Argumentation in language and the Slovenian connective pa

Igor Z. Zagar

IPrA Research Center, University of Antwerp, Belgium
and
Center for Discourse Studies, Institutum Studiorum Humanitatis, Ljubljana, Slovenia

1994

Copyright 1994 - Igor Z. Zagar
TABLE OF CONTENTS

0. Introduction ..................................................... 4

1. Argumentation "in" language vs. argumentation "with" language .... 5
   1.1. Informativeness and argumentativeness ..................... 5
   1.2. To propose an argument, to demonstrate, to deduce ...... 8
   1.3. Argumentative orientation .................................... 9
   1.4. Supposed and presupposed .................................. 11
   1.5. Argumentative scales ......................................... 14
   1.6. Topoď' ....................................................... 17
   1.7. Polyphony .................................................... 24

2. Pa, the reverser of argumentative expectation? .................. 27
   2.1. Some definitions ........................................... 27
   2.2. The hypothesis .............................................. 31
   2.3. The analysis .................................................. 32
       2.4. An example ................................................ 39
0. Introduction

For about 20 years, the French linguist Oswald Ducrot has been trying to develop his own theory of argumentation - a theory very different from the "mainstream" argumentation theories - a theory of "argumentation in language".

In the first part of this paper we will try to describe the shaping and the development of this theory, its conceptual apparatus and its analytical scope. Of course, Ducrot himself might not subscribe to all of the points I make. Also, we shall have neither time nor space to discuss in detail all the problems and transformations his theory is currently undergoing.

In the second part of the paper I will try to apply some of its concepts in order to analyze one of the (interpretatively) most puzzling connectives of the Slovenian language, the connective pa.
1. ARGUMENTATION "IN" LANGUAGE vs. ARGUMENTATION "WITH" LANGUAGE

Oswald Ducrot distinguishes four phases in the development of his theory of argumentation:

- the strong informativistic version
- the weak informativistic version
- the weak version of argumentation in language
  and
- the strong version of argumentation in language.

The latter is at present in a critical stage of formation and transformation.

1.1. Informativeness and argumentativeness

The basic supposition of the first, "strongly informativistic" version - which he never really advocated, but used as a (presupposed) theory in opposition to which he constructed his own theory instead - is the postulate that every conclusion or, more accurately, every instance of putting forward an argument towards a conclusion, is based solely on "facts" conveyed by an utterance-argument. If it is possible to draw a C(onclusion) from an A rgument, this is the case because the utterance A "factually" supports the utterance C - by citing or presenting "facts" which speak in favor of the utterance C although it may not support it in some other way, for example in a structural linguistic way (e.g. by making use of special language particles).

If the utterance

(1) Janez studied for only an hour or so

can be used as an argument or can serve as an argument for the conclusion

(2) He won't pass the exam

then - in accordance with the "strong informativistic" thesis - this can be done only on the basis of the "fact(s)" that Janez studied for only an hour or so, and that an hour of studying is (usually) not enough to pass the exam, but not on the basis of, for example, the argumentative

---

1 The research for this paper was carried out in the context of a research program supported by the Slovenian Ministry of Science and Technology and a Belgian Ministry of Scientific Affairs postgraduate research grant (W&T-samenwerking met Centraal- en Ost-Europa), offered in the framework of the IUAP-II 'Taalpragmatiek' (Diensten van de Programmatie van het Wetenschapsbeleid, contract number 27).
orientation of the particle only, i.e. the orientation which is the domain of language\(^2\), rather than some extra-linguistic "factuality". In example (1) we have the type of argumentation which is (supposed to be) entirely non-linguistic, or, it is linguistic only to the extent that it uses language as a conventional, standard means of communication, as a "medium", which does not affect the "message" that it conveys.

Of course this spontaneous and common sense "theory" is immediately confronted with counter-examples. Let us assume that we work on a seminar paper about friction between Yugoslav nations in post-Titoist Yugoslavia and that we are especially interested in the subtleties of Mr. Milosevic' style (because of the results he achieved); we ask our friends involved in the social sciences to refer us to somebody who might know something about our object of interest, and we get the following two answers:

(3) Janez did not read all Milosevic' speeches (Argument)
    He may not be able to advise you (Conclusion)

and

(4) Marko read some of Milosevic' speeches (Argument)
    He may be able to advise you (Conclusion)

Utterances (3) and (4) display an obvious discrepancy between informative and argumentative values. The "fact" that Janez did not read all Milosevic' speeches, on the "factual", informative level could also mean that he read all of Milosevic' speeches except maybe one, and the "fact" that Marko read some of Milosevic' speeches, on the "factual", informative level could mean that he, perhaps, read only one or two speeches. Janez would thus be an incomparably more suitable "informant" than Marko, but language does not allow the argumentative strings (3') and (4').

(3') *Janez did not read all of Milosevic' speeches (Argument)
    He may be able to advise you (Conclusion)

(4') *Marko read some of Milosevic' speeches (Argument)
    He may not be able to advise you (Conclusion)

\(^2\) That some linguistic entity is argumentatively oriented means that its presence in the given discourse segment imposes or represents some restriction affecting the continuation of the discourse. In other words, even if the particle only were followed by "twenty hours", and not "an hour or so", the utterance would still (have to) lead to a negative conclusion. This, of course, challenges the "factuality" of "the fact, that one hour of studying is usually not enough to pass the exam". Namely, how many hours are enough to pass the exam, especially if we take into account a restricting role of the particle "only"? More on this subject later in the text.
In order to be able to remove asterisks from utterances (3′) and (4′), (i.e. make them argumentatively acceptable), we would have to bring in argumentatively oriented modifiers, for example but in (3′) = (Nevertheless, he might be able to advise you), or only in (4′) = (Marko read only some of Milosevic speeches).

1.2. To propose an argument, to demonstrate, to deduce

We said that it was language that didn't permit argumentative strings (3′) and (4′). What precisely does this mean? Above all it means that to propose an argument is not to demonstrate something in a logical manner, and that argumentation is not based on the rules of logical deduction. The mechanism to arrive at a conclusion in examples (3) and (4) is not the same as the one involved in (5).

(5) a. All Slovenians are nationalists
   b. Janez is Slovenian
   ----------------------------------
   c. Janez is a nationalist

While example (5) is a logically supported conclusion, a syllogism, where the conclusion c is a necessary consequence of the premises a and b, the conclusions in examples (3) and (4) are in no way a necessary consequence of the arguments that actually introduce them. Someone could use the utterance Janez did not read all of Milosevic' speeches as an argument for a completely different conclusion, for example, Janez is a blockhead, or, He will see what is in store for him, and these would be completely different argumentations from the one employed in argumentative string (3). However, the latter conclusions would be no less grounded or justified. In contrast to (logical) demonstration or deduction, which is based on the laws of logic, argumentation is based on a knowledge and judgment of the world, reality and the concrete situation of the speaker, especially on the assessment of the position that an utterance has (or can have) in a concrete situation, and an assessment of (possible) conclusions to which an utterance-argument might lead.

One of the basic characteristics of argumentation is that it is not linear and uniform but, on the contrary, polemical. With an utterance-conclusion (or more precisely, the soundness of argumentative relation between an utterance-argument and an utterance-conclusion) it is possible to polemize, oppose and refute it, or even substitute it with another utterance-conclusion, whereas this is not possible in the case of logical conclusion. Logical conclusion is linear and uniform, and conclusions which are the consequence of logical deduction cannot be refuted or substituted - (solely) on the basis of our knowledge and judgment of the world - with other conclusions. In such a case we would simply no longer have a logically valid conclusion.

---

3 We are of course referring to the so called "classical" logic.
1.3. Argumentative orientation

An argumentative relation (between an utterance-argument and an utterance-conclusion) is thus completely different from a logical relation (between premises and conclusion) which is also supported by the "fact" that some conclusions, discursively completely acceptable, logically make no sense at all.
Let us consider the following conversational fragment (which I borrowed from Moeschler (1985)):

(6) A: *Is dinner ready by now?*
   B: *Yes, almost*

In terms of logic, this dialogue makes no sense. Dinner can be either ready by now, or not ready yet. It can be almost ready, but this, logically taken, means that it is not ready yet; therefore, *Yes, almost* is in no way a possible answer to the question *Is dinner ready by now?* because this would be a contradictory utterance, namely: *Yes, dinner is not yet ready.*
By contrast, this dialogue is discursively, pragmatically completely acceptable, and it owes this acceptability - paradoxically as it may seem - exactly to the (problematical) particle *almost.*
The (utterance) *Dinner is almost ready* presents an argument in favor of some implicit conclusion (i.e. a conclusion which extends beyond the explicit dialogue and which A himself must draw from it), such as, *I must hurry up.* This conclusion is also supported by the (logically "purer") argument *Dinner is ready by now,* the argument *Dinner is ready by now* being stronger than *Dinner is almost ready,* but with the same argumentative orientation. In other words, this means that on the argumentative scale of the "dinner's readiness"

```
/dinner's readiness/
   /-\ 
     | ready
     \_
        | almost ready
        \_
           | ready soon
```

the argument *Dinner is almost ready* actually occurs as a weaker one, but it supports the same conclusion as does the stronger (or the strongest) argument on the scale. An argumentative orientation is thus, regardless of the context, inherent in the very particle *almost,* which means that every utterance-argument containing the particle *almost* represents a restriction affecting the continuation of the discourse: the utterance-conclusion following it must argumentatively pursue the course mapped out or delimited by the use of the particle *almost,* contained in the utterance-argument. In other words, from *Dinner is almost ready* it is impossible to conclude (in the direction of) *There is still time, you don't have to hurry.*
That explains, at least partially, why in the examples (3) and (4) we had to adopt the conclusions we actually adopted. But let us step back for a moment, just to be able to see more
clearly what really is the problem.

1.4. Supposed and presupposed

Examples (3) and (4) which we took to illustrate the difference between informativeness and argumentativeness may be very illustrative, but they are certainly not the most appropriate ones because they use two (lexically) different morphemes, *not all* and *some*. The difference between informativeness and argumentativeness becomes much clearer when we have to deal with (lexically) synonymous morphemes with very different argumentative values. Ducrot's favorite example is the difference between the French adverbs *peu* and *un peu* (which could be translated into English as *little* and *a little*). Informatively, there is no difference between the two: both of them denote a "small quantity" of something. But argumentatively, if we use them in discourse, there is a big difference: *little* is argumentatively oriented towards *nothing, not at all*, whereas *a little* is argumentatively oriented towards *a lot*. How is that?

Let us take a look at the following two examples:

(7) *Janez worked little. He won't pass the exam.*
(8) *Janez worked a little. He will pass the exam.*

Here we have two examples which on the "factual", informational level, deal with the same small quantities of something, but which argumentatively allow for very different conclusions. How can we explain that?

In his "weak informativistic" phase Ducrot tried to solve that problem by distinguishing between the supposed and the presupposed in the utterance-argument. Un utterance such as

(9) *Preseren*⁵ was a great poet

can thus be analyzed into what is supposed

(p): *Preseren's poetry was extraordinary*

and into what is presupposed

( pp): *Preseren was a poet.*

It is usually taken as a test for distinguishing what is supposed from what is presupposed in a given utterance, that its presupposition must not change if we a) negate the utterance, b) put it

---

⁴ "Supposed" and "presupposed" try to render in English the French terms "supposé"/"presupposé". I realize that the translation may not be the best one (it is the best one I could think of, though), but the meaning of the terms will be made clearer later in the text.

