretends to give a lead to a certain group of people (or to professionals who should lead the group) showing e.g. how they should find work or how they should live peacefully together with other groups or how they should increase their power. Thus, policy imposes practice on others who would do something else under uncontrolled, spontaneous conditions. From the other side: it is highly naive to think that patterns of human action emerge in a purely spontaneous way amongst the people. Actors amongst the people develop more or less clear ideas about their targets and how to reach them, or they improvise in what they are doing keeping however certain values in mind, or they are forced to certain reactions by the »policies« of others. There is a policy-dimension in human practice. Keeping these points in mind I make, however, a distinction between practice and policy, applied to the field of mixed community studies. The concept of »practice« refers then to all conduct and speech that is observed on the side of the actors who belong to a subcommunity and who are directly involved in mixed community life (either in their own eyes or in that of others). The concept of »policy« refers to all attempts at external intervention into subcommunities and mixed community life, with or without effects. Important is the interaction between practice and policy. Practice is »embedded« in policies, i.e. in attempts at external intervention, e.g. via formal education, legislation, financial means, propaganda, power exertion, resettlement schemes, national and global market mechanisms, etc. Modern mixed community life is moulded by national targets with regard to language education, laws on minority rights, minority policies and affirmative action, political rhetoric, etc. However, policies as documented in white papers and other official

sources do not replace practice. What happens »in practice« deviates mostly from the official intentions of policy makers in a larger or smaller degree, although many policy makers write their assessments too often as if their policy intentions were true. At the same time community researchers are faced with the danger that they forget that mixed community life is embedded in policies, i.e. that they judge, with the »locals«, their observations as spontaneous conduct and speech. The subsidy structure behind a lovely multicultural festival is easily forgotten. The discipline of policy analysis must protect us against »naive anthropology«, as in-depth case study analysis must show what the mere rhetoric is in (multicultural) policies and what effective intervention. Therefore we need the distinction between practice and policy.

At the level of practice, further distinctions regard the distinction between the pre-conditions of living in a mixed community and the actual participation in it, i.e. the distinction between what people are, have or want, on the one hand, and what they do as members of a mixed community, on the other. The pre-conditions form the set people dispose of as members of mixed communities, to be used and realised by participation. The pre-conditions include (1) attitudes and beliefs about one self, the own subcommunity and the mixed community, and (2) skill enabling the persons their life in mixed communities. The pre-conditions also include the collective characteristics of the community, i.e. its actual level of cultural diversity. Participation includes three distinctive level of participation, i.e. (1) the participation in the own subcommunity to be called »subcultural participation«, (2) participation in the general institutions of the community to be called »institutional participation«, and (3) participation in the community as a mixed community to be called »multicultural participation«. At these different levels pre-conditions and participation can be »good« (and even »best«) or »bad« (and even »worst«). At each level they can be enhanced or obstructed by certain policies, i.e. by »good« (and even »best«) policies or by »bad« (and even »worst«) policies. It can be a policy objective to change attitudes and beliefs as is the case in most combats against racism and xenophobia. Other policy objectives are directed towards the enrichment of intercultural skills (e.g. foreign and second language education, intercultural education), the effective mobilisation of cultural resources, public furthering of the vitality of self organizations, the proportional participation in general institutions or the participation of all subcommunities in multicultural manifestations, festivals, etc.

In this way we come to a (twelve fold) preliminary model for the assessment of practice and policy in mixed communities. The good sides are represented in the diagram following a discussion of the successive levels of good practice and good policy below.

First level of good practice in mixed communities regards shared norms and values about the existence of the other subcommunities - the norm and value of tolerance, non-discrimination, non-racism, non-exploitation and the right to preserve the cultural identity of the subcommunity, to a certain degree. However human such norms and values are (we call them the basic human right since the American and the French Revolutions), recent history and actuality learn that these norms and value are not self-evident in practice. A so-called good reason not to obey to these norms and values is, e.g., revenge against earlier injustice of the other subcommunity, or mere xenophobia in its different faces, or the threatening loss of the »national identity« by the cultural identity of minorities and its markers (language, folklore and rituals, religion, place names, family names, etc.). The norms and values of tolerance etc. must be enhanced by national legislation and law enforcement regarding non-discrimination, minority rights, asylum rights, etc., combined with e.g. campaigns in the public media of communication, as representing good policies from above. Legislation and law enforcement are predominantly a national affair (with a number of international obligations following from international treaties and law, on the one hand, and local rules, on the other). The actors of supportive campaigns can be state institutions, but also international organisations and non-governmental, voluntary organisations.

Second level of good practice in mixed communities regards intercultural skills. To a varying degree, the members of different subcommunities may be able and willing to acquire proficiency in the social and cultural practices of the other subcommunities. It may regard language, religion, history, art/culture/folklore/festivals/rituals, eating and drinking, gender and family relations, etc. Best practice would be that all members of the subcommunities are full »biculturals« on all aspects, but common practice is that some are more bicultural than others and that those who are best in these skills take the role of mediators between the different subcommunities. Part of biculturalism is acquired »on the street« through direct contact. We know that particularly young children in pre-school ages acquire the language and other things of another community easily through street contacts. What they have acquired or what others should acquire, must be stimulated by the authorities through educational institutions and their curricula, as representing good policies. For the youth in school-going ages and adults the acquisition of bicultural skills, particularly the acquisition of second and foreign languages,

depends on formal language education, to the largest extent (Ager, Muskens & Wright 1993).

Third level of good practice in mixed communities regards regional welfare, performance and development. In a mixed community, cultural diversity should work as a resource for regional welfare, performance and development. The spectre of the labour forces, the commodities and the services on the local market is richer than that in homogenous communities or in those that deny their mixed character. The spectre of external relations may be richer too, as the different subcommunities have self-evident relations with »their« people somewhere else. Good practice means that these aspects of community life appear to be comparatively rich. Good policy means, that those who are responsible for regional planning include the parameter of cultural diversity in their catalogue of regional and local resources, to begin with, and that they show the ways how to mobilise them as a comparative advantage.

Next, i.e. fourth level of good practice in mixed communities regards the participation of people in their own subcommunity. We assume that there is a reverse U-form curve of good practice in that respect. Both extremes may represent bad practice. No participation denies the existence of the subcommunity, whereas the maximum participation indicates the cultural isolation of a subcommunity and its members. Other, less extreme forms of participation allow for the necessary identity formation and preservation, on the one side, but they leave sufficient opportunity for involvement in the community as a whole, on the other. Good policies at this level are to be expected primarily from the self organisations of the subcommunities, their leaders, their mediators and professional staff, and financial schemes furthering the vitality of self organisations.

Fifth level of good practice in mixed communities regards full and unhindered participation in general community-related institutions, such as the local or the regional councils, associations that do not belong to any recognised subcommunity, or general social, economic or cultural institutions. In case, all kinds of political, voluntary etc. participation are possible. Realisation, i.e. good practice, is measured in proportional numbers of participants from different subcommunities. The realisation may depend on non-discriminatory access, promotion activities including, if needed, preferential treatment, or special support given by subcommunity leadership and so-called self-organisations, as representing good policies. With regard to proportional participation, a lot of »bad practice« has been reported by minority studies as minorities are discriminated. They remain excluded from (proportional) access to general institutions, are denied voting rights for the councils in the cities, regions or countries where they live, or keep to political, social, economic

and cultural isolation against the public promotion of participation in community-related institutions.

Last but in no way least level of good practice in mixed communities regards social and cultural practices in which people with different backgrounds participate. It regards the public manifestations of multicultural life and grassroots multiculturalism. It is not to be said that we look forward to perpetual multicultural street festivals with drums and dancing and good foot, but it is a good practice phenomenon if these kind of festivals occur, maybe even on a regular basis as an functional institution of the mixed community. The same can be said about mixed dating and marriage. It is not necessary that dating and marriage always go over subcommunities' lines, but in a mixed community that represents best practice, mixed dating and mixed marriages should not be uncommon (assumed that it is not one-sided machismo and gender exploitation). Best policies at this point are to be expected on behalf of the voluntary associations and self-organisations of the community with the support of national and international voluntary associations and funding agencies.

Table 1: Preliminary model for the assessment of good practice and good policy in mixed communities.

	Good practice	Good policy
Preconditions	Shared norms and values, mutual respect	Legislation, law enforcement and campaigns from above
	Biculturalism	Intercultural education
	Rich cultural diversity	Cultural resource mobilisation
Participation	Moderate subcultural participation	Self organisation
	Full and unhindered institutional participation	Promotion of proportional access and participation
	Some multicultural participation	Festivals and other cultural action

The scheme of good practices and good policies gives a guideline for the questions that should be raised in mixed community studies. Some questions are questions about yes or no (e.g. biculturalism), i.e. good or bad. Most however refer to gliding scales and rank order between most positive and best on the one side, and most negative or worst at the other. In the studies these questions about predispositions and participation, about policies and practice, should be answered to be laid side by side for comparative analysis and assessment.

Theoretical Framework*

3.1. Key Notions in Language Policy

Language policy framework focuses on three significant distinctions. These are the following:

1. temporal axis, underlying the changing features of society in transfer from modernity to postmodernity;
2. the structure and qualities of society, revealed through relevant partial identities;
3. relation to power, revealed through respective type of language policy.

3.2. Shift from Modernity to Postmodernity

The contemporary world has been undergoing fundamental changes, qualitatively affecting the social, economic and political systems which came into being in the West in the period after the 18th century, frequently referred to by the summary term modernity (Giddens 1990, Ó'Riagáin 1997). This set of societal systems reflected the needs of industrial society. The principal language-related characteristics of modernity include subtractive ideologies, territorial contact, manufacturing base, unilocus languages and nation-state as the ultimate carrier of sovereignty. In contrast, the characteristics of post-modernity,

* Chapter by Mart Rannut (p. 17-22)

catering for the needs of information society, are openness and globalism enhancing human mobility, advanced communication and transnational competition, pluralism, additive ideologies, language-related service base, languages with several loci, and non-permanent societal relations. This results in the synergetic approach, empowering the most powerful, but simultaneously leaving more undetermined space for minor-level phenomena due to an expanding recognition of chaotic processes within society, based on non-linearity. Thus, post-modern security focuses less on high policies and locates the issues more in the sphere of low politics of accidental, uncontrolled and chaotic, with small, fractioned violence. Its preoccupation is with »soft« societal phenomena, stressing socio-economic and cultural issues affecting identity. It elevates integration and fragmentation into the position of key variables. This may be linked to the emerging security view, recognizing terrorism (with the uncontrollable production and sales of various weapons of mass destruction) as one of the main threats to the contemporary security structure.

3.3. New Paradigm

The current political situation is significantly different from Herderian times that produced the triad of *état-nation-langue* that was idealised up to the beginning of the 20th century. This led to the substitution by nation-states of collapsed empires that were unable, among other things, to cope with linguistic diversity and implement integrative and cost-effective language policies. The solution for facilitating societal balance was found in the form of the nation-state, which in turn has also shown itself to be a temporary one. With the birth of international organisations, transnational corporations and global media as well as information networks, a good deal of power has shifted away from states, except the most totalitarian ones. Simultaneously, the homogeneity of a state showed itself to be wishful thinking in most cases, as seen in the revival of hidden minorities and increasing migrational flows. Thus, the traditional triad of modernity represented surface structure. In order to describe the current position with societal power as an integral element, a new postmodern paradigm is necessary. We propose a postmodern equivalent *power-society-language*. In this form power that once was ultimately possessed by states and therefore marked in the Herderian triad, is still present, whatever its form may be. The same applies to the second everchanging component, which in times of Herder proved to be nation, lasting forever, but nowadays a fragmented set of various non-permanent collective identities, comprised in the notion of society. The

third component has maintained its form, but not content, being qualitatively different in the era of information.

3.4. Language: Instrumental and Primordial Values

One component of this paradigm - language - should be transferred from the former, which over time plays an even more central role, penetrating all domains of society and leaving less room for negotiations about language choice. The reason for the importance of language seems to be its transformation into a political object and resource, like other politically negotiable objects and resources (Ozolins 1993) in both the primordial and instrumental senses (Phillipson et al. 1994). From the primordial point of view, language is seen as an integrative component of ethnicity and a natural symbol of inherent group rights, simultaneously being due to the exclusive nature of language, one of the most common differentiating factors in human affairs. Any negative change that may be linked to language is thus a visible signal to those operating in defence of their ethnolinguistic interests. In this way language has maintained its role as an organizer of ethnic divisions within society. These divisions are sustained by boundary-maintenance mechanisms, such as ideologies, rules and practices.

In addition, language has acquired new, differing functions and modes of use. For example, due to virtual language environment the need for direct contact has decreased, thus diminishing its traditional role. With the development of speech (and information) technology, artificial intelligence systems enable to turn even distant communication multilateral, with some messages conveyed by non-humans or from past (video- and audiomessages). Simultaneously, the gradual economic transfer of population from manufacturing to service base has upgraded the instrumental role of language. Life-long learning has affected also those age groups traditionally considered out of reach of language (acquisition) policy. However, the role of state in creating and modifying language environments through relevant language policies (implemented in the form of language regimes) has decreased within the framework of open global society. Simultaneously, the increase of the instrumental value of language and its exclusive characteristics, rearranging society on a language domination axis, is inevitably connected to the economic and social well being of its speakers. Thus language acts as a regulator of (unequal) access to power. Taken together, both primordial and

instrumental values tend to produce a synergetic effect, making language one of the most important factors in the contemporary political scene.

3.5. Society: Partial Identities

The next component in our paradigm is society - the subject that makes use of power and is simultaneously an agent of it. In contemporary times, the term society need no longer denote a nation or even any homogenous language group, but rather a group with common or similar (possibly linguistic) configuration of identities. Society may be described with a set of partial identities, with various groups affiliating to these or their configurations. From the point of view of language policy, the most significant identities seem to be territorial, measured through permanent residence data, political, revealed through citizenship, ethnic, showing affiliation to some ethnic group (integrative and symbolic aspects), and linguistic, showing instrumental proficiency in languages. The change of partial identities may be carried out in strict order, thus temporal organisation of change is extremely important.

All these conditions require a formalised language environment with a written standard and with language functioning on a native-competence level. The inherent structure of the contemporary society is influenced by the power relations channelled through the instrumental functions of language as well as by language directly, through its primordial side. In order to reveal the connections between these three components, we focus on the issues of power reflected through the societal structures functioning in a language.

3.6. Power and Policy

The last component in our modernized triad seems to be power, which on a macro-scale was earlier available only to states. Power sufficient to reproduce nations with all their characteristics generation after generation was traditionally controlled by states, based on principles of territoriality, sovereignty and exclusivity. Thus, in modernity states concentrated power, together with authority and identity. The current situation may be characterised by a different pattern of power distribution, directly influencing the security agenda of states and the behaviour of nations. Thus, the principle of the territoriality of power will be just one among several principles. Power is qualitatively more transmitted through

language as a channel, used as an instrument of manipulation in discourse. It means that besides resources and structural agents, ideological agents have come to the forefront of policy-making (including language policy). Neither linguistic human rights nor language policy in general are the focus of interest of any state (though, together with diminishing power in other spheres, states have taken more interest in language matters, e.g. France). State interests are usually elsewhere than in language policy, more firmly concentrated in the economy, security, and social policies. The type of language policy adopted is the consequence of decisions taken in other domains for achieving goals that usually have little in common with language issues.

Power is manifested on macro scale through adequate policy, trying to modify the partial identities of the target group and accommodate these to the goal pattern, a specific configuration of partial identities.

The role of language policy has also increased in the continuous redistribution of power between the groups within society. The goals and the activities for achieving these goals are usually accompanied by linguistic ones (validation, invalidation, legitimization). Such language policy relations may be arranged in binary pairs of language policies with conflicting goals. The most spread case of this is language spread confronted by minority protection. The former is focusing on promoting linguistic identity of speakers and shifting linguistic identity of target group. The latter is focused on promoting ethnic identity (ethnic mobilization), with language appearing as a major (or even main) factor of maintenance. On such an array of binary pairs of language policies (sub- or supra-) nation-building is applied, attempting to form or rearrange political identity. As the sovereignty of the body concerned (it may be a state, international or transnational organisation, a community with self-government) is usually limited, boundaries may be overcome by renaming one's language policy from language spread to minority protection, i.e., from overdog to underdog, thus creating basis for legitimization of offensive language policy, making use of human rights standards.

3.7. Instruments of Regulation

In general, human rights serve as human protection from government and act as market correction. Likewise, linguistic human rights regulate language environment and act also as correctives to the free market (Tomashevski 1996, Skutnabb-Kangas 1996), meaning they should guarantee that the basics needed for survival and for the sustenance of a dignified life in certain language environment overrule the law of supply

and demand, thus being outside market forces. Balanced multilingualism is based on balance of the market and market correctives. However, due to continuous redistribution of power relations, human rights standards may prove an obstacle in the new emerging situation. Thus, legitimization of new interpretations and definitions, as well as rearrangement of human rights standards are used, in order to modify and accommodate to the needs of actual power relations.

As changes, produced by power shifts, occur with different speed in various parts of society (cf. language acquisition), attitudinal lag in reacting to language change is often visible in the behaviour of various societal groups. Status is usually affected first, with acquisition and corpus issues following later. Thus, the future of language environment reflects power relations today.

Galtung's imperialism theory (developed further for implementation in language domains by Phillipson (1992) and Skutnabb-Kangas (1988, 1996, 1997) starts from the key notion of imperialism as a type of relationship whereby one society (or collectivity in more general terms) can dominate another (Galtung 1980:107). The theory derives from the unequal distribution of power between a dominant Centre (the powerful western countries and interests), and dominated Peripheries (the underdeveloped countries), which in their turn are further distributed respectively by Centre-Periphery relationship (resulting in the consolidation of elites). Elites of both the Centre and the Periphery may share common interests with the norms dictated from the Centre and internalized by elites of the Periphery. Earlier, colonizers themselves comprised the elites in the Periphery, changed to indigenous, controlled by or under the influence of the Centre. In the latter phase various international organisations (economic, political, military, etc.) play a key role. The next phase will reflect the diminishing need for physical presence of the exploiters and increasing control of societal consciousness due to the advances in technology. Phillipson (1992:53) has emphasized the role of language in this development, paralleling the way power can be exerted by means of sticks (impositional force), carrots (bargaining), and ideas (persuasion). Language is considered the primary means for communicating ideas. Therefore, according to Phillipson (ibid.) an increased linguistic penetration of the Periphery is essential for completing the move away from crude means, and even the more discreet means of asymmetrical bargaining, to control by means of ideas.

Galtung's theory is concerned with the structural relations between rich and poor countries and the mechanisms by which the inequality between them is maintained. This conceptual framework provides useful for analysing other types of situations with asymmetrical links, with norms, ideals and ideologies in one end and modelling, transfer and accommodation in the other.

Methodological Framework*

The project has been designed as comparative interdisciplinary research. It is posited that research into any kind of ethnic relations can be regarded as *a par excellence* comparative research; this is true even in those cases in which the research does not encompass locations outside borders of a single country (Hafner 1993).

Still, the comparative-type-of-research may only take place in those research situations, when traditional concepts of sociological comparative research, - within which territorial units (mostly states) constitute primary research unites -, are surpassed. Hence, within the framework of research on inter-ethnic relations, which is both spatially and functionally (institutionally) restrained by state borders, and often carried out right at the border territories, the category of »ethnicity« becomes, instead, the key comparative category. Moreover, the comparative research in inter-ethnic relations, usually involves comparison of two ethnically defined groups which occupy unequal position. In the case of the research referred to in project, it involved the ethnic majority (Estonians in Estonia, Slovenes in Slovenia, Ukrainians in Ukraine) and ethnic minorities consisting of communities of a different ethnic origin, usually of the same origin as the majority population in neighbouring countries, (Russian in case of Estonia, Hungarian in case of Slovenia, Hungarian, Slovak, Russian, etc in case of Ukraine).


* Chapter by Mitja Hafner-Fink (p. 23-26).

In all locations, the research concerns comparison of two ethnic groups differing in social status and coexisting on the same territory; it is also assumed that this spatial co-habitation shape up a certain, mutually intertwined social structures³.

In any ethnically mixed territory, linkages between the role (status) of the ethnic majority and the role (status) of the minority are the manifestations of specific characteristics within the (locally existing) social structure.

Consequently, holding that any comparative analysis in ethnically mixed communities may be performed both on the »ethnicity« dimension as well as on the dimension of »status«, it is consequently posited that the ascertained differences regarding values, attitudes, lifestyle etc. can, (along with everything else, e.g. the socio-economic status), be attributed to the two dimensions, i.e. to »ethnicity« and »majority/minority« status. Hence, there are, basically, two variables at work: (a) »ethnic appurtenance« and (b) »ethnic status«. Inasmuch as the analysis or comparison is performed within one single state, the two variables are strongly intertwined with each other; hence, any differentiation or explication, respectively of the two variables, which would mean that one variable is assessed as being the determining one, is obsolete and can only be regarded as a matter of redundant interpretation. Additional variable, however, which needs to be taken into account while analysing interethnic relations in synchronic perspective, is the effect of the past interethnic interactions (diachronic perspective). (see Hafner Fink 1993:33-35).

Table 2: Model clarifies of the differences in the attitudes and. perceptions of the population of mix community (Resumed after Hafner Fink, 1993).



³ For such a type of cohabitation, we have introduced the term »mixed community«.

Empirical research on inter-ethnic processes, on the dynamics of interethnic relations and on indicators of ethnic identity, is dominated by methods borrowed from sociology (with pertaining interdisciplinary fields, i.e. sociolinguistics, social psychology, etc.), while some methods used in political sciences or (ethnic) anthropology are also applied. Consequently, the collecting of relevant data has been carried out by means of a questionnaire; interviews were made with representative sample of adult members of both the minority and the majority in the earlier mentioned, selected locations.

Comparative research of interethnic relations requires a specially careful preparation of metric instruments. Above all, it is necessary to consider all the specific features of different surroundings (local mixed communities), in which the research process is going on, in order to be able to verify their effects upon results of measurements by the same instrument. Common points must be found, which make it possible to set the comparisons into some common system framework. A detailed description of units compared is important for the classification of these units, for the interpretation and explication within comparative analysis, but mainly for the formation of valid and reliable metric instruments which only provide for adequate comparisons.

At the same time it is necessary to be aware of the specificity of interethnic relations issues, which cannot be (as a whole) understood merely through research at the level of the whole (questionnaire, statistics, etc.), but has to be studied at the level of the specific and individual. This means that the analysis has to be grounded also on case studies, field research, ethnomethodological studies and qualitative research approach in general (Hafner Fink 1993).

Comparative research of interethnic relations should therefore in its starting point be an exploration, having primarily the character of qualitative studies. This is followed by quantification in the form of a questionnaire-based research and the use of (strict) metric instruments at global level. However, the research does not end at the point of quantitative analysis and interpretation of its results. These results are merely a starting point or materials for further analyses, the aim of which is the clarification and understanding of ascertained differences amongst the units of comparison (in our case between local mixed communities in Lendava, Uzhgorod, Sillamäe). As a rule, these analyses have the character of qualitative research (Allardt 1990).

Material for background studies, highlighting general geographical, socio- and ethnodemographical, historical, economic, cultural, political, etc. features in the three mixed communities, has been selected and

analysed. Sources of different kind - legal and political documents, protocols, records, newspaper articles, statistical data, research reports, sociological surveys, etc. - have been studied.

General Geographical, Socio- and Ethnodemographical, Historical, Economic, Cultural, Political, etc. Features in the Three Mixed Communities

5.1. Estonia*

Historical Overview

A. Period of Soviet Occupation

Following the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact and its Secret Protocol (known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), the Soviet Union occupied Estonia in June 1940. The annexation of Estonia by the USSR in 1940 entailed changes in the population, including its ethnic composition.

World War II overrode Estonia twice. Germany conquered Estonia in 1941, and in 1944 the country was again occupied by the Soviet Union. The result was that by 1946 the Estonian population had decreased by one-fifth (200.000) to 854.000. A mere 23.000 (2,7 percent) of non-Estonians remained as minorities in Estonia (the percentage of 97,3 is disputed by Tiit (1993), who proposes the percentage of 95-96 percent).

* Chapter by Mart Rannut and Anna Uibo (p. 27-52).

During the Soviet period previous ethnolinguistic regime was changed from Estonian-based to Russian-based. Several functional areas were russified. Russian was made the second language in education (not a foreign language), and in several areas, the first. The knowledge of the local language in occupied Estonia was low, with percentage of the knowledge (13-20 percent) among non-Estonians (Rannut 1999). No stimuli were left for newcomers to learn the local language and culture.

Estonia was rearranged as one ethnic unit (republic) in the Soviet Union, with no ethnically based subunits.

Oil shale industry in Estonia was transformed for the needs of providing gas to Leningrad in Russia. More than half of the projects were carried out by Glavpromstroj NKVD (former name of KGB) SSSR that used army personnel, prisoners-of-war and ordinary prisoners as its labour force (Hallik 1994:57).

The local society was unbalanced through massive immigration. In addition to the rooting of Soviet army (it had 505 bases in Estonia, see Hallik 1994:57) Russian workers and collective farmers were sent to Estonia by USSR government through *orgnabor* system. In the years 1945-50, the number of immigrants was 0,5 million, and that of emigrants was half that amount while natural increase was only 8700. Non-Estonians settled permanently in Estonia, over 90 per cent of them in towns. Factories were developed extensively and thus supported immigration (the so-called migration-pump effect). After the 1960s, migration diminished, but until the end of the 1980s, the number of newcomers exceeded those leaving by 8000-9000 per year, in a population of 1,5 million (data from ESA). As the number of Estonians did not rise to its pre-World War II level, remaining at less than a million, the proportion of Estonians in the overall population fell from 97,3 percent in 1945 to 61,5 percent in 1989.

Thanks to special position of Russian-medium factories and plants, subordinated directly to Moscow that employed most of the newcomers, their well-being surpassed that of local Estonians who, as usual, avoided Russian-medium working places. As an example, the newcomers attained a privileged position by getting flats (according to Drobizheva, 1984, 86 percent of the aliens and only 57 percent of the Estonians lived in flats with all modern conveniences, these were not bought, but instead, distributed), as well as enjoying other privileges in towns, mainly because 90 percent of the immigrants were townspeople. The result was a decrease in the percentage of Estonians, falling to 4 percent of the population in Narva, 3,2 percent in Sillamäe, 21 percent in Kohtla-Järve, 2 percent in Paldiski and 47 percent in Tallinn, the capital by 1989 (in 1970 Tallinn still had 55,7 percent Estonians among its residents).

Ethnic Identity

Assimilation of third nationalities was one of the key elements in creating Russian language environment in Estonia. According to the 1989 census, the ethnic composition in Estonia was as follows: 963.000 Estonians, 475.000 Russians, 48.000 Ukrainians, 28.000 Belorussians, 16.600 Finns, 4.600 Jews, 4.000 Tartars, 3.500 Latvians and 3.000 Poles. The group of third nationalities (ethnic non-Estonians and non-Russians) was the most promising soil for de-ethnization: according to the 1989 census only a minority of 40 percent used their native languages as the first language, 52 percent were russified, approximately 8 percent had switched to Estonian. The percentage of those claiming Russian as their native language was 78,4 percent among Jews, 67,1 percent among Belorussians, 63,4 percent among Poles, 54,5 percent among Ukrainians, 56,5 percent among Germans.

Assimilation was extremely prominent in the northeastern region of Estonia with Russian majority (Sillamäe!), where it affected Estonians also (Kõre 1997:239). The lack of education in their native language seems to be reason for an underdeveloped sense of ethnic identity.

Linguistic Identity

Together with the influx of newcomers territorial and functional language shifts took place. In several functional domains, Estonian was replaced by Russian, due to Estonia's direct subordination to Moscow, for example in banking, statistics, the militia (Soviet police), railway, naval and air transport, mining, energy production, etc. Their reasons for moving to Estonia were a better standard of living; organized recruitment (construction work, oil shale industry); privileged positions in certain trades where Estonians were not trusted, e.g. navigation and aviation (an opportunity to flee abroad), the railways (the risk of sabotage), communications (state secrets), etc. Some functional activities were completely new in Estonia, having no corresponding Estonian terminology and were therefore carried out in Russian, e.g. Gosplan (state planning) and the KGB. Some were eliminated entirely in Estonian, and for this reason, recreated in Russian, e.g. everything connected with military purposes. Off-shore fishing was forbidden, the boats confiscated or broken up. Instead, Russian-medium marine fishing and transport system was created, with special attention to ideological alert. As a result, at the beginning of 80s Estonians made up less than half of those employed in industry and transport.

From the late 1970s Moscow reinstated policies aimed at greater cultural standardisation, concerned with the russification. The Estonian Communist Party operated solely in Russian, the Government and several ministries shifted to Russian with the excuse that there was somebody in

the collective who did not speak Estonian language (see more in Sinilind 1985).

Territorial language shifts took place simultaneously. During the Soviet period immigrants (who might not have been aware of their status, but moved, according to their opinion, to another part of the Soviet Union) settled mainly in: 1) the town of Narva (North-East Estonia), which was bombed down by the SU air force and lay in ruins, and where, during the post-war years, resettlement by Estonians was restricted up to 1952; 2) Sillamäe, an area closed to Estonians as members of a »suspect« ethnic group, due to the uranium mining, and, later, uranium processing; 3) the Kohtla-Järve oil-shale mines; 4) the country's capital, Tallinn (large Russian factories and Soviet bases), and 5) the submarine base Paldiski, where Estonians were turned away.

In connection with the building of large military airfields, the Estonian monolingual environment was made bilingual in Tartu, Tapa, Haapsalu and Pärnu.

Together with the decrease of functional as well as regional areas where Estonian language was used, the rapid rise of the status of Russian took place. It was caused by several factors, like Russian being compulsorily the sole language for several functional spheres, the construction of a parallel to the already operating Estonian-medium Russian-medium network of plants, factories, offices, institutions and service bureaus as well as entertainment facilities and residence areas, providing full-scale education (including higher education, vocational schools etc) and services in Russian. These structures were filled with the regular massive influx of immigrants. As a result a Russian-speaking environment was created in Estonia with limited contacts with Estonians and the Estonian language, hindering effectively possible integration.

The goals of the Soviet language policy in Estonia seemed to be: 1) full-scale Russian monolingualism for Russians, with local titular language learning optional or formal, (with no lessons or even a teacher), backed by cadre rotation (for military personnel, Communist Party bureaucrats); 2) minority bilingualism for other titular nations, with Russian-medium functional domains in expansion; 3) assimilation of »third nationalities«, mostly to Russian language.

The Soviet language policy in Estonia was implemented through favoured immigration. In order to consolidate immigrants on the basis of Russian language, three steps were implemented:

- Creation of a parallel Russian-medium environment, with no need to switch to Estonian;
- continuous transfer of territorial and functional domains from Estonian to Russian, and
- ideological incentives to prefer Russian before Estonian.

These steps threatened the integrity of Estonian, as Kreindler (1990:242) has remarked, causing:

- expanding usage of Russian in administration and mass communication,
- an extensive program of translations from Russian,
- massive program of Russian language teaching.

During the period two opposite trends may be observed in language policy: 1) ideological, with the task of creating Russian language environment and establishing Russian language as the second language for non-Russian; 2) scientific, directed and implemented by various local scientific institutions, like the Institute of Language and Literature, Tartu University, Tallinn Pedagogical Institute together with some semi-scientific bodies, like the Mother Tongue Society, with the task of the maintenance of Estonian.

Concerning the first trend of creating the Russian language environment was backed by the continuous immigration flows. The second task of making Russian the second language for non-native speakers of it, was seemingly a flop. In order to carry out this task, emphasis was laid on ideology and acquisition planning. Several decisions were made to improve the proficiency in Russian, at the cost of Estonian.

The second trend focusing on the Estonian language maintenance was also successful. In the domain of corpus planning researchers enjoyed success. The main constraints were insufficient financial and material resources and sophisticated and ineffective publishing.

