Two Moral Levels
Matjaž Potrč

Monistic thin moral concepts in their values and reasons role at the upper level illuminate the holistic dynamical moral landscape featuring graded entanglement of thick moral concepts acting as forces at the lower level. Moral intuitive judgment is psychological morphological content involving enterprise with its limitations that takes this relation in reverse from the lower level in direction of the upper level. Upper level of thin concepts is an idealization providing value allowing for irrealist interpretation.

1. Short introductory statement of two moral levels view.
Moral judgment succeed in a complex situation requiring evaluation. Sometimes the valuation simply jumps into your eyes in the manner as this happens in the famous case where you encounter  hoodlums pouring gasoline upon a kitten igniting it for their own pleasure. You just cannot abstain from condemning what you encountered. At other occasions moral judgments is fallen after a lengthy period of deliberation. And there are cases in between. 
	The view here is as follows. In moral judgment we have to do with an interaction between two levels. Upper level involves moral thin concepts with their role as reasons or values. These concepts are monistic. You should not worship any other values, at the risk of going morally wrong. Thin moral concepts at the upper level valuate whatever is there at the lower level, at the holistic dynamical landscape of moral forces that one encounters. These forces are often mistakenly taken to be principles. Value monism is a jealous tiny lot, opposing pluralism.
	Monistic higher level moral concepts are in interaction with the encountered lower level richness, where some hierarchy is forthcoming, as is the case with moral forces disciplining the rest of moral environment at hand.
Moral judgment tries to reach values, in an evidentialist enterprise, which is necessarily hampered by agent’s psychological limitations. Background morphological content is psychological basis for intuitive assessments, reversing the direction of thin concepts values illuminating the encountered situation. Psychological limitations however do not relieve agent from the obligation to fall his judgment in his best faith, given the available evidence. 
	The inspiration for two moral levels theory comes from Gestalt, just that the static nature of the lower level is substituted by a dynamical one.

2. Some background leading to two moral levels view.
The just shortly preliminarily sketched two levels theory of moral judgment is the result of several forces and experiences in my philosophical itinerary. This section clarifies some of historical links, thereby preparing the next section where arguments for two levels theory of moral judgment are presented in a more systematic manner. Depiction of my itinerary includes Gestalt theory, from the static towards dynamical rendering of it. Then comes error theory, with its realism and nihilism endorsing inclinations. An interpretation of thin and thick moral concepts as keyed to error theory is attempted. Scalar consequentialism and finally pluralism are sketched. Some of these ingredients are quite dated in my development, whereas others are product of more recent thinking of mine. This historical part sheds some light upon my development, which may be of certain interest. But its main function is to clarify several ingredients of two levels theory whose entering the scene may otherwise appear kind of mysterious.
a. Gestalt theory.
I am Slovene philosopher who cares for national legacy. I understand France Veber to be the most prolific and insightful philosopher writing in Slovene language. This interest of mine is in opposition to the actual scene of philosophy in Slovenia, where Veber largely continues to be neglected. I never met Veber in person, but I interacted with his pupil Ludovik Bartelj, who developed Veber’s hitting of reality approach, as I understand it, by what I call relevance providing beautiful patterns. Mentioning of patterns is not arbitrary here. Let me recall Veber’s book on aesthetics. Although he contributed in several areas, one of the main influences of his work on mine comes from the patterns’ central role in aesthetic perception of what he refers to as beauty. My aesthetic appreciation of a symphony is based upon a multitude of tones that are performed by various instruments. These necessarily underlying matters, however, lead to aesthetic experience only once as one indulges into the overall pattern that is basic to the symphony. Conductor is in charge of governing and transmitting that pattern to the audience. 
	As already noted, Veber’s insistence on patterns has its roots, namely in the work of his teacher Alexius Meinong, who, together with his pupils such as philosopher Ernst Mally , born in town of Kranj in Slovenia, inventor of deontic logic, Benussi and Christian von Ehrenfels, established so called Gestalt theory, i.e. theory affirming the importance of patterns. Following his trademark interpretation of intentionality, theory of objects, Meinong treated patterns as real and independently existing, although the access to them is psychological.
	Gestalt theory thus affirms the existence of patterns. The example of pattern offered by symphony shows that patterns are supposed to rest upon basic ingredients, such as tones produced by various instruments in the performance of the symphony. Here is a simple illustration of how one can approach two levels, as provided by Veber.