⁵ *Preseren is a nationally glorified poet in Slovenia.*
into an interrogative form or c) embed it in a subordinate clause. If we apply those three criteria to our example (9) we can conclude that our analysis was correct. Utterances

(9') Preseren wasn't a great poet
(9'') Was Preseren a great poet?
(9'''') Slovenians are convinced that Preseren was a great poet,

in principle retain the same presupposition: Preseren was a poet. We must say 'in principle', because the range of the negation in (9') could easily be the whole phrase great poet, and not only the adjective great, which means that the presupposition (Preseren was a poet) would be negated too. That being the case, we could easily use (9') as an argument for a conclusion such as He was a crook, namely Preseren wasn't a great poet (Argument), he was a crook (Conclusion).

That is why Ducrot introduced a new, decisive criterion, for distinguishing between what is supposed and what is presupposed: **an utterance-conclusion can only be drawn from what is supposed, but not from what is presupposed.** Only after applying this criterion can we be sure that our distinction between of what is supposed and what is presupposed in (9) was correct. From Preseren was a great poet (Preseren's poetry was extraordinary) we can easily conclude We built him a monument, whereas the presupposition Preseren was a poet doesn't allow for such a conclusion (at least not in Slovenia; which doesn't mean of course that there could not be a country where they build monuments for every poet).

This criterion is crucial for explaining and understanding the different argumentative orientation of utterances (7) and (8). Utterance (7) could be analyzed into:

p: the quantity of Janez's work is small
pp: Janez worked

and the utterance (8) into:

p: Janez worked
pp: the quantity of Janez's work is small.

By doing that we retain the informative component of both utterances (the quantity of Janez's work is small) and explain their different argumentative orientations, but the problem of informativeness returns through the back door.

It is obvious that little is argumentatively oriented in the same direction as nothing, not at all, and that a little is argumentatively oriented in the same direction as a lot, to the effect that both Janez worked a little and Janez worked a lot could be put forward as arguments toward a conclusion He will pass the exam, as well as Janez worked little and Janez didn't work at all could be put forward as arguments toward a conclusion He won't pass the exam. The difference is only in the force of the argument, so that we can easily paraphrase and reinforce the argument Janez worked little by Janez worked little, even not at all and the argument Janez worked a little by Janez worked a little, even a lot.
But by doing that, we reestablish the discrepancy on the "factual", informative level: little is nevertheless something and not nothing, and a little is only a little and not a lot. It was that very problem that forced Ducrot into constructing his "weak version" of the theory of argumentation in language.

1.5. Argumentative scales

An important distinction that Ducrot introduces in this phase is the distinction between a sentence (phrase) and an utterance (énoncé) on the one hand, and meaning and sense on the other. Ducrot regards a sentence as a schematic, abstract construction and thus as a matter of language (langue) (in the Saussurean sense), and the utterance as its (reiterative) realization, i.e. a matter of speech. This means that the utterance is unique and always new. Therefore, there are no two identical utterances even though sequences of uttered words may appear identical. Each utterance is the result of some concrete, individual act of uttering. The conceptual pair meaning (signification)/sense (sens) is related to the pair sentence/utterance: meaning is the semantic value of a sentence, whereas sense is the semantic value of an utterance. However, Ducrot does not define (and this represents his innovation) the meaning (of a sentence) as part of the sense (as is commonly done in a formula such as "sense = meaning+context"), but, rather, as a set of instructions, or advices which should help us in disentangling the sense of utterances which are the realizations of the given sentence. The sentence meaning thus guides our correct interpretation of an utterance - which is a realization of the former - and especially our search for information which must be, in order for our interpretation to be correct, sought in the context. What does this mean?

Let us go back to example (6)

(6) A: Is dinner ready by now?
   B: Yes, almost

We have already said that the utterance Dinner is almost ready provides an argument in favor of some implicit conclusion, e.g. I must hurry up, but such a conclusion is also supported by the argument Dinner is ready by now, the latter being stronger than the former, yet both of them having identical argumentative orientations.

To be able to interpret the utterance Dinner is almost ready, the construction of sentence meaning would therefore have to consist of a) informative (descriptive) instructions and b) argumentative instructions. Consequently, the utterances of the sentence Dinner is almost ready can be correctly interpreted only if we follow the instructions for its (sentence) meaning stated below:

informative instructions:
some small quantity of time ě has to be defined or agreed upon; the utterance is true if dinner is not yet ready and if the time difference between the utterance Dinner is almost ready and
dinner's actual readiness equals ě.

**argumentative instructions:**
some conclusion C has to be found which can also be supported by the utterance *Dinner is ready by now*, e.g. *Hurry up!*

Our examples with *little* (7) and *a little* (8) could thus be interpreted as follows:

(7) *Janez worked little. He won't succeed* (in passing the exam).

**informative instructions:** some quantity of work ě has to be defined or agreed upon, which can be regarded or can be still regarded as small. Utterance (7) is true if Janez has not exceeded this quantity.

**argumentative instructions:** some conclusion C has to be found, which would also be supported by the (stronger) utterance *Janez did not work*, e.g. *He won't succeed* (in passing the exam).

Utterances (8) and (7) share the informative, but not the argumentative instruction:

(8) *Janez worked a little. He will succeed* (in passing the exam).

**informative instruction:** some quantity of work ě has to be defined or agreed upon, which can be regarded or can still be regarded as small. Utterance (8) is true if Janez has not exceeded this quantity.

**argumentative instruction:** some conclusion C has to be found which could also be supported by the argument *Janez worked a lot*, e.g. *He will succeed* (in passing the exam).

With this Ducrot still bases the argumentation on the informative and the "factual", but at the same time he enables the regulation of the informative with what is completely argumentative in language. The expression "argumentation in language" points precisely to this, i.e. to the "fact" that the argumentative orientation is inherent to the language itself (language as an abstract, Saussurean structure) and that it is not (only) the result of the working of the context. Despite this compromising solution two things immediately become obvious:

1) Descriptive, informative instructions are not really important for the course of argumentation itself, i.e. for the transition to a conclusion. In other words, the "factuality" or the truth of an utterance-argument (its congruence with the state of the so called "objective reality") is not decisive for the orientation of the argument and it becomes wholly dominated by argumentative instructions.

2. The nature of an argument is scalar or gradual. Some arguments do support the same
conclusion, but more weakly than some other arguments (almost ready, ready by now); that is why Ducrot (sometimes) calls almost and some other morphemes (e.g. already and yet) argumentative variables. They do belong to the same argumentative scales, but they occupy different positions on them, for example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>success (+)</th>
<th>failure (-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/-\</td>
<td>/-\</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a lot of (work)</td>
<td>no (work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a little (work)</td>
<td>little (work)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dominance of argumentativeness over informativeness and the exposition of the gradual nature of arguments already provide all expedients for the transition into the latest, "strong version" of the theory of argumentation in language, in which the fundamental concepts are topoď and polyphony.

1.6. Topod’

The transition into the strong theory of argumentation in language represents a radical break with former phases of the theory of argumentation in language, not only terminologically but also conceptually. This break is evident from the two fundamental hypotheses characterizing Ducrot's latest views:

1. The transition from A(rgument) to C(onclusion) is based on topoď, which are general, common (within a give community) and scalar structures of the type

   The more P, the more Q

2. Argumentative values of utterances take complete dominance over their informative values, whereas exclusively informative utterances acquire a linguistically marginal status.

This transition from the "weak" into the "strong" version of argumentation in language could be rephrased as follows. In the "weak" phase of argumentation in language, argumentation is still based on "facts", but it is controlled by argumentative instructions related to the meaning of the sentence. In the "strong" phase, however, the argumentative no longer simply controls the informative, but supersedes it: the informative becomes not only entirely subordinate to the argumentative, but is even derived from it. If argumentation (an argumentative orientation) is (at least to some extent) inherent to language, then utterances merely describing
reality or reporting about it are linguistically marginal: they use language only as the medium of transmission. Consequently, if argumentation is inherent to language, this medium can in no way be (argumentatively) neutral: argumentative variables guide the discourse in a quite specific direction, regardless of the representative or informative content conveyed in and by the discourse.

What does it mean that some topos is a) general and b) common and c) scalar? It means, that it is a) a general (and, at the same time, very abstract) scheme or matrix allowing a multitude of particular conclusions, which are not obligatory or binding in a way that a syllogism or logical deduction is. The topos (i.e. referring to a topos or applying it), can allow some conclusion, but it does not bind the speaker to that conclusion. Therefore, our addressee (and with this we have arrived at b)), can recognize the validity of the topos employed in our conclusion, without actually agreeing with our conclusion. He/she may find some other topos more appropriate to the situation and may use it to support a different conclusion instead.

The assertion that topos are common (within a given community) only means that some community recognizes their validity, or validity and justifiability of the conclusions based on those topos. It does not imply that every member of the community would necessarily use the same topos in identical situations. The application of some topos, or a conclusion allowed by this topos, can always be refuted (the nature of argumentation is essentially polemical), but only by applying some other topos to support a different conclusion.

If we try to apply the theory of topos to our examples (7) and (8)

(7) Janez worked little. He won't succeed (in passing the exam).
(8) Janez worked a little. He will succeed (in passing the exam).

then we can see, that the argumentative string (7) applies or refers to some topos such as

T1 The less we work, the smaller is the likelihood of success

and that it applies this topos weakly, whereas the argumentative string (8) applies (once more weakly) a topos such as

T2 The more we work, the greater is the likelihood of success

Why do we say that argumentative strings (7) and (8) apply topos T1 and T2 weakly? How can we define "weakly" and its antipode "strongly"? That is where the concept of scalarity comes in.

Ducrot initially defined "strongly" and "weakly" as heuristic devices:
- to apply a topos **strongly** means that there are only few arguments that could be stronger than the one used

- to apply a topos **weakly** means that there are only few arguments that could be weaker than the one used

And, if we take a look at the argumentative scales of "success" and "failure"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>success (+)</th>
<th>failure (-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/-\</td>
<td>/-\</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\</td>
<td>\</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a lot of (work)</td>
<td>no (work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a little (work)</td>
<td>little (work)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

we can see that those heuristic devices work: if the scale consists of two levels only, then the given topos can have two values only, weak and strong.

However, is it possible to define the values 'weak' and 'strong' in a more strict linguistic manner?

Let us assume that we operate with a two part argument: let us call the first part A, the second B. We shall say that in this case the following two definitions apply:

1. Argument A is stronger than B, if: B, and **even** A holds true.
2. Argument A is weaker than B, if: B, and **at best/at worst** A holds true.

Let us now test these definitions on two concrete examples:

A                B
(10) It is a cold, or **at worst** a flu. Don't worry.

A                B
(11) It is pneumonia, or **at best** very bad flu. Take care!