Language maintenance may be observed through the data provided by censuses. Its opposite, language incongruence refers to people who declare a main («native») language different from their national language (nationality was entered in one's passport in the Soviet Union and indicated, as a rule, one's parents ethnic background, i.e. language of origin; Taagepera 1990:142). This variable indicates that a person is in the middle of an assimilation process, and it also indicates the probable direction of the process. Concerning Estonians, Taagepera noted insignificant incongruence: In Estonia, the difference is in favour of Russian and shows signs of widening. Still the cases sum up to only 1,1 percent of the republic population, and this share has increased very slowly... By this measure, assimilation is not proceeding in either direction at a significant rate... (Taagepera 1990:143).

While language incongruence may look limited and stable, the preconditions for its future increase may be set by current changes in second language fluency. Members of one nationality must first become fluent in another language before that language can start competing with their native language. Concerning the knowledge of Estonian among

Russian-speakers, this was minimal. According to Taagepera (1990), the number of Russians fluent in Estonian was in 1970 12,5 percent, by 1979 it had decreased to 11,4 percent. These were mainly local Russians, the resident minority from before 1939 or children from Estonian-Russian bilingual families. This trend was accompanied by the low level of fluency in Russian (*svobodno vladeyet*) among ethnic Estonians: in 1970 it was 27,8 percent, in 1979 correspondingly 23,3 percent with decrease 4,5 percent, though Russian was a compulsory school subject (Itogi 1970:317, Vestnik statistiki 1980, 10:72, quoted in Dellenbrant 1990). This reflected the linguistically-based polarised ethnic situation in Estonia, which might have changed from passive separation to active confrontation if the balance of power changed.

In acquisition planning we may follow similar lines. According to the law the pupils in Estonia had the right to study either through the medium of native language or of another language of the Soviet Union (cf. Law on Education of 1974). In reality, the choice was between Estonian and Russian. The children of newcomers in general attended Russian-medium schools, further strengthening assimilational tendencies. The number as well as the relative share of pupils attending Russian-medium increased continuously. In 1980/81 they comprised 32,5 percent of all schools of general education, by 1990/91 this number had increased to 36,8 percent (Vare 1997).

According to the prevailing ideology, Estonian language proficiency did not belong to the priorities of the Russian-medium school system. Estonian language lessons in the Russian-medium schools were lesser in number than foreign language lessons, or Estonian was made so optional that the 1956 curriculum lacked it as a subject altogether and from 1965 to 1972, no Estonian was taught at the secondary level. The number of lessons of Estonian was weekly two hours, usually it was regarded as optional with lessons used for other purposes and the marks not counted for, teaching posts vacant (Vare 1997). Estonian language lessons began in the third grade in Russian-medium schools (RIESH 3/1988, in Kreindler 1990:247). This kind of language policy was characteristic of the Estonian SSR Russian-medium education system until 1988.

Thus, in acquisition planning for Estonian one may monitor two different periods. The first one, based on language shelter model that ended with the powerful campaign of the Russian language promotion of the end of the 1970s, was substituted with the transition model, which, however was not implemented in full, due to the passive resistance of the population (and bureaucracy, of course). Thanks to the former model, high internal status of Estonian was maintained also among the next generation.

Simultaneously, monolingual Russian-medium educational structure was created, which also maintained high language status, thus promoting the separation of these two linguistic groups.

Sblizhenie - indigenous populations are asked to increase their understanding to the Russian language and culture. It is obvious that the present school system, with separate schools for the indigenous and the Russian population groups, does not promote any integration among cultures. On the contrary, it tends to reinforce the separation of the two communities in the Baltic republics. This has been clearly noted by Maamägi (1981) and other scholars, especially from Estonia (Dellenbrant 1990:110).

This system, comparable to language shelter pattern (Skutnabb-Kangas 1995), avoiding assimilation in minority communities, produced together with the massive promotion of unilateral bilingualism focused on Estonians, the monolingual society of Russian speakers, separated from the rest of society (Rannut and Rannut 1995:183)

The period of Soviet power ended officially on the August, 20 1991, when Estonia restituted its independence. In conclusion we may stress the following features:

The main societal change was the foundation of potential ethnolinguistic conflict by creating a new privileged linguistic elite based on preferential Russian language-biased status and acquisition planning, supported by the artificially created Russian language environment, while still the maintenance of the high inherent status local Estonian language was allowed, through ideological passivity in corpus planning, and for a long time, in acquisition planning (it may also interpreted as hidden resistance of prominent cultural figures). Acquisition planning changed its pattern from language shelter to transition model only at the end of 1970s, together with the increase of ideological component in language planning. Thus, two linguistic groups with high inherent native language status were maintained simultaneously: Russian and Estonian speakers, the last ones powerless at that time, due to the effective mechanisms of hegemonic control. The inevitable conflict was postponed by state violence or threat of it. Levits (1990:53) commented the situation: Despite the formal equality of Soviet citizens, their division into two politically and socially uneven groups is an important domestic political factor, which destabilizes the entire ruling system. The constantly growing need of the non-Russian part of the population for political emancipation is also increasing the significance of the national factor.

Thus, the separation was maintained and active major linguistic conflict avoided by state violence, based on hegemonic control.

B. Perestroika and Restitution of Estonia's Independence: Shift From Modernity to Postmodernity

The leadership of the Soviet Union had the choice between two incompatible options during transformation: either strengthening of a state, which, due to economic problems, might be temporary, or strengthening of democracy, that needs a new type of government to substitute totalitarian. Both scenarios foresaw difficulties, with necessary legislation delayed and ineffective administration, while negative tendencies, like crime rate, suicides, and unequal distribution of riches strengthen in society. The expanded use of police force and arbitrary solutions by government might keep the situation under control at the cost of democracy, however in this case no solutions for improving the economic situations were available. In Estonia a sophisticated set of problems of democracy and human rights had to be tangled, among those the expanding confrontation between the two linguistic communities. Estonians had the right to end occupation and oppression, including linguistic one. Simultaneously, those who in-migrated during the occupation, did not expect the previous regime to come to an abrupt end, meaning that they had to face obligations connected with language and citizenship, lowering their competitiveness in the employment market and deteriorating their relative living standard compared to indigenous population.

Transformation of Linguistic Identity

Language Law, adopted in 1989, should be seen as a remedy to language problems at that time. The main problem was a catastrophic increase of Russian monolingualism, reasons being demographic changes, low status of Estonian in several functional and regional domains, and non-integrative education. Language laws should thus be regarded as the response to the considerable threat to local national and linguistic autonomy. Particularly for Estonia and Latvia, the language laws were seen as a prime means of securing ethnic survival for a population threatened with becoming a minority within its own territory (Ozolins 1994:165).

Language requirements instead of ethnic criteria. Language as a vital element of national identity and national survival was non-negotiable. Simultaneously the issue of ethnicity was less significant, with the Estonian population accustomed to minorities. Thus, no ethnic preferences in legislation and administration were introduced, but instead, language requirements, while providing clear language rights for speakers of other languages (Ozolins 1994:168).

Language law propagandistic rather than for implementation. Several articles of the Law had no legal meaning, or their implementation was beyond the reach of a democratic state. Thus, these should be considered as signals for power turn. Simultaneously, implementation of the law was secondary, and politically sensitive, demanding some postponement for future. This may be the explanation why the office for implementation of the law National Language Board was established only in 1990. This has been noted by Maurais (1997:158), who regards the lack of a state agency, entrusted with all the practical aspects of implementing the switchover from Russian as a major flaw.

Visible signs of the new language policy (Maurais 1997:152) has emphasised the necessity of visible change in some language policy domains, in order to reduce uncertainty about the future of the language concerned through visible, concrete manifestations of language. In Estonian case these may be public bilingual signs and information, and language requirements for employment.

Language law as power redistributor. Language law caused the mobilisation of groups based on linguistic interests. However, the anxiety was not the content of the law, but the political factors behind the law. Maurais (1991) who has analysed the Estonian Language Law in comparison with Quebec and four other republics, noted that the language question conceals power struggles in a given society, as it has been noted repeatedly, extralinguistic factors play their part in language planning (Maurais 1991:119).

From the formal point of view, the Estonian Language Law did not alter the former situation substantially, but rather maintained *status quo* by granting the right to receive education in one's native language, with Estonian enjoying higher status among Estonians and Russian among Russians (cf. Taagepera 1990). Ozolins (1994), however considers these modest language policies of the Baltic states as a crucial element in national reconstruction and transition from the Soviet system. The Language Law redefined Estonian language from a minority status that it had *de facto* acquired to a full national status as the language of state and administration, and of most social discourse (Ozolins 1994:161). Even more, this occurred in a peculiar context where the national language was not the most wide-spread language in Estonia: while most of Estonian residents were able to cope in Russian, only a minor part of local non-Estonians knew Estonian that much.

In this way, the adoption of the Law signalled the redistribution of power and together with it, the formation of new elites in Estonia. Due to the insignificant formal changes for the most of the Russian-speaking population (the Law did not concern the main bulk of it directly), the ambiguity of the situation with the two endo-majorities remained, causing

thus several further conflicts and offering grounds for outside political influence.

Ozolins supports the view that Estonia has, in the short period since independence, been able to substantially realise its language policy aims (Ozolins 1994:161).

Current Situation

Society

Though the Language Law promoted Estonian language learning and introduced the incentives for learning Estonian, learning itself was widely based only on instrumental motivation. No significant advance toward integration of the Estonian population has been observed. Even more, separation seems to be maintained. According to Osipova (1997:30-32), among Estonians Russia is still perceived as a backward dangerous country, and the diminishing knowledge of Russian is observable. Though Estonians are tolerant on cultural differences, they are not ready to accept their own life being affected by it (the so-called »Russian way of life«). According to Kruusvall (1997), the number of Estonians regarding Russians as carriers of political interests of Russia is in rise: while in 1994 the percentage was 4 percent, then in 1996 it was 50 percent. While the progress in other domains is visible, the lack of knowledge of the Estonian language and culture among Russian-speakers causes irritancy among Estonians. As can be traced from Kruusvall's (1997) research, after a short period of instability and vagueness, Estonians have reacquired the opinion viewing Russian-speaking population in Estonia as a carrier of language spread.

Among Russians in Estonia difficulties to cope with the new situation may be observed, being in a position of a minority. However, the self-estimate still qualifies the group as majority or at least elite, temporally being in a weak and constrained position due to the main supporter Russia's problems, with Estonian viewed as an insignificant language. It is accompanied by psychological unpreparedness to speak Estonian and frustration towards everything Estonian, resulting in the formation of monolingual Russian communities, diminishing the contacts with the Estonian environment to minimum (Osipova 1997:30-32). Ethnic non-Estonians fear deprivation of social guarantees and unemployment, due to their undetermined legal position in the society, insufficient knowledge of Estonian and absence of Estonian citizenship. However, they don't fear bad relations with Estonians and expulsion to Russia. Most satisfied are ethnic non-Estonians with Estonian citizenship (Kruusvall 1997).

Different information and value system further strengthens the separatist phenomena. Maaris Raudsepp (1997) has shown the total separatism and incompatibility of Estonian and Russian-language media in Estonia due to a different addressee. Consequently, dialogue in these conditions is impossible and media usually strengthens the views of the community concerned. Findings of Aune Valk and Kristel Karu (1997) support the understanding of contrasting nature of Russians to Estonians.

Ethnic Integration

The composition of the Estonian population makes the task to build a nation difficult. For this aim, establishing the common language regime covering the institutions of the state must be achieved. This requires common interests and consensus to be established. In Estonia's case with occupation looming in the immediate past, this task proved to be more than difficult. The current population of Estonia, divided into two linguistic groups, has never been united against common enemy, it does not share common glorious past, nor does it have common norms, values, ideals that might distinguish it from others (cf. Fishman 1966). On the contrary, due to the durable occupation it has history of military and political conflict and discrimination carried out domestically. Thus, the society proved to be deeply divided. In Fishman's (1966) dichotomy, the objective of nation building in Estonia should be nationalism, not nationalism. However, the requirement for Estonian as the common official language has been hardly acceptable for Russian-speakers, representing language spread policy based on the Russian language, causing the escalation of tensions.

The politicised language situation in Estonia has had a number of serious consequences. For example, opportunities for social mobility for the speakers of these languages have constantly followed the unequal distribution pattern of language status, with access to resources, power, and prestige also being linguistically based. In the political domain there was a nondemocratic political set-up, the absence of national cohesion, the presence of deep divisions in national life, leading to ethnic mobilisation due to the relax of the totalitarian grip. It was followed by perfectly legal and democratic solution, which, due to the abnormality of the preceding period carries still along features that should be considered abnormal for a contemporary democratic state (huge number of non-citizens resulting from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, having restricted political rights).

As a result of the Soviet occupation, Estonia has linguistically divided national society and a high conflict potential. There is still no single language of wider communication for the whole country. As group identities are based on language, the Estonian society is polarised and

language is regarded as highly politicized and conflict issue. Both languages have acquired specific sociopolitical meanings. Estonian was strongly stigmatised during the occupation period, in some regions it still is. The Russian language was seen as the language of oppression, harming sovereignty of the state and national identity. Thus, the conflict potential is clear.

One of the constraints obstructing the formation of the common Estonian society seems to be the lack of Estonian geographical and political identity (cf. politonym and toponym in Bromley 1977) among ethnic non-Estonians. Up till now, Russians have not still decided to cast their future with the sovereign Estonia, instead, most of them are waiting for their great chance that might be in whatever country, preferably in the West (Kruusvall 1997).

Further separation takes place. Due to the association of Russian with occupation, learning of the Russian language among Estonian-speakers has collapsed, reducing the intergroup communication to minimum. This means that there is very little meaningful intergroup communication in the country, making national political development a sophisticated challenge.

Common loyalty (sociopolitical unity) presupposes broad pattern of interethnic communication, so that common values and norms, points of view, attitudes, loyalties, social practices can be established and stereotypes, prejudices and misrepresentations can be tempered, thus respect can be engendered for one another. This can occur either through effective promotion of lingua franca or by the promotion of individual bilingualism, both of which are still on the insufficient level. Thus the marker of loyalty, analysed through *we - they* relationship by Rein Ruutsoo (1997) shows sharp differences in perception of history between ethnic Estonians and Russians. For Russians »our side« is always Russia, where global changes play minor role, for Estonians with no significant »glorious past« global or regional view prevails over Estonian territorial development. According to the data provided by Hallik (1997), views on the history of Estonia were almost opposite between Estonians and Russians. Factors positively influencing Estonian development were for Russians as follows: the Soviet occupation, Russia as a neighbour, Russian immigrant community in Estonia, while for Estonians these were the first period of Estonian sovereignty in 1918-1940 and the influence of Western neighbours (Sweden, Finland, Germany).

According to Lambert et al. (1972) integrational aspect is one of the basic in creating language learning motivation and achieving satisfying results. In Estonia, this aspect seemed to be marginal, according to the various surveys. Interest of adult non-Estonian population in learning Estonian has dropped considerably (more than three times), according to the data from the Director of the Tallinn Language School 4. September.

1996: while in 1994 there were 460 learners, in 1995 280, then in 1996 the number was 140, comprising all groups on various levels. The same developments reflecting decreasing interest are witnessed in the Tallinn Language Centre. The main motivation for learning language seems to be connected with the economic welfare, thus instrumental motivation seems to be the reason, instead of interest in linguistic integration. The current competence in Estonian of the Russian-speaking population does not allow effective intergroup communication.

Integrational motivation can be assessed through the spread of the pattern of mixed marriages and interethnic friendship. Concerning mixed marriages, 6,6 percent of the marriages in Tallinn in 1987 and 8,1 percent in Estonia in 1993 were mixed Estonian-Russian (Kirch et al. 1993:174, quoted in Laitin 1996:52). This number is definitely a marginal share from the expectations of the mixed marriages of integrated communities.

The same pattern is observable in the domain of interethnic friendship: in 1988 4 percent of Russians who had lived in Tallinn for under ten years had close friends among Estonians, as compared with only 11 percent who had lived there longer, and 14 percent of those who were born in Estonia (Arutiunian 1991, quoted in Laitin 1996:52). According to Kaplan and Brady (1992, quoted in Laitin 1996:52), a 1991 survey showed that approximately half of Estonians and Russians had no relatives, friends, acquaintances, or co-workers from the other nationality. These results reflect a considerable social, economic and cultural differences that separated Estonians and Russians during the restitution of independence. E'Donnell (1991:184) remarks in this case that when social or business relations develop in one language, it is often very difficult to change to the other language within that relationship. Switch usually corresponds with a change in one's social group, or a move to a new neighbourhood or a new school. According to Pavelson (1997), no significant communication between Estonian and Russian graduates is observed. For Russians language is the main barrier, for Estonians barrier is a psychological one: 75 percent are not ready to marry a Russian. The confrontation of Estonian and Russian youth may be presumed in Tallinn, where Russians are most pessimistic.

Another aspect here reflects the transformation of information society, with language being the monopolizer of access to information. Due to the sole option of following programs broadcasted from Russia (due to the rarity and lower quality of Russian-medium programs broadcasted in Estonia, with the exception of some radio stations operating on FM frequencies), the views voiced in Russia have found significant acceptance among local Russian-speaking population. Thus, the views of ethnic cleansing and allegedly ethnically biased Estonian politics are spread and actually believed in (cf. Semjonov 1998).

However, describing the Russian-speaking population in Estonia as coherent and integrated body with homogenized views is actually oversimplification. One should draw at least two differentiating lines, for the both markers of territorial residence, separating Ida-Virumaa with prevalent Russian-medium environment, Tallinn and its environments with diglossic language environment, and other territories with Russian becoming marginal, and of language competence, with the threshold level securing the access to the Estonian society and Estonian-medium environment, and the second, based on the competitive level with Estonian speakers, enabling to join the elite. The first level satisfies most of the Russian-speaking population.

In Estonia main forms are integration (dominating outside Tallinn and environments and Ida-Virumaa, in major cities like Tartu and Pärnu, and marginalisation in Tallinn, where concrete-built suburbs tend to cause alienation (Tammaru 1997). Separation seems to be the solution adopted in Ida-Virumaa, due to the lack of Estonian-language environment on the primary level of socialisation. Second generation (i.e. children of the residents born outside Estonia) tends to be more integrated. Thus we have four distinct language environments, producing separation (Ida-Virumaa), confrontation (Tallinn and environments), integration (shore of Lake Peipsi), and marginalisation (the rest of Estonia).

Heidmets (1997:338) provides confrontation as one marker of convergence. According to Heidmets (1997:342) there are differences in various regions of Estonia. However, the tendencies of separation seem to be dominant, as being the continuation of former national existence, with no need for additional resources, this has been promoted by the official policies of the Estonian government and is based on the attitudes of the main bulk of Estonians. Surveys point out that a major part of non-Estonians live with the high niveau of uncertainty with no explicit legal status, educational perspectives of their children and migrational options. Separation is also promoted through the Russian language media.

The Link Between Ethnic and Linguistic Identity: Russians and Russian-Speakers

Among the Russian-speaking population in Estonia the ideology inherent to ethnic Russians seems to be prevailing, in spite of the ethnicity of the Russian-speaker. Heidmets (1998:9-10, my interpretation) distinguishes the following endo- and exo-factors creating common ideology and consequent behaviour:

- the role, status and environment of the Russian language (strengthening linguistic identity);
- majority share of ethnic Russians in the Russian speaking community (approximately 80 percent, ethnic identity);
- Russia's interest in the fate of the community (political identity);
- outside pressure towards monolingual Russians from Estonian-speakers, uniting the community and strengthening the common identity.

Major role plays the past period of Russification for third nationalities (Ukrainians, Belorussians, Jews, Germans and Poles, etc.). The 1989 census registered 127.547 members of non-Russian ethnic minorities in Estonia, of which 66.641 or 52,2 percent gave Russian as their mother tongue, 40 percent of them spoke their native languages, and approximately 8 percent spoke Estonian. The lack of education in their native language resulted in an underdeveloped sense of ethnic identity, which hinders the cultural recovery. Although Jews, Germans and Swedes, owing to their cultural autonomy, had successfully maintained themselves as ethnic groups between the two World Wars, most of them left Estonia during World War II. As a result, only one fifth of Estonian Germans and Jews are of local origin, i.e. legal minority. The rest came to Estonia seeking better opportunities for emigration to the West (as well as being in fear of pogroms in Russia), using Russian as their first or second language. Usually those languages in Estonia are functionally underdeveloped, though in some cases their corresponding titular countries of origin assist in maintaining the necessary referential and non-referential potential of the language concerned. However, the support from the government and the countries of origin seems to be irregular and insufficient. As a result, several of these languages have very low social and political status, being seen as almost meaningless in public life. In the educational domain this situation has contributed to the high rate of illiteracy in one's native language. Quick assimilation processes are visible, resulting in the loss of the language of parents in the second or third generation. In most cases, the trend to shift to Russian, promoted and enforced during the Soviet occupation, continues by inertia. Some language groups assimilate to Estonian (Finns, Ingrians, Swedes, part of

Jews, etc.). Hallik (1997:108) remarks that the statistical data and ethnic data differ in Estonia's case significantly. The conditions and potential for ethnic reproduction is fully available for Estonians and Russians, and partially (endogamy, native language near environment, links with the ethnic homeland) for Ukrainians, Ingrian Finns, Jews and some other minor groups. Some of these are affected by massive emigration. All of these are non-territorial (dispersed), their number to support self-development of their culture, insufficient. Most of these speak Russian as their first or second language and, as it seems, are bound to assimilate into the Russian-speaking community in Estonia.

Political Identity

Political identity is based on citizenship (or statelessness). However, in the case of Estonia, it does not reflect a direct link with loyalty towards Estonia, connected mostly with language, but rather an economic consideration

Citizenship seems to be one of the crucial foreign policy issues in Estonia's nation-building attempts. Due to the fact that Russia has denied Estonia's occupation, and still maintains its official version of Estonia's voluntarily giving up its sovereignty and joining the Soviet Union, with Estonians becoming a minority in 1940, the points of view between Estonia and Russia on citizenship as a legal issue lie far apart, enabling various interpretations.

The domestic feature characterising citizenship has been noted by Ozolins (1999), showing a diminishing value of citizenship, due to political attempts to take heat out of citizenship, through the marginal difference between the rights of non-citizens and citizens. However, both phenomena affect negatively language learning, as the incentive to take up systematic language learning is decreasing. Non-citizen status is often preferred, enabling to visit Russia and most CIS countries without a (costly) visa.

Estonian citizens comprised in 1997 77 percent of the whole population. 956.876 Estonian citizen's passports had been issued as of January 1, 1997. 88.534 individuals (non-ethnic and ethnic Estonians) have received Estonian citizenship by naturalisation as of January 31, 1997 (since May 1992). From 1992 to May 1995, more than 184.000 persons obtained Estonian citizenship, 48.500 through naturalisation. Considering Estonia's very liberal citizenship requirements (5 years minimum residence, elementary knowledge of Estonian and Estonian history, loyalty to the Republic of Estonia), this is not a high number. In addition, an estimated 80.000 non-ethnic Estonians already hold Estonian citizenship by birth. The naturalisation rate is ca 7000 new Estonian citizens a year.

According to Kruusvall (1998) the role of language requirements for citizenship has changed. During the years 1993-1997 this filter in society has gradually lost its importance as a stimulus for learning the Estonian language, as the main interests (and together with these obstacles) lie outside the framework of political loyalty.

335.368 individuals, who are either citizens of another country or who have not yet chosen their citizenship, have received an Estonian residency permit as of January 1, 1997. The main difference between stateless persons and Estonian citizens is the proficiency in Estonian, 8 percent and 37 percent accordingly. Over 100.000 people have chosen to take the citizenship of other countries, mostly (94.000) Russian citizenship. The reasons for the latter behaviour are explained by the survey conducted by IOM in Estonia in 1996: 42 percent of the Russian citizens are retired, compared to 12 percent among stateless persons and Estonian citizens. 88 percent were born outside Estonia, compared to 43 percent and 63 percent accordingly. According to Kruusvall (1998), Russian citizenship may be interpreted to have been chosen for practical rather than for ethnic or political reasons.

According to the data available, the number of foreign citizens should not increase. On the question of citizenship, according to the »Estonian Reality '92« survey, 37,7 percent Russians, 28,9 percent Ukrainians, 40 percent Belorussians and 55,9 percent other nationalities expressed interest in becoming Estonian citizens (comprising 320.000 people). According to Pain (1995), majority of non-Estonians wish to take Estonian citizenship (53,3 percent) as opposed to a tiny minority who wish to take Russian citizenship (3,9 percent).

Territorial Identity

Regional identity or toponymic identity is important due to the immigrant origin of the main bulk of the non-Estonian population in Estonia.

The current population of Estonia is 1.453.200. According to demographer Kalev Katus (1997) of ethnic non-Estonians 73 percent (26,3 percent of the total population) were first generation immigrants. Historical Russian minority comprises 38.200 (7,3 percent of ethnic non-Estonians), being mostly bilingual. As the census of 1989 showed, the reason for such sociolinguistic picture was the abnormal immigration pattern during the Soviet occupation (Katus 1997):

- Most non-Estonians are first-generation immigrants with socialization outside Estonia. They comprise over 95 percent among 45-year-old people and 80 percent among those 20 years or older.

- The second-generation immigrants fail to follow the socialization patterns of the local population: due to the high russification pressure, the second-generation immigrants joined the Russian language community.
- The contacts between immigrants and Estonian population are marginal (different workplaces, cultural habits, marginal number of mixed marriages). Though immigration was put under control with the Law on Immigration in 1990 and Law on Aliens in 1993, the influence of this pattern will last long, causing tensions and hindering integration.

The non-Estonian population is mainly concentrated in towns (91 percent of all non-Estonians were townspeople), the principal concentration places (for 80 percent of all aliens) being six major Estonian towns: Tallinn, Tartu, Narva, Kohtla-Järve, Pärnu, Sillamäe. 234.000 (39 percent) were born here, and 86 percent of these people never moved from their place of birth. The last few years have seen an increase in the percentage of Estonians in the population (from 61,5 in 1989 to 64,7 in 1997). This is due to emigration and the relatively sharp fall in the birth rate among non-Estonians. The relative share of births to Estonian families has risen from 58,6 percent in 1986 to 66 percent in 1990 and 73,3 percent in 1993.

Repatriation has cooled down in recent years. From 1990 to 1994, almost 70.000 people emigrated. Although a certain number of people will emigrate in the future, most people now living in Estonia will probably remain. The main factors hindering it are Russia's indifference (having refugee flows from Central Asia) and devastating economic situation in the CIS countries. Net migration in Estonia (+ immigration - emigration) is strongly negative. Reasons for emigration are different: one being the rapid change of social environment and restructuring of economy, making keeping the previous living standard in Estonia difficult. The other factor, remarkable among Ukrainians and Byelorussians is the search for their ethnic roots and national identity. As the obtaining of corresponding citizenship in these countries requires the residence in the state concerned, repatriation becomes the sole option.

The continuous development of Estonia's economy and rising living standard has supported non-Russians' decision to link their fate to Estonia in growing numbers. *Estonian Reality 92*, a study conducted by EKE Ariko and the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law in April 1992 found that 42 percent of the foreign residents were interested in leaving, with 8,2 percent ready to leave immediately. The actual number of emigrants in 1992 was 33.827 people or 5,7 percent. In 1993, fewer were in favour of leaving: 12 percent would, but 2,5 percent did. Two surveys carried out in 1993 by two different polling organisations - *Saar*

& *Poll* in June, and *Emor* in October - confirmed this trend: 80 percent of the foreigners questioned in June wanted to stay; by October the figure had risen to 87 percent for men and 97 percent for women. This accords with the results obtained by Pain (1995): non-Estonians want to remain in Estonia (92,9 percent) with only 2,1 percent intending to leave.

Maley's survey (1995) based on data from late 1993, consistently shows that the Russians in Estonia prefer to stay. According to the survey 82 percent of non-Estonians considered that Estonia offered better opportunities to improve living standards than did Russia. The majority (66 percent) of non-Estonians also said that conditions for people like »me« are worse in Russia than in Estonia.

It was asked how much the Estonian Russians valued Russia and their country of residence, and whether they would abandon their homes. An overwhelming majority placed more importance on their home in Estonia (86 percent) than a future in Russia (65 percent). The interviewees were also asked if they thought that they could find a place to live in Russia if they wanted. Only 60 percent of Russians in Estonia felt that they could find a place to live in Russia. Maley (1995) draws the conclusion that, without a realistic option of exit many may choose to assimilate, even if the option of full citizenship was not available. Some Balts would welcome them: there is a powerful strand in Baltic nationalism which emphasises shared political commitment rather than common ethnic heritage.

Linguistic Identity in Estonia

Territorial Distribution of Collective Linguistic Identity. According to the plurality square proposed by Khubchandani (1996:99), Estonia is linguistically a pluralist country with stratificational pluralism. There are two language communities, Estonian and Russian, acting as homogenizing melting pots for other language groups. Their own language loyalties are almost total (cf. Taagepera 1990). During the Soviet occupation the link between them might be described as unidirectional bilingualism and diglossia for Estonian speakers, and monolingualism for Russian speakers. One has to note the existence of corporate trilinguals, represented by a bulk of Ingrians and local Jews.

Thus, Estonian language functions in four different types of language environment. Estonian is the sole language spoken all over the Estonia, however, in various combinations of environment:

Firstly, it provides the sole linguistic environment in major part of the Estonian territory, with the exception of major cities, urban areas of Harjumaa and Ida-Virumaa and the western shore of Lake Peipsi.

Secondly, it competes successfully with Russian in the environment of stratified linguistic pluralism (cf. Khubchandani 1996) in most cities with the Russian community present (Tallinn, Tartu, Pärnu, Haapsalu, Kehra, Loksa, etc., Estonians form a minority in 14 towns) except in Ida-Virumaa.

Thirdly, in the western shore of Peipsi (Mustvee, Kallaste) peaceful bilingual coexistence of Estonian and Russian language environment seems to take place.

Finally, Estonian is marginalised in some towns of Ida-Virumaa (Narva, Sillamäe, etc.).

Russian holds strongly to the North-East Estonian cities with almost monolingual Russian language environment, due to the Soviet policies of the past. It loses the ground elsewhere and in some places with former Soviet army bases it has totally disappeared together with the alien army.

Functional allocation of languages. Most of the domains are covered by both Estonian and Russian languages, with the exception of state administration, which has transferred to Estonian (The Estonian parliament *Riigikogu* does not provide any translation to Russian since 1992).

In the courts of law, both Estonian and Russian are used, usually depending on locality (language environment) and the language preference of the accused. For third languages of the accused, mastering it as one's mother tongue, an interpreter is provided. For all the judges, prosecutors and lawyers proficiency in Estonian is required and the National Court operates in Estonian only.

In education Russian is represented in primary, secondary and tertiary level, and also in vocational and special schools. Due to the diminishing number of pupils the Russian-medium educational system has been decreasing.

In industry the language used among blue-collar employees depends on the linguistic environment. In Ida-Virumaa and some other urban areas with the majority of the Russian-speaking population Russian is used among the white-collar staff to a significant extent, as the provisions of the Language Law concern the working language of the enterprise only in book-keeping, communications with clientele, outside communications in Estonia and some other fields that the state has to supervise.

In service sector requirements demand the sufficient proficiency in Estonian. However, the use of it is flexible, as the service staff should switch to the preferred language of the customer. Thus, the requirement foresees the use of Estonian when dealing with the Estonian-speaking customer.

As in agriculture mostly Estonian-speaking rural population is employed, the language used there is also Estonian.

Media is covered by both languages, including newspapers, radio stations. Though there is no Russian-medium TV station in Estonia, several Estonian stations provide broadcasts in Russian. However, the relative share of the Russian-speaking media is considerably smaller than that of the population. For this, there seem to be several explanations, like the higher cost of production per unit in the case of smaller auditorium, and also the tendency among the Russian-speaking population to watch TV programs from Russia offered by cable-TV operators.

Due to the significant immigrant Russian-speaking community formed during the occupation, besides Estonian in unofficial communication also Russian is widely used. However, Russian is limited more and more only to its native speakers. According to the 1989 census, Russian was a language known by 922.000 people (59 percent of the population of Estonia). Russian is still used in several functional spheres like rail and sea transportation, communication, and the corrections system. For this reason, Russian was, and is to significant extent up till now, considered by a major part of the Russian-speaking population to be the language with the highest status in Estonia, while Estonian is regarded by them as a minority language which is of no use to learn.