Utterance (10) applies some topos such as:

T3 The less we are ill, the less reason to worry

and utterance (11)

T4 The more we are ill, the more reason to worry.
The arguments are, in the light of our definition, stronger than the B arguments, which means that, if the given conclusion proceeds from B, it must also proceed from A. In other words, both utterances apply "their" topos strongly. With regard to the argumentative scales that could be constructed in accordance with our knowledge of the force of arguments in both cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>worry (+)</th>
<th>worry (-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/-\</td>
<td>/-\</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pneumonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>flu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

we can say, that both utterances apply their topos in the direction of argumentative scales; therefore, they tend towards the stronger application of topos.

Let us now change the argumentative variables. Instead of at best/at worst, we shall use even, which results in:

(10') It is a cold, even a flue. Take care!
(11)* It is pneumonia, even a (very bad) flue. Take care!

In accordance with our definitions of the weak and strong application of topos, the introduction of the argumentative variable even changes (inverses) the force of the arguments (B is now stronger than A), and with this also the argumentative orientation itself! From the argument It is a cold, even a flue, we can no longer conclude Don't worry, but only Take care, which entirely complies with the argumentative scale of worry (-), where flu occupies a lower position than a cold, thus being closer to the cause of worry since the scale is negative.

That our assertion about the decisive role (of the choice) of the argumentative variable is not exaggerated, is demonstrated by the very "transformation" of example (11). What happens to example (11) after we change the variable? To a "(bad) flu", which occupies a lower position than pneumonia on the argumentative scale of the worry (+), the mere presence of even in the utterance, i.e. the argumentative orientation inherent to even, assigns the value of the stronger argument thus leading to the conclusion Take care. The argumentative orientation inherent to even does not allow the argument following it to be weaker than the one preceding it; on the contrary, the argument introduced by even (i.e. the argument following the (argumentative) variable even), only escalates the force of a preceding argument.

Therefore, if we want to avoid the application of some topos T3' The less we are ill, the more
reason to worry (which could be general, but hardly common) and thus recover the argumentative balance, we must introduce an additional argumentative variable in example (11'), as in:

(11") This is pneumonia, even only a bad flu. Don't worry

or even (!)

(11"') This is pneumonia, maybe even only a bad flu. Don't worry.

If only attenuates and alters the argumentative orientation of even, then maybe argumentatively attenuates a potential logical disparity between coordinately related propositional elements. If an illness is pneumonia, then it is not a (bad) flu, and vice versa; however, if we temper both assertions with maybe, we place them outside the logical system where they can be either true or false.

Ducrot recognizes also a "moderately strong" or "moderately weak" application of a topos. I mention it at this point because it underlines the dominance of the argumentative over the informative, and because the role and significance (function) of the argumentative variables is here revealed in its, so to say, pure form.

Consider the following examples:

(12) The bottle is already half empty. Another one needs to be opened.

which applies a topos such as

T5 The more we drink, the more liquor we need

and

(13) The bottle is still half full. There is no need yet to open another one

which applies a topos such as

T6 The less we drink, the less liquor we need.

An utterance, according to Ducrot, applies a topos Tx moderately strongly if it, at the same time, allows the application of a topos Ty which it also applies moderately strongly. This is the case for both utterance (12) and (13). The beauty of "moderately strong applications" is in their explicit exposition of the difference between the informative and the argumentative (in language): already half empty and still half full "report" about one and the same state as far as informativeness is concerned i.e. about the level of liquor in the bottle which is the same regardless of whether the bottle is half empty or half full, but their argumentative orientation is completely different, and consequently also the conclusions to which they lead.
Already half empty and still half full, for instance, allude to the act of emptying and not of filling the bottle. Let us now change the places of both variables (already and still), so that we get still half empty and already half full. Owing to the change of these two variables, the newly obtained expressions are not only argumentatively differently oriented, but moreover, with the change of the argumentative variables we practically "jump to a new situation": we are no longer dealing with the act of emptying but of filling!

f. Polyphony

The other crucial concept for Ducrot's strong version of argumentation in language is polyphony. Ducrot thinks that what traditional linguistics refers to as a speaker is in fact a very complex (and confused) notion that covers a number of wholly different ideas. So he proposes to distinguish between a producer, a speaker and an utterer of an utterance.

Who is the producer of an utterance? The producer of an utterance is the one whose activity results in the production of an utterance, i.e. the producer is the one who carries out the intellectual activity necessary for the production of the utterance. That may seem very obvious but there are cases where it becomes rather puzzling. Think of yourself as a pupil, for example (I borrowed this example from Ducrot): the school organizes a walk in the country side and for you to be able to go on that trip you must have your parents' permission. Your teacher therefore gives you a form for your mother/father to sign. So you bring to your mother/father a form that says something like: "I allow my son/daughter to take part in the excursion", and at the bottom of the form there is a word "signature", and what your mother/father has to do is to put her/his signature under the word "signature". Now, who is the producer of that form saying "I allow my son/daughter ..."? The one who signed it? The teacher who gave it to you? The secretary who typed it? It is hard to say. It seems that producer is a very unclear notion. That is why we need the speaker and the utterer.

The speaker is the one who is responsible for the utterance, the one who is held responsible for the utterance itself or, at least, responsible for the act of uttering the utterance.

In the case of our pupil and his/her mother/father, there is no problem: the utterance contains a pronoun "I" that clearly points to the speaker. But what happens if the utterance contains no explicit devices such as pronouns? And do we have to hold the speaker responsible for everything that is said in the utterance? Must everything that is said in the utterance be taken as his/her own point(s) of view?

That is where the utterers come in. According to Ducrot, there are several utterers or

---

6 The term Ducrot and his French followers use is énonciateur(s). I think that utterer may be a better translation than enunciator; we enunciate something on rather formal, solemn occasions, while we utter this and that all the time in everyday conversation. And that is exactly how the term énonciateur is used in Ducrot's theory.
uttering positions within an utterance, which is another way of saying that several different viewpoints may be expressed through one utterance. Ducrot's position is even more radical; according to him every utterance could be analyzed in at least two utterin positions.
For example, let us take the utterance

(12) *This fence is not red.*

The speaker of this utterance presents two utterers:
- the first one (U1) who affirms that the fence is red, and
- the second one (U2) opposing his/her affirmation,
and the speaker, as the one who is responsible for the utterance, merges with U2.

But what makes it possible to proceed in this fashion? What gives us the right to distinguish between several utterers within a single utterance? In the case of (12), for example, the vary fact that there are no fences that could be described as non-red, non-yellow, non-brown. Of course there are fences that could be described as non-red, non-yellow or non-brown, but such a description doesn't give us any positive idea of the real color of the fence (whether it is red, yellow or brown). Therefore if somebody is affirming that \( X \) is not ..., he must be objecting to somebody who is affirming the contrary, namely that \( X \) is ...
We will try to indicate some (more linguistically oriented) answers in the second part of our paper, analyzing one of the most peculiar connectives of the Slovenian language, the connective **pa**.

2. **PA, THE REVERSER OF ARGUMENTATIVE EXPECTATION?**

The connective **pa** (usually translated in English as plain *and* or *but*) is one of the (contextually) most diversified and most widely used lexemes of the Slovenian language and for this reason probably also among the most self-evident and therefore least researched. *Slovar slovenskega knjižnega jezika* (=Dictionary of the Slovenian Literary Language) (hereinafter SSKJ) distinguishes the following four uses of the connective **pa**:

a) in adversative clauses, with a comma;
b) between lexical units in a sentence, without a comma;
c) in conjunctive clauses, without a comma, usually with omission of auxiliary words in the second clause;
d) after a period or semi colon;

In order to present the diversity of the usage of the connective **pa** to a non-Slovenian speaker, we shall give a number of examples (accompanied by more or less schematic definitions (SSKJ 1986 : 502-503).

2.1. Some definitions
Ad a)
I - expressing opposition to what has been said previously
(13) Obljubil je bil, pa ni držal besede.
He promised, pa (and, but) did not keep his word.

II - expressing the unexpected
(14) Nihce ni mislil nanjo, pa je stopila v hiso.
No one was thinking about her, pa (and, but) she entered the house.

III - for expressing moderate opposition
(15) Po travi so pajcevine, na njih pa se blesci rosa.
There are cobwebs on the grass, pa (and) dew sparkles on them.

IV - for enlargement, explanation of what has been said previously
(16) Potrebno nam je znanje, pa resnico znanje.
What we need is knowledge, pa (but) real knowledge.

V - for reinforcement of the adverb which introduces the last lexical unit of a sequence
(17) Dela v tovarni, hodi na lov, pa se kmetuje pomalem.
He works in the factory, hunts, pa (and, but) also farms a little.

VI - for gradation
(18) Pozdrav vsem, posebno pa ocetu.
Greetings to everyone, pa (and, but) particularly to Father.

VII - for expressing a causative-consecutive relation
(19) Ni placal davkov, pa so ga rubili.
He did not pay his taxes, pa (and) they seized his property.

VIII - for expressing a causative-conclusive relation
(20) To je zanimiv primer, pa je prav, da si ga ogledamo.
This is an interesting case, pa (and) it is proper that we examine it.

IX - for expressing a conditional-consecutive relation
(21) Njo bi vzel, pa bi bilo drugace.
He should have taken her, pa (and) it would be different.

X - for expressing a fact despite which the action of the previous clause is performed.
(22) Joze je odlicnjak, pa nima instruktorja kakor ti.
Joze is an A student, pa (and, but) he has no private tutor like you do.

XI - for emphasizing opposition
(23) Moja bo obveljala, pa ce se na glavo postavis.
I am right, pa (and) if you stand on your head.

Ad b)

XII - for linking two equivalent lexical units
(24) Pospravi kroznike pa kar je se na mizi.
Put away the plates pa (and) what else is on the table.

XIII - for linking one before last to the last lexical unit
(25) Sumenje macesnov, borovcev pa smrek.
The rustling of larch trees, pine trees pa (and) spruce trees.
XIV - for stepped emphasis of lexical units.
(26) *Fant je se mlad pa norcav pa zaljubljen.*
   The boy is still young pa (and) clownish pa (and) in love.

XV - for combining two similar notions into a single semantic unit.
(27) *Ves vik pa krik je zaman.*
   All this howling pa (and) yowling is of no use.

XVI - for expressing large quantity or high degree.
(28) *Tam je sam pesek, pa spet pesek.*
   There is nothing but sand, pa (and) more sand.

XVII - for adding, counting
(29) *Star je pet let pa tri mesece.*
   He is five pa (and) three months.

XVIII - for addition
(30) *Povedala je samo materi, pa (se) teti.*
   She told it only to mother, pa (and) (also) to the aunt.

XIX - in set expressions *ta pa ta (that and that), tak pa tak (such and such)* referring to a known person or thing which can not be revealed
(31) *To pa to bi se bilo treba urediti.*
   This pa (and) this would still have to be arranged.

Ad c)

XX - for linking two clauses, expressing simultaneity or sequentiality.
(32) *Pili so, peli pa sale zbijali.*
   They drank, sang pa (and) told jokes.

XXI - for stepped emphasis of sentences.
(33) *Fant hodi samo v kino pa gleda televizijo pa bere stripe.*
   All the boy does is go to the cinema pa (and) watch TV pa (and) read comic books.

XXII - for combining two similar verbs into a meaningful unit
(34) *Ves dan vpije pa razgraja.*
   He screams pa (and) carouses all day.

XXIII - for expressing intensity of action
(35) *Ne dam pa ne dam.*
   I will not pa (and) will not give it to you.