Contact languages used by diverse nationalities were Estonian (mainly in the country) and Russian (only in Tallinn and towns of North-East Estonia). Apart from their mother tongue, 31,3 percent of the population (490.000 people) had a command of another language. For most people the second language was Russian (77 percent of second-language speakers), followed by Estonian, used by 18 percent of second-language speakers. The frequency of other languages in the role of a second language was below 1 percent. These so-called third languages function marginally in families and cultural associations. These are non-territorial, with the exception of Swedish, which is almost extinct.

One has to take account of the evergrowing importance of foreign languages, due to increasing international community, using English as the *lingua franca*.

Language Status

Referential power. Both languages striving for the *lingua franca* role, Estonian and Russian are functionally developed and have high status among their speakers. During Soviet time these languages received government support for their corpus development (Russian from the central government, for standardisation, codification, lexical and terminological development, etc.), though to different extent. However, governmental attitude differed vis-a-vis their status development (promotion as languages of administration, media languages, languages

of instruction, of law and justice, objects of research and development, etc.).

Estonian ousting Russian. Nowadays, the support for Russian has been decreasing considerably, covering education, judicial spheres, media and culture. The status of Estonian has risen considerably with the restitution of sovereignty in 1991. Due to the favourable political climate, a change has taken place in the consciousness of Estonians, the socio-psychological status of Estonian has risen, and its use has extended in various functional domains. Besides being regarded as the major economic, educational and social language, it has become a symbol of the struggle against occupation and therefore for independence.

Segregation maintained. The main differentiating (and segregating) factor is the competence in Estonian as the official language. With the Russian language still held as the first language for the Russian-speaking community, the knowledge of the Estonian language, usually insufficient, is not improving. This seems to reflect both competence and function (which are, of course, interrelated), the extent to which Russians use Estonian in their work. The function aspect seems to change first, as many Russian speakers can no longer use Russian for all purposes. With the Russian language losing its almost exclusive official functions in Estonia, it turns gradually into the Russian community language. However, without being redefined as a minority language with lower status by its speakers, due to the attitudinal lag, and with the Estonian view not accepted, the situation results in the growth of tension between the two linguistic groups, reflecting the pattern of language spread.

Language Acquisition

The knowledge of the Estonian language is increasing with slow rate. According to the results of the census of 1989 18 percent of ethnic non-Estonians could speak Estonian; the knowledge of Estonian among Russians was 15 percent, among Ukrainians 8,1 percent and Belorussians 6,8 percent.

Among this population group, the share of non- Estonians, who are able to speak Estonian has been continuously increasing during last years, from 14 percent in 1988 to 37 percent in 1995. According to the survey data, in 1995 81 percent of them were interested in learning Estonian, with 17 percent not interested. According to Pettai (1997) the share of non-Estonians considering their proficiency in Estonian at least satisfactory rose in Tallinn from 61 percent in 1993 to 68 percent in 1996, compared to the data obtained in North-East Estonia, responding rise from 37 percent to 39 percent during the same period. Half of the non-

Estonian population is currently able to speak Estonian at least at an elementary level. The main constraint hindering acquisition of Estonian seems to be based on the high status of Russian still held in their esteem.

Vihalemm (1997) has measured the share of various patterns of interethnic communication between Estonians and Russians with at least passive knowledge of Estonian language in 1995. In The communication pattern was as follows: in Estonian 15 percent of the cases, mixing both languages 15 percent, starting in Estonian, consequently shifting to Russian 23 percent, in Russian 45 percent of cases. In comparison with the year 1990 the main difference is the reduction of Estonian-Russian communication pattern on the cost of Estonian only by 10 percent. On the whole, advances are insignificant. Even Russians fluent in Estonian use Estonian only in 46 percent of cases. The conclusion supports the idea that only those mastering Estonian to some extent have improved their Estonian language, while others have stayed on the same level. This corresponds to the data provided by Pettai (1997), showing extremely rare usage of Estonian by non-Estonians, the population share of this group ranging from 39 percent in Tallinn to 93 percent in Narva.

According to Vihalemm (1997), there exist intergenerational differences. In connection with the destruction of the authoritarian system value orientations have changed from collective to more individualistic. However, older and usually less successful Russian-speaking generation with minute knowledge of Estonian and no chance to obtain Estonian citizenship in the near future views Estonian society as a closed corporate structure. Their behaviour provides passive response to changes (so-called consumer behaviour). Results testify that ideological values like ethnic relations are modified by environment and show that official position of the ethnic group and even one's values and experience does not change it easily.

Marje Pavelson, who has studied ethnic non-Estonian graduates (1997), has presented the findings according to which the knowledge of Estonian is not valued (crash course is commonly thought sufficient). 71 percent are optimistic concerning their future, linking it with major functioning of the Estonian language and residence in Estonia. The main constraint for integration of Russian-medium schools seems to be the teaching staff with insufficient proficiency in Estonian. Vasilchenko (1997) argues here that among Russian-speaking 7th graders in Russian-medium schools Estonian is the most popular subject. On the other hand, almost nobody confessed in watching Estonian TV programs.

The modest pace in language acquisition and differing opinions seems to be extralinguistically founded. Hallik (1997) shows that 92 percent of Estonians opt for Estonian as the national language, only 3 percent agreed to extend this status to Russian. Among Russians only 7 percent accepted Estonian as the sole national language, opposing thus the current

linguistic legal solution in Estonia. Thus, the pattern of language spread, demanding the restitution of the previous language regime and accommodation of the other side, is still popular.

Aim of Governmental Policy

The reactions of governments towards the solution of the integrational challenge have been primarily linguistic, attempting to create Estonian-speaking society with national bilingual minorities (based on the linkage between linguistic competence in Estonian and political competence), and trying to get political heat out of citizenship (with non-citizens almost equal to those of citizens, the only major difference concerning political rights). Therefore, as prescribed in the Law on Cultural Autonomy, territorial and political identity was to be linked firmly with Estonia through residence and citizenship, with ethnic identity free of any administrative supervision, except by the fellow ethnic community, who had the right to set standards for belonging to ethnicity.

In July 1993, the President of Estonia Lennart Meri set up the Presidential Round Table, a permanent assembly in which representatives of non-citizens and national minorities participate together with members of the Estonian Parliament. According to its statute, the objective of the activities of the Round Table is to prepare recommendations and proposals concerned with:

- establishing a stable, democratic society in Estonia and integrating into Estonian society people who have connected their lives with Estonia or who wish to do so;
- solving the problems concerning the aliens and non-citizens permanently residing in Estonia, as well as the problems of national minorities;
- supporting the applicants for Estonian citizenship;
- solving problems related to the learning and use of the Estonian language;
- preserving the cultural and linguistic identity of national minorities;
- creating conditions and opportunities for persons of Estonian origin, born abroad, to return to Estonia.

According to the opinion of foreign experts, the results so far of the actual functioning of the Round Table are highly satisfactory. The Rapporteur of the Council of Europe has stated in his report (Bratinka 1994:2): This political forum has opened the door for permanent dialogue between the Russian-speaking minority and the Estonian majority on a number of crucial issues (conditions of citizenship, situation in North-East Estonia, local elections, etc) and has contributed to appeasing inter-ethnic tensions.

However, in connection with the representation of various Russian political parties in the *Riigikogu*, the importance of the Roundtable has diminished.

According to the criteria proposed by Bourdieu (1991), Estonia is not a nation-state, as it does not possess unified national markets in all fields of social life, the most significant deviation being the absence of the unified linguistic market in Estonia. Instead, internal Russian-language market is maintaining its own norms, in fact being autonomous from the national market to a considerable extent.

Thus, together with state security, economic success and functioning social network, the task of linguistic regulation and normalisation carried out by language policy is of the prime importance for the future existence of Estonia, in order to provide politically stable and minority-friendly language environment.

With the state type of nation-state fixed in the Constitution, the linguistic goals follow the aims of this type, namely, establishing the common language in Estonia, also fulfilling the positions of official and national language, and regulating the use of other, especially minority languages. The state goals may be divided as the official, minority, and foreign language-related.

These interests may be in conflict with the interests of individuals and groups, found in the basis of human rights standards (cf. Laitin 1996:56-57). These interests may be divided as native language, second language and foreign language-related.

According to the features of nation-building model, the main task is to introduce the common language, in this case Estonian. The main linguistic challenge is caused by unsatisfactory linguistic integration of Russian-speaking immigrants from various parts of the former Soviet Union during the Soviet occupation. (According to the census of 1989 from 603.000 non-Estonian speakers residing in Estonia at that time, 57 percent were born outside Estonia, according to approximate calculations more than 20 percent of them were second generation immigrants, around 14 percent third generation immigrants, and less than 5 percent constituted traditional minorities (Russians, Germans, Swedes, Jews, Finns, Ingrians, etc.)). Thus, the main domain of action focusses on the introduction of Estonian as the common language, being the first language for Estonian-speakers and the second language for non-Estonian-speakers. For the needs of the state, and for speakers of Estonian as the native language Estonian must be normalised, regulated and standardised in the official language usage. For the non-Estonian population of Estonia the main challenge is the linguistic integration.

Following (Mazrui 1996), one could mention the aims of the Estonian government:

- the consolidation of the Estonian market (and together with this, integrity of state, cf. Bourdieu 1991);
- to improve the characteristics of mass mobilisation and organisation of labour;
- to improve the dissemination of labour (without linguistic barriers);
- to contribute to effective social policies;
- to create counter hegemonies and transform foreign relations by establishing linguistic barriers against outside penetration.

Thus, the main challenge lies in the crossing of interests of the state promoting the common language policy through the official language, and the non-Estonian (mostly Russian)-speaking community, for whom it means the acquirement of Estonian as the second language.

5.2. Slovenia

Historical Overview

Throughout historical periods, the present territory of Slovenia has represented an important transitional zone of Europe. It was continually under the cultural, economical and political domination of foreigners. From the period of the earliest settlement in the sixth century, the Slovene people struggled for their cultural, political and economic existence against larger Germanic, Romanic, Hungarian and Slavic peoples. In this struggle, the Slovenes lost two-thirds of the territory they had originally settled in.

Until 1918, the present Slovene state territory was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy after the First World War and the emergence of the new states Austria, Hungary and the Kingdom of the Serb, Croats and Slovenes, and with the expansion of Italy to the western part of the Slovene territory settlement, new border areas populated by national minorities were formed. Thus some territories with homogenous Slovene population became parts of border regions of Italy, Austria and Hungary.

On the other hand, border territories of Prekmurje populated by Hungarians became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Slovenia joined the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 and from 1929 on called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. With the beginning of the Second World War, the Slovene territory was occupied by German, Italian and Hungarian forces. After the World War II, the territory of Slovenia was expanded in the West by which a large part of the Slovene population, which between the wars formed a national minority in Italy, became part of Slovenia, one of the six republics of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As a consequence of post war delimitation a tiny Italian minority emerged in the Slovenian coastal area. The changes of state borders and the social political system in the former Yugoslavia after 1945 caused migration (exodus) of large number of Italian population from the territories of Western Slovenia, the majority of the German minority left Slovenia together with approximately 20.000 Slovenes.

Current Situation

Political changes in Slovenia, brought about in early nineties did not come about suddenly as a result of an unexpected »coup d'etat«. Preparations started much earlier, and one could consider them as a natural outcome of the long term endeavours of Slovene people for its own statehood.⁴ Already with the amendments to the Yugoslav Constitution in 1969 and with the Constitution from 1974, a tendency towards establishing a con-federal Yugoslav State was expressed. However, the centralization efforts of Belgrade augmented during the 1980's, in spite of an intensive resistance in Slovenia. With the multiparty elections in 1990, aspirations to transform the Slovene society in concordance with principles of the parliamentary democracy gained solid grounds. Following the referendum demands (December 23, 1990) independence of the Republic of Slovenia was declared (June 25, 1991). After the subsequent short war against the Yugoslav federal army all its units left Slovenia. In 1992 Slovenia became a full member of the CSCE and of the UNO, and in 1993 a full member of the Council of Europe and signed the European charter on Human rights (Stergar, Klopčič 1994).

⁴ The strive for its own statehood is illustrated in many documents throughout the Slovene history. In a synthesised form it is illustrated in the discussion by the Slovene Writers' Association and the Slovene Sociological Association in their plea for the new Slovene Constitution,: »In the political sense, the proposed theses for the Slovene Constitution are based upon the tradition of medieval Carinthia and Kocelj's principality, upon the demands for United Slovenia, upon the short-lived and internationally unrecognized state of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, upon the unification in the state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, upon the programme of the Slovene Liberation Front, upon the principles of the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia, and upon experience gained in the socialist Yugoslavia; culturally, they are based upon the heritage of Trubar, Vodnik, Prešeren, Levstik, Cankar, Kosovel, Kocbek, and all branches of Slovene art which, lacking political organization or witnessing its precipitation and exaggerated conformity to foreign models, were taking upon themselves the essential responsibility for the preservation of the Slovene identity; in the military sense, they are based upon the traditions of anti-Germanic and anti-Christian rebellions in medieval Carinthia, peasant risings, anti-Turkish fights, heroic defence of the Western border in the World War I, military revolts in the Austrian army, military actions of the first modern Slovene army forces under General Maister, and above all the Slovene army during the National Liberation War, when organization of our forces was exclusively Slovene, and they were victorious despite the worst possible conditions.« - Dimitrij Rupel, Janez Menart: Gradivo za slovensko ustavo (Materials for the Slovene Constitution). Časopis za kritiko znanosti, Ljubljana, 1988, p. 6.

With the transformation of Slovenia to market economy the new national currency, the Tolar, became relatively stable and convertible. However, the loss of Yugoslav markets and the privatisation problems deteriorated economic situation. Thus ever rising unemployment (together with the influx of refugees from Bosnia and nowadays from Yugoslavia) provides fertile grounds for nationalistic tensions, one of the major issues being the assignment of Slovene citizenship to the non-Slovene nationals from ex-Yugoslav republics. Economic crisis was also reflected in several fields of language and culture related activities.

Ethnolinguistic Composition

Owing to the 1991 population census population of Slovenia numbered 1.965.986 persons out of whom 1.727.018 declared themselves as Slovenes. Of 24 other ethnic categories, registered during the 1991 census (Table 3), only three represent more than 1 percent of the total population. Most groups attain barely some hundred members. A more detailed inspection into the absolute numbers shows that only in six cases there are more than 2000 (Italians, Hungarians, Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Roma) and in three cases more than 20.000 persons of the same ethnic group (Croats, Serbs, and Muslims). Nevertheless, due to a substantial concentration of non-Slovene populations in some districts and due to historical reasons, the interethnic contact situations constitute a socially relevant phenomenon. Comparison across the after World War II war population censuses points to the fact that relatively homogenous ethnic structure of Slovenia has steadily been altered exactly on account of the influx of immigrants from other Yugoslav republics. In this aspect, some similarity can be traced with the two countries included in our investigation.

Table 3: Ethnic composition of Slovenia in the censuses from 1953-1991.

	1953*	1961	1971	1981	1991	
	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	%
Republic of Slovenia	1466425	1591523	1727137	1891864	1965986	100
Nationality determined						
Slovenes	1415448	1522248	1624029	1712445	1727018	87,84
Italians	854	3072	3001	2187	3064	0,16
Hungarians	11019	10498	9785	9496	8503	0,43
Roma	1663	158	977	1435	2293	0,12
Albanians	169	282	1281	1985	3629	0,18
Austrians	289	254	278	180	199	0,01
Bulgarians	49	180	139	105	169	0,01
Czechs	807	584	445	433	323	0,02
Montenegrins	1356	1384	1978	3217	4396	0,22
Greeks	24	50	24	18	23	0,00
Croats	17978	31429	42657	55625	54212	2,76
Macedonian	640	1009	1613	3288	4432	0,22
Muslims	1617	465	3231	13425	26842	1,36
Germans	1617	732	422	380	546	0,03
Polish	275	222	194	204	204	0,01
Romanians	41	48	43	94	116	0,01
Russians	593	295	302	194	170	0,01
Russinians	46	384	66	54	57	0,00
Slovaks	60	71	85	144	141	0,01
Serbs	11225	13609	20521	42182	47911	2,44
Turks	68	135	53	87	155	0,01
Ukrainians**	143	192	213	0,01
Vlachs	9	6	5	17	38	0,00
Jews	15	21	72	9	37	0,00
Others	352	449	307	577	1178	0,06
Nationality undetermined						
Nationality undetermined according to Art. 214 of the Const. of the RS	-	-	3073	2975	9011	0,46
Yugoslavs	-	2784	6744	26263	12307	0,63
Regional adherence	-	-	2705	4018	5254	0,27
Unknown	211	1154	2964	10635	53545	2,72

* At the time of the 1953 census the mixed territory in the Slovene-Italian border region was still the subject of the post II World War treaty negotiations.

** In the censuses of 1953 and 1961 Russinians and Ukrainians are presented as one group.

Because of the unbalanced structural development of the Slovene economy, migrations from other parts of Yugoslavia to Slovenia, and the emigration of Slovenes to other European countries, the concentration of the non-Slovene population (speaking mostly a variety of either Croatian or Serbian language) has continuously increased, especially in centres where today it ranges from 10 percent to 23 percent of the population. However, it is rather uncertain to establish the actual number of the ex-Yugoslav nationals that remained in Slovenia after the decay of the SFRY and the subsequent war on parts of its ex-territory (owing to the 1991 census there were cca 160.000 such persons of different ethnic origin: Croats, Serbs, Muslims, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Albanians). Some indications give reason to the assumption that the number of citizens from other ex-Yugoslave republics has rather augmented than diminished. For instance, during 1991 and 1996 approximately 170.000 persons passed the Slovene language exam as precondition for accordance of the Slovene citizenship.⁵ In some regions of Slovenia, especially in the industrial centers their share exceeded 25 percent of the population.

The autochthonous Hungarian minority is settled in the area along the Slovene-Hungarian border in the easternmost part of the Prekmurje region. The autochthonous Italian national minority is settled in the littoral districts. The areas where the Hungarian and the Italian minorities reside as compactly settled groups have the status of ethnically-mixed territories.⁶

Today one can hardly speak about Germans in Slovenia as a group phenomenon, although they constituted a substantial national minority before the World War II. In the 1991 census, they declared themselves either as Germans or as Austrians. They live scattered throughout Slovenia. Recently there has been an evident effort on part of their representatives (especially the Kočevje/Götsche Germans) as well as on part of the Austrian authorities to provide for Germans in Slovenia the status of a national minority.

⁵ The Slovene parliament bound itself, in its statement on good intentions (Official Gazette of the RS, no. 44/90), to enable naturalization to all members of other nations and nationalities with permanent residence in Slovenia who wish to become Slovene citizens.

⁶ The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia 1974, already put forward constitutive elements of the Slovene State (Article 1). The Italian and Hungarian minorities are listed among them: »SRS is a State based upon the sovereignty of the Slovene nation and all people of Slovenia, upon the power of and self-management by the working class and all working people, and is a socialist self-management democratic community of working people and citizens, of the Slovene nation and the Italian and Hungarian nationalities.« (Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia: Official Gazette of the SR Slovenia, 1974 Ljubljana).

There is a small island of autochthonous Serbian population in some villages near the Croatian border (the descendents of Uskoki). Their number hardly exceeds a hundred. The Romany ethnic group should also be mentioned, the status and special rights of this group being regulated by Constitution.

Concept of Cultural Pluralism in Slovenia and Legislative Framework

It is not exaggerated to claim that in view of human rights protection and promotion, Slovenia had built up a model of a progressive national minority policy already in the framework of the Yugoslav federation.

Since Slovenia has become a sovereign state a series of activities aiming at adjustment of her legal system to the demands of the newly emerging reality is in course. In the field human rights' promotion and national minorities' protection, the policy follows the already established principles of the so called »positive concept of protection of ethnic minorities and their members«. It was agreed during drafting of the new Slovene Constitution (from 1992) that the scope and the level of protection of ethnic minorities, established by the 1974 Constitution of the then Socialist Republic of Slovenia, should not diminish.⁷

After all, the adoption of positive minority protection measures in Constitution and in other legal documents is in harmony with statements and assurances, given by responsible Slovene politicians during preparations for referendum on independence of Slovenia, in December 1990.

The continuity principle was expressed already in the basic constitutional charter on the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Slovenia of June 25, 1991, demonstrating the aim to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons within its territory, on the one side, and for maintenance of the already established status of Italian and Hungarian minorities, on the other. Already at this stage the international agreements pertaining to the status of national minorities, to which Slovenia adhered as a successor State, were taken as the point of departure.

The Slovenian concept of the minority policy is based on the premise that protection of human rights from discriminative actions is not

⁷ Article 62 (The Right to the Use of Language and Script): In order to give effect to his rights and obligations, and in all dealing with State bodies and other bodies having official function, each person shall have the right to use his own language and script in such a manner as shall be determined by statute (Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia: Official Gazette of the Republic Slovenia, 1992, Ljubljana).

sufficient for a national minority and its members to maintain their identity features, language among them. It seems as if theoretical speculation about the powerful set of the structural variables that influence ethnolinguistic vitality of ethnic minorities, so academically presented by Giles (Giles 1977) and later on modified into productive and reproductive factors by Nelde and his research team (Nelde, Strubell, Williams 1996), had been taken into account in the Slovene policy making procedures already in the sixties.

The attitude of the newly founded state towards the ethnic diversity of its population is stated by Article 5 of the Constitution.⁸ It is the welfare of the Slovene nation together with its parts abroad, and the protection of the two national (= traditional= classical = territorial) minorities that are of prime concern of the Slovene state.

A system of measures Slovenia, aimed at establishing an atmosphere and practice of cultural pluralism is administered in the ethnically mixed regions. Cultural pluralism in Slovenia is understood as mutual participation of the members of either majority or minority in each other's cultural life. On the linguistic level cultural pluralism is manifested in two-way linguistic accommodation grounded on an expanded (at least passive) knowledge of the minority language on the part of the majority members. Two-way individual bilingualism and hence an overall possibility for minority members to use their language in the mixed areas, are enabled by a set of institutional supportive measures. On the one side these measures provide for acquisition of both languages not only among the minority but also the majority members in a given area. On the other side, the legislative demands measures providing for actual functioning of both languages in all channels of public communication by the system of institutional bilingualism.

Besides Slovenian as the official language of Slovenia, Italian and Hungarian are defined as languages having official status in the ethnically mixed regions (Constitution of Slovenia, Article 11): these are three coastal communes in the Slovene Istria (Koper, Izola, Piran) parts of five

⁸ Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Article 5: »Within its own territory, Slovenia shall protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall uphold and guarantee the right of the autochthonous Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities. It shall attend to the welfare of the autochthonous Slovenian minorities in neighbouring countries and of Slovenian emigrants and migrant workers abroad and shall promote their contacts with their homeland. It shall assist the preservation of the natural and cultural heritage of Slovenia in harmony with the creation of opportunities for the development of civilized society and cultural life in Slovenia.

Slovenians not holding Slovenian citizenship shall enjoy special rights and privileges in Slovenia « (...) (Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia: Official Gazette of the Republic Slovenia, 1992, Ljubljana).

communes in Prekmurje (Lendava, Šalovci, Hodoš, Moravske Toplice and Dobrovnik).

Special rights, designed for the Italian and the Hungarian national minorities and the Roma ethnic community are of dual nature, being collective and individual rights simultaneously. As collective rights, they belong to a specific ethnic minority as a distinct community; as individual rights, they belong to each member of a specific ethnic minority. According to their nature some rights are realised mainly as collective rights, and some as individual rights. Based on the recognition of the dual nature of minority rights and the implementation of the »positive concept of protection of minorities« the Constitution of Republic of Slovenia establishes an obligation on the State to assure the realisation of these rights in their complexity, both as individual and collective rights (Stergar, Klopčič 1994:19).

Realisation of special rights, set forward in the Article 64 of the Constitution⁹ is morally and materially supported by the State. As Italian

⁹ Article 64 of the Constitution (Special Rights of the Autochthonous Italian and Hungarian Ethnic Communities in Slovenia):

The autochthonous Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities and their members shall be guaranteed the right to freely use their national symbols and, in order to preserve their national identity, the right to establish organizations, to foster economic, cultural, scientific and research activities, as well as activities associated with the mass media and publishing. These two ethnic communities and their members shall have, consistent with statute, the right to education and schooling in their own languages, as well as the right to plan and develop their own curricula. The State shall determine by statute those geographical areas in which bilingual education shall be compulsory. The Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities and their members shall enjoy the right to foster contacts with the wider Italian and Hungarian communities living outside Slovenia, and with Italy and Hungary respectively. Slovenia shall give financial support and encouragement to the implementation of these rights.

In those areas where the Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities live, their members shall be entitled to establish autonomous organizations in order to give effect to their rights. At the request of the Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities, the State may authorize their respective autonomous organizations to carry out specific functions which are presently within the jurisdiction of the State, and the State shall ensure the provision of the means for those functions to be effected.

The Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities shall be directly represented at the local level and shall also be represented in the National Assembly.

The status of the Italian and the Hungarian ethnic communities and the manner in which their rights may be exercised in those areas where the two ethnic communities live, shall be determined by statute. In addition, the obligations of the local self-governing communities which represent the two ethnic communities to promote the exercise of their rights, together with the rights of

and Hungarian are the official languages in the territory where their members reside,¹⁰ the right to use their language is not explicitly enumerated in the article. The accent is on the free use of their national symbols and to fostering of a set of activities - economic, cultural, scientific and research activities as well as mass media and publishing. An important obligation is entrusted on the self-governing communities which represent the two ethnic communities, namely to promote the exercise of the minority rights. In this context, the direct representation of the Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities at the local level and in the Parliament should be mentioned. The Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities are entitled to elect one deputy each directly to the Parliament¹¹ as well as to the local bodies. One of the important instruments that Constitution provides for in this context is the so called minority *veto*. This mechanism was created as a guaranty for a national minority to safeguard and realize its vital interests related to its ethnic, language and cultural features in the decision-making process within the political system.

Language is expressly mentioned in connection with education. The right to education and schooling in their own language as well as the right to plan and develop their curricula are granted to the Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities. The State shall determine by statute those geographical regions in which bilingual education shall be compulsory.

the members of the two ethnic communities living outside their autochthonous areas, shall be determined by statute. The rights of both ethnic communities and of their members shall be guaranteed without regard for the numerical strength of either community.

Statutes, regulations and other legislative enactments which exclusively affect the exercise of specific rights enjoyed by the Italian or Hungarian ethnic communities under this Constitution, or affecting the status of these communities, may not be enacted without the consent of the representatives of the ethnic community or communities affected.

In the Article 65 of the Constitution of Slovenia an act determining the status and special rights of the Romany community is foreseen.

(Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia: Official Gazette of the Republic Slovenia, 1992, Ljubljana).

¹⁰ Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Article 11: »The official language of Slovenia shall be Slovenian. In those areas where the Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities reside, the official language shall also be Italian or Hungarian« (Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia: Official Gazette of the Republic Slovenia, 1992, Ljubljana).

¹¹ Article 80. Composition and election of the National Assembly, Law on elections to the National Assembly - Official Gazette of the RS, No. 44/1992.

In view of the minority language status as well as corpus planning, a stipulation on fostering of contacts with the mother nation, seems to be relevant.

For execution of the enumerated linguistic and other special minority rights two supportive measures are foreseen: First, according to the Constitution, Slovenia is obliged to give financial support and encouragement to the implementation of special minority rights. Second, statutes, regulations and other legislative enactment which exclusively affect the exercise of specific rights enjoyed by the Italian or Hungarian ethnic communities, or affecting the status of these communities may be enacted only with the consent of the relevant ethnic community or communities.

Constitutional rights are elaborated in more detail in the statutes of ethnically mixed communes. A special (Parliamentary) Committee for Minorities consisting of an equal proportion of Italian, Hungarian and Slovene deputies conveys to the Parliament its considerations and suggestions concerning issues related to the position of minorities. Besides this an Office for Minorities within the Slovene Government has the task of monitoring the position of minorities and provide finances for the functioning of their organisations. In this context several Slovene-Italian and Slovene-Hungarian commissions should be mentioned, occupied with the realisation of the program, set forward by bilateral agreements, by »Convention on providing special rights for the Slovenian minority living in the Republic of Hungary and for the Hungarian minority living in the Republic Slovenia« from November 6, 1992, among them.

Application in Practice

The legal and constitutional system provisions can not be realised in practise without positive political attempts and a favourite social climate that influence relationship between different ethnic communities. Therefore it is of crucial importance how the constitutional and other provisions are reflected in the everyday life in the ethnically mixed area. The actual quality of relations is reflected and realised also in the attitudes of the majority population towards the minorities.

The principles of today's language policy and practice in education precede form a longer tradition. The unhindered use of the minority language in public communication, the educational institutions included, is supported by »institutional bilingualism«. In accordance with the statute of the respective commune, the work of public institutions, administrative agencies, and public services must be organised in such a way that written and oral communication in the language of the party (client) concerned is guaranteed (e.g. bilingual topographic signs, street

names, names of firms, public announcements and warnings, forms, invitations, decrees, regulations, and documents such as identity card, matrimonial documents, passports in both languages). While in the Slovene-Italian area institutional bilingualism is supported by all groups, living together in the area, in the Slovene-Hungarian area bilingual personal documents cause some tension. At the moment, there is also some controversy regarding the actual model of bilingual education in Prekmurje from both, Slovene and Hungarian sides: instead of bilingual instruction there are sporadic suggestions to introduce a unilingual instruction with Hungarian and Slovene respectively, as languages of instruction. According to these propositions, instead of bilingual instruction, attended by both the Slovene and Hungarian children, both languages should figure only as curriculum subjects (as the first and second language respectively). This issue was also dealt with in our interviews.

In practice, the right to use one's mother tongue is fulfilled to varying degrees in individual institutions. As a rule, bilingual communication is better provided for in the courts of law and at the level of communal administration, political assemblies, and public signs while it is not so satisfactory in public and private enterprises and factories. Employees in administrative agencies and schools who according to the job requirement should be proficient in Italian and Hungarian respectively in addition to Slovene are awarded a supplement to their salary.

The status of the Romani communities is expressly treated in the Constitution »The status and special rights of Gypsy communities in Slovenia shall be such as are determined by statute« (Constitution of Slovenia, Article 65: Official Gazette of the Republic Slovenia, 1992, Ljubljana).

However, the statute is yet to be passed. Meanwhile some attempts have been made to overcome classical approach towards this community in view of treating them as a social problem. Namely, Romani representatives themselves are motivated to participate more actively also in their language and culture maintenance and promotion.

Conclusion

From the today's »historical« distance, it could be concluded that realization of the Slovenian, in many aspects modern, minority protection model in ex-Yugoslavia, was partly due to the one-party political model which also in the field of interethnic relations was aimed at creating a »conflict-devoid« society. To that end a slogan was launched, saying that »the situation of a minority reflects the democracy values of a majority« However, it was not merely due to dictated processes of tolerance and

coexistence that relatively positive and constructive relations were established. In the mixed areas, these values were actually supported by the system of institutional support measures, in which all media of socialization were integrated. In this framework the system of two-way bilingualism should be mentioned, developed first of all by way of a bilingual model of education. Spreading knowledge about each other's culture and history, among both the majority as well as the minority children and youth, was one of the most outstanding educational goals. Mass media, both in minority and in majority language, were oriented towards a constructive interaction and refrained from ethnically biased information; communication between minorities and their »nation of origin« was promoted and supported by gradual opening of the state borders, etc. All of these »good policy measures« were bound to contribute to at least some »good practice«; a hypotheses which was tested in own research.

5.3. Ukraine*

The Ethnographic and Ethno-Social Processes in Trans-Carpathian Region

Interethnic Consensus as a Specific Feature of the Region

Trans-Carpathian region is one of the biggest mosaic regions in terms of the variety of ethnic communities living on its territory. In this sense Trans-Carpathian region is rather unique. Situated in the very middle of the Central Europe, Trans-Carpathia is inhabited by many ethnic communities which coexist on the same territory for more than 100 years.

The very fact of the ethnic mixture in this region would not be a unique feature in itself. In historical and demographic sense, ethnic diversity is not an exceptional phenomenon and exists almost everywhere in the world today. What makes Trans-Carpathian region so special is the fact that all those numerous ethnic communities populating the region live together in ethnic tolerance and interethnic consensus. Historical documents about this region have no reference to the ethnic wars or even conflicts on the ethnic basis. Even the international crises involving the region, such as the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire and the dissolution of the Soviet Union much later, did not provoke any ethnic conflicts among the minorities populating Trans-Carpathia. Neither was ethnic genocide characteristic for Trans-Carpathia. However, the massive repression which took place in the region under the governing of Horti (1939-1944) and Stalin (1945-1956) should be mentioned. Even then, however the repression had more of the political than of the ethnic character.

The territory of Trans-Carpathia occupies 12.800 sq. km. The population of the region is equal to 1.288 million. Territorially Trans-Carpathian region occupies 2,1 percent of Ukraine. Trans-Carpathia is one of the 24th territorial and administrative regions of Ukraine and it is on the 19th place according to the density of population.¹² The very fact of the high density of population in the region (100, 6 per 1 sq. km) is speaking for itself. Just to compare, in Austria the same variable in 1990's is equal to 88 persons per sq. km, in France - 92, in Italy - 64, in the neighbouring countries of the Slovak Republic, Romania, Poland and

* Chapter by Tatiana Joukova (p. 65-86).

¹² Naseleňnja Zakarpatskoji oblasti. Zbirnyk demographichnoji statystyky, Uzhgorod, 1998, p. 4.

Hungary the density is respectively 90, 84, 103 and 111 persons per sq. km.¹³ At the same, the fact of the high density of the population in Trans-Carpathia is very important to consider as an important factor, which determines the regional specificity of Trans-Carpathia. Why is it so?

The high density of population in the region is simultaneously accompanied by the lack of the land suitable for the agricultural production. Four fifth of the Trans-Carpathian territory is occupied by bigger and smaller mountains. At the same time the half of the whole region is covered by forest.¹⁴ The population of Trans-Carpathia inhabits mostly the flat lowlands and the foothills of the Carpathian mountains. The lack of the land and the mountainous landscape does not allow the agricultural production of many very important products in the region itself, which implies that most of the food and goods are imported to the region. Neither can Trans-Carpathians use the natural recourse of region without a limit.

Rapid industrialisation of Trans-Carpathia after 1945 determined the character of the region that is that the region transformed from being agricultural to intensively agro-industrial. However, the current economic crisis in Ukraine of 90's has basically pushed the region back to its pre-war situation. In other words, the major factories and industries of the region have terminated its function since 1990's and since then the main source of survival for the people was agriculture. As the statistical data show, 44,9 percent of the population in Trans-Carpathia makes their living from their private allotment gardens.¹⁵

Another specific feature of this region is the neighbouring with four counties of the Central and Eastern Europe that is Poland, Slovak Republic, Hungary and Romania. The border line with these countries stretches up to 467,3 km.¹⁶ The peculiar geopolitical position of Trans-Carpathia makes it attractive as a region for the international market reforms, regional as well as Euro-regional economic and political projects.¹⁷ The fact that many ethnic communities, people of different religions and beliefs are living in Trans-Carpathia for a long time makes

¹³ Szabo Laszlo Karpataljai demografiai adatok, Intermix Kiado, Ungvar-Budapest, 1993, old. 19.

¹⁴ Ukrainskyj radjanskyj enchyklopedychnyj slovnyk, vol. 1, Kyiv, 1986, p. 639.

¹⁵ Matvijchuk, E Malozemellja: golovna problema Zakarpattja, RIO, January 30, 1999, p. 4.

¹⁶ Zakarpatska oblastj: statystychnyj schorichnyk, Uzhgorod, 1998, p. 16.

¹⁷ The beginning to this processes is already on the way. For example, Transcarpathia is one of the founders of the economic and other forms of cooperation among five bordering countries to Ukraine. This border region is called »Karpathian euro-region«.

it even more interesting and attractive for the social research and evaluations.

Compared with many other Central and Eastern European mixed community regions, where the nationalistic movements have led to a severe confrontations and even armed conflicts, Trans-Carpathia can be seen as an island of interethnic amity. It is important to emphasise that in Ukraine itself the interethnic tensions have been reinforced in Crimea and the Donbass area due to the enormous pressure of the economic crisis. However, these tensions have not reached any significant level in Trans-Carpathia.

The ethnic mixture in Trans-Carpathia is a fact of the special interest also because it significantly influences the situation in the region and in Ukraine in general. In addition, the stability of this region is extremely important for the political and economic development in broader terms, that is in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. Because Trans-Carpathia is a sort of geopolitical 'middle ground' where the most important transport, communication, information and political forces between East and West are bind together. Therefore, a study of the interethnic situation of Trans-Carpathia is more than relevant to carry out at this historical point.

The task of this research is not only in analysing the former positive experience of Trans-Carpathia with regard to the mixed communities, but mainly in projecting the future of the region given the fact of its rather stable interethnic relations. This objective of the research is even more important to achieve due to the numerous conflicts, which constantly brake out in the Central and Eastern Europe with a dangerous tendency to reconsider the territorial rights (after war) of these countries according to the ethnic principles.

Many empirical facts lead us to assume that the Trans-Carpathian region does not bear an explosive tendency when it comes to the interethnic relations. The current study is one of those empirical evidence which enables us to argue that the mixed communities of Trans-Carpathia, situated in the middle of the Central Europe, may serve as a good experimental ground for examining of how a mixed community can function, how different ethnic, religious and social groups can communicate with each other and how the interethnic consensus can be improved or strengthened in the future. For these purposes it is necessary to have a better look into the historical, demographic and ethno-psychological factors which affected the development of the mixed communities in Trans-Carpathia in general, and in Uzhgorod as our case city in particular. This research requires a multidisciplinary approach. Namely, the materials of the study as well as the conclusive discussion have resulted from a mixture of disciplines, such as demography, ethno-history, ethnosociology and - psychology, as well as ethnopolitics. In its

turn, the dissemination of this research can be realised in the same variety of disciplines and scientific areas.

The Creation of the Specific Trans-Carpathian Socium - a Historical View

Following the problem, aim and the methodology of this research let us go more in detail into the history of this region. The historical path of the Trans-Carpathian people is very complicated, full of struggle and at times even cataclysms. There are no precise data about the first Slavonic tribes who populated and cultivated this region. However, some historical facts prove that when the Hungarian nomads from the Black sea steppes arrived to Trans-Carpathia in IX century, there have been already the first Slavic dwellers.¹⁸ Hungarian nomads have created their own state in the middle Donau lowlands, which by some time became a ruling centre for today's Trans-Carpathian region until 1919. After the World War I, which caused the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire, as well as a short term existence of the Hungarian Republics, Trans-Carpathian region has been consigned to the newly created state of Czechoslovakia according to the piece-treaty St-Germain (1919).

The time, during which Trans-Carpathian region has been under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian empire (1867-1918), can be characterised as an active assimilation of the non-Hungarian population to the Austro-Hungarian regime. This was a political strategy of the official Budapest. North-eastern areas of Hungary, which have been mostly populated by Ruthenians (karpato-ruser or *rustnatsi*),¹⁹ were the most poor and backward areas of the empire in the economic sense.²⁰ On the contrary, being a part of the newly created Czechoslovakia, Trans-Carpathian region (then Carpathian Rus) has received quite a different economic and political treatment. The active economic, administrative and socio-political reforms run by Prague have been fostered by the new state's high motivation to integrate Trans-Carpathian region as quick as possible into the territorial and political sphere of power of the new Czechoslovakia. Although most of the historians, politicians and ethnographer admit that the 20 years rule of Czechoslovakia has

¹⁸ Granchak, I. M. Do pytanja pro vstanovlennja vlady ugorskoj derzavy v Zakarpatti X-XIII, Acta Hungarica, 1996-1997, V. 7-8, Uzhgorod, 1998, p. 90-95.

¹⁹ see T. A. Ash »Länge leve Rutenien« (Let Ruthenia live long) in Dagens Nyheter, (Swedish newspaper), March 14, 1999.

²⁰ During the times of Hungarian rule this region was called »Felvidék«, which means »high lands«.

positively influenced the Trans-Carpathian region, many of those researchers agree upon the fact that the Czechoslovakian politics toward the Trans-Carpathian province was of a »colonisation character«. ²¹ The Government of Czechoslovakia the Trans-Carpathian region the status of autonomy. However, the hopes about the autonomous status has never become true, despite the promises of Czechoslovakia for about 20 years.

In two steps, October 1938 and later in March 1939, Trans-Carpathian region was occupied by the coalition governed by Horti in Hungary. ²² During the times when the Horti's coalition - a satellite of Germany in the World War II - governed in Trans-Carpathia, there were many efforts undertaken in order to re-integrate Trans-Carpathia back to the Hungarian society. The Slavic population did not enjoy the same political and social rights, which Hungarians did. Many Ukrainian nationalists as well as the communistically oriented leaders were repressed and assassinated. Horti's fascistic alliance deported 112.500 Trans-Carpathian Jews and later 104.117 of them were killed. ²³

At the end of October 1944 the Red army was intensively pushing the German troops back to the West. During that time, most of the control over Trans-Carpathian region belonged to the former USSR. Only on June 26, 1945 Trans-Carpathian region officially became a part of the former Soviet Union as a result of the Soviet-Czechoslovak peace treaty. ²⁴ According to the treaty mentioned before, Trans-Carpathian Ukraine (that was a new name of the region stated in the peace treaty) was supposed to receive autonomous rights. However already on January 22, 1946 the status of Trans-Carpathia Ukraine was deminished to the status of an Ukrainian *oblast* (region) within the former Soviet Union.

The inclusion of Trans-Carpathian region in to the Soviet Union, which lasted until 1991, has significantly affected the development of the region. This period was characterised by the totalitarian regime and the neglecting of the regional needs. Disregard of the social-economic interests of the people living in the region, as well as deterioration or sometimes even destroy of the Trans-Carpathian historical and cultural traditions, as well as the traditional ways of life was typically for this period.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Socialist Republic of Ukraine became an independent state, declared in 1991. Now it is called

²¹ Makara, M. Vplyv socialno-economichnyx faktoriv na zminy etnicnoi strukturynaseleńnja Zakarpattja, *Economika Zakarpattja sjogordi i zavtra: shlahy vyhodu z kryzy* (Materials from the conference, 13-14 March 1997), Uzhgorod, 1997, p. 296.

²² Horti's coalition united Hungary, Germany and Italy during the 1939-1944.

²³ Derzavnyj arkhiv Zakarpatskoj oblasti, R-195, Vol. 1, No. 53, p. 40.

²⁴ *ibid* 2, p.640.

the Republic of Ukraine, in which Trans-Carpathia is included as an *oblast* (region). Frequent changes of regimes, and its turn, also socio-political governance and rules essentially pre-determined the mentality of the Trans-Carpathian population. All those societal processes, which Trans-Carpathians witnessed during hundreds of years, have generated a special ethno-profile of the region, quite different from other regions of Ukraine. The peculiar profile of the region is emphasised even more by the fact of the high inter-ethnic mixture of Trans-Carpathian population. According to several sociological investigation conducted in the region,²⁵ Trans-Carpathians are strongly united around the idea of the regional identity, based on the regional social, economic, cultural and ecological interests. These interests are intensively motivated by the historical unity of Trans-Carpathians, their common territorial distance from the rest of Ukraine, as they are divided from the main land by a long range of Carpathian mountains.

The recent trend in the region is a mere expression of the closeness more to the West than to the East when it comes to culture, political preferences and the economic reforms in Trans-Carpathia. This tendency has been intensified by the opening of the borders to the West and frequent travels to the Central and Eastern Europe. One of the most distinctive process in this trend is an intensive labour migration of Trans-Carpathians to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. It is important to emphasise here that most of labour migrants from Trans-Carpathia do not aim at changing their place of living. On the contrary, their short term travels abroad can be called »a shuttle trading« or seasonal working.²⁶ Moreover, people in Trans-Carpathia have many families and friendship ties in the neighbouring countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, which go back in history long before the Soviet time.

Taking into consideration all the complexity of historical and political development of the region we can surely argue that there has been created a specific Trans-Carpathian ethno-cultural solum.

²⁵ The current study is one of them.

²⁶ See more in the Wallace, Bedzir and Shmulyar.

The Dynamics of the Ethnographic Structure of the Population in Trans-Carpathia

At the relatively small geographical territory of the Trans-Carpathian region there lives a large number of different ethnic communities. One of the most numerous ethnic groups in the region are Ukrainians, Hungarians, Russians, Romanians, Belarussians, Romanies, Jews, German and Slovak. It is difficult to estimate how many of Trans-Carpathians consider themselves as Ruthenians (*rusnatsi*), because the last Census of population in Ukraine, 1989, did not include this ethnic category in its classification.²⁷

Pre-war and after-war ethno-structure of the region differ very much also with regard to the population balance in the rural and the urban areas. To begin with that first, before the World War II, Ukrainians (most of them would call themselves Ruthenians) lived mostly in the villages and smaller towns of Trans-Carpathia. While, the bigger towns and cities were populated by the ethnic groups consisted of Hungarians, Jews and the Czechs. First we can have a look at the total and percentage growth of the population in the region between the 1959 and up until the last Census of population in Ukraine.

Table 4: Absolute and relative growth of population in the Trans-Carpathian region, ethnic profile in 1959-1989.

Ethnic belonging	Absolute growth of population	%
Ukrainians	290 285	42,29
Hungarians	9 464	6,47
Russians	19 859	67,09
Romanians	11 139	60,72
Slovaks	- 4 900	-39,87
Jews	-9 530	-78,31
Romanies	7 161	144,08
Germans	-26	-0,74
Belarussians	1 419	128,77
Total	325 445	26,13

²⁷ This situation is caused by the fact that self-identification as »rusin« (ruthenian) was prohibited in Trascarpathia under the Soviet times. This nationality had never been included in the census registers of the Soviet period. After Ukraine has become independent in 1991, no census has been carried out.

To understand how the equilibrium between the rural and the urban population was kept during the same years, it would be important to illustrate the respective numbers for different ethnic communities:

Table 5: The number of the rural and the urban population in Trans-Carpathia, the ethnic profile, 1959-1989.

Year	Ethnic belonging										
		Ukrainian	Hungarian	Russian	Romanian	Slovak	German	Romanian	Jewish	Belarusian	Other
1959	U	61,3	18,1	9,5	1,1	3,2	0,6	1,1	3,5	0,3	1,3
	R	38,7	15,0	0,7	2,4	0,6	0,3	0,3	0,4	0	0,3
1970	U	64,8	15,9	9,5	1,1	2,2	0,6	1,3	2,9	0,5	1,2
	R	35,2	13,7	0,7	2,7	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,1	0
1979	U	71,2	13,8	8,7	1,0	1,6	0,3	0,9	0,8	0,5	1,2
	R	28,2	13,7	0,6	3,1	0,2	0,3	0,2	0	0,1	0,2
1989	U	74,0	11,6	8,5	1,0	1,3	0,3	1,5	0,5	0,4	0,9
	R	81,4	13,1	0,9	3,3	0,1	0,3	0,6	0	0,1	0,2

U - Urban population

R - Rural population

After the World War II the demographic situation in the region changed substantially. First of all, Russians as ethnic group appeared in the official statistics (see table 5). Most of the Russians moving to the Trans-Carpathian region chose to live in the cities, where it was more possible to find a job and to get a flat provided by the state. Both Russians and Ukrainians, arriving to Trans-Carpathia from outside, came from Galicia and the Eastern Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. At the same time, a migration of Trans-Carpathian Ukrainians from the rural to the urban areas was observed. Ukrainians from the region were attracted by the future perspective of living in the city, such as employment for example. Jews and Czechs almost completely disappeared from the local registers due to the well known repression and mass deportations. The decreasing tendency was also characteristic for the ethnic Hungarians. It was caused partly by Stalin's repression and partly by the emigration of this ethnic group to Hungary. Instead the ethnic groups of Romanians significantly increased during the same time. Some other ethnic changes were observable too (see table 6).

The migration factor had a significant influence on the ethnic composition of the Trans-Carpathian population. Dynamics of the ethnic

structure of the region is exposed by data from both ante and post World War II population censuses.²⁸

Table 6: Ethnic structure of the Trans-Carpathian population, Census 1930, 1959, 1970, 1979 and 1989.

Ethnic belonging	Census statistics				
	1930*	1959	1970	1979	1989
Ukrainians	62,2	74,6	76,4	77,6	78,4
Hungarians	16,0	15,8	14,3	13,7	12,5
Russians	-	3,2	3,3	3,6	4,0
Romanians	1,8	1,9	2,2	2,3	2,4
Jews	13,1	1,3	1,0	0,3	0,2
Czechoslovaks	4,8	-	-	-	-
Slovaks	-	1,4	0,9	0,7	0,6
Germans**	1,9	-	-	0,5	0,3
Romanies	0,2	0,6	0,6	0,5	1,0
Belarussians	-	-	-	0,2	0,2
Others	0,0	1,1	1,3	0,6	0,4

* The census data for 1930 in Czechoslovakia does not contain any statistics for Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians, because their number was not significant, less than 1 percent. Instead they were included into the category of »others«. Those who indicated themselves as being »Ukrainians« in 1930 (62,2 percent) were actually the population of pre-Carpathia who considered themselves as Ruthenians. Czechs and Slovaks were included into the same category before the World War II. After the war most of the Czechs have left Ukraine, that is why their numbers are not indicated in the after war statistics.

** The census data of 1959 and 1970 did not include of Germans in Trans-Carpathia. The same was true for Belarussians, who were missing from the statistics during 1939-1970.

²⁸ Data for the 1930 are taken from Bohman, A. Menschen und Grenzen. Band 3. Strukturwandel der deutschen Bevölkerung im sowjetischen Staats- und Verwaltungsbereich. Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln, 1975, p. 411.

Data for 1959 and 1970 are taken from: Kopchak, V. P. and Kopchak, S. I. Naselenie Zakarpat za 100 let. Statistichsko-demograficheskoe issledovanie, Lvov university, 1977, p. 70.

Data for 1979 and 1989 are taken from: Naselennja Zakarpatskoji oblasti za dannymy vsesouznogo perepysy naselennja 1989, Statystychyj zbirnyk, Uzhgorod, 1990, p. 120.

Demographic Status of Ethnic Groups in the Region

This sub-chapter will mainly analyse the demographic status of the major ethnic groups populating the Trans-Carpathian region nowadays.

Ukrainians

Before the World War II Ukrainians in Trans-Carpathia were rather a small ethnic group. They were mostly represented by the emigrants from the Russian empire and later on from the former Soviet Union or from Poland, mainly from Galicia. As it was mentioned earlier, the original population of Trans-Carpathia considered themselves as Ruthenians (*rusnatsi*). When the Soviet power prohibited this ethnic affiliation, most of Ruthenians registered themselves as Ukrainians and less often as Russians. In nowadays Trans-Carpathia, Ukrainians compose the biggest ethnic group of all. Partly it is explained by the relatively high birth rate within this ethnic group. Another explanation to their high number is that this ethnic group grew continually due to the arrivals of Ukrainians from other regions of Ukraine, Poland and Russia.

During the Soviet period the number of Ukrainians amounted to 78,4 percent, as the last census of population indicates (see table 6). However, in some smaller regions of Trans-Carpathia, especially in Velykoberezivskij, Mizgirskij and Perechinskij the number of Ukrainians significantly decreased during the 1979-1989.

Ruthenians

The historical and statistical literature on the Trans-Carpathian region before the World War II clearly stated that the original population of Trans-Carpathia were Ruthenians. Today, it is difficult to estimate how many of Trans-Carpathians consider themselves as Ruthenians because this ethnic group does not have any official status, neither as ethnic minority nor as nationality. The only statistical material available on this issue, are the data of one sociological research conducted in Trans-Carpathia in 1991. Based on a representative sample of 1200 respondents, where most ethnic groups populating Trans-Carpathia were included, this study showed that out of 80 percent of respondents who were »Ukrainians by passport«, only 55 percent considered themselves as Ukrainians. 17 percent of all respondents considered themselves as Ruthenians, and 0,7 percent called themselves as *rusnatsi*.²⁹

²⁹ *Rusnatsi* is the self-identification of Ruthenian population, see more in T. Ash Podkarpatska Rusj, September 10, 1992.

The fact that the ethnic self-identification and official identity of many Trans-Carpathians do not correspond can be explained by the fact that ethnic identification as Ruthenian was strictly prohibited for the local population during the Stalin regime. In the neighbouring Slovak Republic, where this restriction was abolished long ago, the numbers of Ukrainians and Ruthenians were rather close. Namely, in the census data of 1991 the number of Ruthenians and Ukrainians was 17 and 14 thousands respectively.³⁰ Since the 1990's a kind of rehabilitation of Ruthenian as an ethnic identification was observed. The original (before 1946) self-identification of Trans-Carpathians started to permeate through the scientific discourses in many disciplines, such as ethnology, sociology and political science. However, there are still political and constitutional hindrances for using this self-identification in the official discourse. That is why in the mass media and political debates Ruthenians or *rusnatsi* are often associated with the separatists or nationalists, which create some social tensions around the issue.

Most of the historians in Ukraine argue that Ruthenians are not an ethnos not even an sub-ethnos, but a »separate territorial group«, which »can not be separated from the rest of the Ukrainian population«.³¹

Hungarians

Historically, Hungarians populate the lowlands of the region. Namely almost 90 percent of Hungarians live in the smaller Beregivskij, Vynogradivskij and Mukachevo and Uzhgorod regions of Trans-Carpathia. In other three regions, such as Hustskij, Tjachivskij and Rahivskij, Hungarians live more compactly along the river Tisa.

Hungarians living in Trans-Carpathia have a very low natural growth of population. This fact is caused by several circumstances. To begin with, the Hungarian population was severely repressed during the Stalin regime, especially at the end of the World War II. For example, in 1944 all male population between 16 and 55 years old was forced to the concentration camps or imprisoned.³² Secondly, low birth rates among Hungarians also contributed to the low natural growth of this ethnic group in the region. Furthermore, an intensive out migration of

³⁰ Magochij, P. Russynse pytannja in Politychan dumka, 1995, No. 2-3, p. 110.

³¹ Zadoroznyj, V. Fedaka, S. Ukraintsi na Zakarpattji: mynule, suchasne, majbutne in Doslidjennja istorii socialno-ekonomichnogo rozvytku krajn Schentralnoj ta pivdenno-shidnoji Evropy: suchasnyj stan, problemy, perspektyvy, Uzhgorod, 1998, p. 267.

³² Altogether more than 40 thousands of Hungarians had been driven away to the concentration camps and illegally imprisoned during the Stalin regime. There is no official data on the exact numbers of repressed people, because they were kept secret until recently.

Hungarians abroad, predominantly to their motherland was in course. As statistics shows, during the 1989 and 1998, around 26 thousands of ethnic Hungarians left Trans-Carpathia for Hungary for the permanent settlement.³³ A considerable deteriorating of life conditions in Ukraine during last years, as well as the long lasting economic crisis in the country give all the grounds to assume that the outflow of Hungarians abroad will continue in the future.

Russians

Before the World War II the number of the ethnic Russians living in the Trans-Carpathia (then pre-Carpathian Rus) was insignificant, namely it was less than 1 percent of the population. This ethnic group, as well as the Belarussians, was represented by people escaping the Bolshevism regime in the former Soviet Union. However, the proportion of the ethnic Russians in the whole Trans-Carpathian population had substantially increased during the last 50 years (see table 6). Nowadays their number is equal to 4 percent of the whole population of the whole population in Trans-Carpathia. Compared to other ethnic groups in Trans-Carpathia they are the third numerically ethnic group living in the region, concentrated mostly in Uzhgorod and Mukachevo (see table 5). Moreover, among urban population, ethnic Russians is the second group in the region, with 8,5 percent of all urban population in Trans-Carpathia. In the rural areas, Russians represent only 0,9 percent of the whole population.

Jews

Jews were one the most numerous ethnic groups in the region before the World War II. In 1930 there was 95 thousands of Jews living in Trans-Carpathia, or 13 percent of all the population. Just before the World War II there were almost 100 thousands of Jews. However, the strict political repression and genocide led to a serious decrease of the Jewish population in the region. According to the materials of a commission for nazi crime investigation, there were only 650 people who came back to Trans-Carpathia after the end of the World War II.³⁴ During several years after the war, the number of Jewish population increased gradually due to the internal immigration from other oblast. During the Census 1959 their number was equal to 1,3 percent of the whole population of the region (see table 6). A significant decrease in their number occurred in 1970's, when many Jewish people started to emigrate abroad. Nowadays they

³³ Ibid 31.

³⁴ Derjavnij arhiv Zakarpatskoji oblasti, R-195, N. 53, p. 42.

comprise 0,2 percent of the whole population in Trans-Carpathia (see table 6).

Germans

The ethnic Germans had a similar destiny to that of the Jews. They also experienced mass repression and deportation during the Stalin's regime. That is why, out of 13,8 thousands of Germans living in Trans-Carpathia before the 1930, there were only 2338 Germans left in 1948.³⁵ By the Census of 1970 their number increased to 4320 people. However, due to the intensive emigration to the Federal Republic of Germany during 1970-1980, ethnic Germans are represented by 3478 people in 1999.³⁶

Romanians

The ethnic group of Romanians is the most stable with regard to their demographic structure and migration potential. Their part among other ethnic groups has changed insignificantly during the last century. In 1910 their number was equal to 1,9 percent of the whole population, while in 1989 it was 2,3 percent, namely their absolute number increased only by 17.938 during all those years.³⁷ As before, ethnic Romanians live mostly in Tjachivskij and Rahivskij regions of Trans-Carpathia, directly bordering with Romania. This group can be characterised as ethnically closed. They tend to have lower education and higher migration mobility. Due to the intensive labour mobility, ethnic Romanians tend to have a relatively good household economy.

The percentage of this ethnic group increased from 2,0 percent to 2,3 percent during the 1959-1989. At the same time, the percentage of the urban population did not change at all during this time, while the rural population increased from 2,4 percent to 3,3 percent. These figures clearly illustrate that ethnic Romanians prefer to remain at their homes, even if they often travel for short term jobs, as well as they mostly live in the villages and smaller towns. As mentioned before, ethnic Romanians live very close to the border of Ukraine with Romania, which allows to them to stay in close relation with their ethnic culture and basically not to assimilate into the cultural and ethnic mixture of Trans-Carpathia.

³⁵ Derjavnyj arhiv Zakarpatskoji oblasti, V. 67, p. 58-59.

³⁶ Naselennja Zakarpatskoji oblasti za dannyj vsesouznogo perepysy naselennja 1989, Statystychnyj zbirnyk, Uzhgorod, 1990, p. 125.

³⁷ Bohman, A. Menschen und Grenzen. Band 3. Strukturwandel der deutschen Bevölkerung im sowjetischen Staats- und Verwaltungsbereich. Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln, 1975, p. 411.

Romanies

The ethnic group of Romanies in Trans-Carpathia has been insignificant in number before the World War II. For example, in 1921 their official number in the region was equal only to 418. In 1930 there were 1442 persons altogether, which comprised only 0,1 percent of the whole population in the region.³⁸ After the war their number has increased and now comprise around 1 percent of the whole population in the region. From 1959 to 1989, though their number increased almost for 144 percent. However, if we use some other statistical source (there was one special study done on the Romany population in the region) this ethnic group has increased in numbers even more than is stated in the official statistics.³⁹

This inadequacy in figures can be explained by the fact that ethnic Romanies are often on the move and do not always register themselves at different authorities. On the other hand, Romanies tend to register themselves as members of other ethnic groups, which can be more profitable or convenient depending on the circumstances. For example, they present themselves as Hungarians, Slovaks or Ukrainians. That is why their number tends to be stable and to change insignificantly during a long period of time (see table 6). During the 1970 their number almost decreased, while between 1979 and 1989 almost doubled, from 5886 to 12303.

During the Soviet time, there were much less negative attitudes towards Romanies in comparison to the time of Horti. However, the ethnic and social rights of this group have never been completely recognised. In other words, during the Soviet regime as well as in the nowadays Ukraine, Romanies tend to be discriminated with regard to their employment, place of living and wellbeing. Romanies are more often unemployed in comparison to other ethnic groups living in the region. In addition, their life conditions are rather difficult. Moreover, Romany is the only ethnic group in Trans-Carpathia who does not have the education in their mother tongue.

Slovaks

This ethnic group rapidly decreased in numbers during the last years. From 1959 to 1989 their percentage diminished from 1,3 to 0,6 percent. This fact can be explained by intensive assimilation of Slovaks in Trans-

³⁸ Bohman, A. *Menschen und Grenzen. Band 3. Strukturwandel der deutschen Bevölkerung im sowjetischen Staats - und Verwaltungsbereich.* Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln, 1975, p. 411.

³⁹ Emetsj, G. D'jachenko, B. *Tsiganske naselelnja Zakarpattja, Uzhgorod, Karpaty, 1993, p. 8.*

Carpathia as well as by noticeable emigration of ethnic Slovaks to the Slovak and partly Czech Republic. It can be argued that Slovaks follow the same pattern as ethnic Germans and Jews, who left Ukraine in general and Trans-Carpathian region in particular, during the last twenty years. Most of the ethnic Slovaks, still living in the region, inhabit cities and towns. Recently there has been an obvious ethnic revival movement among the ethnic Slovaks.

Ethnic Climate in Trans-Carpathia

The previous chapter gave us a clear picture of the ethnic mixture in Trans-Carpathia. Historically and demographically the ethnic mixture in the region has a long tradition. That is why it is extremely interesting to know what is the ethnic climate and how it can be described in terms of satisfaction with the ethnic relation among different ethnic groups. Let us turn to one of the sociological investigations carried out by the Institute of sociology of Ukrainian Academy of sciences, the Trans-Carpathian branch. This study has been carried out in 1993 and measures the level of satisfaction of different ethnic groups with regard to the education in mother tongue, ethnic culture, media and communication as well as the economic situation for different ethnic groups.⁴⁰

The results of this study can be presented in the following table.

Table 7: The level of satisfaction with ethnic climate in the region.

Ethnic group	Level of satisfaction
Germans	1,95
Romanians	1,92
Hungarians	1,42
Ukrainians	1,29
Slovaks	1,12
Russians	0,70
Romanies	-1,07

As it is obvious from the table above the most satisfied groups are the ethnic Germans and Romanians. Presumably this is related to their improved ethnic status within the independent Ukraine since 1991.

⁴⁰ Kolibaba, A. Individ ta jogo rid, in Karpatskij kraj, Vol. 7, 1997, No: 1-5, p. 10.

However, the current economic crisis has influenced all ethnic groups equally and that is why most of the promised social and ethnic rights are not completely fulfilled. One of the most unsatisfied groups are ethnic Russians. Their ethnic discomfort is obviously related to the general development of the ethnic relations in the former Soviet Union Republics. As in many other post-Soviet states, ethnic status of Russians has significantly declined during the last five years.

It was difficult for them to accept the deteriorating of the political, economic and social privileges, which they had enjoyed during the Soviet time. Now, as it is well known, Russians became of the numerous ethnic minority living in Trans-Carpathia. In addition, their social discomfort is caused by the loss of their primary economic status, which they tended to have due to the privileges on the labour market in the region. These economic and social diminutions happens despite the fact that ethnic Russians are the most educated among all other ethnic groups in the region. Just to exemplify, the percentage of highly educated people among Russians is twice as much as among any other ethnic group in Trans-Carpathia. That is why, among those who happened to be unemployed during the recent economic crisis many are representative of this particular ethnic group.

Another dissatisfied group in the region are Romanies. However, their level of discomfort in society seems to be marginal one. Namely this ethnic group has many social problems, which are caused by the general economic and social unrest in the country. The most complicated issue for Romanies is their position at the labour market, where they seem to have a very low profile.

There are many ways of how to measure the satisfaction with the ethnic self-perception among the different ethnic groups sharing the same geographical territory. One of them most effective one is, as our own study illustrates, to measure an access to the education in their own mother tongue. Besides the state - Ukrainian - language, there are other 5 languages, which are used in the education in schools, kindergartens and partly at Universities. For example, in schools the education is provided in Hungarian, Romanian, Russian, Slovak and German. In kindergartens and high schools the education is often provided in Ukrainian, Russian and Hungarian. According to the data on January 1, 1998, in Trans-Carpathia there were 576 schools (including the secondary and high schools) teaching in Ukrainian, 61 teaching in Hungarian, 11 teaching in Romanian and 4 teaching in Russian. Besides that there are few schools which offer education in several languages, such as Slovak, German and Ukrainian.