XXIV - for expressing intention.
(36) *Poji pa zapri vrata.*
   Go pa (and) close the door.

Ad d)

XXV - for expressing the same meanings as in a) (particularly (19) to (22)) and c)

XXVI - expressively
(37) *Bodite mirni. Pa nobenega sepetanja.*
   Be quiet. Pa (and) no whispering.
XXVII - for referring to what has been said previously.
(38) Jaz sem koncal. Pa ti?
I'm finished. Pa (and) you?

XXVIII - for calling attention to a transition to another thought.
(39) Pa se to. Vceraj mi je pisal Janez.
Pa (and) one more thing. Yesterday I got a letter from Janez.

XXIX - for expressing wonder, astonishment, reluctance.
(40) Pa da mi nikdar vec ne gres tja.
Pa (and) don't you ever go there again.

A total of 29 distinctions. All of them could in fact be translated by and (or sometimes but) or, more exactly, be replaced by in, which is the Slovenian counterpart of and. But a Slovenian speaker (all of the above examples were taken from literature and newspapers) hardly ever uses pa in conjunctive clauses, he prefers to use in instead. Why is that?

2.2. The hypothesis

My (hypo)thesis is that pa really is an argumentative (i.e. a discursive) connective and not a propositional (i.e. grammatical) operator. In other words: if all uses of in can grosso modo be substituted by pa, not all uses of pa can be substituted by in (as is the case in the above 29 examples). I will try to present a specific use of pa that is distinctively discursive (and argumentative), a use of pa that functions as discourse anaphora that reaches out of the discourse in progress in order to give it (at least relative) autonomy and independence.

But by saying that we have already bumped into the problem of the "internal and external hypotheses" as Ducrot calls them.
The external hypotheses are the hypotheses which regard a given entity (property, relation ...) as an object of study, as an object of some science, while the internal hypotheses are the concepts supposed to explain (and/or support) these external hypotheses.

In the case of the connective pa, the external hypothesis, in terms of grammar for example, lies in the fact that pa is investigated in terms of its grammaticality, or agrammaticality. That means that pa, as well as all other grammatical parts of speech, are investigated in terms whether (and under what conditions) they are capable of forming a grammatically correct string of words, sentences.

Our external hypothesis, on the contrary, is founded on studying the connective pa argumentatively (and therefore discursively), i.e., in its ability to link not only two (or more) parts of a sentence (e.g. clauses), as an abstract structure, but also two segments of a discourse (i.e. utterance A(rgument) and utterance C(onclusion)), which is a unique realization of specific sentence structures, therefore belonging to the domain of speech.

To specific external hypotheses correspond specific internal hypotheses. The internal
hypothesis we are making in this paper is, distinguishing between the grammatical operator and the discursive (argumentative) connective. We are arguing that a (grammatical) operator coordinates propositional elements of a given sentence (see examples (25) to (30)), while a (discursive) connective links two (or more) segments of discourse. Usually those segments are speech acts (see examples (37) to (40)), but not necessarily. We will especially try to show what this "not necessarily" could be.

2.3. The analysis

In the first part of the paper (pages 27 - 30) I tried to show that the argumentative connectives have not only an exceptional directional force, but also that the link ("buffering") of several argumentative connectives helps us crystallize their argumentative orientation. So, let us consider the "behavior" of the connective pa in conjunction with connectives ker (because) and sicer (otherwise)\(^7\).

Let us compare the utterances

(41) Ker si razbil sipo, ne bos sel v kino.
    Because (ker) you broke the window, you can not go to the cinema.

(42) Pridi sem, sicer pridem pote.
    Come here, otherwise (sicer) I'll come for you.

with the same utterances into which pa has been inserted.

(41') ?Ker pa si razbil sipo, ne bos sel v kino.
    ?But since (ker pa) you broke the window, you can not go to the cinema.

(42') ?Pridi sem, sicer pa pridem pote.
    ?Come here, anyway (sicer pa) I'll come for you.

As we can see, example (41) contains a kind of causal-consecutive ker (because), which argumentatively connects two speech acts: an assertion that the person spoken to, X, has broken the window (argument), and the interdiction (directive) of his (X's) departure to the cinema (conclusion). Ker as an argumentative connective thus links the two speech acts so firmly that (41) as a discourse segment comes across as relatively autonomous (selection of each of the components of the given discourse segments is conditioned by the selection of the whole (the others), or in other words: each of the components of the given discourse segment is a part of that discourse segment due to the entire discourse segment (all of its elements) and independent (so that it reflects to a sufficient degree the (possible) uttering situation, and

\(^7\) The choice of connectives ker (because) and sicer (otherwise) is of course in no way arbitrary.
doesn't require that additional, co(n)textual information be engaged for its interpretation). In other words: a given discourse segment is relatively autonomous and independent if for its understanding we do not have to engage some (still) greater discourse segment of which it is a part.

But what happens if \textit{pa} is inserted into utterance (41)?

The first thing that we notice is the dramatic change of meaning of the particle \textit{pa} (in conjunction with \textit{ker} becoming \textit{but since}, and in conjunction with \textit{sicer} becoming \textit{anyway}), and the loss of discursive (and thereby interpretative) autonomy and independence: namely, \textit{ker pa} obviously alludes to some previous argument or discourse segment (which could provide an argument for the opposite conclusion, namely \textit{You can go to the cinema}) that is in fact ("materially," literally) absent from the directly provided argumentative string. However, the missing discourse segment is (implicitly) rejected precisely by the given argumentative string as insufficient for the conclusion for which it could provide an argument (\textit{You can go to the cinema}) and the actual conclusion is drawn (\textit{You can not go to the cinema}).

Utterance (41') is therefore discursively and argumentatively not autonomous and independent. In order to obtain a relatively autonomous and independent discourse segment, we must engage (search) or reconstruct that part of the discourse to which the \textit{pa} of a given explicit discourse segment may refer (or more precisely, could refer). For example:

(41")  A: \textit{Res si bil priden: pomil si posodo in pobrisal prah. Ker pa si razbil sipo, ne bos sel v kino.}

You were really a good boy: you washed the dishes and wiped the dust. \textbf{But since} (\textit{ker pa}) you broke the window, you can not go to the cinema.

The situation is completely different in example (42). \textit{Sicer} of utterance (42) can be (quite easily) paraphrased as exclusive either - or: \textit{Ali prides sem, ali pridem pote} (Either you come here, or I'll come for you). The introduction of \textit{pa} does not cause interpretative problems: \textit{Ali prides sem, ali pa pridem pote} (Either you come here, or I'll come for you). This is in fact a classical \textit{pa} of opposition, which can not be said about \textit{pa} in the utterance (42'):

(42") ?\textit{Pridi sem, sicer pa pridem pote.}

?Come here, \textbf{anyway} (\textit{sicer pa}) I'll come for you.

At first glance, the utterance makes no sense since the speaker first orders the realization of a given propositional content and then says that he/she will grant it its true value with his/her own action. Let us consider several similar utterances:

(43) \textit{Ugasni luc, sicer (?pa) jo bom sam.}

Turn off the light, \textbf{otherwise} (\textit{sicer}) I will do it myself.

(\textit{?anyway (sicer pa)})
(44) Povrni mi povzročeno kodo, sicer (?pa) te bom prisilil, da mi jo povrnes.
   Pay for the damage you caused, otherwise (sicer) I will force
   (?anyway (sicen pa))
   you to pay back.

(45) Zapri vrata, sicer (?pa) jih bom sam.
   Close the door, otherwise (sicen) I will do it.
   (?anyway (sicen pa))

All three utterances without pa can be interpreted as exclusive either - or, but if we introduce
the pa, the second part of the utterance, which is introduced by the expression sicer pa, cancels
the illocutionary force of the first part of the utterance (in our case the directive force) and
endow the entire utterance (speech act) with an ambivalent, even nonsensical status.

Therefore, utterance (42') is obviously not discursively independent, for this is the only way to
account for its (uttering) nonsensical (at least not completely sensical) status. Similarly, it is
difficult to construct (on the analogy with example (41')) the preceding discourse segment to
which pa is supposed to refer, without at the same time changing the utterance (42') itself.
What can in fact be done?

All examples with sicer (without an accompanying pa) which have been discussed so far could
be paraphrased with exclusive either - or and all of them were (illocutionary speaking)
directives. But this is not the only use of sicer known to the Slovenian language. Let us
consider the following examples:

(46) Petra je vzela kljuce. Sicer pa to ni prvic.
    Petra has taken the keys. Anyway (sicen pa) this is not the first time.

(47) Avto je fuc. Sicer pa tako ni bil vreden piskovega oreha.
    The car has had it. Anyway (sicen pa) it wasn't worth a dime.

(48) Preseren pojasniti, kdo je Preseren je bil velik pijanec. Sicer pa je to znano.
    Preseren was a big drunk. Anyway (sicen pa) this is a well known fact.

Now let us subject these to the opposite procedure than the one used in examples (41) to (42)
and drop pa:

(46') ?Petra je vzela kljuce. Sicer to ni prvic.
    ?Petra has taken the keys. Otherwise (sicen) this was not the first time.

(47') ?Avto je fuc. Sicer tako ni bil vreden piskovega oreha.
    ?The car has had it. Otherwise (sicen) it wasn't worth a dime.
Preseren je bil velik pijanec. Sicer je to znano.

Preseren was a big drunk. Otherwise (sicer) this is a well known fact.

What we notice immediately (that is, what the Slovenian speaker notices immediately) is that examples (46') to (48') are somehow unfinished, that they "hand in the air." In order to endow them with discursive interpretative autonomy and independence, we would have to complement them somehow, e.g.: ((46') = ... vendar bi vseeno lahko prej povedala (...nevertheless she could tell us about it beforehand); (47') = ... vendar je bil se vedno uporaben (...nevertheless it was still useful); (48') = ...vendar za oceno njegove pesniške velicine ni pomembno (... nevertheless, it is not significant for the appraisal of his poetic greatness). Notice that the complement can only be introduced by an adversative clause.

On the other hand, examples (46) to (48), where pa intervenes, are discursively and interpretatively completely autonomous and independent. In opposition to ker pa, we could not say that sicer pa rounds off the given discourse segment into an independent one (only) by referring to some preceding discourse segment or situation. On the contrary, it seems that sicer pa explains, attenuates, or more precisely, rejects the preceding utterance, which introduces a given (empirical) "fact", as non-new (that is, non-new in the discourse that is actually going on), precisely by making explicit and by wording some previous, but, in the on-going discourse, unuttered knowledge. In this case, pa not only does not reach back into the discourse of which it is a part or a continuation, in order to clarify a given discourse segment (that is, the rejection of the preceding utterance as non-new), but in fact reaches literally outside of the given discourse segment, in the area of some fragmented general knowledge - in order the discourse can be given any support at all, i.e. be endowed by the necessary autonomy and independence.

It seems that in critical cases (42’) and (43) to (45), this reference to some general knowledge could in fact be reconstructed as a reference to common places or topos (as Oswald Ducrot defines (the wording of) general knowledge). All four critical examples could in fact be given (at least relative) discursive autonomy and independence if we interpreted them as relying on some topos such as T7 The more we want something, the harder we have to work for it.