It is interesting to emphasise that during the last ten years the number of Russian teaching schools have noticeable decreased. This fact additionally contributes to the ethnic discomfort of the ethnic Russians in

the region. Those who are provided the best with ethnic education are Ukrainians, Hungarians and Romanians. For them the percentage of pupils in their ethnic schools approximately corresponds to the percentage of their minority in the whole population of the region. For Hungarians, there are not only ordinary schools in their own language, but also other educational institutions. For example, there is an agricultural gymnasium and pedagogical University where teaching is carried out in Hungarian. Moreover, there are professional and technical schools teaching in medicine, culture and other areas in Hungarian.⁴¹

The leading role in the preparation of the teaching staff for the whole Trans-Carpathian region plays the state University in Uzhgorod. There specialists in many languages are educated and trained to work further on in a multicultural setting. Such languages as Ukrainian, Hungarian, Romanian, German and Slovak are common teaching languages at the Uzhgorod University.

In the sphere of culture and folklore, there are several drama theatres in Uzhgorod and other cities, which perform in Ukrainian, Hungarian and Russian. The Hungarian theatre was opened very recently in 1993 in the town of Beregov. Those theatre are professional organisations and work on the constant basis. Besides theatres, there are also five museums of Hungarian culture and ethnography. Most of the ethnic groups in Trans-Carpathia, except Romanians and Romanies, have their own publishing organ, that is the newspapers or book publishing. In case of the Slovak and German ethnic groups, they issue some pages in the local newspapers. Furthermore, book publishing is carried out in Ukrainian, Russian, Hungarian, Slovak and German. With the exception of Romanies again, all other ethnic groups have their radio and TV transmitting in Uzhgorod and other places of Trans-Carpathia. For example, the TV and radio programs in Hungarian and Romanian transmit at least once a week.

To summarise, it is possible to argue that the demographic situation in the region has drastically changed during the last fifty years. The ethnic groups of Ukrainians, Russians and partly Romanians have grown in number, while other ethnic groups such as Germans, Jews, Slovaks and Hungarians have obviously diminished. Paradoxically, those ethnic groups, which are not large in numbers, tend to feel much better in social and economic terms than those, which dominate the ethnic arena. There is not doubt that the key issues in the harmonic ethnic climate in the region are determined by the availability of the ethnic education, communication, cultural expression and possibility to have equal rights in political and economic life of the region in particular, and the whole

⁴¹ This data were given by the Ministry of Education for Trans - Carpathian region, Uzhgorod, October 1998.

country in general. The fact that the most of the ethnic groups populating Trans-Carpathia feel relatively satisfied with those issues is explained by the variety of ethnic schooling, mass media and cultural expression. However, it is much to be done with regard to the political and economic situation for all the nationalities because there is still a kind of discrimination with regard to the equal employment chances, which is complicated furthermore by the general economic distress in Ukraine.

Religion as a Dominant Feature of the Region

One of the most interesting features of the Trans-Carpathian region, which we discovered only in the process of the field study, is that the religious factor has become obstinate for our analysis. It would be impossible to tackle the questions of the ethnic mixture in the region and how it is managed without having a closer look in the influence which the religion play for Trans-Carpathians. One has to emphasise here that religious affiliation of Trans-Carpathians has a very stable character. Namely, before the World War II there was very easy to observe a certain relation between the numbers of different ethnic groups and the percentage of them being affiliated with different religion confessions. The following tendencies were observed: Ruthenians (*rusnatsi*) were affiliated with the Greek Catholic Orthodox confession, Hungarians with Reformats, Roman Catholics or Greek Catholics, Romanians were associated with Orthodox or Greek Catholic confession, Slovaks with Roman Catholics, Germans in their turn with the Lutheran church, and finally Jewish were affiliated with Hebrew religion. The tables presented below clearly illustrate that there, between 1910 and 1930, was a close connection between the ethnic belonging and the religious affiliation in major ethnic groups populating *Pre-Carpatska Rus* (Trans-Carpathia's name before the World War II).

Table 8: Ethnic structure of the region according to the Censuses of 1910, 1920 and 1930.⁴²

Ethnic belonging	Censuses of population, figures in %		
	1910	1920	1930
Ruthenians	56,2	62,3	62,2
Hungarians	29,6	17,4	16,0
Jewish*	-	13,3	13,1
Czech and Slovaks**	-	-	4,8
Slovaks	1,3	1,7	-
Czechs	-	1,6	-
Germans	10,7	1,7	1,9
Romanians	1,9	1,8	1,8
Romanies***	-	0,1	0,2
Others	0,2	-	2,0

* The censuses conducted in the Austro-Hungarian empire (1910) determined the ethnic belonging by the language people used. Consequently, Jewish ethnicity was difficult to determine as nobody indicated using Hebrew as a language.

** The census conducted in Czechoslovakia (1930) collapsed Czechs and Slovaks in one category.

*** There is no official data on the numbers of Romanies in 1910.

Table 9: Religious affiliation of Trans-Carpathian population in 1910-1930.⁴³

Religious affiliation	Censuses of population		
	1910	1920	1930
Greek Catholic	65,0	54,5	49,5
Orthodox*	1,0	10,1	15,4
Reformat	11,2	10,3	9,8
Roman Catholic	8,9	9,1	9,6
Hebrew	14,6	15,4	14,1
Other	0,3	0,7	1,6

* The Orthodox religion stated its revival in the beginning of the 20 century after being suppressed under many years due to enforcing of Catholicism since 1548.

⁴² Bohman, A. Menschen und Grenzen. Band 3. Strukturwandel der deutschen Bevölkerung im sowjetischen Staats- und Verwaltungsbereich. Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln, 1975, p. 411.

⁴³ Boldyzjar, M. Uzhgorodska unia: prychny i naslidky. Uzhgorod, 1996, p. 67.

The period after the World War II was distinguished by the prohibition of the Greek Catholic church on the territory of Trans-Carpathia. This restriction was lasting from 1949 until the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, namely 1991.⁴⁴ Roman Catholicism either had a full freedom of expressions and practice in the region. For example, they were not allowed to educate their own priests, or to repair their old churches.

A close relation between the ethnic belonging and the religious affiliation, remarkable for the pre war period, ceased to exist afterwards. The deformation in this relationship was partly caused by an intensive inflow of population into the region from other regions and even countries after the World War II. Another reason to it is the abolishing of freedom for religious practices as well as then enforcement of the atheism as an alternative to religion. However, some deeper connection between the ethnic belonging and the religious affiliation still exist now, despite the complicated historical and political turmoil. Though, Ukrainians and Ruthenians in today's Trans-Carpathia tend to belong to the Orthodox or to the Greek Catholic confessions, while Russians and Belarussians affiliate themselves with the Orthodox church, Hungarians are still Reformats or Roman Catholics, Romanians are Orthodox or Greek Catholics, Slovaks belong to the Roman Catholic church, and Germans, as a rule, are Lutherans or Roman Catholics. During the 1980-1990's there has been a certain revival of the New Protestant church, which is mostly supported by the ethnic Romanians.

Throughout all the history of Trans-Carpathia religion played a very significant role for the society and helped people to preserve their culture, traditions and ethnic identity. When Ukraine became an independent state, all the religious restrictions were abolished. Some empirical data clearly show that recent years can be characterised by awakening of the interest to religion, its meaning and practising. Only during 1988-1992 the religious activities in the region doubled in their quantity. Already in 1993 there were 1230 religious associations registered in Trans-Carpathia. The variety of religious beliefs was unprecedented. More than twenty different religious branches found their place under the umbrella of those associations.

⁴⁴ Mygovych, J. *Religij i cherkvy v nashomy kraji*, Uzhgorod, 1993, p. 84-85.

Regional Particularism and its Specific Character in Trans-Carpathia

Regarding the political situation in the region, which certainly determines all other social relations, including the religious and the ethnic structures, Trans-Carpathia has a tendency to the regional particularism. This feeling, or rather an identity of the people living in the region, is grounded on the territorial communality and the common interest in the nature. This identity needs somewhat to be promoted by the Ukrainian authorities in order to make sure that the region can manage its economic, political, ecological and social needs by taking decision on the local level. However, this issue is not that simple, as it may seem.

Already when being a part of Czechoslovakia, when Trans-Carpathia was named as pre-Carpathia Rus, inhabitants of the regions put forward some demands with regard to the right to autonomy. This demand has its grounds in the promises, which the Trans-Carpathians got while being united with Czechoslovakia in 1918.⁴⁵ However, this promise was never kept, neither after 1918 nor later when Trans-Carpathia became a part of the former Soviet Union. Another chance to get the autonomous status occurred in 1991, when Ukraine became an independent state, proclaimed after the referendum on December 1, 1991. One of the questions of the referendum was directly related to the status of Trans-Carpathian region, where 78 percent of the Trans-Carpathian population indicated that they would like to live in an autonomous region.

However, those results have been ignored by the new Ukrainian parliament, which has never turned to the re-consideration of the question on the autonomy for the Trans-Carpathian region. Neither a status of the Euro-region for Trans-Carpathia has been positively treated. These circumstances do not give a proper chance for the Trans-Carpathian region to manage its own needs using the advantage of being close to many countries, which recently became members of the European Union and have a certain interest in the developing of the stable Euro-regions as bridges between the East and the West.

In general, there are not explicit anti-Ukrainian tendencies in the region. There is no desire singled out to completely separate the region from the rest of the country. However, the majority of population in the region would prefer to follow their own genuine way of development, which is expressed as a certain social and political value by the Trans-

⁴⁵ Petrovskij, A. Shljahy vyryshennja enerhetyčnoj problemy Zakarpattja, RIO; January 30, 1999, p. 5.

Carpathians. Obviously that the historical facts mentioned above determine this situation to a great extent.

A necessity of a special model of relations between the capital of Ukraine and the Trans-Carpathian region has its objective explanations. Among them are the following:

- weak resource potential of the region, which is worsened by the braking of the economic relations among the Republics of the former Soviet Union;
- one-sided economic profile of the region, dominated until recently by the military production;
- somewhat higher social and economic aspirations of the population influenced by the close communication with the Western Europe;
- lack of the land and high density of population;
- mass unemployment of the major working force in the region;
- a distinct ethnic mixture of the population, where several indigenous ethnic groups coexist in the same territory, among them are Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Hungarians and Romanians;
- a distinct religious variety and a strong role of religion for the region;
- a certain conservatism in mentality, generated by the strong religious and cultural bounds with the regional particularity;
- a serious damage to the ecological balance in the region, intensified by frequent natural disasters.

The latter mentioned factor has been especially damaging. The water overflows happen in Trans-Carpathia almost every year. The last one took place in 1998 and ruined around 3000 houses in the region. The economic losses caused by the natural disasters have been calculated up to 300 millions dollars.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Mygovych, J, Pelin, O. Kedj e rozum - za tsiganskym ne jdy vosom in Karpatskij kraj, Vol. 6, 1996, No. 5-7, p. 27.

Indicators of »good« and »bad« practise in the three mixed communities: Empirical research

With empirical research of interethnic processes, dynamics of interethnic relations and indicators of »good« an »bad« practice, the methodological approach of sociology (with pertaining inter-expert fields) is in the foreground, as well as the methodology of politology with elements of ethnic anthropology. In sources' analysis the historical method has been applied in sources' analysis.

Sample: In each mixed community, the collecting of relevant data was carried out in two time points by way of interviews on a sample of minority and majority elite (expert representatives).

We formed a purpose sample, which means that it is not representative and does not contain accidentally selected interviewees. Interviewees were selected according to two criteria: creators and bearers of public opinion and national adherence. We wished to include in the sample as many people as possible of different professions and from different activities, who participate, one way or another, in the formation of public opinion. The choice for this population segment was made mainly because of their status in their respective surroundings. With their attitude or their standpoints towards ethnic issues they can, indirectly and/or directly, affect the creation and defining of standpoints of a wider community on interethnic relations, as well as on standpoints regarding the adequacy of functioning of individual channels of public communication and socialization in the ethnically mixed territory.

During the planning of the field study, relevant samples (of up to fifty respondents) were calculated, which would proportionally include all

subcommunities (ethnic groups), living in mixed areas. Owing to intensive streaming of population after the establishment of all three states, the statistical data gathered during the last population census are not reliable. Therefore calculations, which may be subjectively influenced, had to be made. Hence, it was agreed within the project group that respondents shall be asked to ponder on their nationality, religion, ethnic affiliation, mother tongue, etc.

Questionnaire: A structured questionnaire, in which the majority of questions were open, was prepared.⁴⁷ The collecting of attitudes and information by means of open questions is more universal in certain respects, and makes possible a more realistic picture of life, social situation as well as expectations, attitudes and opinions of people. Such a type of questions enables a respondent to form an answer himself, instead of choosing between proposed alternatives. Considering the fact that there are no fixed categories of answers, which would be suitable for all respondents, and since a respondent has to express his opinions by his own words, data collected in such a manner are more reliable. The intention of the use of open questions was to stimulate respondents to define their perception of social reality, and, at the same time, to expose topics and problems which they found relevant and which were not expressly pointed to (Silverman 1995).

Such approach of data collecting certainly has some drawbacks. The collected attitudes and opinions are much more difficult to classify and quantify, respectively. If data collected by open questions are to be presented in the form of statistics, they have to be coded, which means that, according to respondents' answers, a smaller number of categories are formed into which individual answers are classified. Attitudes and opinions collected and classified in such a manner could be analyzed by means of multi-variant analyses thus discovering the links between variables. However, it should be pointed out that every categorizing is distinctly subjective, which of course affects the reliability of results. Preparing an instrument suitable for collection of data in three quite diverse mixed communities was already a demanding task. In view of the

⁴⁷ Two main arguments for the use of open questions in opinion polls:

1. Answers offered by a closed question may be found ambiguous or irrelevant to an interviewee. This argument leads to the recommendation that an opinion poll should be started by a pilot qualitative research containing open questions. Its results are an important guideline as to how to develop and form an adequate questionnaire containing closed questions.
2. Suggested answers to closed questions may affect respondents' answers. The collected data are more valid if a respondent has to form the answer himself. Open questions enable us to avoid, to a certain degree, »socially desirable« answers, automatic choice of answers, or guessing (Schuman and Presser, 1996).

above mentioned problems and in view of a relatively structured sample from each country, qualitative analysis was applied.

Questionnaire covered the major spheres of life in the ethnically mixed territory. In the forefront, there were the following issues:

- characteristics of life in each place,
- attitudes towards ethnic affiliation,
- evaluation of cultural activities,
- attitudes related to mass media,
- opinions on status and function of languages in public communication,
- standpoints towards the model(s) of education in ethnically mixed territory,
- attitudes towards the status of individual subgroups.

The questionnaire draft (in English) was prepared by the Slovene members of the group. It was discussed with other members of the Project group. Several items were adapted and reformulated, specific features of mixed communities in Estonia and Ukraine being taken into account. In addition to the questionnaire several in-depth interviews were conducted.

The language of interviews was chosen by the respondents.

6.1. Estonia*

General Characteristics of the Sample

The survey was conducted in two periods: in April-May 1998 and in April 1999. The last part was necessary due to the failure to receive back thirteen copies of our questionnaire from the closed enterprise Silmet, which was the main employer of the town and previously held political power as well. Thus, the previous regime of utmost secrecy was maintained, making us unable to reach our respondents directly. In spite of the numerous promises from a wide array of secretaries, we lost track of our questionnaires, which just vanished inside the vast bureaucracy of this closed industrial giant. In compensation we conducted the survey anew, focusing on Estonians, due to the low number represented on the first survey. Thus we managed to raise the total number to fifty, with thirty-five ethnic Russians and fifteen ethnic Estonians, with nobody hesitating, and according to gender thirty-two women and eighteen men. Age groups were represented as follows: younger than thirty years six persons, from thirty-one to fifty years thirty-six, over fifty-one years seven, in one case no answer. Most of the Russians (thirty-one from thirty-five) reside there from birth (excluding some temporary periods for schooling and employment), others moved in from nearby Russian-medium towns or after graduation of higher institution in Russia. In any case, the period of residence in Sillamäe extends beyond ten years to the Soviet times and closed regime. The only exception as a late ethnic Russian newcomer was a local banker, who moved in four years ago. Among Estonians only six from fifteen were born here, others have come here after the University due to compulsory assignment system during the Soviet years, others have moved in recently to upgrade Estonian-medium management. All ethnic Estonians hold Estonian citizenship, while just a minority among Russians (seventeen from thirty-five) are Estonian citizens. Eight Russians declined to answer this. Almost everyone has higher education (forty-eight from fifty), those two missing are Estonian secretaries. Thus, it became explicit that there exist two groups with differing qualities and consequent behaviour that struggle for elite position in Sillamäe. In the following part we are going to observe the views and preferences of those groups separately when possible.

* Chapter by Mart Rannut and Anna Uibo (p. 90-100).

Local Characteristics as Perceived by the Respondents and a Description of the Major Particularities of Sillamäe

The questionnaire may be divided into sub-surveys on territorial, political, ethnic and linguistic identity and integrity. In the part characterizing territorial aspects most of the respondents held similar views, with no major ethnic difference:

- Residents described their hometown as silent, friendly, boring, sometimes adding modality (relatively, almost, etc.). They were no difference between Russian and Estonian group.
- The advantages emphasised were comfort, cuteness, good for family life and so on. From the negative phenomena economic problems and their results in unemployment, criminal rate, closeness were most prominent. Research findings enable us to identify the following trends and markers, relevant for the present study: social insecurity and lack of perspective for future, resulting in contracting business opportunities, marginal investments and growing unemployment. We may consider all the responses as patriotic, stressing the feeling of belongingness to one's hometown.
- From the ethnic sub-survey separation between ethnic groups is felt. No qualitative difference between the responses of the Estonian and Russian ethnic groups were found. Communities live next to other, each with its own problems, common activities are exceptional, yet there is mutual tolerance. The reason of this, brought out in the following comments is language barrier, especially among the older generation.

Ethnic affiliation

Most of the answers about ethnic affiliation and its causes got mixed on parental and power lines.

Ethnic affiliation seemed to be a significant item of information about a person for Estonians, but not for Russians. In Estonian comments the link between ethnicity and mother tongue was considered important (sometimes the term was mixed). Not a single Russian provided a comment.

However, ethnic affiliation may be overcome theoretically, but practically impossible, due to the Russian monolingual environment in Sillamäe.

Concerning the ethnic affiliation of people coming from mixed marriages all the options were popular. In addition, several were

proposed. The language spoken within family should be chosen by children as their mother tongue, and this should correspond to one's ethnicity. Also the human right to take whatever ethnicity was mentioned. Also one Estonian mentioned that Russian always stays Russian as long he/she resides in Sillamäe.

Culture

The questions concerning local culture caused significant difficulties in answering. Very often whole blocs were left without response. The reason is the weakness of local culture, having no professional structure. Thus people are usually distanced from culture and touring entertainment companies avoid Sillamäe. Those companies that have visited Sillamäe have been Russian-speaking themselves.

Estonian-medium theatre has never performed in Sillamäe, there have been some Russian performances from touring theatres. The same applies to paintings. Estonian-language literature is scarce in the local bookshop as well in library, medium for Russian. The same is true for folklore (most of the persons interviewed did not understand this question and needed our explanations, we still miss eight answers). There is lot of, or at least sufficiently Russian music and scarcely Estonian music. Local performances of theatre and painting were evaluated as mediocre, most of our respondents declined to respond with the excuse that it varies, and is not enough to form one's opinion (twenty-seven missing opinions). No ethnic deviation was found.

In any case, the common opinion was that if something cultural happens, it comes from the Russian group (100 percent!).

The reason for that is the organisation, as the local cultural center and other cultural entertainment institutions cater for Russian-speakers only (opinion of eighteen Russians and four Estonians). However, six Russians and one Estonian noted that Russians in general are more active.

The cultural contact and cooperation was considered insufficient (eighteen) or as missing altogether (twenty-six) with no ethnic deviations.

The participation was considered ethnicity based (usually explained as mother tongue-based) by all Estonians (fifteen) and most of the Russians (twenty-nine), others declined to respond or explained that it depends on the event.

Mass Media

Everybody agrees basically that the affect of Estonian-medium media is minute on Russians in Sillamäe, as the programmes are focused on the interests of Estonian-speakers. On the other hand, Russians do not follow these, due to insufficient Estonian skills. In the issue of Russian-medium media role produced in Estonia, Estonians and Russians disagree, as Estonians (five out of nine) consider it to be sometimes irrelevant and mismatch to the reality, due to ethnopolitical basis (my addition based on in-depth interviews). Russians (fourteen) consider this part of media objective and as a primary source of information. The media distributed from Russia (TV programmes, newspapers, to lesser extent radio) seems to enjoy strong influence among Russian-speakers, according to their own opinion (nineteen) and that of Estonians (four).

Language Policy

According to the Language Law, working language of the municipal government should be Estonian. Estonians (twelve) considered this advantage raising the status and providing stimuli for Russians (twenty-nine) to learn it. Russians considered it totally unacceptable, viewing this as a form of discrimination.

The good command of Estonian as the national language is considered necessary by all Estonians (fifteen), due to its role, but also to its functions. The opinion of ethnic Russians was mixed. They seemed to consider it at abstract level to be a necessity (nineteen), however, practical requirements attached to it were rejected (eight). Several respondents (nine) suggested that the necessity should be linked to the educated next generation, who has learned the language at school up to the sufficient level. There is no information if these people had children themselves or was it a pure theoretical speculation.

To the question about the necessity to master the Russian language everybody answered yes. However, one Estonian provided a commentary where she explained that this reflects the current situation with Estonians being a minority. If this would change, the answer would have been opposite.

The command of both the languages as a precondition for employment was considered necessary in every profession by Estonians. Simultaneously, responses by Russians differed considerably here.

Those performing bilingual jobs were considered to be worth of higher salaries by both parties, with no exception.

Estonians regarded that institutions in bilingually mixed regions not providing for bilingual operations should be subject to financial and other sanctions unanonymously (fifteen). Here again differing attitudes among Russian-speaking population were visible. The professions that need not know both (in our case, visibly Estonian) were as follows: bank, post office shops, public transport, Russian schools, libraries, art galleries, Russian cultural organisations, religious sphere. As a later check showed, most of Russians had added their own profession also to this list. The necessity for bilingual services was felt in municipality, courts, police, customs and Estonian cultural organisations, i.e. in the domains controlled already by Estonians.

Concerning the attitude towards the language situation in Sillamäe and intentions to change this, a large variety of responses were received. Estonians (eight) stressed the difference between the legal status of the Estonian language and its implementation, urging this gap to be eliminated. Here, the carrot policy (three) was recommended, instead of sticks, as outside pressure might bring forth tensions and ethnic conflict. The same idea was promoted by a number of Russian respondents (twenty-three), who said that time is not ripe, but in the future a wholesome bilingual environment would be acceptable. At the same time, a group of Russians (eight) expressed the view that Sillamäe is a Russian town and should be left so. No outside interference should be tolerated: *My sami razberyomsa* - we deal with it ourselves. Several respondents did not elaborate on this issue.

Education

Most of the (younger) respondents had no opinion on educational issues or provided primitive slogans, like *bilingualism should be respected*. Contrary to this, a small group of educational workers and assumingly parents of school-going children compensated this with excellency. All of those, Russians (eleven) and Estonians (six) claimed that existing model is inadequate in providing societal bilingualism (the term used differed, but the idea was just the same). Estonians (six) complained that as a result there are very many Russian students in the Estonian-medium school that hinders considerably the advance in education. No advantages were found. Overall, the responses provided were very similar. We have a suspicion that some sort of lecture on this topic may have been heard recently.

This question on opportunities of the bilingual schools' graduates was mixed with the previous one.

Everybody (thirty-five) shared the opinion that bilingual graduates have considerably more opportunities. No drawbacks for these were found, no ethnic preferences were observable.

Ethnic Minority Issues

The comments on the status of Russian population, being a regional majority and national minority simultaneously were rare, seemingly due to the abstractness of the issue.

The impact of various factors upon the status and future of the Russians varied in both groups. Owing to the opinion of Estonians mixed marriages, Estonian-medium cultural events and participation in local and national politics stimulate assimilation. Education, Russian-medium cultural life, legal status of the minority and demographic characteristics stimulates the vitality of ethnic Russians. Conflicting responses were received in the assessment of the current organisation of minority life, leading eventually to assimilation by some Estonian respondents (two), while others saw it as stimulating to minority's vitality (five) or exerting no impact (seven). The same concerned bilingual language regime, where there was no leading opinion. Emigration was regarded either as a factor of no impact (nine) or assimilating one (five), being not actual in Sillamäe. The heterogeneity seemed to be connected with the sophistication of the issues.

Special measures for minority protection are necessary due to a part of Russians. Estonians in toto refused any kind of special rights for Russian minority.

The best way to deal with the participation of Russians in decision-making was the participation in municipal election, which was considered sufficient by Estonians (eight). Russians extended this to the right of participation on national elections (fourteen) (*without citizenship - our comment*) to be obtained in the future.

Trans-border cooperation within the same ethnicity between various institutions and people was again too abstract. Those who responded (forty-three) mentioned positiveness of this. A wide array of comments was received here, however having no link with the contents of the issue (for example, the issue of permanent residence, customs, border regulations and visas, etc.). No ethnically based division was transparent.

The impact of ethnically mixed population to economy belonged to the set of most difficult questions, with twelve responses received. No

advantages or disadvantages were found, as one banker said about the impact: *Poka nikak - varitsa v sobstvennom soku* (juicy idiom: Until now no impact, it is its inherent issue).

Russian ethnic community felt deprived in Sillamäe not only by all Russian respondents (twenty-three), but also by some Estonians (five).

The next question asked for explanation of the previous statement. Here however, a multitude of issues were raised, without any link to ethnicity. Most of the respondents repeated their statements about political and economic challenges.

The personal experience of ethnically mixed environment in one's job received seventeen significant commentaries. Most of the respondents declined to respond, stating various reasons (working outside Sillamäe, being here for a too short period) or just leaving the space unfilled.

Research Findings

Change from sole monolingual Russian environment to segmented Estonian and bilingual Estonian-Russian linguistic environments may be observed, echoing the shift from the direct subordination to the power centre in Moscow (due to the status of monofunctional closed industrial complex) to the political periphery in independent Estonia. According to the responses obtained from our survey, partial identities show the following pattern:

Among Russian population, ethnic identity reflects normal ethnic relations, with minute knowledge in Estonian culture (transcultural competence), and adherence to mass media (as a marker of information society) through the Russian language: local Russian newspaper, national Russian-medium Radio channel (Radio-4) and Russia's TV programmes. Territorial identity pattern shows constrained social mobility, practically limited to the home town Sillamäe and other nearby Russian-speaking areas. Political identity shows dissatisfaction with the mechanism, limiting political participation to local government. The lack of Estonian citizenship is perceived to be the main obstacle to integration. There is a popular demand for dual citizenship and resistance to requirements to citizenship. Linguistic identity seems to be accommodating to the new conditions in Sillamäe slowly. Though the adult generation opts to be monolingual, the demand for bilingual education through intergenerational language transmission is growing as bilingualism as the general principle is supported. However, the implementation of it is suggested to be based on encouragement and promotion rather than on punishment, towards which the general attitude is either negative or »the

situation should be taken into account». For the future, the Estonian and Russian languages are envisaged to share equal legal status. Thus, language regime is depicted to be bilingual, based on the two local official languages. Future is seen through normalisation taking mainly place through intergenerational language transmission, with educational model implying either bilingual education, Russian maintenance or Estonian-medium with compulsory Russian model.

Estonian identity has a different configuration of partial identities. Ethnic identity reflects separation, without any significant ethnic conflict. Russians have been increasingly seen as outsiders, who should sort out their problems with no detriment to the whole society. Territorial identity corresponds to the whole national territory. Through social mobility the number of Estonians is felt to decrease due to the non-return of younger generation after the accomplishment of studies outside Sillamäe. Simultaneously, due to the bilingual language proficiency requirement several Estonians are employed in the higher echelon of political and economic power structure and thus forming the new elite in Sillamäe. Language identity comprises attitude, which considers punishment in implementation of language policies positive. Future is seen with the sole national language environment. In education either bilingual or transitional model is proposed, with maintenance model administered by the ethnic Russian community itself.

For the evaluation of the overwhelmingly Russian-speaking community in Sillamäe several criteria may be used. The social anthropological view places the importance on a social organisation, an infrastructure of its own for the group, as one of the criteria. For the local Russians, no umbrella organisation exists any more. The previous organisation built around monoindustrial complex has been disintegrating together with the freefall of the local industry.

Ethnic loyalty is based on self-identification. Russians in Sillamäe identify themselves as Russians, and maintain, according to census, the Russian language. So does the majority of other nationalities, who may still keep their own ethnic affiliation, or consider themselves Russians.

Following Drobizheva and Guboglo (1983) in Skutnabb-Kangas' interpretation (1986, 1990), integration, from the Russian population's point of view, means that the Russian population must form common features with the Estonian majority so that they share some of the cultural competence that the Estonians have, on the level of the three components of cultural competence, cognitive (including language), affective and behavioural. In addition to having (retained) common features with the Russian majority in Russia so that they share some of the cultural competence that the Russians in Russia have, on the level of the three components of cultural competence, cognitive (including language), affective and behavioural. In addition, integration also entails a higher

degree of metacultural awareness vis-à-vis both cultures than the metacultural awareness possessed by representatives of the Estonian or Russian source cultures. This may in time lead to new features in the ethnic minority's culture, so that it develops specific cultural traits not found in any of the source cultures.

However, Russians in Sillamäe do not correspond to these criteria comfortably. Most of them, according to the data provided previously, seem to show a pattern of social segregation, operationalised as high degree of knowledge of Russian culture (including high proficiency in the Russian language), high degree of behavioural competence in Russian culture, and a low degree of metacultural (including metalinguistic) awareness vis-à-vis Russian culture, combined with a low degree of knowledge of Estonian culture (including low proficiency in the Estonian language), low degree of identification with Estonia and Estonianness (affective component), low degree of behavioural competence in Estonian culture, and a low degree of metacultural (including metalinguistic) awareness vis-à-vis Estonian culture.

On the whole, Russians must be considered poorly integrated. There is evidence of social segregation. The prerequisites for forming a national ethnic minority thus do not exist yet. In this way, Russians in Sillamäe resemble immigrant elite, which still holds to the values and beliefs of the country of origin and is reluctant to integrate into the larger host society. Simultaneously, the majority of the Russians has settled in Estonia firmly, with no intention to repatriate to Russia. Such a situation seems to be improving slowly, due to the slow acquisition rate of Estonian. However, the knowledge of the local culture, especially the linguistic competence, seems to have a fair chance of developing fully only through the competence in Estonian.

In Bourdieu's (1970:40-42) concept, Estonian culture may be viewed by Russian-speakers as a mechanism of selection, which decides and excludes those who are able to deal with the Estonian culture, and those who are not. In Bourdieu's linguistic market (1991:37) in Estonia, competence in Estonian functions as capital. Distribution of this capital is related to and indexes the distribution of other forms of capital, which together define the location of a Russian-speaker within the social hierarchy in Estonia.

The main challenge for Sillamäe seems to be the transformation of the Russian-speaking community from industrial society to information society, according to the rules accepted by both sides. Patterns of collaborative work and cooperation, mutually accepted rules emerging from negotiations are priority in this aspect.

Up till now status quo with the control of minds is maintained through the consciousness industries:

- Education, as a channel excluding other languages than Russian and thus barring any influence not in uniformity with Russian ethnic interests. In this form, education carries out the intergenerational consciousness penetration together with the Russian language.
- Mass media, providing exhaustive coverage of the interests of the Russian-speaking community, thus keeping competitive non-Russian-medium sources out.
- Ideology: emphasizing Russianness, including cultural (Orthodoxy) and political traits (world politics from Russia's point of view) and values.

It seems that though most of the current discussion regards Russian population in Sillamäe as an integrated whole, the more promising approach might be viewing it as a *matryoshka*-type community, with a tiny historical minority fully integrated. This group is accompanied by a larger group of Russians who have entered the threshold level linguistically and thus are able to monitor and react to the developments in the Estonian-speaking society. Their drawback seems to be insufficient level of the competence in the Estonian language, making them non-competitive and socially less mobile, which may cause frictions. The main bulk of the population shows no traces of integration, presenting a considerable for themselves, for Sillamäe as well as for the Estonian society as a whole.

Conclusions

The main conclusion is that contrary to the years of the Soviet power, there are two visible groups in Sillamäe, holding quite common views on Sillamäe, but locating their own position in it very differently. Though both belong to the contemporary elite, they are separated by several markers: ethnicity (Estonian/non-Estonian), language proficiency in Estonian (y/n) and Estonian citizenship (y/n). The primary feature seems to be language proficiency, providing societal mobility and political rights. The transfer from one group to another is hindered by language barrier, which is planned to overcome during the next generation.

From the data received we may deduct that openness and globalism are the features that are still unheard in Sillamäe. It is still a closed locality, aiming at industrial production instead of language-filled service and information activities. Thus, while in Estonia as a whole we may speak about phenomena of postmodernity, in Sillamäe modernity still reigns. When analysing the behaviour of the linguistic groups mentioned above, Russian group still holds to modernity, while Estonians have

accommodated themselves with new postmodern conditions well and thus become an elite group in Sillamäe. To the contrary, the Russian-medium elite of Sillamäe, supported by language-spread policy and a direct access to Moscow through economic and military links, have lost all this support with the weakening of Russia and Estonia's restitution of sovereignty. It means that nowadays there is no basis for maintaining former Russian monolingual language environment. Sillamäe has moved from the position of near Centre to that of belonging to Periphery. The only option for resurrection seems to be accommodation to bilingual regime proposed by the new political power radiated from Tallinn. However, this means additional costs and may be completed during the next generation. Up till now we may witness attitudinal lag in Sillamäe, with collective societal identities not lagging behind qualitative political changes.

The material analysed leads us to the following conclusions on the population of Sillamäe:

- Estonian and Russian communities are still apart;
- shift from monolithic view to polarization of views, based mainly on language competence, seems to take place;
- shift of the official language from Russian to Estonian is observed;
- among Russians differentiation of Russia and Estonia is taking place, with priority placed on political, rather than on linguistic identity;
- among Estonians linguistic identity is considered primary.

6.2. Slovenia

Demographic and Ethnic Structure of Lendava*

The town of Lendava is situated in the northeasternmost part of Slovenia. It grew at the confluence of Kobiljanski potok, Radmožanski kanal, Bukovnica and Lendava beneath the southwestern brinks of Lendavske gorice. The entire territory belongs to the Pannonia outskirts. This is a transitory region between the Alpine world in the West and the wide Pannonia plains in the East. The vicinity of two neighbouring states, Hungary in the northeast and Croatia in the South, strongly affected (and still affects) the economic and cultural development of Lendava and its surroundings.

In 1941, a population census was carried out under the Hungarian authorities. In the settlements Lendava, Dolga vas, Trimlini, Lendavske Gorice and Dolgovaške Gorice 3429 persons were registered. Among these, 2568 persons stated Hungarian to be their mother tongue, 793 persons stated Slovene, and 68 persons stated »other«. ⁴⁸ After World War II, in 1948, 3824 inhabitants were registered in the above listed settlements. According to national appurtenance, the majority were Slovenes (2010 persons), then Hungarians (1639), Croats (130), Serbs (15), while 30 persons were listed as belonging to other nationalities. ⁴⁹ Data on national appurtenance from 1941 and 1948 - particularly the number of Hungarians and Slovenes - differ essentially. The main reason for this were political changes. In 1941 Prekmurje was annexed to Hungary, which signified the emigration or expulsion of Slovene administrative workers, teachers, etc. And colonization of Hungarian administrative workers. After the World War II, the above situation was repeated, but this time the other way round.

A special fact to be mentioned is the genocide over Jews. From approximately 200 Jews, that had lived in Lendava before the World War II, only 18 survived, and even those mostly left Lendava (Varga

* For a more detailed discussion, see Kovács 2000.

⁴⁸ 1941. Evi nepszamlalas. Demografiai adatok kozsegenkent. (Orszaghataron kivuli terület) Kezirat. (Population census 1941. Demographical data according to municipalities/ Data from the neighbouring country/ Manuscript). Budapest 1990, 331-333.

⁴⁹ Population census 1948. Census by nationality. Federal Institute for Statistics, Beograd 1952, 403.

1994a:152). In the 1953 population census, 2495 inhabitants were registered in Lendava,⁵⁰ among them 1690 (67,7 percent) Slovenes and 805 Hungarians (32.3 percent).⁵¹

The rapid increase of population in Lendava started with the development of oil industry. At the southeastern edge of the town, a new settlement of apartment blocs appeared, where manpower arriving from other parts of Slovenia and Yugoslavia began to settle. Eight years later, in 1961, 2561 persons were registered in Lendava. 1713 (66,9 percent) of these declared themselves as Slovenes and 848 (33,1 percent) as Hungarians (Varga, 1995:17-20). As evident from the 1953 and 1961 population censuses results, the population of Lendava grew only slightly. This was mainly due to the decrease of production in oil industry.

The economic development of Lendava in the 1960 was also reflected in the increase of the number of inhabitants. Thus, in 1971, 3044 persons were registered in Lendava, which meant 483 persons more than in 1961. 53,1 percent (1617 persons) of all the people registered declared themselves as Slovenes, 31 percent (943 persons) as Hungarians, and 15,9 percent (484 persons) declared themselves as others (mostly Croatsians).⁵² Also in the following decades, the number of population of Lendava increased. Between the years 1971 and 1981 for 625 persons, and in the following decade for 138 persons more.⁵³ The population growth in Lendava is related to economic progress and to the town's role of an administrative and cultural center, since from 1963 to 1995 Lendava was a center of municipality comprising 41 settlements.

The demographic picture of Prekmurje with the Lendava surroundings was from the middle of the 19th century till the present day strongly affected by emigration and employment abroad, and partly also by field work. Before the World War I, people used to go to Hungary as field workers. After 1890 they began to emigrate to America, above all to the USA. After the World War I, Hungary closed its borders, therefore fieldworks diverted to state-owned estates in Slavonia and Vojvodina, and in the 1930s to France and Germany. Between the two world wars

⁵⁰ In 1953, the data for the settlements Trimlini, Dolga vas, Dolgovaške Gorice and Lendavske Gorice were stated separately and were not attributed to Lendava.

⁵¹ In 1953 and in 1961 members of all other nations and ethnic groups but Hungarians were treated as Slovenes.

⁵² Federal Institute for Statistics. The 1971 population and housing census, Beograd 1972.

⁵³ Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. Unpublished data according to settlements for the year 1981. Ljubljana, 1982. Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. Unpublished data according to settlements for the year 1991. Ljubljana, 1992.

emigration continued, especially to South America. After the World War II, the third wave of emigration⁵⁴ from Lendava and its surroundings began, also known as the dissident wave. A considerable number of youth, disappointed, oppressed and therefore embittered over the political system, fled Yugoslavia in that period. The reason for their emigration was partly of political and partly of economic character. In the beginning of the 1960s the number of emigrants increased. These took advantage of economic prosperity of the Western states and were seeking work mostly in Austria and Germany (Kerecsenyi 1994:20-42). Apart from emigration abroad, inner migration taking place in both directions, should be mentioned. Thus, people were leaving Lendava and its surroundings for larger urban centers of Slovenia (Ljubljana, Maribor, etc.) and other republics (Zagreb), while, at the same time, Lendava was populated from the nearby villages (so Slovene as Hungarian), as well as from other parts of Slovenia and Yugoslavia, mainly the neighbouring Croatia.

The above stated migration currents also influenced the ethnic structure of Lendava. In 1981, 1840 Slovenes (50,2 percent) and 1018 Hungarians (27,7 percent) were registered there. The share of Slovenes and Hungarians dropped as compared to the 1971 census. But the share of members of other nationalities increased to 22,1 percent (formerly 15,9 percent), which in numbers meant 811 persons.⁵⁵ The last population census of the 20th century was in 1991. 3807 persons were registered in Lendava. A good half of them (51,3 percent) declared themselves as Slovenes (1952 persons), 27,9 percent as Hungarians (1062 persons), while 20,8 percent were classified into other categories (793 persons, among them 482 Croatians).⁵⁶

In 1991 Slovenia became an independent state. With the independence of Slovenia, with democratic processes in Eastern Europe and the outbreak of war in the territory of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the importance of the border town Lendava increased. Due to war, transitory traffic, which in Slovenia formerly ran in the direction North - South, was diverted and now runs in the direction West - East. The easternmost point of this transitory road is Lendava. The section of the so called fifth paneuropean corridor (connecting Barcelona to Kiev) will run in the immediate vicinity of Lendava, thus increasing the town's importance. The openness of state borders affected the increase of border

⁵⁴ The first wave of emigration took place before the World War I, the second wave in the period between the two wars, and the third wave of emigration after the year 1945.

⁵⁵ Statistical office of the Republic of Slovenia. Unpublished data according to settlements for the year 1981. Ljubljana 1982.

⁵⁶ Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. Unpublished data according to settlements for the year 1991. Ljubljana 1992.

traffic, which can be seen from statistical data. In 1991 the border crossing Dolga vas - Redics was crossed by 413.397 people, and in 1995 by 4.488.682 people (Gyuricza 1997:94). On the other hand, the gaining of independence of Slovenia and the transition to market-capitalist economic system also had negative consequences, and Lendava economy found itself in trouble. According to statistical data, in October 1998 the unemployment rate in the Administrative Unit of Lendava was 19,3 percent (the state average being 14,6 percent),⁵⁷ and the possible closing down of the Nafta refinery would only contribute to the increase of this rate.

General Characteristics of the Sample*

An intentional sample was prepared. This means that it was neither representative nor does it contain coincidentally selected interviewees. The latter were chosen according to two criteria: the creators and bearers of public opinion, ethnic affiliation. The intention was to include the largest possible number of people of different profiles and from different fields of activity, who, in one way or another, participate in the shaping up of public opinion.

Field work at Lendava took place from November 19 to 21, 1997. 131 questionnaires were distributed, of which ninety-six were answered (sixteen in Hungarian and eighty in Slovene). The realization was therefore 73,3 percent.

The sample included ninety-six experts and workers in leading positions. The choice of this particular segment of population was mostly due to their status in this social setting. Their attitudes and standpoints towards ethnic problems can namely affect, directly or indirectly, the forming of standpoints of the wider community regarding interethnic relations in this ethnically mixed territory, as well as the standpoints towards the adequacy of the functioning of individual channels of public communication and socialization in this territory. The classification of respondents according to their activities produced the following categories: the majority of respondents are employees in education (47,9 percent), 21,9 percent are technical intelligentsia (engineers, economists, doctors, etc.), 20,8 percent of respondents are classified as social science intelligentsia (i.e. journalists, workers in culture, librarians, clergy,

⁵⁷ Employment Service of Slovenia, the regional unit of Murska Sobota, Monthly Bulletin, December 1998, Vol. V, no.12, Murska Sobota, March 1999.

* For a more detailed discussion, see Medvešek 2000a, 2000b.

translators, psychologists, etc.); 9,4 percent did not wish to state their profession. The majority have lived in the ethnically mixed area since their birth.

The detailed demographic structure of the sample from research of 1997 is presented in the tables below:

Table 10: Ethnic structure of the respondents (Would you confide to us to which ethnic community you feel you belong?).

Ethnicity	N	%
Slovene	39	40,6
Hungarian	46	47,9
Slovene and Hungarian	7	7,3
Other	3	3,1
Refrained from answer	1	1,0
<i>Total</i>	<i>96</i>	<i>100</i>

Table 11: Gender structure of the respondents.

Gender	N	%
Male	42	43,8
Female	49	51
n.a.	5	5,2
<i>Total</i>	<i>96</i>	<i>100</i>

Table 12: Age structure of the respondents.

Age	N	%
Up to 30 years	12	12,5
From 31 to 50 years	63	65,6
Over 51 years	16	16,7
n.a.	5	5,2
<i>Total</i>	<i>96</i>	<i>100</i>

Table 13: Structure of the respondents by education.

Education	N	%
Secondary school	11	11,5
Higher education	35	36,5
University education	45	46,9
n.a.	5	5,2
<i>Total</i>	<i>96</i>	<i>100</i>

Table 14: Respondents according to the place of birth.

The place of birth	N	%
Living in Lendava since birth	57	59,4
Moved to Lendava later	32	33,3
Not answered	5	5,2
Does not live in Lendava	2	2,1
<i>Total</i>	<i>96</i>	<i>100</i>

Table 15: The respondent's sphere of employment.

The sphere of employment	N	%
Education	46	47,9
Technical intelligentsia	21	21,9
Social science intelligentsia (journalist, librarian, artist, lawyer, translator ...)	20	20,8
n.a.	9	9,4
<i>Total</i>	<i>96</i>	<i>100</i>

Local Characteristics as Perceived by the Respondents and a Description of the Major Particularities of Lendava*

The respondents listed, in their extensive descriptions, the following characteristics of Lendava: natural beauty, multi-ethnic population structure, history and border location. They also stated the phenomena aggravating life at Lendava (transit traffic and pollution).

The prevailing estimation in the answers is that, despite ethnic differences that inhabitants live in good mutual relations, especially Slovenes and Hungarians. There were some critical remarks about immigrants from ex-Yugoslavia who do not sufficiently participate in the development of Lendava.

Concerning the advantages and disadvantages of life at Lendava, the respondents generally repeated the answers from the previous question relating to the typical features of life at Lendava. At the same time they repeatedly stressed the good mutual relations among people, their tolerance and lower living costs. Hungarian respondents underlined the significance of close connections with their parent nation (made possible by the vicinity and openness of the state border); other important values for them are bilingualism and biculturalism. Among the answers, descriptions of advantages of life at Lendava prevail.

According to the respondents, the phenomena aggravating life at Lendava are consequences of dense transit traffic, industrial pollution, unemployment, economic underdevelopment, lack of cultural events, bad traffic connections and far distance from the center; a few respondents have also mentioned problems arising from prescribed bilingualism.

Most of the respondents regard the relations among members of different ethnic communities at Lendava as »constructive coexistence«. A good half is of the opinion that the communities live in close interaction with one another. This opinion is rather equally distributed between Slovenes and Hungarians. The number of Hungarians slightly exceeds that of Slovenes. This statement is illustrated by the facts that members of different communities strive together for the development of the area, that cultural and other activities are intertwined and that they all strive for the progress not only of their own but also of other communities.

A good third of the respondents is of the opinion that the communities live beside one another, i.e. each regulates its own activities, but there is an atmosphere of mutual respect and tolerance. Such a view is slightly more distinct with Hungarians than with Slovenes.

* For a more detailed discussion, see Mejak 2000.

Only five respondents are of the opinion that communities live separately and in isolation from one another, and that there is an atmosphere of distrust and conflicts

The question »Which area are you most attached to?« was by the majority of respondents, so Slovenes as Hungarians, answered as »Lendava«. The second most numerous group is attached to Slovenia; in this group too there are Slovenes and Hungarians. Other respondents stated that they were most attached to their own municipality, to Prekmurje, and some individuals also to Europe and the entire world. The interesting fact is that none of the respondents (not even Hungarians) expressed distinct attachment to Hungary.

Ethnic Affiliation*

Development research points out the more extensive starting-points for the shaping up of man's identity in contemporary society, which enables and supports the flow of ideas, people and goods at local, national and international level. All this brought about a shift from the so called conservative concept of ethnic identity, characterized by in-group ethnic, cultural and linguistic unification and even exclusiveness. Also in ethnically mixed areas, where people are daily faced with (at least) two cultures and languages, ethnic identity is becoming an increasingly complex phenomenon. Like other aspects of man's identity, ethnic identity too is characterized by its multilayeredness. Experts talk about a typical shift from »identity as an island« towards »identity as a crossroads« (Mlinar 1996).

In this context, ethnic identity increasingly demonstrates itself as a flexible, interest-related option. Factors affecting or determining ethnic affiliation are diverse and complex. It is true that they are anchored in social circumstances and resulting personal orientation or interests. Experts are realizing that shifts in ethnic identity can primarily be interpreted as an expression of unbalanced social status of two ethnic communities in contact, and as a reflection of relations of social power within two communities, respectively. The power relation is often expressed as an indirect or direct assimilation pressure. Ethnic identity is in many cases the object of more or less hidden or open manipulation, mostly political. This is testified by numerous past and contemporary examples in Slovene ethnic territory and abroad. Usually, the direction of the shift of ethnic affiliation is in favour of the spreading of a majority

* For a more detailed discussion, see Nećak Lük 2000, 2000b.

community; however, especially in crucial periods or in cases of particular advantages for a minority, cases have been known when majority members decided for adherence to a minority community.⁵⁸

The purpose of this study is not to discuss these factors. A more detailed presentation of loyalty to ethnic heritage and of reasons for shift of ethnic affiliation can be found in numerous studies (Fishman 1989, Giles, Johnson 1987, Nečák Lük 1998).

It is possible to anticipate that people in ethnically mixed regions are more aware of their ethnic affiliation than inhabitants of ethnically (more) homogeneous settings. The former can also be expected to have a more elaborated opinion regarding ethnic identity.

The aim of our research was to verify this domain. We are trying to learn the views of selected population concerning ethnic affiliation as a phenomenon defining man, as well as its changing and substitution, respectively. We were interested in our respondents' attitude towards ethnic affiliation as a component of man's identity, and in their prevailing view, either traditional or post-modernist, upon it. This was dealt with by two questions, the first being: »In your opinion, is ethnic affiliation important information about a person?«

The collected viewpoints regarding ethnic affiliation can be classified on a continuum from highly important to absolutely unimportant. A large share of the respondents (less than half) ascribes no special significance to ethnic affiliation, a person's moral qualities ranking higher. Commentaries to this standpoint contain a number of cliches, like:

»Nationality is of no importance. The only thing that matters is to be humane. «

Respondents to whom a person's nationality is insignificant or only relatively important, expressed their personal attitude towards people and enumerated the values they appreciate.

Ethnic affiliation seems more complex to those who have listed it among important facts about a person. In a way they see it as an

⁵⁸ One of the cases of the shift of ethnic affiliation concerns Prekmurje where, according to the decrees on agrarian reform in the first state of Yugoslavia, members of Hungarian (and German) minority could not get land. A recent blatant example of a misuse of legal support to the preservation of a minority community has been reported by a journalist from Hungary. She writes about several cases of the adoption of minority identity among the majority population in Hungary. Due to the so called minority mandate on the basis of which minority candidates at local elections require only one half of votes otherwise necessary for the election into local municipal councils, numerous candidates proclaimed themselves as minority members (Romanians but also Slovenes), who have so far declared themselves as Hungarians. (Free choice of identity? Marjana Sukič, Vestnik, Murska Sobota, 4. 3. 1999, Vol. 51, No. 9).

important component of a person's identity, yet they also point out the group basis of ethnic affiliation, the belonging to a community, which determines a person spiritually, linguistically and culturally.

»Ethnic affiliation or ethnic awareness is to a certain degree necessary for the sake of personal satisfaction, due to respect for one's ancestors it should be nurtured and transferred to future generations.«

Some strive for a discreet attitude towards ethnic affiliation, appealing to personal freedom in ethnic self-declaring:

»Until the events in Croatia no one ever asked anyone about his ethnic affiliation. We lived in peace and understanding, regardless of nationality. Nowadays it has become more important though we still get along well.«

»I find this information irrelevant from the point of statistics of ethnic affiliation; however, I do find it important from the point of everyday human relations.«

Quite a few respondents drew attention to the possibility of misuse, and to the wealth of cultural diversity.

»This information is relevant only in case that a person identifies himself as a member of a nation, finds a positive model in his nation and strives to co-exist, as a loyal citizen, with other nations in the same state. It is, however, dangerous to condition ethnic affiliation with politics, and emphasize the former with a negative connotation (where somebody used to live, what somebody ought to do...)«

»Yes, if it means cultural identity, which confirms the wealth of diversity.«

The reflections on the importance of ethnic affiliation was with some respondents intertwined with the care for the existence of (Hungarian) ethnic community, as well as with the care for civil loyalty.

The answers regarding the significance of ethnic affiliation were also analyzed with regard to the ethnic structure of our sample. There is a considerable difference in the views of Slovenes and Hungarians.⁵⁹ Hungarians as a rule ascribe certain significance to ethnic affiliation, mostly defining it as very important. They have a prevailing positive

⁵⁹ The question on ethnic affiliation of the respondents was distinctly neutral (»Can you entrust us with your feelings about your ethnic affiliation?«) due to respect of two objective circumstances – Article 61 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia which provides an individual's free choice regarding his self-declaring of ethnic affiliation, and a large number of mixed marriages in the region.

evaluation permeated by the conviction that being anchored in this segment of human identity is important for one's self-image as well as for the acceptance of others.

Another typical difference between Slovenes and Hungarians concerns the individual or group aspect of ethnic affiliation. It is characteristic that particularly respondents who have declared themselves as Slovenes, reflected about ethnic affiliation mainly at personal level, as if it were an in-built characteristic, an aspect of an individual's personal image. At the first sight it would seem that this part of the respondents find affiliation to a community self-understood and do not reflect upon its group category meaning. Only exceptionally did respondents of Slovene nationality reflect upon the significance of ethnic affiliation in terms of the fate of their own nation or other ethnic community:

»We Slovenes are a small nation so this is important.«

»The information seems important since, through affiliation, endeavours of a certain community are expressed, and standpoints, culture, language, as well as identity are formed.«

Commentaries that went along with these answers were mostly exhaustive which indicates that people pay attention to the phenomenon of ethnic affiliation and other different aspects of life in ethnically mixed regions, and wish to convey their standpoints to others. Such an approach can be classified as an expression of a relaxed and democratic atmosphere in the ethnically mixed territory where the issues of ethnicity and relations between the two communities are not a taboo topic.

We further attempted to find out the respondents' relation towards a free choice of ethnic affiliation or to its changing. More recent theses on ethnic identity, its development and substitution place it within the complex of elements of a person's social mobility. They establish two dimensions of ethnic identity, the in-born one, based upon the hereditary elements of the ethnic, and the acquired/ascribed one, which is formed in the process of socialization, and more or less overlaps with, or shifts away from, the identity gained by a person being born into an ethnic community (Fishman 1998).

Theses on ethnic affiliation as an option have triggered a lively polarization within the minority in some Slovene ethnic surroundings (Wakounig 1999, Mermolja 1998). Some eminent representatives of the Slovene communities in the neighbouring countries regard the transparency of ethnic boundaries with a minority community as a sign of openness and inclination to cultural pluralism. A certain doubt appears here which demands serious consideration: reasons for shifts in ethnic identity, or the direction of transparency of ethnic boundaries, should be analysed separately in each surrounding. As stated above, the shifts in

ethnic identity usually reflect the relation of power between two communities. In an unbalanced social situation members of the (by status) weaker community try to avoid the indirect (and often direct) pressure by dropping identification indices of ethnic affiliation. In this way, a minority community slowly loses its productive and reproductive ability (Nelde, Strubell, Williams 1996), loses its ethnolinguistic vitality, which on longterm is demonstrated as the dropping or »dying-off« of characteristics of ethnic identity, language, cultural participation within their own community, etc. When ethnic boundaries are only transparent in one direction (usually shifts from the in-born to the acquired identity are traced among minority members, the shifting is therefore towards the majority community), a researcher should pay attention to the level of ethnolinguistic democracy in a society.

The apparently evident, but in truth delicate differences between concepts such as assimilation and integration, cultural pluralism and multiculturalism, should be considered here.

We were interested in the attitudes and opinions related to ethnic identity as a choice category, and to the shift in ethnic affiliation in the surroundings where the institutional support to the ethnic minority is shaped in order to promote the preservation and development of the minority language and culture, its political participation, to incite the co-existence between the majority and the minority, all of which is also reflected in the developing of two-direction bilingualism.

The question to be answered was: »Can a person change his ethnic affiliation?«

A good two thirds of the respondents reject the possibility to change affiliation. There are, however, few categoric answers. The commentaries to negative answers show that these are mostly personal standpoints towards the phenomenon, which respondents nevertheless perceive in their surrounding. Changing of ethnic affiliation is not considered possible mostly by those who regard it as an in-born category. Socialization in the spirit of an ethnic community into which a person is born seems to them self-understood, almost automatic.

»Ethnic affiliation is determined by birth and cannot be changed.«

»I don't know whether it can be changed but I believe it unnecessary. Our ethnic affiliation is passed on to us by our parents, who bring us up in the spirit of this ethnic group (language, culture...). We should not be ashamed of it or try to alter it.«

To many the change of ethnic affiliation seems pointless. By many it is sharply condemned. Some regard the persistence in ethnic affiliation as an indicator, sign of a person's integrity.

A good tenth of the respondents allows for the possibility that a person may change his ethnic affiliation, but at the same time condemns such behaviour. So in fact they do not see an option in ethnic affiliation and basically claim that changing is unacceptable.

»Why would I change it? I believe that each person is loyal to his/her ethnic group, and the changing of it would signify betrayal.«

Less than a tenth of the respondents believe that ethnic affiliation is a constant, yet intensity of identification with the primary ethnic group may oscillate. The oscillation or adaptation to another community arises from life in a multicultural surroundings.

Less than a tenth of the respondents see ethnic adherence as an optional category, and only two agree without any reservation to the change of ethnic affiliation.

Others seek reasons for shifts in ethnic identity, stating mostly instrumental motives, or social and political dimensions of the influence upon identity.

From the answers of those who present ethnic affiliation as an option, it can be understood that it is primarily minority members who face such an alternative.

A group of respondents mention a complex phenomenon of ethnic affiliation in mixed marriages. Typical remarks concern the determination of ethnicity of children from mixed marriages. In the opinion of this group, the choice of ethnic affiliation by such persons is acceptable if it was determined by parents at birth. The decision is therefore up to an individual.

Culture*

With the group of questions dealing with culture at Lendava, and with respect to variables (profession, nationality), we tried to find out the standpoints regarding the quantity and quality of cultural activities, and the cooperation between Slovene and Hungarian culture institutions, as well as the structure of audiences. The questions from the field of culture showed that despite ethnic differences the majority of the respondents have a positive standpoint towards cultural life at Lendava; some of the respondents, however, pointed out that:

Hungarians have a greater number of events and a better attendance. This is due to their activity, cultural awareness, good organization and

* For a more detailed discussion, see Hirnök Munda 2000.

extensive cultural activity. The some drawbacks. On the basis of the respondents' answers regarding culture we may conclude quality of cultural activities is relatively high and satisfactory, with outstanding visual arts followed by literature and theatre.

Hungarian ethnic community gives character to cultural life at Lendava (due to tradition, active cultural societies, Institute for the culture of Hungarian ethnic community, professional help from Hungary, greater ethnic awareness).

Some point out the lack of cultural activity of Slovenes. Such a state is considered to arise from the inadequate cultural policy of Slovenia as well as from passivity of Slovenes in developing their own cultural activities.

Cooperation between Slovene and Hungarian cultural institutions in the shaping up of cultural life is good (in the opinion of the majority), yet quite a number of people believe it is bad (cooperation between the Association of culture organizations and Institute for the culture of the Hungarian ethnic community is merely fictitious, respondents miss joint projects) or non-existing.

Most of the respondents believe that it is possible to speak about the structure of audience (mainly due to language barriers).

Regardless their ethnic affiliation the inhabitants of Lendava are eagerly expecting the building of a new cultural center at Lendava.

One would expect that it would be possible to establish a certain link between the meaning ascribed by our respondents to ethnic affiliation and their views upon the possibility of (non)changing of ethnic affiliation. However, the comparison of views upon the meaning ascribed by the respondents to one's ethnic affiliation, and views upon the changing of ethnic affiliation, shows that the standpoints are often in direct contradiction. It is apparent that ethnic affiliation as a sign of belonging to a certain ethnic community is a very important category for the majority of our respondents. Many see it as an unalienable sanctity. The view upon the changing of nationality is completely classical, traditionalist: the changing of ethnic affiliation is seen as devaluation, a deed unworthy of man. We can therefore conclude that ethnic affiliation is not an important piece of information only when they reflect about it in the context of interpersonal relations.

Mass Media*

A block of questions dealing with the role of mass media in the shaping of relations between ethnic communities, with respect to variables (profession, ethnicity), shows a mainly critical standpoint towards this function of media at Lendava.

Only a sixth of respondents ascribes to Slovene media some role and a positive influence in the shaping of interethnic relations

Most of the respondents believe that Slovene media are generally informative, article deal with current events at state level and forget local events. Some respondents are critical towards the radio programme Murski val and the paper Vestnik. They believe that their coverage of the wider region is good but insufficient for Lendava itself. The answers indicate that they do not regard these media as their own; they expressed a wish for Slovene media, which would be produced and printed at Lendava. Hungarians and Slovenes are very close in the evaluation of Slovene media. Some respondents think that Slovene media do not contribute, or even negatively contribute to the forming of relations between ethnic communities.

Half of the respondents discuss the main advantages and disadvantages of the Hungarian ethnic community media in Hungarian language. Among the advantages the informing of inhabitants about local events and the specificities of ethnic community life may be listed. The prevailing negative opinions concern the weekly Nepujsag, stating that its quality is diminishing (conflicts arising from non-professionalism), that it presents a deformed picture of Hungarians in Lendava by stating that they are discriminated. Respondents are most satisfied with the Hungarian radio programme. Such an opinion was expressed by most of Hungarians and half less of Slovenes, meaning that Hungarians are mostly dissatisfied with their own media. Only a seventh of respondents think that media positively affect the shaping of relations between Slovenes and Hungarians.

Regarding the evaluation of media from the neighbouring Hungary opinions were very varied. Hungarian media are unknown or not used by a fifth of respondents who are either Slovenes or members of Croatian or Serbian ethnic communities. A sixth of the respondents, mostly Hungarians, believe that media from the Hungarian state have a positive effect upon interethnic relations, they offer additional information about the area, and particularly the TV station Duna pays a lot of attention to the way of life of Prekmurje Hungarians, and their coexistence with Slovenes. A sixth of the respondents, mostly Hungarians, believe that

* For a more detailed discussion, see Hirnök Munda 2000a.

media from the neighbouring Hungary have no influence upon interethnic relations.

Language Policy*

In the ethnically mixed territories of Prekmurje and the Slovene Istria Hungarian and Italian languages have a status of an official language along with Slovene in all spheres of public life.⁶⁰

Amongst the factors of institutional support the present model of institutional bilingualism holds important position. The model is based upon the constitutional starting-point according to which both the languages, Slovene and Hungarian, have the status of official languages in the ethnically mixed territory. Thus the principle of spoken and written bilingualism is established in the area. However, this in itself does not guarantee equal status to both the languages. A balanced sociolinguistic situation can gradually be obtained by the creating of public (formal) communication situations in which minority members can also freely use their language (Pogorelec 1998). Therefore both the languages should be officially used in public institutions and services. This means that working posts should be held in such a way that a customer can use his own language and be entitled to receive a written or oral answer in his own language. To this purpose, a certain number of workers in every institution must have a command of the two languages, while forms, documents and official papers should be bilingual. Institutional bilingualism also includes visible bilingualism - bilingual topographic signs, inscriptions and notices, etc.

For the implementation of prescribed institutional bilingualism, the so called two-way bilingualism is necessary, i.e. the sociolinguistic situation in which members of one community (also majority) at least understand the language of the other. The model of bilingual education in the ethnically mixed territory is expected, apart from general educational goals, also provide for this aim. In the learning process it should be provided for the development of individual bilingualism of minority and majority children and thus for two-way bilingualism (Nećak Lük 1986).

Recently institutional bilingualism has been raising doubts, and several attempts have been made for the Constitutional Court of the R Slovenia to reconsider certain demands for official bilingualism. Dissatisfaction was triggered by bilingual identification documents, some

* For a more detailed discussion, see Nećak Lük 2000, 2000c.

⁶⁰ The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Article 11: The official language of Slovenia shall be Slovenian. In those areas where Italian or Hungarian ethnic communities reside, the official language shall also be Italian or Hungarian.

disagree with the present bilingual school model, and according to some, provisions on bilingual functioning should only obligate those business companies with the seat in the ethnically mixed territory, but not those with the seat elsewhere in Slovenia, etc.