The same goes for the examples (46) to (48), only that it seems that in those examples it is not a question of direct reference to some general knowledge, but rather to some preceding knowledge, a knowledge whose generality is more or less limited (to a certain situation or a certain group of people).

Therefore two hypotheses could be formulated:

a) in the expression ker pa, pa is used to refer to some preceding discourse segment or extradiscursive situation, and only this reference enables the completion of the discourse segment, containing pa, as a discursively autonomous and independent one;
b) in the expression sicer pa, pa is used to refer not to some preceding discourse segment or extradiscursive situation, but rather to a kind of common, general or at least preceding
knowledge, implicitly presupposed, but not explicitly related in the on-going text.

The above two hypotheses have been tested on a large computer-processed body of newspaper articles, which allegedly represented (according to the Yugoslav Armed Forces spokesman) 'attacks on the Yugoslav Armed Forces'.

Our analysis which included 355 articles by 169 known authors and by 111 unknown or anonymous authors, published in 20 different Slovenian periodicals in the first half of 1988 (from July 1 through December 31 1988), yielded the following results:

Of the 2534 occurrences of the connective pa, only 7 occur in the combination ker pa, and 10 in the combination sicer pa (which leads us to conclude that either this complex argumentative connectives posses exceptional argumentative force, or that they represent a particularly rare method of argumentation). However, the analysis of concrete "empirical" data didn't completely confirm the justification of our (rather heuristic) differentiation between ker pa and sicer pa.

On the contrary, the analysis showed that not only sicer pa, but also ker pa may, in order to support or refute the said or written argument, reach outside the realm of discourse in progress, and tap from some common, general, or at least preceding knowledge, in other words, no direct reference to preceding discourse or discourse in progress is necessary.

2.4. An example

Let us consider this findings on the example of one of the computer-processed articles by Dragan Duric titled "Slovenia and Democracy", first published by the Croatian newspaper Vijesnik and reprinted by the Slovenian newspaper Delo on June 11, 1988. It was selected because it features sicer pa as well as ker pa (the latter occurring twice).

SLOVENIA AND DEMOCRACY

In the past thirty days, the Slovenian public has experienced two new shocks. After the May rumors that our northernmost republic was getting ready for a "military coup," June began with the detention of Janez Jansa, Ivan Borstner and David Tasic, a journalist, a second lieutenant in the Yugoslav Armed Forces and an editor of Mladina. All three have been arrested on suspicion of having divulged a military secret. According to the official statement, parts of top-secret military documents were discovered in their homes or places of work. Accompanied by increasingly vociferous statements by different associations, alliances and forums, Jansa, Borstner and Tasic were handed over by the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs to the military prosecutor. A military secret is at stake here. Even though in the first case it was only a rumor, and in the second, the epilogue of the story is still not known, the fact remains that both cases were skillfully combined, so that in some quarters this was viewed as

---

8 We used a database that was originally compiled for other purposes, namely for a research on newspapers' reports on the Yugoslav National Army.
the autumn of the "Slovenian spring," or the beginning of the end of democracy. Is it possible that such assessments may nevertheless be somewhat premature?

As far as Jansa's case is concerned - with it in fact began the arrests and searches of the places of work and residences of the accused - Mladina, Tribuna, Katedra and Radio student issued "public statements" to the effect that this was "inamissible meddling in the electoral procedure and blatant pressure on the public." It is obvious that the detention of Jansa on the basis of suspicion for having divulged a military secret carried severe political implications. Ker pa1 he is one of the candidates for the president of ZSMS (League of the Socialist Youth of Slovenia), this certainly should not come as a surprise. The current president of the Slovenian youth organization Tone Anderlic also made a statement and on behalf of his organization demanded from Tomaz Ertl, Republican Minister of Internal Affairs, an official explanation of Jansa's arrest, about which, so he said, he learned from the newspapers.

This request could be in fact interpreted as an undemocratic act. Why should the Secretariat of Internal affairs, proceeding in compliance with its lawful competencies, inform the youth organization differently than the rest of the public? Does this mean that Jansa should receive preferential treatment? Ker pa2 the pre-electoral procedure for the youth organization elections is drawing to a close - and due to this, it is becoming a prime political event - Anderlic's demand is, despite everything, justified. This could certainly not be said of the joint statement of youth periodicals which in a biased way disqualified the legal authorities, and that even before their task was completed.

After that, the mass media have conveyed, according to a well established Slovenian ritual, a series of statements and bulletins for the public. Eighty-eight eminent Slovenian personalities from cultural and artistic circles signed a statement which called for an explanation as to who initiated the investigation against Jansa. The same is demanded by the Slovenian Writers Association, also calling for an immediate release of Jansa, Borstner and Tasic. In this context, the writers emphasize that they are indignant "with these investigations, which are creating an atmosphere of a state of emergency in Slovenia." They are also concerned for constitutional order and freedom of the press.

The administrative board of the Journalist Association of Slovenia pointed out in its declaration that the "majority of journalists of the Journalist Association of Slovenia have expressed their concern regarding respect of the constitution, lawfulness, human rights and democratization of our society."

Why such a great mistrust of lawful authorities? Why all those questions addressed to the Republican Secretariat of Internal Affairs, social and political organizations and authorities of Slovenia protesting against the "restriction of information?" Tomaz Ertl said, in a long interview published in the June 1st issue of Delo (editor's comment: the interview
published in Delo on June 8 is probably meant here), that the public is being informed on a regular basis about the proceedings. The public was informed on how the procedure is progressing, what has been discovered, and why the Secretariat of Internal Affairs opted for detention. But one thing is clear: Until it has been proven that the suspicions are well founded - competent legal authorities will have something to say about that as well - no one should be declared a criminal. The competent authorities must be allowed to establish the facts. Regarding the comment that information is incomplete, one can say only that it simply can not be more detailed and precise until the investigation is completed.

In the same vein, the criticism that this was an unlawful act is probably not justified. Public protests stand on shaky ground, particularly because it is the public who is advocating democracy. If someone is in favor of democracy, then he would have to acknowledge a law-based state, recognized by its constitution and laws, as a civilizational achievement regulations are incomplete, they must be respected until they are changed. And the authority to do this rests with the Republican Assembly.

The most outspoken defenders of democracy, however, fell into the trap against which they were fighting on the public stage: they force their opinion on others as the supreme yardstick of right and wrong. Just as we are not ready to accept a dogmatist who has no ear for diversity and richness of opinions, so a "democrat," who is prepared to do away with all those who do not share his views with methods which are not defined by the constitution and law, can not broaden the horizons of democracy. A democratic society indeed does not suggest that it has no dogmatists, just as no social or political system is black and white.

The Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Slovenia declared in a press release that it "does not wish to influence the course of investigation." According to the statement, competent authorities, which have initiated and are leading the investigation, are responsible for everything. The lawful authorities should therefore independently - and of course ethically - perform their task and bring it to its completion. In any event, the outpouring of "liberal demands" with which individuals in fact attempt to exert a kind of pressure on the judiciary, can not be characterized merely as pressure on the law courts and investigating authorities. Many among them demand the observance of constitutional and legal principles as well as accurate and detailed information. The fact remains that in the future the judiciary will have to take into consideration public opinion and public itself, which increasingly hungers for complete, accurate information. Sicer pa this is the usual price to pay when the doors of democracy are opened. We have achieved, despite everything, a higher level of democracy and this is borne out by the fact that this case is debated every day in public. If times were different, the entire incident would warrant no more than a brief report, or perhaps not even that much says Vijesnik's Dragan Duric.
If one takes a closer look at the (complex) connectives Ker pa\textsubscript{1} and Ker pa\textsubscript{2}, one can see that they do not refer to any previous discourse segment, or, to put it more precisely, they introduce an argument not supported by anything already mentioned in the text: that at the given time Janez Jansa ran for the post of the president of RK ZSMS and that the election procedure was drawing to an end has never been mentioned in the text explicitly. At best, both "facts" were the matter of some previous common knowledge. Ker pa\textsubscript{1} and ker pa\textsubscript{2} therefore introduce (even though implicitly) new utterers into the text, new voices, or to put it in a more abstract yet more precise way, they introduce new standpoints or information which are not directly and materially - by means of words and sentences - incorporated in the given text. In order to endow the given text with the requested autonomy and independence, one must therefore suppose that the standpoints of the speaker (in our example the author of the article) are the result of the confrontation of several utterers or uttering positions (which are only reflected in the article, but not also directly, "materially" related in it). This kind of text structuring is what we will (with Ducrot) call polyphonic, many-voiced structuring, which in other words means that in order to analyze ker pa\textsubscript{1} we need not only one speaker, but also two utterers:

U(utterer)\textsubscript{1} presents some F(act)\textsubscript{1} (the arrest of some citizen), which has an unusual C(haracteristic)\textsubscript{1} (heavy political implications);
U(utterer)\textsubscript{2} opposes him/her by introducing some (new) "fact" F\textsubscript{2} (it is a citizen who is involved in politics) in which he/she obviously refers to some topos such as T\textsubscript{8} The more one is involved in politics, the more politically his/her actions are interpreted. The Speaker, the author of the article, joins U\textsubscript{2} in his/her opposition.

Even more interesting is the interpretation or the possibility of interpretation of ker pa\textsubscript{2}. The interpretation could be based not solely on the confrontation of the two utterers, but on the confrontation of two topoi as well:

U\textsubscript{1} presents some "fact" F\textsubscript{3} (democratic methods should be observed) having the characteristic C\textsubscript{3} (equal treatment of all), and in doing this U\textsubscript{1} applies some topos T\textsubscript{9} The more democratic the laws, the more strictly we (all) must observe them;
U\textsubscript{2} actually approves of this, only that he/she applies some other topos, T\textsubscript{10} (which "opposes" T\textsubscript{2} only in that it reinforces it) The more tense the situation, the more democratic methods we must use, while the Speaker joins in this (latter) argumentation.

Especially interesting (particularly for shedding some light on the nature of topos and the arguments based on them) is a possible way of interpreting sicer pa\textsuperscript{(anyway)}. It seems that the same topos can be the basis for various argumentative conclusions, which on the other hand means that the same topos can be crossbred with various uttering positions. Sicer pa\textsuperscript{(anyway)} should be explained by assuming that there is a speaker and two utterers:

U\textsubscript{1} presents some "fact" F\textsubscript{1}'(which is the same one that we saw in the case of ker pa\textsubscript{1} - the arrest of a citizen), only that U\textsubscript{1} ascribes to it a characteristic different from the one used by U\textsubscript{1} in the case of ker pa\textsubscript{1}. This characteristic could be designated as C\textsubscript{1}' (the great commotion
among the public).

U2 opposes U1 with "fact" F3' (which is identical to the one used by U1 in ker_pa2 situation - (democratic methods should be observed), only that U2 ascribes to it a different characteristic than U1 in the case of ker_pa2, namely C3' (the freedom of information). By doing this U2 applies some topos **T10** *The more tense the situation, the more democratic methods we must use* (which is the same topos that U2 in the ker_pa2 example uses to refute U1). That is to say, U2 employs gradation (intensification) to refute the argumentation of U1 in ker_pa2 example.

Looking from the polyphonic perspective, the text in question is even more complex than it appears at first glance:

By his/her own presentation of the "fact" F1', U1 from sicer_pa example already enters the polemics with the U1 from ker_pa1 example, on the ground that U1 from sicer_pa example ascribes a different characteristic to the same "fact" (different than U1 from example ker_pa1); On the other hand, U2 from sicer_pa example, in addition to refuting argument of U1 from sicer_pa example, enters into the polemics also with U1 from ker_pa2 example, on the ground that he/she (U2 from sicer_pa example) ascribes to the "fact" F3' (which is actually the same as the one used by U1 in the ker_pa2 example) a characteristic different than the one ascribed by U1 (from ker_pa2 example).

One could thus conclude that connective pa, at least when used in complex connectives ker_pa (but since), and sicer_pa (anyway), represents some kind of anaphoric uttering element, which, by referring to some common, general (or at least preceding) knowledge that is external to the discourse in question, exposes the polyphonic structure of the given discourse, and rounds it up as an interpretatively or/and argumentatively relatively autonomous one.

Connective pa could thus be defined as a discursive-argumentative variable that

1) demands the choice of argument whose (argumentative) orientation is opposite to the orientation of the argument preceding pa;
2) does not oppose the preceding argument by (discursively) introducing a new argument, but by referring to some extra-discursive (external in relation to the on-going discourse), common or general knowledge. In this respect, the most appropriate label for connective pa would in fact be the reverser of argumentative expectation (expectation of an argument is reversed by reference to some extra-discursive knowledge), while its effects could be represented as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{X} & \text{Ker pa} & \text{A, B} \\
\end{array}
\]
3. THE ROLE OF **KER (PA)** AND **SICER (PA)**

The questions which impose themselves immediately are of course: what is the role of connectives ker and sicer when used in conjunction with pa and what is the extent of their influence? Is the working of sicer and ker when used on their own the same as when used with pa? The rest of this paper is an attempt at answering these questions.

3.1. Some (more) definitions

Once again we shall start by look at some definitions of ker and sicer in the Slovar slovenskega knjiznega jezika (The Dictionary of the Slovenian Literary Language): According to SSKJ (1975 : 312) ker (because) serves:

I - to express the fact that the subject matter of the relative clause is the cause of the action related in the main clause:

(49) **Ker resnice ni smel povedati, je raji molcal**

   *Because (ker)* he could not tell the truth, he chose silence

(50) **Ker ga je doma zeblo, je sel v kavarno**

   *Because (ker)* he was cold at home, he went to the pub

(51) **Nanj sem se obrnil zato, ker vem, da je posten**

   I turned to him *because (ker)* I knew that he was honest
Zdelo se jima je zelo zabavno, *ker* sta usla od doma
They found it amusing *because* (*ker*) they ran away from homes.

II - to provide causative explanation of the previously stated fact:
(53) *Skrb je odvec, ker delavci so zanesljivi*
There is no need to worry, *because* (*ker*) the workers are reliable.

On the other hand, *sicer* (SSKJ 1985: 652 - 653) (otherwise) serves:

I - to express the consequence if what has been previously stated fails to come true:
(54) *Brz pomagaj, sicer bo prepozno*
Help me immediately *otherwise* (*sicer*) it will be late;
(55) *Pri nas se dobro pocuti, sicer bi ze odsel*
He feels fine at our place *otherwise* (*sicer*) he would have left by now;
(56) *Zadnji del poti sem moral teci, sicer ne bi prisel pravocasno*
I had to run the last bit of the way *otherwise* (*sicer*) I would not have arrived in time;

II - to introduce a restrictive assertion opposed by the assertion related in the second clause:
(57) *Sicer je se mlad in neizkusen, vendar zelo spreten*
Even though (*sicer*) he is young and inexperienced, he is most deft;
(58) *Sicer nima denarja, a za to ga bo ze se nasel*
Even though (*sicer*) he has no money, he will find it somehow for this;
(59) *Sicer je slo tezko, pa smo se le sporazumeli*
Even though (*sicer*) it was a hard negotiation, we eventually agreed.

III - to supplement or explain what was previously stated:
(60) *Kmalu se bodo pripeljali, in sicer iz te smeri*
They will arrive soon *and that* (*in sicer*) from this direction;
(61) *Telefoniral mi je zvecer, in sicer ob osmih*
He phoned me in the evening *and that* (*in sicer*) at 8 p.m;
(62) *Kosti se med seboj stikajo na tri nacine, in sicer s sivi, s hrustancem in s sklepi*
The bones are joined in three ways *and that* (*in sicer*) by means of suture, cartilage and joints.

IV - to express circumstances or states in other, different situations:
(63) *Zakaj mu ni nic povedala, saj je sicer tako odkritoscena*
Why did not she say a word, she is *otherwise* (*sicer*) so frank;
(64) *Danes so mu vsi zoprni, ceprav sicer z vsemi dobro sodeluje*
Today he dislikes everybody even *though* (*sicer*) he cooperates well with them;
(65) *Lepo je ce se ljudje, ki skupaj delajo, tudi sicer razumejo*
It is fine if colleagues at work get on well also *otherwise* (*sicer*)
(66) *Kljub sicer hitremu napredku na tem področju se zaostajamo za drugimi*
Despite the *otherwise* (*sicer*) fast development in this area, we still lag behind *others*;
(67) *Opazil je, da je njegov sicer zagoreli obraz pobledel*
He noticed that his *otherwise* (*sicer*) sunburnt face turned pale;
(68) Zagotoviti moramo enakomernejšo proizvodnjo, ker sicer trg ne bo redno preskrbljen
We must provide more steady production because otherwise (sicer) the market could not be supplied regularly;
(69) Secnjo bo treba pospesiti, saj sicer lesna industrija ne bo izpolnila nacrta
Felling of trees must be accelerated otherwise (sicer) the wood industry will not fulfill the plans;
V - to express a slight limitation or reservation:
(70) To je sicer lepo, je pa zame predrago
This is indeed (sicer) fine, but too expensive for me;
(71) Ljudje so sicer mnogo govorili o tem, toda pravega vzroka ni nihče poznil
People indeed (sicer) talked about it, yet nobody knew the real reason;
(72) Strokovnjak sicer ni, vendar marsikaj zna
An expert is he indeed (sicer) not, but he knows a lot;
VI - to express the realization of the real state of things:
(73) Vsi mu morajo streci. Sicer pa si samo domislja, da je bolan
Everybody has to please him. Anyway (sicer pa) he only imagines that he is ill;
(74) Lahko greš z mano. Sicer pa se rajsi vidim, da ostanes doma
You can come with me. Anyway (sicer) I would rather see if you stayed at home;
VII - to express a general validity of the stated:
(75) Njihovo ravnanje ljudem ni bilo vsec. Sicer pa so delali po ze preizkusenih metodah
Their conduct was not approved. Anyway (sicer pa) they were using known methods;
(76) Od vseh zahteva natancnost. Sicer pa je strog tudi do samega sebe
He demands accuracy from everybody. Anyway (sicer pa) he is also strict with himself.
VIII - it stresses the denied statement or realization:
(77) Ne bomo te vec silili. Sicer pa ne misli, da je tako hudo
We are not going to force you any more. Anyway (sicer pa) do not think that it is so difficult;
(78) Kdo tako krici? Sicer pa mi to nic mar
Who is shouting so loud? Anyway (sicer pa) I do not care;
(79) Tega niste nikoli omenili. Sicer pa pustimo to zdaj
You have never mentioned this. Anyway (sicer pa) let's drop this subject now (as indication that there is a shift to some other strain of thought).

For the aims of this paper the uses of ker (49 ) and (51), and the uses of sicer (73) -(79) are especially interesting. Let us see why.

3.2. The analysis

The examples (49) and (51) for instance, indicate that SSKJ definitions provide a misleading explanation. The subject matter of the relative clause could probably, in a sense, really be interpreted as the reason of the action related in the main clause, but, above all, this could not
and should not be understood in a chronologically-causative way. One could not say that
the agent from example (49) went silent because he could not tell the truth, or more precisely,
that his sudden realization that he may not tell the truth was the cause of his going silent. The
"subject matter of the relative clause" is rather the interpretation of the events related in the
main clause: the agent from example (49), for example, could/might also have been silent even
before "the subject matter of the relative clause" was made known to him, as well as after that.
And above all, one should not forget that in example (49) we are dealing with one "real" event
(the event that happened in the "real" world) and two systems of belief relating that event, the
first being the one of the silent agent and the second being the one of the speaker (the one
delivering the utterance about the silence of the agent in (49)). To us, listeners, only the "truth"
of the speaker is available, that is to say, the speaker who thinks (or even better, who makes us
think) that the agent from example (49) was silent because he could not tell the truth, but we do
not know if the silent person would agree with the speaker's interpretation (let alone what the
"real" state of affairs was). The "subject matter of the relative clause" is thus solely the
speaker's interpretation of the agent's silence, but not (necessarily) also the cause of it.
Example (51) could be argued in a similar way: "the subject matter of the relative clause" (my
knowledge that the agent from example (51) is honest) is probably not the cause of the event in
the main clause (the "fact" that "I turned to him"). It is rather the interpretation of it: I probably
did turn to him because he was honest, yet the reason why I turned to him was not (or at least
not only) my knowledge about his honesty, but the "fact" that I wanted something from him:
and since I knew that he was honest I turned to him (and not to somebody else).
The same as in example (49), there is (only) one "fact" (the one stating that the speaker turned
to the agent from example (51)) and two (different) systems of belief: the one of the speaker
(expressed in example (51)) and the one of the agent from example (51) (about whose
interpretation of the actual event (why the speaker really turned to him) we do not have any
information).
An additional argument in favor of the hypothesis that "the subject matter of the relative
clause" is only an interpretation and by no means the cause of the event in the main clause, is
the choice of tenses (in Slovenian), namely the past tense for the main clause and the present
tense for the relative clause. One could probably say that some present "fact" cannot be the
cause of something that happened in the past (which would be a rather hasty conclusion in our
case); yet, since the present tense is used merely to relate the past event, it means that the
speaker in example (51) is only explaining the criteria of choosing the addressee of his act,
and by no means causing it.
This brings us to the point we were aiming at: it seems that some uses of the connective ker
(because) obscure its real function or to put it differently, its function is in a way
overestimated: but in conjunction with the connective pa, its function becomes more clear cut.
Let us look what happens if we introduce pa in examples (49) and (51):

(49') Ker pa resnice ni smel povedati, je rajiš molcal
       But since (ker pa) he could not tell the truth, he chose silence.

(51') Ker pa vem, da je posten, sem se obrnil nanj.
But since (ker pa) I know that he is honest, I turned to him.

Only in conjunction with pa do we realize that the given discourse segment, or more precisely, "the cause of the event related in the main clause" cannot be properly understood without an additional information coming from outside (or at least preceding) the discourse:

\[ X \quad \text{Ker pa} \ A, B \]

We can conclude from the above diagram that it is X which is the cause (and the argument) for the event related in the main clause. On the other hand, "the subject matter of the relative clause", introduced by ker, is only the interpretation of the main clause, or one of its (possible) interpretations. Of course it is quite probable and not at all impossible that X is of an entirely mental nature (in example (49), say, it is my knowledge/conviction/fear why he could not tell the truth; and in example (51) it could be my knowledge/conviction/hope why he is honest).