With regard to the above listed facts, the standpoints of our respondents regarding the good and bad sides of bilingualism are important for the highlighting of the actual attitude towards the use of languages in the territory of our research. On the other hand, the very issue of regulation of public use of Slovene and Hungarian languages and the acceptance or rejection of public bilingualism clearly show whether it is possible to speak about a mixed community (*Gemeinschaft*), composed of two sub-communities, Slovene and Hungarian, in the ethnically mixed region of Prekmurje.

There are some typical groups of answers regarding the advantages of bilingualism. In the first, most numerous one, it is possible to recognize the mentality of ethnolinguistic democracy. Among the advantages of bilingualism, the majority of respondents exposed the possibility for each citizen to use his own language in public affairs, and the possibility of mutual communication despite a different degree of the second language command. Stating the possibility of communication as the foremost advantage of bilingual model in Prekmurje, many have pointed out the older generation that does not have a high command of Slovene.⁶¹

A group of answers emphasizes the significance of institutional bilingualism for the preservation of ethnic identity and language of the Hungarian community, and the well being of its members.

Some are appealing to the European dimension of the phenomenon and to the accordance of bilingual regulation with the contemporary orientation towards cultural and language diversity.

A group of respondents emphasizes the significance of bilingual regulation for: the active co-existence between the two communities of the same territory, the aspect of minority loyalty towards the state of Slovenia which should be strengthened by the possibility of unimpeded expressing of their own identity as well as the use of their mother tongue, and for the possible wider impact of this model upon the regulation of

⁶¹ It is interesting that a number of respondents ascribe the poor knowledge of Slovene amongst the older generation to the former school model. Before the present bilingual model of education there were namely departments with Hungarian as a language of instruction, while Slovene was only present as a subject. Although the monolingual model did not prove satisfactory, having a number of negative consequences, during the recent years opinions have been heard among the Hungarian intelligentsia that it should be re-established in order to raise Hungarian language culture.

interethnic relations in the neighbouring states where Slovenes reside as a minority.

Several respondents claim that in the ethnically mixed region bilingualism is a way of life, that it is integrated into the consciousness of the local population. Such a standpoint is illustrated in the answer of both Slovenes and Hungarians:

»It has neither advantages nor disadvantages, it's how it is, it is the way of life here.«

The respondents with such a standpoint at the same time believe that public bilingualism mostly causes problems to those who come from monolingual regions. Immigrants are expected to accept both the languages and to adapt to bilingual regulation.

A distinct feeling of mutual connectedness of the mixed local community is expressed by the following statement regarding the advantages and disadvantages of public bilingualism:

»It is stated in the Constitution and most people take it for granted. Problems arise due to some immigrants (i.e. persons from linguistically homogenous parts of Slovenia- comment of the author) who blame bilingualism for their inabilities and inadaptability. Unfortunately, these individuals come to the region out of their own free will, but they can cause a lot of harm to co-existence.«

With regard to disadvantages of institutional bilingualism, the respondents' opinions are more varied. About a tenth believes that bilingualism has no disadvantages. Some nevertheless point out that the offered possibilities are not fully used:

»There are no disadvantages but I feel that too few people make use of this law and Constitution.«

Amongst disadvantages most of the respondents point out the fact that the model of public bilingualism is optimally elaborate at the normative legal level, but has many drawbacks in its practical application.

»At the declarative level everything is settled at the highest level (constitutionally, legally, etc.)«.

»In some institutions this problem is not adequately settled, the declared rights are not effected.«

There are many doubts as to the language culture and quality. The primary concern with Hungarians is for their language. The characteristic opinion of minority members regarding bilingualism (the ability of bilingual communication) is a fear that it may generate on insufficient command and dropping of the mother tongue.

A relatively equal share (between 14-15 percent) of Slovenes and Hungarians do not find disadvantages in institutional bilingualism. Among the disadvantages particularly Hungarians point out the gap between declared possibilities and actual practice, expressing their concern for their language. Slovenes, however, stress their fears that Hungarian is favoured, which makes them feel discriminated. Obviously, many do not know the legal regulation (or disagree with it) as well as the official status of the two languages in the ethnically mixed territory, emphasizing that Slovene is the state and official language and should therefore prevail in the ethnically mixed territory.

When comparing standpoints regarding the advantages and disadvantages of institutional bilingualism, it is noticeable that respondents from the field of education emphasize, more than others, the advantages of bilingualism with unimpeded choice of language and possibilities of communication among people. To this group belongs the majority of those claiming that such regulation has no disadvantages. With such results it is possible to claim that particularly people working in education persist upon the integrative value of bilingual model. Since they are the social stratum that is most competent for the spreading of values of bilingual setting and bilingual socialization, this fact might be promising for further promotion of co-existence in the ethnically mixed territory. It should however be pointed out that the respondents from this professional field were the most numerous in refusing to list the disadvantages of bilingual regulation. This makes the above interpretation questionable.

Technical intelligentsia more than pedagogical workers emphasize the formal level of bilingual regulation and its significance for the preservation of the Hungarian community. The respondents from the field of technical professions stressed, more than others, among the disadvantages the over-emphasizing of Hungarian, estimated the obligatory learning of Hungarian as compulsion and were of the opinion that, due to the language regulation in the ethnically mixed territory, Slovenes are discriminated.

Command of Slovene and Hungarian Languages*

Standpoints towards the two languages and thus to individual bilingualism of the population in the ethnically mixed territory of Prekmurje were studied from the answers to several questions. The necessity of knowing Slovene was investigated from the aspect of its role

* For a more detailed discussion, see Nećak Lük 2000, 2000c.

as a state language. We kept in mind the fact that the command of Slovene is legally prescribed as one of the conditions for the acquisition of citizenship.⁶²

The necessity of the knowledge of Hungarian in the ethnically mixed territory was investigated from the aspect of the concept of two-way bilingualism or functional bilingualism (Necák Lük 1986), when individual bilingualism should support institutional bilingualism by the fact that Slovene native speakers at least understand Hungarian messages.

The first question should reveal the respondents' standpoints about communication abilities in Slovene. The question was: »Should in your opinion all citizens of Slovenia - regardless of their ethnic affiliation and mother tongue - have command of the state (Slovene) language?« Most of the respondents are convinced that command of Slovene is for a citizen of Slovenia *conditio sine qua non*. Only one respondent (of Hungarian nationality) thinks that it is unnecessary, that it is a matter of personal decision.

Explication of the need for the command of Slovene is quite varied. Apart from the reasons connected with Slovene citizenship or residing in Slovenia, illustrated by the answer:

»I believe it normal for all citizens regardless of ethnic affiliation to have command of the state language. Such is the worldwide practice.«

instrumental reasons prevail:

»I believe it is necessary, as employment is impossible outside the bilingual territory or school.«

It is interesting that everyone, Slovenes and Hungarians, (except one) are convinced about the necessity of command of Slovene. There are however differences about the standpoints regarding the necessary level of Slovene language command. About eight percents of the respondents expressed a rather undemanding view, saying that every citizen of Slovenia should at least have passive command of Slovene. Interestingly, this opinion prevails among the Slovene respondents. With regard to fields of profession there is a slight difference between technical intelligentsia and other professional groups concerning the level of the Slovene language command. It is also interesting that respondents from the educational spheres are the most tolerant regarding this issue.

An increasing number of respondents are in favour not only of mutual command of both the languages, but also of mutual knowledge of culture and history of the two nations. Some are pointing out the historical dimensions of relations between the two languages, when older

⁶² Legal provision.

generations of Hungarian ethnic community members were mostly monolingual:

»We cannot expect older minority members to learn Slovene.«

The second question about the communication competence concerned the command of Hungarian: »In your opinion, should everyone in the ethnically mixed territory have command of Hungarian?«

The standpoints concerning this question are more complex. The highest share (just below one half) pertains to respondents who believe that at least passive command of Hungarian is necessary. Their motives are mostly integrative: good co-existence, neighbourly relations, respect for minority members, striving for minority's equality, etc. Such opinion prevails among the Hungarians, since it is expressed by twice as many Hungarian than Slovene respondents.

A good quarter of the respondents think that command of Hungarian is a matter of personal decision of each individual. Such a standpoint is favoured by a slightly larger percent of Slovenes than Hungarians.

About a sixth of the respondents do not recognize the need that all inhabitants of the ethnically mixed region ought to have a command of Hungarian. Such opinion prevails among Slovenes. Despite the negative standpoint, the majority emphasizes endeavours for cooperation between ethnic communities in the ethnically mixed region:

»I think this is not necessary, it is important to establish such mutual relations as would make communication among people of different ethnic affiliation possible in such a way that no one would feel subordinate.«

It is interesting that only a few respondents (mostly Hungarians) with this question placed the knowledge of Hungarian in the context of employment possibilities. This comes as surprise, especially from the point of view of legally prescribed institutional bilingualism in the mixed territory.

Concerning the command of Hungarian, the most undemanding standpoints, with regard to profession, were expressed by technical intelligentsia. Almost half of them believe that it is a matter of personal decision. Respondents from the sphere of education, humanities and social science come close to one another in their standpoints, namely that people living in the ethnically mixed region should at least have a passive command of Hungarian. The respondents from education reach the lowest share (about 10 percent) among the answers that command of Hungarian is not necessary. At the same time they link the knowledge of Hungarian to the demands of employment.

Bilingual Education*

We asked the respondents an open question as to how they evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of bilingual education, taking place in Prekmurje.

The majority of respondents stated a number of advantages of this model of education, and only a small percentage sees no advantages in it.

Among the advantages of this education model, the majority of respondents stated the following arguments:

»It is good for a child to learn a second language«

»Bilingualism is an advantage«

»Children easily learn a second language, which enables them to communicate with friends and surroundings«

»At the conclusion of bilingual education one has a possibility to continue his studies in another state«

»Through different topics one can learn about the culture and language of another nation living in the same territory«.

The majority ascribes advantage and value to the command of two languages. Respondents also underlined that the advantage of the present educational model is that children are not separated with regard to ethnic affiliation, because they study together. The advantage of the model is also its bringing up the young in the spirit of tolerance, promoting co-existence of different nations, contributing to ethnic equality. The above listed advantages were stated by three fourths of the respondents.

Approximately 4 percent of the respondents see no advantages of the bilingual model of education. Such an answer is no doubt due to the fact that all these individuals (declared as members of Slovene ethnic community) moved to Lendava as formed and mature persons (after completed schooling) and that none of the ever attended bilingual elementary school. In their opinion bilingual education does not affect the future status of Hungarian minority and even incites assimilation.

Among the disadvantages of the bilingual model, the largest share of the respondents exposed the fact that bilingual education in Prekmurje is not adequately organized. This opinion was expressed by less than a third of pedagogues (teachers, professors, workers in education) who are most familiar with the teaching processes and can therefore evaluate them critically. Their evaluation of the bilingual education process is undoubtedly the most objective because it is based upon their own experience.

* For a more detailed discussion, see Novak Lukanovič 2000a.

The second place among the disadvantages of the bilingual model was, according to all respondents, regardless of their profession, given to the fact that children are overburdened. Some also complained that after schooling pupils have insufficient command of both the languages.

A rather high percentage of the respondents (12,5 percent) did not answer the question about the disadvantages of the bilingual education in Prekmurje, which does not mean that there aren't any. With this standpoint, the respondents placed in the category »others« slightly deviate statistically. As we expected the question was not answered primarily by individuals who had moved to Lendava from other places, and had themselves not attended bilingual schools. Apart from this they don't have children attending bilingual school, so they do not consider themselves competent to evaluate its advantages and disadvantages.

With the question »what kind of organization of language education in the ethnically mixed region would you propose?« Statistic processing of the answers, regardless of the respondents' profile showed that the majority of them opted for present-type bilingual school (41,7 percent), while 22,9 percent was of the opinion that the most adequate model of education would provide bilingual classes for pupils who so desire, and classes in the mother tongue with second language as a compulsory subject for the rest. According to 10,4 percent of the respondents, placed third is the model having classes with Slovene as the language of instruction and classes with Hungarian as language of instruction. In both classes, the second language would be taught as a subject. Only about 3 percent of the respondents did not opt for any model, which shows their ignorance on this matter or their indifference towards bilingual education.

Table 16: The organization of language education in the ethnically mixed.

	N	%
Present type bilingual school	40	41,7
Bilingual classes for pupils who desire, and classes in mother tongue with second language as compulsory subject for others	22	22,9
Bilingual classes for the members of minority and classes in Slovene language with the Hungarian language as the compulsory subject	3	3,1
Classes with Slovene as the language of instruction and classes with Hungarian as language of instruction – second language as the subject	10	10,4
School with Slovene as the language of instruction and lessons in Hungarian language for all pupils	5	5,2
School with Slovene as the language of instruction and lessons in Hungarian language for pupils who want to attend	7	7,3
Other	6	6,3
n.a.	3	3,1
<i>Total</i>	96	100

The statistical analyses of this question show that there is a difference in the opinion among Slovenes and Hungarians and others. The majority of Hungarians opted for the present type of bilingual education, while one third of Slovenes opted for the second type of bilingual education (only for those who wish). It is interesting that also the majority of others (members of other nationalities-Croats, Serbs, Muslims) opted for the present type of bilingual education. The majority of pedagogical workers (employees in education) and social science intelligentsia opted for the present type of bilingual education. This result can not be based only on their subjective decision but it is very much based on their work experiences.

A critical and negative attitudes towards the present model of bilingual education (the use of two languages is disturbing, the model is unsuitable) can be directly or indirectly analysed from the other questions. These attitudes are directly related to respondent's ethnic adherence; a higher percentage of Slovenes and others think that monolingual classes would be more suitable and that the use of two languages is disturbing. Bilingual education is also not very well accepted by those respondents who moved later to the ethnically mixed area and so they haven't personally attended bilingual school and also they don't have their personal experiences with bilingual education. Over a half of respondents disagree with the opinion that only Hungarian children should attend bilingual school, which indicates that they accept the model of bilingual school and that the respondents' standpoints testify to their tolerant and approving attitude towards bilingual and bicultural reality.

Contacts with Hungary*

By a large majority of respondents, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, cooperation with the neighbouring Hungary was estimated as highly positive. They mainly emphasize that cooperation provides for the preservation of ethnic identity and cultural heritage, enriching of the language, access to Hungarian books and non-fiction literature. Cooperation with the parent nation favourably affects the status of the Hungarian ethnic community at Lendava.

The answers describing disadvantages of the cooperation with the neighbouring Hungary are scarce and diverse.

* For a more detailed discussion, see Mejak 2000.

Interethnic Relations and Politics*

Political organization of the Hungarian ethnic community of the Republic of Slovenia (as well as the Italian) is guaranteed by the Slovene Constitution.⁶³ Forms of organization and political participation are merely a logical continuation of the organization and forms of political representation which had been shaped in the former political system. The most important constitutional provision from the aspect of political participation is certainly the one determining that laws, other regulations and general documents concerning the implementation of the constitutionally guaranteed rights and status of ethnic communities only, are to be adopted by consent of their representatives. This is a provision ensuring the minority representation not only the possibility of ordinary co-decision by voting for or against, but also the possibility of obligatory consent or the right of veto. This enables the ethnic communities to be co-responsible for their own fate, that is to be the subjects of their own progress. The consent or the right of veto therefore do not only mean prevention of adoption of a certain law or measure, but also an obligation for the majority and minority to reach consent on all essential issues regarding the minority. Members of the Hungarian ethnic community have established no political parties of their own, but they participate in the political parties of the majority nation.

The above described represents a highly elaborate domain of articulation of political interests. We were interested in the degree to which political organization, according to respondents, affects the identity of the minority. That is why, within the frame of the question defining the estimation of individual factors from the field of political participation and organization, we posed a question whether political organization of the minority promotes its identity, or, whether to the contrary, it enhances assimilation, or has no influence at all.

According to our respondents the minority's political organization favourably affects the minority identity. This is the opinion of a good half of the respondents regardless of their ethnic affiliation.

»The present organization is satisfactory or adequate. In my opinion there are sufficient rights.«

Particularly within the ethnic community critical voices begin to be heard concerning the functioning of minority organization:

* For a more detailed discussion, see Jesih 2000, 2000a, 2000b.

⁶³ See Article 64 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia.

»It is good that Hungarians have an adequate forum, but unfortunately the present leadership is very weak. It rather represents than protects the rights«.

Remarks are also on the Slovene side:

»Rivalry within ethnic community structures weakens the community itself, therefore it is impossible to fulfil what is legally provided for, and some individuals threaten the minority interests and cause conflicts due to their own interests.«

Minority organization is blamed for its being confined within narrow ethnic frames and for wasteful spending of financial means.

Part of Hungarians had more critical remarks to the functioning of self-managing ethnic community:

»I believe that the distance between the base and the leadership is increasing. I find Lendava and villages Hungarians passive towards common affairs. Personal problems are in the foreground, common social affairs are neglected;«

There are also more extreme statements, such as:

»The present organization should be dissolved and re-established with completely new people.«

They were also critical about the relations with the majority:

»Tolerant and parallel cooperation with the Slovene community is rarely achieved«.

Minority Representation and its Influence at the Local and State Level*

The Hungarian ethnic community is in relation to the state represented by the Pomurje self-managing national community of the members of the Hungarian ethnic community

On the basis of the Law on elections to the State Parliament,⁶⁴ the Hungarian (and Italian) ethnic communities elect one representative to the State Parliament. All minority members having the right to vote have the active and passive right to vote. A special electoral unit is shaped for elections. Likewise two electoral commissions of the special electoral

* For a more detailed discussion, see Jesih 2000, 2000a, 2000b.

⁶⁴ Official gazette no. 44/92.

units are appointed for elections, which must contain at least one ethnic community member.

Individual ethnic community members also appear as candidates on the lists of majority nation political parties, and are, as a rule, elected. All members have the right to vote candidates from the political parties lists, thus practically having two votes at every election.

In this way two representatives among the 90 that form the Slovene Parliament are elected. They have the same status as all other representatives.

In the State Parliament, according to the standing orders, a special Commission for Ethnic Communities functions, which is a central working body dealing with issues concerning both the ethnic communities; its standpoints are directly conveyed to the plenary sessions of the State Parliament. Conclusions are adopted by obligatory consent of the two representatives.

The question to which degree the possibility of co-deciding at the state level affects the minority status and the preservation of ethnic identity was by a large majority, i.e. 72,9 percent (71-30 Slovenes and 35 Hungarians) answered that such a possibility has a positive impact upon the preservation of ethnic identity. Typical opinion (of a Slovene respondent) confirming this truth was:

»I think it important for the minority to have its representatives in all spheres of public life where decisions are taken so at municipal as at state level. Representation must be ensured directly and indirect presence also strived for«.

Or (another Slovene respondent):

»I would extend the minority rights regarding state level decisions«.

Another respondent sees the possibility of minority's own parliamentary party.

Only three Hungarians believed that such a possibility incites assimilation, while twelve respondents - five Slovenes and seven Hungarians - believed that it had no impact. More than 10 percent of the respondents did not answer this question.

The answers show that the possibility of co-deciding at state level is highly esteemed with both the national communities, although individual answers to some questions indicate that some respondents are not exactly familiar with the status and the rights of minority representatives in the Parliament, since they suggest the introduction of rights already granted to the two representatives (e.g. the right of veto). More about this later on.

Hungarians and Slovenes are mostly of the opinion that:

»The minority has sufficient right to co-decide«,

and quite a few respondents (8) emphasized that

»They should have equal rights as Slovenes.«

Which can also be explained as a demand to reduce a part of minority rights. This is evident from some answers of Slovene respondents who contradict the double right to vote:

»Double right to vote should also pertain to Slovenes.«

The special possibility of co-deciding is for some respondents particularly *»questionable«* at municipal level:

»At the state level minorities should have their representative in the Parliament; at local level it would be normal for the minority to execute its rights within local parties in municipal council, as the population structure is in favour of the minority. Considering the population structure of the municipal council, the minority can adopt decisions which are unfavourable for the majority nation; another solution would be for the entire population in the ethnically mixed region to have double right to vote.«

Such extremely critical opinions were rare (four).

We specifically asked how the minority possibilities to co-decide should be ensured or complemented. As mentioned before, a considerable number of the respondents specifically mentioned some rights already guaranteed to the minority, e.g. the right of veto, mentioned by a large part of respondents of both ethnic communities. The largest part of the respondents (20,5 percent) believed that the possibility of co-deciding is adequately arranged and no additional mechanisms are necessary:

»The present situation should be preserved, things are well settled (sufficient benefits are provided), they only need implementation.«

(a Hungarian respondent) Despite some critical voices, the majority of the respondents of both the ethnic communities saw the possibility of minority co-deciding in special mechanisms providing for it, e.g. the double right to vote, the right of veto, etc.:

»For a tiny ethnic minority a special mechanism is essential, such as double right to vote, the right of veto, yet the majority nation's understanding would be of greater significance. Minority should be given the right to decide about its rights through its representatives«
(a Hungarian respondent),

or

»The right of veto in language, culture and ethnic identity preservation issues«,

and

»By delegating of representatives into the bodies deciding about ethnic community rights which are important for their existence«.

These are mostly already existing mechanisms, therefore such answers can be interpreted in two ways: either these mechanisms are not sufficiently known and put into practice in everyday life, or the respondents do not know that they are already there.

6.3. Ukraine*

Demographic and Ethnic Structure of Uzhgorod

It is important to underline, that the current research has been carried out in the time of the most vulnerable economic and social transformations in the Ukrainian society, and the Trans-Carpathian region in particular. These circumstances have seriously affected the results of our study. To begin with, the city of Uzhgorod can be characterised by a high level of unemployment and very low level of incomes among the population. These factors increase the mobility in the city, provided the proximity of the East and West European borders. Uzhgorod borders mainly with the Slovak Republic. However, the nearest border to Hungary is in 25 km, while the border to Poland and Romania is respectively in 100 km from the centre of the city. Due to the high mobility of population in the city, it is rather difficult to provide a reliable statistics with regard to its population. However, it is obvious that after the World War II the population of Uzhgorod has significantly increased. To compare, the population of the city in 1930 was equal to 26.675 people, in 1959 - 47.396, 1979 - 90.995, in 1991 - 117.061, and in 1998 126.500. In other words, the population of the city has increased five times during the last seventy years.

Similar to the demographic structure of the city, the ethnic composition has dramatically changed. According to the statistical data, in 1919 there were 3,9 percent of population who used Ruthenian language, 80,3 percent used Hungarian, 6,8 percent used German, 7,2 percent spoke Slovak. More over, the data showed that 25 percent of Uzhgorod population were Jewish in 1919. However, they indicted their language as German or Hungarian. At the end of 1930, the demographic structure of the city was represented by 31,7 percent of Slovaks and Czechs, 24,7 percent of Ruthenians, 17,8 percent of Hungarians, 23,3 percent of Jewish and 2 percent of Germans. The genocide, mentioned in the chapters above, led to cleansing of Jews, Hungarians and German from the city population. As the result, in 1996 in Uzhgorod there were 69,9 percent of Ukrainians, 14,2 percent of Russians, 7,4 percent of Hungarians, 0,7 percent of Slovaks, 1,6 percent of Romanies, 0,5 percent of Jews and 2,4 percent of other ethnic groups. Among the others, there were 0,5 percent of Belarussians, 0,001 percent of Romanians and 0,06 percent of Germans. With regard to Ruthenians, who live in Uzhgorod,

* Chapter by Oksana Chmouliar and Vasyl Bedzir (p. 130-152).

the situation is similar to the one for the whole region, where the identification with Ruthenian has been prohibited. That is why it is unknown how many Ruthenians populate the city nowadays. However, during our field study, we met people who consider themselves Ruthenians, despite the fact that this ethnic groups does not exist in the official statistics.

To summaries shortly, it is obvious that some new nationalities have appeared on the demographic map of Uzhgorod. Resembling the situation in the region as a whole, Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians from the eastern part of Ukraine dominate in the demographic structure of today's city. The situation with Ukrainian as an identity should be especially underlined here. Namely, in pre-war Czechoslovakia »Ukrainian« as an ethnic belonging was associated with the people living in Galicia and east Ukraine. That is why for Trans-Carpathians, who call themselves Ruthenians, Ukrainians are considered to be migrants in the region, while, all Ukrainians tend to consider themselves as an indigenous population of the region. This question is rather delicate and requires further research in a more specialized study. At the same time, two other ethnic groups dominating the ethnic structure of today are definitely newcomers, because they started to populate the Trans-Carpathian region and the city of Uzhgorod not earlier than after the World War II. In a similar way, Romanies appeared in the region and in Uzhgorod during the last fifty years.

General Characteristics of the Sample

During the field study, thirty-five respondents were interviewed. Twenty-four of them were men, and eleven were women. All our respondents represent social, political or cultural elite of the city. In other words, they all work in the field of culture, education, policy making, mass media and research. To be more precise, according to their education seven male respondents are language specialists, five of them are historians, one is a biologist, five other men work in the sphere of culture and mass media. The rest are educated as engineers, physician and technical specialists. Among women, six are language teachers, and five others are teachers in mathematics and history.

According to the current occupation of the respondents, five men are teachers, five are working in the local municipality on the questions of culture and mass media, four work as journalists, two are research fellow at the historical department of Uzhgorod University. Among others there are a museum director, two writers, an artist, three engineers and one leader of the scientific association *Znanja* (knowledge). Our female

respondents also have various occupations. Five of them are working at the local municipality (one of them occupies high position), one of our female respondents is a docent at the University, another one is a librarian, the rest are teachers. Obviously that all our respondents are highly educated. Four of them have a PhD degree, of which two are female and two are male.

Our respondents have various ethnic backgrounds. Nine people are Ukrainians, six - Russians, six - Ruthenians, six are Hungarians, five are Slovaks, and one is Romanian and two respondents are Jewish. All of them are rather active in the ethnic and cultural association of the respective ethnic groups. The age structure of the sample falls into the following categories. Six respondents are under 30 years old, seventeen are in between 31 and 50, and twelve other respondents are above 51 years old.

It is interesting to emphasise that most of our respondents are representatives of the indigenous population of the region. Namely, they are Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Hungarians and Romanian. However, some of the Ukrainians have indicated that they did not live in the city or the region before. Instead, they have moved in Uzhgorod alone or together with their family because of the educational practice they had to complete after doing their studies. Otherwise, many of them came to the city in search for a job and stayed longer after a while. That is why they do not consider themselves as an indigenous population of the city, or of the region as a whole. In the group of our respondents eleven people belong to this category. Some of them are Ukrainians (two women and three men), some are Russians (four), two are Jewish. All of them, except one, came to Uzhgorod from the eastern part of Ukraine. One of them (a Russian) came to Uzhgorod after the World War II from Prague, where he lived in exile since the Bolshevik rule in Russia.

Only twelve of our respondents were born in Uzhgorod. The rest of the group has their roots in other regions of Trans-Carpathia, in Eastern Ukraine, Russia and former Czechoslovakia. Approximately half of all thirty-five respondents come from the rural area and half of them are from the cities. All respondents are Ukrainian citizens. However, one of them also has a stay permit for the Slovak Republic (this status is granted to all Slovaks living abroad).

Local Characteristics as Perceived by the Respondents and a Description of the Major Particularities of Uzhgorod

The respondents expressed quite a high interest to the questions they were asked. In most cases, they answered the closed questions and the ones with several choices with some extra commentaries. Moreover, almost all questions of the open character have been answered fully.

Another important issue, which has been mentioned earlier, is that our fieldwork took place in a situation of economic and social distress in the society. This fact came through many interviews as an expression of bitterness or deep concern about several problems. Among them are how the people will manage the new market economy policy, sharp social differentiation on rich and poor, as well as a new ethnic situation in the city, influenced by the mass movements across the border, high level of unemployment, crime and insecurity.

The majority of respondent's point out that Uzhgorod, as a city, is able to provide all necessary things for living. *»Historically, architecturally, ecologically and ethnically Uzhgorod is designed for a harmonic living in it«*, as several respondents indicated. Many respondents underlined that the specific features of the city can be summarised as being multi-national, close to the Western border, having long historical and cultural traditions. The general evaluations of the city are different, depending on the age and ethnic belonging of the respondents. For example, younger respondents are more optimistic with regard to the prospects of international co-operation of Uzhgorod with the countries of the Western Europe. Older respondents are more concerned about the high level of crime and social insecurity in the city.

Somewhat radical are the evaluations of Ruthenians, who are not officially recognised as an ethnic minority in Ukraine. Ruthenian respondents are more aware of the change, which has happened in the city after the World War II. Having learned from their grandparents and parents, Ruthenian respondents are more critical to the industrialisation and the way in which it has been introduced in the region during the Soviet time. On the other hand, the independence of Ukraine brought among other things, criminalisation and worsening of the economic standards of the local population. As a consequence, the moral and social values of the population have declined. Obviously, life in Uzhgorod is challenging and promising, difficult and encouraging. For example, one the expert expressed these tendencies in a poetical way

»West and East promise Uzhgorod warmth and hopes for the future, while South and North cause chaos, conflicts and unrest«.

Another respondent underlined that an ordinary person coming from Uzhgorod is a marginal type. He explains it by the fact that there are many people of different nationalities and social classes who have arrived to the city during the last 50 years. He stressed that

»There are no such people in the city who would identify themselves as 'We are from Uzhgorod'. Too many of them lived all their lives in different cities. Many are from other regions of Ukraine, or even further East (Russia)«.

Most of the respondents react positively to the high density of the city districts. Everything seems to be quite closely situated. Moreover, the respondents pointed out that Uzhgorod is a rather cosy city to live in, because of the nice architecture, even though it is eclectic, and many historical monuments. Among the negative sides of the life in the city the following are mentioned:

»Extremely high prices for the food and services«,

»Large numbers of the transit transport«,

»High level of unemployment«.

Among other negative factors mentioned are

»Absence of the advanced electronic enterprises«,

»The proximity to the border attracts too many illegal immigrants and criminals«.

It is important to emphasise that none of the experts interviewed mentioned ethnic variety of population as a negative factor. The majority tends to analyse more general factors of positive or negative life in the city, while ethnic factor is not mentioned to be as a decisive one. However, several experts expressed their concern about the increasing numbers of Romanians arriving to the city. This fact, in some sense, can be seen as a negative one with regard to the evaluation of the ethnic climate in Uzhgorod.

Other questions related to the ethnic relations in the city contain more facts on this issue. First of all, the respondents are less homogeneous in their answers. For example, let us take the question on the models of the ethnic relations and which of them is more adequate for Uzhgorod. Only seven respondents agreed with the first model of the relations between the ethnic communities. Namely, first they think that ethnic communities in Uzhgorod live next to one another, but without a special contact or common activities. Among them are some Russians, Ruthenians and Hungarians. Twelve experts of our study, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Russians, Hungarians and Jewish have chosen the second answer, which is that ethnic communities of Uzhgorod live one with another, meaning having

common cultural activities and events, striving for development of each other's communities. The rest of answers are closer to the third model, which is that ethnic communities in Uzhgorod tend mainly not having any contacts between each other.

Interestingly that experts from different ethnic groups explain the models using quite the opposite facts or beliefs. For example, one Russian respondent, who chose the second (the most positive) model, has commented

»I can not remember any single conflict among different nationalities living in Uzhgorod for the last 40 years«.

While a Hungarian respondent who chose the third model, further explained

»It is like a war going on between Ukrainians and Ruthenians«.

These contradictory expressions can be better understood with the help of further comments from the respondents. The same Russian respondent admitted

»I think that the ethnic tolerance in the city is explained by the mentality of the local people and not by the policies and social mechanisms of the authorities. People here have been used to live in an ethnic mixture«.

While another respondent, who was Ruthenian and also chose the third (negative) model has commented that

»The relations between the ethnic groups in the are often determined by the relations between the leaders of different ethnic communities. As a rule, the position of the leaders in the power structure of the city imposes the type of the relations between the different ethnic communities.«

In other words, the respondent argued that the ethnic relations between different groups are often coloured by the personal relations established between the separate representatives of one or another ethnic group. That is why, the relations between the leaders of the ethnic communities tend to be quite ambitious, intolerant and often politicised. At the same time, the ordinary people are more tolerant to the members of different ethnic groups. They do not necessarily agree with the points of view of the ethnic leaders.