What is important for our analysis at this stage is the "fact" that **there was some knowledge/conviction/fear ... which existed before the discourse segment in question was uttered**, and that this knowledge/confidence/fear ... was used as an indirect argument for the event related in the main clause.

All this appears much more transparent in the case of the connective **sicer** (otherwise): it is used in conjunction with pa much more readily than ker. Furthermore, already some of the SSKJ's definitions explicitly show that the discourse segment introduced by sicer pa is being argumented for by some previous "fact", related in the given discursive segment.

Let us look at the example (73):

(73) *Vsi mu morajo streci. Sicer pa si samo domislja, da je bolan*

Everyone must please him. Any\textit{way} (sicer pa) he is only imagining that he is ill

If we omit pa the utterance yield unusual, even senseless implicatures:

(73') *Vsi mu morajo streci. Sicer si samo domislja, da je bolan*

Everyone must please him. Other\textit{wise} (Sicer) he is only imagining that he is ill > If he is not pleased by everybody he only imagines that he is ill (even though in fact he is not) > If he is pleased by everybody he is (in fact) ill (otherwise he is only imagining that he is ill).

The omission of pa in the examples (75) and (77), on the other hand, robs the sentences of their autonomy and independence which renders them co(n)textually misplaced and non-understandable, as in (75') and (77'):

(75) *Njihovo ravnanje ljude\textit{m} ni bilo vsec. Sicer pa so delali po ze preizkusenih metodah*
Their conduct was not approved. Anyway (sic__pa) they were using well-known methods;

(75') Njihovo ravnanje ljudem ni bilo vsec. Sicer so delali po ze preizkusenih metodah
Their conduct was not approved. Otherwise (sic) they were using well-known methods;

(77) Ne bomo te vec sili. Sicer pa ne misli, da je tako hudo
We will not force you any longer. Anyway (sic__pa) do not imagine that it is so difficult.

(77') Ne bomo te vec sili. Sicer ne misli, da je tako hudo
We will not force you any longer. Otherwise (sic) do not imagine that it is so difficult.

We have already discussed that problem in relation to examples (46') - (48'), but it is interesting to note that examples (75) and (77) recover their autonomy and independence if, in addition to pa, sicer is omitted as well.

(75'') Njihovo ravnanje ljudem ni bilo vsec. Delali so po ze preizkusenih metodah
Their conduct was not approved. They were using well-known methods;

(77'') Ne bomo te vec sili. Ne misli, da je tako hudo.
We will not force you any longer. Do not imagine that it is so difficult.

Such substitutive analysis thus leads to the conclusion that connective sicer cannot be separated from the connective pa when used as a complex argumentative connective sicer pa as described by SSKJ's definitions VI - VIII. In other words, it is only the complex connective sicer pa (anyway), and not sicer alone, to which the SSKJ's definitions VI - VIII could be applied (with some reservation of course as to the sometimes bizarre jargon of the SSKJ).

But, such analysis also raises an unpleasant question: if the connective sicer pa (anyway) could be omitted without affecting the autonomy and independence of the analyzed argumentative string(s), why should one bother to use it at all? Our hypothesis is as follows: it is used in order to lend complexity to the argument, in order to place it not only as part of the linear argumentative connection A > C, C < A, but also - by referring to some previous (previous in relation to the discourse in progress) common and general knowledge (some topos) - as a multi-layer, polyphonic structure.

Let us test this hypothesis (made on more or less isolated examples from SSKJ) on some newspaper articles taken once again from the main Slovenian daily, Delo.
3.3. Some examples

Text I (Delo, September 7, 1990)

"We are obviously not wanted in this society"

The Press conference of the "Party for the Equality of Citizens" - Pressures on the party

"Since the party was deceived at the last elections, we have no other way to communicate with the government but through the mass media", said the president of the party Dragisa Marojevic at today's press conference. The conference was aimed at presenting the party's views regarding the draft proposal for the amendments to the republic's constitution which are currently under public scrutiny. These were sent to the constitutional committee but they probably won't be presented to the delegates in the republic's assembly. Another issue at the press conference was the pressures on the party and the political gaffe of the republic's secretariat for internal affairs, which occurred after the party released the public notice regarding events in Knin.

"Since it is both the fact and the reality that Slovenia is still part of SFRJ, we are convinced that the adoption of constitutional amendments would directly obstruct further democratic dialogue about the resolution of the political crisis in Yugoslavia", is the opinion of the party.

They also pointed out that the direct clash with the current Yugoslav constitution and accompanying laws is intolerable. In their opinion what this boils down to is the destruction of the legal system. Furthermore, they find even more disturbing the fact that proposed amendments oppose article 235 of the Yugoslav constitution which deals with the sovereignty of Yugoslavia and the right of the citizens to defend the sovereignty of the state. This could have grave consequences and cause agitation among the citizens, stressed the party.

Indictments regarding the party's disputable public notice on events in Knin are in Marojevic's opinion only another proof that they are not wanted in this (Slovenian) democratic society. The most surprising, however, is the fact that the verbal offense is being revived by those democrats who used to be unanimous in demanding its abolishing. Dragisa Marojevic also said that after the release of the public notice he received 15 anonymous and seriously offensive letters and that the party members assume that these letters came from the police.

*Sicer pa (anyway), the party thinks that it is in Slovenia where human rights are worst violated.*

Mihalea Zitko

The concluding sentence printed here in italics, when considered in relation to other statements at the press conference, appears quite unusual, to put it mildly, viz. the party's leader hasn't been but giving examples of what he regarded the violations of human rights in Slovenia. The appropriate (i.e. the expected) conclusion could thus only be something like:
The party therefore thinks that it is in Slovenia where human rights are worst violated,
Stranka torej (therefore) meni, da so clovekove pravice najbolj krsene prav v Sloveniji

or (maybe)

The party thinks that it is therefore in Slovenia where human rights are worst violated
Stranka meni, da so clovekove pravice torej (therefore) najbolj krsene prav v Sloveniji

but by no means

Anyway, the party thinks that it is in Slovenia where the human rights are worst violated
Sicer pa (Anyway) stranka meni, da so clovekove pravice najbolj krsene prav v Sloveniji

because (as we have already seen in our analysis of sicer pa) the use of connective sicer pa (anyway) presupposes that:

1. the speaker is going to change the subject or is shifting to another train of thought (also one of the SSKJ's definitions)
   or
2. the speaker is going to employ some already (or generally) known "fact" in order to support and reinforce what was stated.

At first glance, the journalist Mihaela Zitko, does not do any of the above. But only at first glance. To put it more precisely, why should one round off Marojevic's detailed list of human rights violations with the assertion that human rights were worst violated in Slovenia, i.e. with the assertion which obviously cannot be understood as a conclusion that sums up what has been previously stated, since it is introduced with the complex connective sicer pa (anyway)? In fact, the idea seems unusual, senseless, even contradictory in itself only as long as we assume that there is only one speaker involved. Even the superficial reader would have noticed that the journalist simply reports Marojevic's words all until the last sentence/paragraph. Therefore, who is actually the speaker in the last paragraph: Mihaela Zitko, the journalist-reporter, or somebody else? The last sentence (paragraph) would not present co(n)textual difficulties were it paraphrased as

Anyway (sicer pa), as we already know (kot ze vemo), the party thinks that it is in Slovenia where the human rights are worst violated.
Sicer pa, (Anyway), kot ze vemo (as we already know), stranka meni, da so clovekove pravice najbolj krsene prav v Sloveniji

38
In other words this means that the introduction of the connective ("buffering") phrase kot zevemo (as we already know), which overtly refers to some general (common) knowledge, enables one to detect several utterers or uttering orientations in the text otherwise signed by (only) one journalist. In the given text it is possible to identify three utterers:

U1 who "discloses" the violation of human rights in Slovenia ("empirically", considered at the level of persons appearing in this text, this could be Dragisa Marojevic);
U2 who (maybe by providing proofs of actual respect of human rights in Slovenia, maybe by comparing the state of human rights in Slovenia with the one in other Yugoslav republics, maybe in some other way) opposes U1 (at the level of the individuals appearing in the text, U2 has no empirical representative; the opposition to U1 or indeed the "fact" that U2 is actually inherent to the text itself, becomes clear only with (and because of) the appearance of U3);
U3 "sums up" the dispute by referring to some previous, general and common knowledge (in our example it is the knowledge about the "disclosure" or the manner of argumentation of U1), which saps the strength off the argument put forward by U1 (it is interesting to note that U3 could as well be Mihaela Zitko, only that this time she does not assume the role of the reporter, but rather that of the commentator; therefore, in empirical terms, it is one and the same person, who in the given discourse has two separate roles);
U3, on the other hand, merges with the speaker S (in our example it is the author of the article).

Especially interesting feature of this example is that it does not relate the confrontation of particular opinions of particular utterers from which the individual confronted topod - the most general structures forming the foundation of individual lines of reasoning - are yet to be derived. It is the topos itself - the one that could be formulated as T11 The more something is repeated, the lesser its (convincing) power - which takes on the role of the argument used by one of the utterers. In other words this means that it directly intervenes in the "surface" structure of the text, and we don't yet have to reconstruct it.

Of course the structure of the complex connective sicer pa is not necessarily thus complex. Sometimes it even seems that it is not possible to ascribe to it a polyphonic structure either. Let as take the following article as an example:

Text II (Delo, September 21, 1990)

A Ray of Hope for Health Service

The Slovenian government looks for ways out of the health service quandary - Tito's pictures to be removed from public places

What to do with Tito's pictures and busts in public places? Since they are not state symbols and accordingly there is no law which would prescribe that they must be there, the Slovenian government at today's session expressed their opinion that these pictures could be removed.
This is not an order but simply a recommendation which of course pertains to public places, but not to private premises. The government also recommends a polite attitude and consultation with museums and other cultural institutions in the case of objects of artistic value.

This discussion is related to the initiative of Vojvodina's assembly which put forward a proposition that the Federal Assembly should annul the law from the '80s about the usage of the name and the image of late Josip Broz Tito. The Executive Council supports this initiative. The issue was given a wider consideration also because people often ask what are they supposed to do with Tito's pictures in schools and other public institutions.

Anyway (Sicer pa), the most part of the press conference following today's session was devoted to the quandary of the public health service in Slovenia. In order to function normally some 12 billion dinars would be needed by the end of the year. After the rebalancing of the republic's budget, only 8.9 billion dinars are available. According to the calculations of health institutions, for the most basic operation or rather survival they would need 10.7 billion dinars. The deputy Minister of Health, Dr. Tone Kosir, tried to explain to the journalists how the missing funds could be obtained.

Several options are being considered. One is increase in fees that citizens have to pay for health services, which have not been raised for quite some time. In addition to this, the Executive Council increased the funds for charges and salaries, but these are intended for health institutions which are worst affected. Some health institutions are also exempt from certain tax payments.

Dr. Tone Kosir pointed out that it is high time a new law which would regulate the area of health services, health care and insurance were adopted. The first drafts should be finished by the end of September. As to the article 20 of the current law on health care, which defines to whom apply fees for health services, it should be expanded even before the adoption of the new law to encompass more fee payers. In addition, an accelerated procedure to introduce private health centers has also been considered. This could be solved with an amendment to the current law.