The question on the territorial identity of experts brings many interesting issues to our study. While being asked with what they tend to associate themselves: with the city of Uzhgorod, with the Trans-Carpathian region, with Ukraine, with Europe and so forth, the answers looked like the following. Six respondents (among Hungarians,

Ukrainians and Jews) would rather associate themselves with *»Uzhgorodians«* (people from Uzhgorod). To note, all of them have been born in Uzhgorod. Most of the respondents would associate themselves with the Trans-Carpathian region first of all and then with any other territorial entity. Among those respondents were Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Hungarians and Russians. Two respondents indicated that their identity would be more of an European character. While only one person expressed his feeling of belonging to the whole planet. Surprisingly, only one respondent (a Hungarian) indicated that his first identity would be of the ethnic character. Only two respondents could not answer this question.

To make the above presented tendencies even more clear, we have also discovered that most of the people who express their belonging to the Trans-Carpathian region or to the city of Uzhgorod have been born there. While those people who came to the city or to the region later on tend to associate themselves with other territorial entities. This fact gives stronger evidence on the questions discussed in one of the previous chapter, where the regional particularism has been thoroughly analysed. That is that Trans-Carpathians tend to cherish their regional identity, its historical and traditional peculiarity. At the same time, they make a clear distance between their own territory and the territory of the rest of Ukraine.

Ethnic Affiliation

Answering the questions *»Is the ethnic background an important source of information on the person?«* One third of the respondents said *»Yes«*. Some of them even commented further

»The information on the ethnic background of a person can be the most important source of who is this person. What language, culture and religion this person has«.

Remarkably that Russian and Jewish respondents have answered negatively on this question. Only two experts refused to answer this question.

Related to this question is the one on the possibility to change one's ethnic belonging. Experts largely agreed with the fact that it is possible to change one's ethnic or national belonging. While one third of them, exactly those who answered on the previous questions positively, denied the possibility to change one's ethnic belonging. The explanation seems

obvious, because for them the ethnic belonging is the most important indicator of person's background.

Answering the question on what are the main determinants of one's ethnic affiliation the experts fell in the following categories. Among the key elements determining the ethnic affiliation most of the respondents place ethnic culture, traditions and cultural habits. The majority of the respondents, that is thirty out of thirty-five, chose these elements. It is interesting to underline that most of them also brought forward the language as the most decisive factor in one's ethnic affiliation.

These answers, however, did not depend on the ethnic background of the respondents or the place of their birth, etc. At the same time, there is some relation between this question and the respondents' religious affiliation. Because eleven experts out of thirty-five indicated that religion is extremely important for one's ethnic affiliation. These respondents belonged to different religious confession, namely Roman Catholic (Slovaks and Hungarians), Greek Catholic (Ruthenians and Ukrainians) and Orthodox (Ukrainian).

Few respondents (five) indicated that only the territory is an important factor for the ethnic affiliation. Among them were Ruthenian, two Hungarians, Romanian and Russian. There were some other answers, which were not given as choices. Namely, one Russian expert expressed that

»Self-consciousness is a decisive factor for one's ethnic affiliation«.

Another respondent of the Jewish nationality wrote that

»Each person decides what is important for his/her ethnic affiliation personally«.

One more answer from a Romanian expert suggested that

»Ethnic affiliation depends on with whom you have a feeling of the ethnic solidarity«.

In case of the mixed marriages seventeen respondents think that the ethnic affiliation should be decided after both mother and father. It is necessary to note that none of the Hungarian respondents chose this alternative of the question. Instead, all the Hungarian, as well as some Ruthenian and Slovak respondents agreed that the ethnic affiliation of a child should be determined after a father. Only two people, both Ruthenians, admitted that the ethnic belonging can be determined after mother, but only in case if there is no father in the family. Some respondents suggested that the ethnic affiliation of children from the mixed marriages can be negotiated between the parents. We found out also that some respondents, among them were Hungarians, Ukrainians, Slovaks and Russian, consider that people from mixed marriages should

choose their ethnic affiliation themselves after they fulfil eighteen years old. One of the most striking answers on this question was given by a Ruthenian expert, who said that

»Unfortunately while determining our ethnic affiliation, we should also take into consideration the official ethnic policy of the state we live in«.

Social Distances Between the Ethnic Communities

One of the questions of our inquiry has been constructed using the ranking scale of Bogardus, with the help of which we tried to measure the social distances between different ethnic groups living in the city of Uzhgorod. To make this possible, we asked our respondents some indirect questions, related to their readiness or on the contrary absence of it, to share the work place, live in the same house, or to have friends among different ethnic communities in the city. What was remarkable was that almost one and the same ethnic group has been excluded from the possible social contacts. Namely, all the respondents indicated the largest social distance to neighbours, or colleagues, or friends if they were Romanies. Only four people could imagine themselves a marriage with a person who is Romany. Those respondents were Russians and Jewish. Almost 3/4 of the whole sample answered negatively on the possibility to have Romanies as their friends. Less then a half of all respondents would agree to live with Romanies in the same house. However, another 3/4 of the respondents would not mind to communicate with Romanies at the work place. Eight experts who took part in our research did not want to have any contact with Romanies what so ever.

Another rather discriminated group, which we found out, was Romanians. Half of the experts asked would not allow a marriage with Romanian. Among these people were Hungarians, Slovaks, Ruthenians as well as Ukrainians. All those ethnic groups, to be noted, are the representatives of the indigenous population of the region. More tolerant to Romanians are Ukrainian and Russian respondents who arrived to Uzhgorod from the eastern part of Ukraine or from Russia.

The most tolerant were our Jewish respondents. On the other hand almost all Ukrainian, Ruthenian and Slovak respondent would not like to marry a Jew. Moreover, many respondents excluded the possibility to have friends among Jews.

Our special interest was attracted to the answers related to the Russian ethnic group. Russian respondents were quite positive to almost all ethnic groups, except to Romanies. Interestingly that Ruthenians and Ukrainians

exclude the marriage possibility with the people of the Russian nationality. Rather distanced and sometimes negative attitude to the Russian population in the region and in the city of Uzhgorod can be explained by a feeling of hatred or a desire *»to get even with the Russians«*. These negative attitudes are mainly of a general character. They are associated with Russian as a symbol of ideological repression, power and the metropolitan state, which Russia once was in the relation to the Trans-Carpathian region.

Hungarians represented a more tolerant group. They excluded only marriage possibility with Romanies or Romanians. Otherwise, they were quite open to have contacts with all ethnic groups on different levels of social relations. As it can be assumed, the most closed ethnic groups, which we investigated, were Ruthenians and Slovaks. It can be easily understood as a fear to dissolve in the ethnic mixture or to disappear from the arena of the numerous ethnic communities.

Culture

A block of questions touched upon the area of culture, including theatre, visual arts, music, literature etc. We were interested to measure both qualitative and quantitative indicators of the ethnic cultures, how they dominate or on the contrary are underrepresented in Uzhgorod. On these questions almost all answers were homogenous, namely majority of our experts admitted that Ukrainian culture was the dominant one in the city. The Ukrainian ethnic group contributes both professionally and on the amateurs' basis in the creation of the cultural atmosphere in Uzhgorod. Other ethnic groups are more influential in separate spheres of culture. For example, Jewish community was seen to be mostly represented in the sphere of theatre and art, Hungarians and Romanies were masters of the folklore music, Ruthenians led in the chorus singing.

Interestingly that only few respondents appreciated the contribution of the Ruthenian ethnic community. Otherwise, other ethnic groups were named as more influential. As average was the quality of the Hungarian and Russian communities in the visual art. Slovaks were valued quite low on this question, too. It was interesting for us to realise that none of the respondents tried to present his/her ethnic group as the best in quantity or quality of the cultural activities in Uzhgorod. When it comes to the publication of literature in different languages, Ukrainian community was evaluated as the most influential in this sphere. As average saw their own contributions the Hungarian and the Slovak experts. Very little publishing in their own languages had Germans and Ruthenians. Romanians did not

have almost any of the literature contribution in the cultural life of Uzhgorod.

As it became obvious, Ukrainians seemed to dominate the cultural life of the city. The most natural explanation to it is the number of the Ukrainian population in the city. As one Slovak respondent argued

»Quantity logically determines quality«.

A Ruthenian respondent was more radical by saying

»The cultural life in Uzhgorod is overwhelmingly Ukrainian«.

His bitter reaction was further commented as the following

»Often people mix up what is Ukrainian and what is Ruthenian in the Trans-Carpathian traditions. The oldest Ruthenian traditions, songs, tales sometimes are taken for Ukrainian. Suddenly, it is their heritage, but not ours«.

This tension on the Ukrainian and Ruthenian cultural roles are not about their content or meaning. Mostly, this tension is about the recognition of the ethnic minorities by the ethnic majority of the population.

Almost all respondents acknowledged that the Ukrainian majority has the largest financial support for their cultural activities. Ukrainians are supported on all three levels: national, regional and local. One Ukrainian expert put it this way

»The Ukrainian authorities seems to promote purely mono-cultural society«.

A Hungarian expert saw the situation a bit differently

»Ukrainians in Uzhgorod are supported by the Ukrainian government, Hungarians are supported by the Hungarian government and Slovaks, in their turn, receive the support from their own Slovak government. All of us are promoted from different sides, but there is no common policy when it comes to the multicultural policy in the city or in the region as a whole. All those policies are isolated from each other«.

Not all minorities in Uzhgorod enjoy the support from the authorities. For example, some Russian experts, pointed out that

»Nobody supports Russian population of Uzhgorod«.

One Russian expert reflected about the Romany community in Uzhgorod

»Their strong cultural solidarity and the contribution into the cultural life of Uzhgorod is generated by their long historical traditions and mentality«.

At the same time, few Ruthenian respondents indicted that difficult economic situation in the whole country prevents the potential sponsors to invest into any ethnic community, and those who are in power do not care about the development of the multiethnic culture.

All in all, almost nobody admitted that the Ukrainian culture, being largely supported from the state, was also the most developed. Only four people were inclined to think so. Instead, many respondents gave an impression that the matter is not in how talented or superior this or another minority is. The matter is who and how cares about his/her ethnic community.

Co-operation Between the Ethnic Communities

One of the questions of our research aimed to analyse the level of co-operation between the different cultural institutions in Uzhgorod. Remarkably, that no one of the expert thought that this co-operation works »very good«. Eight experts of different nationalities saw this co-operation as »good«. Such co-operation was seen as »insufficient« by a large number of respondents namely by ten of them.

Another third of the respondent argue that there is no co-operation whatsoever between the different cultural institutions led by different ethnic minorities in Uzhgorod.

»The nationalistic feelings of some leaders prevent this co-operation to develop properly«, said one Ukrainian respondent.

»All the problems are in the formalism and lack of the real desire to co-operate, which is characteristic for most of the ethnic associations leaders«, insisted one Jewish respondent.

»Cultural and ethnic associations function on their own and only symbolically are they united in the so called Democratic league of nations«, pointed out one Ruthenian respondent.

»Some co-operation, which takes place, is rather sporadic. It is not well organised at all. If only one of the ethnic groups is supported by the state (meaning Ukrainian), others just isolate themselves and are not willing to co-operate«, underlined a Romanian expert.

Quite surprising were the answers on the other question of the questionnaire, which we constructed particularly for the Ukrainian case. Namely, the experts were asked to reflect on the issue which cultural or social associations represent the interest of this or another ethnic group in

the best way. Only Ukrainian, Hungarian and Slovak respondents declared that they feel a certain support from their own ethnic association. While Russian, Jewish, Romanian and Ruthenian experts did not think so at all about their own ethnic associations. Not a single Russian respondent thought that the Russian ethnic association could represent his/her interests. Only two Ruthenians could see such help from their own ethnic association.

Mass Media

Similar to the evaluation of the cultural activities and events, the role of the ethnic mass media has been assessed according to its quality and quantity. In quantitative terms, the Ukrainian mass media was valued very high. However, the quality of it was not always appreciated. Neither content nor informativeness of the Ukrainian radio, press and TV were highly valued. Along with the Ukrainian broadcasting there exist two other languages in the mass media in Uzhgorod, namely Hungarian and Slovak. The Hungarian mass media is seen as a

»Fair protection of the interest of the Hungarian minority in Uzhgorod«, as one Hungarian expert pointed out. He further commented »Hungarian minority receives 90 percent of the information via these ethnic channels«.

Ruthenian and Slovak experts were not quite happy about the Hungarian broadcasting. They pointed out that Hungarian mass media exaggerate with the nationalistic ideas. The same point of view had a Romanian expert.

Many respondents saw the contribution of the Slovak media as average or even unsatisfactory at times. However, few respondents admitted that the Slovak mass media were *»more tolerant«* and *»more Slavic in their manner of expression«*. Quite on the contrary to the attitudes to the Russian population in the city, almost all respondents highly appreciated the professionalism of the Russian mass media. One Russian expert, however, underlined that

»The Russian media are sometimes very arrogant to Ukraine as a neighbour«.

Ruthenian respondents were quite disappointed with regard to their own mass media. They pointed out that in the neighbouring countries of Hungary, Slovak Republic and the Republic of Yugoslavia, local Ruthenians have much stronger financial support, including the support for the mass media, from the respective authorities.

It should be emphasised here, that radio broadcasting in the languages of the ethnic communities was rather underestimated in the evaluations of the experts. They all critically referred to the low level of the radio media, which could have been better used for the promotion of the ethnic languages and culture. The most contrasting were the evaluations of the Ruthenian experts. They referred to the fact that the Romany community received a special support for the opening of the ethnic newspaper. While Ruthenians still wait for the recognition of their needs in promoting their ethnic mass media.

Language Policy

Various evaluations were expressed with regard to the language situation in Uzhgorod. Surprisingly the respondents do not think that the fact that they are multilingual gives them some priority in comparison to those people who speak only one language. Instead, they think that command several languages is natural and even useful. Some experts underlined that multilingualism promotes a better communication between the different ethnic communities, as there are no language barriers. Moreover, a multilingual milieu promotes the learning of many languages, which can be useful while communicating with other counties across the border. The above mentioned comments are all related to the positive sides of the multilingual situation in Uzhgorod. However, our respondents have also expressed some negative comments. Among them are the following

»People who live in Uzhgorod have a very limited knowledge of the literature written in the languages of the people populating the region« one Ruthenian respondent pointed out.

»Our language is not pure, we borrow to many words from the languages which different ethnic communities speak« suggested some Russian experts.

»The language surrounding is often narrow by the borders of the ethnic community which speaks it«, said one Ukrainian respondent.

Another Ukrainian respondent commented that *»Variety of Ukrainian dialects prevents the pure Ukrainian language to develop and establish itself as a state language«.*

»Languages of ethnic groups are used mainly in the families and not that much on the official arena« indicated one Slovak respondent.

All those comments are rather critical to the language situation in Uzhgorod. However, having various attitudes to the language situation, experts still were quite homogeneous in their answers on the questions that one should strive to command the state language. In other words, along with having a good command of an ethnic languages, one has to learn Ukrainian. Only two respondents did not think that this was necessary.

On the contrary, when it comes to the good command of the ethnic minority languages, only half of all experts agreed that this was necessary. Their argument in favour of several languages was based on a tradition in the region to speak more than only one's own language. Another half of the respondents did not support this positive argument. They referred to the historical facts and insisted that learning of languages was also an element of the political oppression (like it was with the Russian as an obligatory language in all the schools during the Soviet time). Few respondents chose a middle position, emphasising that knowing of more than one's own language should be a result of one's own inner consciousness but not of obligation.

One set of question on this topic touched upon the priorities/drawbacks, which multilingualism can give to an employee in the spheres of communal service, culture and mass media. This set of questions is one of those, which were put forward with the aim to compare the situation in all three countries involved in the current study, Ukraine, Slovenia and Estonia. It was interesting to discover that most of the respondents were positive to having a good command of several languages in such spheres as municipal authorities, law-court, police and customs, as well as educational institutions. Similar was opinion about the language demands in culture and mass media institutions. The majority of the respondents thought that an employee of such institutions should speak more than one language.

Logically that two thirds of all the experts agreed that bilingual employees should be paid extra for knowing more than one language. One third of the respondents did not think that it was necessary. Quite interesting were the answers to the question related to this issue. Namely, the authorities should promote, the so-called, positive discrimination in favour of the variety of ethnic languages at the working places instead of the homogeneity of it. Two thirds of the experts pointed out that the

»The promotion of bilingualism at the working place is a very positive thing, however the absence of it should not be sanctioned either«.

In general, all respondents tended to be rather satisfied with the current status of the ethnic minority languages in Uzhgorod. However, the representatives of the smallest languages groups have made some critical comments, namely Russian and Ruthenian.

»Both ethnic communities suffer the lack of the promotion of their languages because the Ukrainian language dominates everywhere. Moreover, other ethnic minority groups also deserve to have a higher status«,

as the respondents of these two groups indicated. Concern of the both ethnic groups can easily be understood. The Russian language, which used to be

»a Great Russian language«,

now have become just a language of a tiny ethnic community living in Uzhgorod. At the same time, Ruthenians are concerned about the fact that their language is seen not more than a dialect of the Ukrainian, while in Hungary, Slovak Republic and the Republic of Yugoslavia it has a special status.

Education

The experts accentuated that the fact of the multiethnic education, that is the education in different languages, as a very positive factor for Uzhgorod. In general, there are twenty minority schools in the city of Uzhgorod. One of them is with the Hungarian language of instruction, five with the Russian languages and fourteen with the Ukrainian language. It is rather impressive that the education in the schools of Uzhgorod is carried out in four different languages fully: Ukrainian, Russian, Hungarian, and Slovak. Education in Romany is conducted in some schools on the facultative basis. Russian, Ukrainian and Hungarian minorities enjoy the education in their own language in separate, ethnic schools. Slovaks usually attend schools, where the Slovak language is thought intensively.

No one was against the ethnic education. Even more, the Ukrainian respondents considered it necessary to learn the languages of other ethnic groups in the Ukrainian schools. However, other experts were not that positive about the idea of the education in different languages in parallel. Probably they are afraid that the parallel language learning may set other ethnic languages aside and give a priority only to the languages of the larger communities, such as Ukrainian.

All respondents, except the Ukrainians, were quite reserved in relation to current model of education in which Ukrainian language is especially emphasised. The Ukrainian respondents believed that

»The promotion of the Ukrainian language helps young people to feel themselves as full citizens of the Ukrainian State«.

On the other hand, experts from other ethnic groups warned that

»Teaching exclusively in Ukrainian we undermine the ethnic structure of our society«

»Such a development narrows down the cognitive and linguistic developments of children« said one Ukrainian respondent.

In addition, one Russian expert underlined that

»Promotion of one language only limits the possibilities of the communication across the borders of the ethnic community. We learn nothing about 'the others' and their culture«.

All in all, a good command of all ethnic minority languages, used in Uzhgorod, is a big asset. But it can not be used anywhere else then in Uzhgorod itself, Trans-Carpathian region or in the neighbouring counties, which is not such a little area, in the end.

Religious Component of the Mixed Community

Above we argued that the religious factor of the mixed communities became an obstinate factor of our analysis. In that chapter we have thoroughly described the historical and cultural aspects of the religious situation in the Trans-Carpathian region. Though a substantial basis for this empirical analysis has been drawn up there. That is why, here we are not going deep into the religious affiliations of the different ethnic communities in Uzhgorod. Instead, we have asked our respondents to answer more qualitative questions related to this issue. For example, two thirds of our respondents consider themselves as believers and belongs to a traditional religious confession. Among those respondents who did not think of themselves as believer, there was no one who would call him/herself an atheist. Moreover, only three respondents from the whole group did not celebrate religious holidays. This rather traditional religiosity of the Uzhgorod population is quite a remarkable fact. Even, the so-called non-believers still celebrate all the religious holidays and appreciate cultural traditions. As an explanation of what belief in God means for them, ten respondents chose *»ethnic tradition«*. Five respondents indicted that belief in God is *»a family tradition«*. Other respondents associated the belief in God with

»God itself«,

»Place of meeting with other believers«,
»Cultural and spiritual prominence«,
»Spiritual consciousness«, »belief in goodness«, etc.

Interethnic Relation and Politics

The opinions of the experts were very ambivalent with regard to the social and political context of the ethnic relations in Uzhgorod. One and the same respondent could be positive and negative to the same issue discussed. For example, one respondent expressed the following points of views

»It is obvious that people of different ethnic background respect each other«.

And

»I think that the education in the languages of the ethnic minorities should be developed better«.

Additionally,

»In Trans-Carpathia all ethnic groups are in competition to each other (in a positive way)«.

Similar expressions were characteristic for many other respondents. Russians and Ruthenians expressed most of the negative points of view, which again can be explained by their vulnerable position in the society. One Russian expert underlined

»Since the beginning of the 90's the situation of the Russian people in Uzhgorod has changed dramatically, while the situation of Hungarians and Slovaks did not change much«.

A separate question on this topic was devoted to the status of the indigenous population, namely Ruthenians. With exception of six respondents, the rest was very positive to the recognition of the status of Ruthenians as an ethnic minority. Some of the Ruthenian respondents admitted that they did not advocate the separation of the Ruthenians from the Ukrainian people, however, they insisted that the name of the minority should revive. They singled out that

»Rusnatsi as the name of the ethnic group is alive. Many relatives who live abroad register themselves under this name. This is our history, our roots«.

There were few Ruthenians who considered Ruthenian and Ukrainian roots as the corresponding to each other. Still, they did not mind to revive the original name of the indigenous people.

The position of the majority in this question can be exemplified by the following point of view

»Every person has a right to decide what is his/her nationality. Self-identification should be respected«.

However, there were somewhat political aspects on this matter underlined. One Slovak expert argued that

»Ukraine, if it considers itself a democratic state, is obliged to recognise the status of Ruthenians. It will calm down the tensions, which exist towards the ethnic Ruthenian associations as well as to the forced nationalisation, which is going on«.

Another Slovak respondent underlined that

»The recognition of the Ruthenian ethnic minority status would be more than fair towards the indigenous population, which preserved their specific features and deserve to be represented on the multi-ethnic arena of the society. They have all the constitutional rights to demand such a status«.

At the same, the right to the political recognition for the Ruthenians is denied by a small group of those respondents who think that this would lead to the

»... political provocation« and »... unlawful state of affairs«.

As a summary of the political influence on the ethnic situation in Uzhgorod, the respondents were asked to name the factors, which either stimulate the vitality of an ethnic group, or its assimilation, or do not produce any impact at all. Respondents of the smaller ethnic groups (Hungarian and Slovak) strongly agreed on that the main promotional factor for the ethnic minority's vitality is a support from the mother state. We would like to comment here: Such a support plays a key role now, when the economic situation in the country is very dramatic. However, there was a certain disagreement noticed between the Hungarian and the Slovak ethnic groups. One Slovak respondent commented

»An absolute support from the mother countries side can lead to the self-isolation of the ethnic group from others. This is very characteristic for the Hungarian minority«.

Another, Ukrainian, respondent reflected on the situation of other ethnic groups as the following

»Jews and Romanies do live separately from others in Uzhgorod. The assimilation factors do not influence them«.

Finally, there was a set of questions related to the impact, which local authorities had on the promotion of the ethnically mixed communities and its functioning. Answering this question. The majority of the respondents agreed that the fact of the high ethnic tolerance in Uzhgorod was not a merit of the local authorities.

»It is a historical feature of the region. People living here are used to manage ethnic mixture themselves«, a respondents underlined.

Experts saw it as a positive factor that people could travel more easily abroad and communicate with their relatives and friends among Slovaks, Hungarians and Ruthenians in the neighbouring countries. Naturally, the freedom of movement is especially appreciated because new opportunities occurred to open internal enterprises and promote the economic co-operation across the borders. Some respondents admitted that shuttle trading and short-term employment in the neighbouring countries are the major sources of the survival for many people living in Uzhgorod.

However, respondents did point to many deficiencies of the local authorities.

»We know too little about what ethnic policy is carried out in the city and in the region as a whole. The local authorities do not try to promote our ethnic associations neither financially nor ideologically.«

Many positive features of the current political freedoms (such a freedom to move) have been associated with the reluctance of the local powers to protect the local labour market from the out flow of the labour abroad and disproportional ethnic representation at the local labour market. As it becomes obvious, many of political aspects of the ethnic situation in the city tend to slide down in the economic sphere. This is understandable, because the economic crisis and social unrest do dominate the political discourse of the today's Uzhgorod. The reasons are self-evident. Uzhgorod has the highest rate of unemployment in comparison to other cities in Ukraine. Prices for food and services are galloping. It seems that economy would rule the political arena of Uzhgorod for many years to come.

Discussion and Conclusions

Trans-Carpathian region of Ukraine situated on the north-west side of Carpathian mountains has its specific character shaped by its long and

turbulent history, geopolitical centrality and ethnically mixed status. Uzhgorod is its capital. Due to its »border zone« European position the city has a very high potential of internal and external migration, as well as a multi-ethnic spirit. Here, side by side for many centuries, live Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, Jews, Germans, Russians, Belarussians, Romanies and fourty other small ethnic groups.

The absence of the serious ethnic confrontations or tensions in the city has their deep historical roots. In other words, people populating this area, where Uzhgorod belongs, have always been able to manage their ethnic mixture. Before 1991 as well as after, the ethnic problems tend to be resolved with a special tolerance and respect for all ethnic communities, and mainly the sense of regional communality shared by different ethnic groups. Even the national renaissance of 80-90's shaking the whole Europe did not undermined the long lasting amity in the city and in the Trans-Carpathian region as a whole.

Rapid industrialisation process in the region brought many people to move from the villages and town to the bigger cities, where the employment and infrastructure were more easily available. The population of the Trans-Carpathian cities, Uzhgorod as the biggest, increased also due to the inter-regional migration. These both types of migration have caused further diversification of the ethnic structure in the region, and in its big cities in particular. Before the native population including Ruthenians, Hungarians, Romanians and Ukrainians dominated the ethnic profile of Uzhgorod. Now the newcomers to the regions, Ukrainians from the eastern Ukraine, Russians and Belarussians are in majority. The majority of the respondents, taking part in our empirical study, underlined that the ethnic mix of the city is a very positive factor in a sense of multi-linguality, ethnic education and getting to know each others culture in a better way. However, the rapid migration in the region, both internal and external, influences Uzhgorod in a negative way too. Because the proximity to the borders and freedom to travel attracts lots of illegal migrants, as well as increases the criminality and insecurity in the city.

Another noticeable feature of the ethnic situation in the city is a shift in the ethnic self-identification of the native population of the region, which occurred during the Soviet time. For example, the self-identification Ruthenian or »rusnak« has been transformed into »Ukrainian« or »Russian«. This transformation of the ethnic self-identification was partly imposed and had deeply rooted in the mentality of the local population and other people in Ukraine. However, since Ukraine became an independent state, the former restriction has been abolished. Now many people of the older generation come back to calling themselves »rusnatsi«. Most of the respondents agreed that Ruthenians

should be given a special status, as an ethnic minority of the region.

Other autochthonous people began to use their original ethnic identity instead of the imposed one during the years of suppression. The memory of many native ethnic communities is full of the mass repression, genocide and crime. Among such ethnic communities are Hungarians, Germans, Romanies and especially Jewish. Furthermore, many people of the Jewish, Slovak, German, and Hungarian ethnic affiliation have left the Uzhhorod and the Trans-Carpathian region for good. Therefore, such ethnic groups as Jews and Slovaks, as well as Germans and partly Hungarians tend to disappear from the ethnic profile of the city. For example, in our expert study, we managed to find only one Romanian, and two Jewish respondents. Romanies unfortunately were not available at all in those strata of population where all our respondents were found.

The Uzhgorod population has been especially affected by the closure of the major enterprises in the region because its production sector, being one-sided, was heavily dependent on them. The critical situation in the economy of the city has somewhat of an explosive character. That was the reason why many of our respondents were inclined to explain the ethnic and political difficulties in the city primarily by the difficulties of the economic situation.

However, there is all the evidence to argue that the ethnic situation in the city does not carry any conflictual tendency. The dissatisfaction with the economic and social situation in the region does not actually lead to the open resistance of Uzhgorod population to the official capital, Kyiv. What is the most important, though, is that Uzhgorod, having a long tradition of ethnic communities living together, treat each other with a special respect and tolerance. This gives a certain hope for the better life in the region for the years to come. Cultural elite of the city is aware of the necessity to improve the co-operation between the different ethnic communities.

When being asked to comment freely on the changes, which could be introduced in the ethnic sphere of the city, the experts suggested many interesting possibilities. Some of them seem to be very important for the issue under the study.

»The attitudes of the local authorities to different ethnic groups lack the basic principal of democracy. 'Convinced Ukrainofils' should not dominate the political vanguard of the city and the Trans-Carpathian region«.

»Many things should be done in order to improve the cultural atmosphere in Uzhgorod. All ethnic minorities should be guaranteed equality of treatment in all, economic, political and cultural spheres«.

»Our political leaders need to be more persistent in the development

of the common ethnic policy for the promotion of the mixed community of Uzhgorod».

Towards a conclusion

The nature of the status relationship (historical, political, social, language status) accounts for the actual nature of interethnic relations in mixed communities,

- Disjunctive (disintegrative) processes seem to be a more typical phenomenon in mixed communities where political status of the subcommunities has recently been reversed due to (re)establishment of independent states (the case of Sillamäe). In mixed communities with traditional minorities, however, transcultural competence appears to be a shared value.
- In all three countries the establishment of the national language as the state language seems to be of high priority. In Sillamäe and in Uzghorod, future and official management of interethnic relations is seen through normalisation taking mainly place through intergenerational (Estonian and Ukrainian) language and culture transmission, going on hand in hand with the minority languages' status planning in individual domains (education, culture, mass media, etc.).
- Policy and practice of respect of human rights and promotion of ethnic subcommunities' characteristics (minority rights) contributes to creative interaction and coexistence in mixed areas.
- Insight into and participation in individual domains of the other subgroup's activities (culture, language, way of life, etc.) promotes the communication and interaction in mixed communities and contribute to multiplication of the »good« practice indicators,

Proceeding from the above findings, it has been ascertained, that management of cultural pluralism in the three mixed communities, as different as they are, can be - as planned - compared with regard to »good« and »bad« practice indicators. The most outstanding common denominator in the three areas seems to be the sociolinguistic domain. In all three countries, after independence, much of the cultural pluralism management efforts have been invested in quest for appropriate status relationship between the newly established State language and languages of other ethnic groups. Even in Slovenia, where for decades now, the model of two-way bilingualism has been established in policy and practice, and accepted as a way of life in the mixed areas, some alternatives have been registered.

In Estonia, for instance, the national policy towards ethnic diversity of its population has been formulated, the main target groups being mostly newly established minorities. Along with redistribution of the social power in other domains, creation of a language policy model, regulating sociolinguistic practice in favour of the newly emerged state language, seems to be a priority.

In Silamäe, interethnic ethnic relations reflect predominantly separation, without any significant ethnic conflict. Estonian identity has a different configuration of partial identities. Russians have been increasingly seen as outsiders, who should sort out their problems with no detriment to the whole society. Territorial identity corresponds to the whole national territory.

In some mixed communities in Ukraine a kind of »grassroot multiculturalism« emerged, originating from the shared historical destiny and necessity to survive in spite of all social transformations.

In both countries the unsettled citizenship presents an additional issue in this framework.

Both Estonian and Ukrainian population have been exposed to the indoctrination by the previous Soviet policy of »internationalism« and merging of ethnic entities into a »Soviet nation«. In view of management of cultural pluralism (mixed communities), these phenomena have to be taken into account in investigation of identity issues, perceptions and attitudes towards one's own and towards other ethnic communities, (especially towards the ex-dominant Russian communities in our case).

The system of measures administered in the ethnically mixed regions in Slovenia is based on the positive concept of minority protection providing the so called special rights for promotion of their ethnic features, culture and language. Cultural pluralism in Slovenia is understood as mutual participation of the members of either majority or minority in each other's cultural life. On the linguistic level cultural pluralism is manifested in two-way linguistic accommodation grounded

on an expanded (at least passive) knowledge of the minority language on the part of the majority members.

The groups in the region belonging to the national majority are encouraged to become bilinguals, too. In the regional context, the national majority had no higher status than the recognised minority of Hungarian speakers. In education, the region was managed as if it was formed by two rather equal minorities. The survey data point to the fact that in spite of critical remarks the mixed community is perceived as a local phenomenon characterised by shared linguistic and cultural competence.

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