It appears that in the above text, the connective sicer pa functions in accordance with one of the SSKJ's definitions, which describes the connective sicer (without the accompanying pa) as indicating solely a switch to another thought. Yet, is it indeed merely a switch to another thought? Let us try to substitute sicer pa with another connective which is also used to indicate a switch to another thought, namely poleg tega (in addition to that), and let us compare the two examples:

(84) Anyway (Sicer pa) most part of the press conference following today's session was devoted to the quandary of the public health service in Slovenia.

Sicer pa (Anyway) so na tiskovni konferenci po danasnjem zasedanju najvec casa odmerili zagatam slovenskega zdravstva
In addition to that, (Poleg tega) most part of the press conference following today's session was devoted to the quandary of the health service in Slovenia.

Poleg tega (In addition to that) so na tiskovni konferenci po danasnjem zasedanju največ casa odmerili zagatam slovenskega zdravstva.

If we return to the article now, we will notice that anyway (or our substitution, in addition to that) occupies roughly the middle position in the text at which one topic melts into another. This "fact" could (in a very vague way, though) support the thesis that what we have here is really a switch to another thought. Yet let us have a closer look at the connective poleg tega (in addition to that): In addition to that (Poleg tega) most part of the press conference was devoted to the quandary of the health service in Slovenia.

Using the simple arithmetical logic one could argue that most of the time can be devoted to one issue only and not to two issues. If most of the time at the press conference was devoted, apart from the issue about the removal of Tito's pictures, to the quandary of the health service, then the amount of time devoted to each problem could not possibly be the same: if for the most part the participants concentrated on the removal of Tito's pictures, then the most part could not be devoted to the quandary of the health service and vice versa.

The issue of course becomes controversial with the introduction of the connective poleg tega (in addition to that) which is neutral in relation to the subject matters it connects within the text (the two connected parts are not neutral to each other though). And it is this feature indeed that distinguishes poleg tega (in addition to that) from sicer pa (anyway). In the previous example (Text I) it was obvious that sicer pa (anyway) does not denote only a switch to some other subject matter (to one of the subject matters dealt with in the text, to one subject matter among other subject matters), but to a specific subject matter, namely the one which prevails in the text and gives weight to it. In fact, sicer pa (anyway) unambiguously denotes some uttering position other than the one which was in the forefront up to that point, the uttering position that will be, at the level of the "surface" structure, adopted and summed up by the speaker, and will thus become the mediator of the fundamental message of the text.

In the analyses of sicer pa (anyway) of the Text II one must therefore depend on the speaker and two utterers:

U1 who presents some "fact" F1 (in our example it is the "fact" about the removal of Tito's pictures, but the "fact" itself is not important at all; it could indeed be anything).

U2 who exposes another "fact" F2 as being more important (which, let us stress it once again, could be anything as well; what makes it more important in a specific text is the "fact" that it is introduced by the connective sicer pa (anyway)), while the speaker S merges with (or adopts the position of) U2.

However, if this holds true how are we to explain the sicer pa (anyway) in the following example?

Text III (Delo, September 3, 1990)
The Missionary Healed the Sick

The seminar entitled "Evangelization 2000", at which pater Emilian Tardif was to heal the sick, attracted some 20,000 people.

"Jesus is among us and he heals the sick. Some of you will be relieved of the pains in your shoulders and knees. Raise your hands if you are cured". Thus started his cure following the prayer pater Emilian Tardif, the missionary from the Dominican Republic, otherwise the member of the charismatic group "Renovation in Spirit". Thousands gathered at the stadium in Spodnja Siska went silent. "Do not be afraid. Raise your hands. Jesus healed you", encouraged pater Emilian Tardif. Suddenly someone raised his hand, someone else waived a scarf. Then an elder woman. There was a commotion at the stadium. "Thanks God. Lord is great", called out pater Emilian Tardif ecstatically while the participants at the seminar started a fervent applause. There followed an indescribable euphoria.

This is a rough description of the last week's healing session by pater Emilian Tardif at the perfectly organized three-day seminar "Evangelization 2000" held at Ljubljana's stadium in Spodnja Siska. Miraculous healing which pater described during his speech, usually occurred following the religious ritual and his prayer for the sick which is held in some unintelligible language, which pater Emilian Tardif admits he does not understand either. It is a gift from God, according to him the "prophecy of healing". Otherwise, at the session some were said to be cured of their shoulder, knee, back, and ear conditions, and others are expected to be cured of cancerous diseases in a few weeks.

For example, Zdravko Kovacic from Bugojno told us that he had been having problems with his backbone for twenty years. "At the seminar I prayed for a girl and suddenly I could feel pins and needles in my backbone. The pain then vanished. I knew Jesus healed me", described his experience Zdravko Kovacic. Something similar happened to Vojka Mihacic from Izola and Fani Zele from Rijeka, whom we met waiting in front of the health center to obtain certificates about their miraculous healing.

And what do doctors have to say? Dr. Janez Zajc, the specialist in physical medicine and convalescence in the Ljubljana Clinical Center, who was invited to attend the seminar by his friend pater Marjan Sef of the parochial office of St. Jacob in Ljubljana (also among the organizers), said at the Saturday's press conference that they examined 18 miraculously cured patients. With four of them, who claimed that they had strong pain in their shoulders and knees before the session, the doctors established an extremely good flexibility of the affected parts. "This does not mean that they were miraculously cured at the seminar. We must first compare their previous condition with the present one" added Dr. Janez Zajc. Anyway (Sicer pa) there were as many as 15 doctors and 35 nurses at the seminar.

If the sicer pa from the above example is to be interpreted simply as a switch to some other thought, one would expect that it could be easily substituted or paraphrased with poleg tega (in addition to that) or even with tudi (also). For example:
There were also (tudi) 15 doctors and 35 nurses at the seminar.
Na seminarju je bilo tudi (also) 15 zdravnikov in 35 medicinskih sester.

Such paraphrasing is obviously illegitimate since it does not allow for implicatures to which leads the variant with the connective sicer pa (anyway). There are two main implicatures that the examples with sicer pa yield:

Anyway (Sicer pa) there were as many as 15 doctors and 35 nurses at the seminar. > All (of them) together will be able to establish what happened in reality.

Maybe it was their presence that helped the (miraculous?) healing.

The substitution of sicer pa (anyway) with poleg tega (in addition to that) or tudi (also) turns the conclusive sentence into some kind of the dead-end of the text, some forced appendix which has no impact on the previous text: even without it the text would have been a relatively autonomous and independent entity.

This, however, could not be said of the connective sicer pa (anyway), which lends to the text - somehow retroactively - a specific, polyphonic structure. In the case of the first as well as the second implicature, it is indisputable that there are three utterers, of which the first two are common to both the first and the second implicature:

U1 presents some "fact" F (healing of several people) as miraculous;
U2 presents the same "fact" F as ambiguous (ambiguous as to the causes of the healing);
The third utterer (U3) or to put it more precisely, his/her views and standpoints, vary depending on the implicature on which one decided.

If we have decided on the first implicature, U3 does not support either the view of U1 or the view of U2, but takes (apparently at least) a neutral position: the forthcoming examinations will show whether U1 or U2 is right (which, implicitly, means that U3 supports U2).
On the other hand, if we decided on the second implicature, U3 oscillates between the views of U1 and U2: if it was the presence of many doctors which helped the healing, U3 obviously supports the view of U2. However, if it was their presence alone that helped, and not also their medical knowledge, then it is obviously the case of miraculous healing, which means that U3 supports the views of U1.

What implicature we are going to decide on, depends on the topos we are going to apply. The issue actually becomes extremely interesting at this point: the same topos (a topos such as T12 More people, more knowledge) can, in fact, support both implicatures - even though they are different. This does not only mean that the speaker S, who merges with U3, employed some general knowledge common to (i.e. shared by) some given group, but also that what is at work here is some general structure, so general that it is possible to use it (within various groups or
different systems of beliefs) to support various arguments leading to the same conclusion!
The move of the speaker S is thus mightily subtle: on the one hand, by involving in the game
two possible U3, the speaker extracts for us the skeletal structure of his/her own conclusion,
while on the other, he also suggests that it is this simple skeletal structure (and that precisely
because it is skeletal) which allows for the variety of conclusions giving to the text the
many-voiced, polyphonic structure.

3.4. A (tentative) conclusion

And it is this usage of sicer pa (anyway) which is probably the most typical. From the above
examples it becomes quite clear that the role of sicer pa (anyway) is to stage or enact the
polyphonic structure of the text. Moreover: polyphony, even though having only two levels
(Text II) is, as we have seen, inherent to the connective sicer pa (anyway), which in other
words means that by simply prefixing some part of the text with sicer pa (anyway) we endow it
with the polyphonic structure.
In order to confirm the above hypothesis (and conclude the paper), let us have a look at the
following text:

Text IV (Delo, November 2, 1990)

Broken Warning Signs in Tivoli (comment under a photography)

A regular visitor to the Tivoli park drew our attention to the fact that
some signs reminding the dog owners to put their pets on the leash, have
already been damaged. Who is destroying the signs nobody could tell, not
even the people from Rast, the company in charge of the Tivoli park. But
they told us that each year they have considerable expenses because of
damaged signs, benches and lights. The pleasure that some derive from
destroying the public property knows no limits.

Up to that point, the text seem to be autonomous and independent, and it does not call for any
additional explanation(s). Yet the text is concluded with this utterance:

(88) Anyway (Sicer pa) every serious damage is reported to the police.

Sicer pa (Anyway) vsako vecjo skodo prijavijo milicnikom.

With this appendix, the previously transparent text suddenly loses its transparency. A very
simple test will convince us that the reason for this resulting intransparency is the connective
sicer pa (anyway): the last part of the text relates that unidentified persons do not break only
signs in the park, but also benches, lights and that the "pleasure that some seem to derive from
destroying the public property knows no limits". It would be quite unambiguous and the
journalist would be entirely justified (especially since this is a short comment under the
picture) to conclude the text with Every serious damage is reported to the police, omitting the
connective sicer pa (anyway) entirely: the comment (text) would thus retain its autonomy and
transparency.
The very appearance of sicer pa in the text, however, enlivens the linear structure of the text, robs it of its direct transparency, by referring to some extra-discursive support. Which forces us to introduce two additional utterers.

The most general (polyphonic) structure of the connective sicer pa - regardless of the structuring of the text in which it is used or the context in which it appears - could therefore be described as "containing" two utterers:

U1 (who is not necessarily the first utterer in the text) either opposes the preceding utterer relating some "fact" (in the case of the damaged signs in Tivoli this is done by taking exception to the irresponsibility, careless attitude to public property,...)

U2 answers to U1 (opposes him/her, calms him/her down,...) by stating some (usually) general, widely known (or, as in the case of the damaged signs in Tivoli, self-evident) "fact" (every damage is reported to the police).
REFERENCES

Anscombe, J.-C. and O. Ducrot
1983 *L'Argumentation dans la langue*. Brussels: Mardaga

Breznik, A.

Ducrot, O.
1991 *Slovenian lectures*. Manuscript.

Ducrot, O. et al.

Moeschler, J.

Tancig, P. and Igor Z. Zagar.
Toporisic, J.

Zagar, I.Z. and P. Tancig.
1989 Racunalniska analiza 'napadov na JLA'. *Casopis za kritiko znanosti* 119/120. Ljubljana.

Zagar, I.Z.

Zagar, I.Z.