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What we can see are just five points, and nothing else. Let us call these points basic ingredients or building blocks. But in fact, it is not difficult to see that you perceive something in addition to these basic five points in the setting above, namely a cross -- don’t you? Yet again, the same distribution of points may be the basis for perception of other patterns, such as a diamond with a point in the middle of it. As a home taking exercise, you are challenged to find at least three more patterns that the above five points support. I just remind you on the Kanisza triangle, invented by the psychologist whom I happened to encounter close to Slovenia, where the materially inexistent pattern space protrudes from a basic arrangement of three bitten circles.
	I got interested in Meinong’s theory of objects, and found out, following Veber’s indications in his System of Philosophy, that its beginning lies in Weber’s law, where Weber in question is no relative of the Slovene France, but rather the German inventor of the psycho-physics. Meinong built upon just noticeable differences that characterize psycho-physics, and upon their relation to the perceived patterns which they support. A slight increase in physical stimulus will not be noticeable untill it reaches a certain threshold. Anyway, the theory of objects, and Gestalt along with it, are presented as perceptual outcomes at the higher or upper level, in their dependency upon the arrangements at the basic sensory level. This is two levels theory that underlies theory of objects and Gestalt. Gestalt comes at the upper level, whereas the sensory stuff comes at the underlying lower level.
b. Dynamical take upon Gestalt.
I was happy to discover Gestalt, as rooted in the sensory underlying supportive stuff arrangements. This went along with my interest in the psychological theory of concepts or categories, where categorization proceeds not just at the higher, but also and even more central for experimental psychological interest, at the lower, sensory or psychophysical level. Meinong, for his part, distinguished the basic inferiora, as he called them, and Gestalt like superiora, that he understood to be ontological matters. As he treated these to be prone to vagueness, I later realized that his vague objects are in fact creatures of language and thought, contrary to his ontological pretensions.
	Happy with my two levels theory project I arrived to Memphis in 1996, at the time as  Connectionism and Philosophy of Psychology book was published. Its authors, Terry Horgan and John Tienson, listened politely to my two levels theory presentation. But I discovered that they were skeptical. It took me some time to understand that the static Meinongian approach is what they disliked, as they were developing a dynamical approach in the area of philosophy of psychology, where connectionist models served just as an inspiration for the deep cognitive dynamics. Two levels, to some extent I may say now, were preserved, in that the background morphological content effectuated positioning of what may become total occurrent cognitive states of a cognizer at a time. Since then, I subscribed to that idea, which is clear from the title of my book Dynamical Philosophy. The two levels theory of mine I did not develop further, although the dynamical approach substantially involved transformation of Marr’s three levels of cognitive systems’ description. Now I think that I may use two level theory again, in the area of moral philosophy, as I will try to shortly explain in what follows. So two levels theory is my old project that I appropriate with the dynamical twist.
c. Error theory.
My philosophical interests are broad. They extend from the philosophy of mind and ecological psychology to epistemology and to ontology involving identity of objects, among other matters. In the last decade and more I am increasingly involved into moral philosophy, under the influence of my colleague Vojko Strahovnik. This started with moral particularism, and with the work in that area by Horgan and Timmons, which lead to their view of cognitivist expressivism and to the illuminating reasons project. It continues with my involvement into Bled Slovenia conferences dedicated to ethics and with Rocky Mountains Ethics congresses, where Alastair Norcross proves to be the leading moving agent. One of the views that myself and Vojko are considering is error theory. I never met Mackie in person, but my German teacher Wolfgang Stegmüller of Slovene origin was his friend. 
Recently, the question is discussed what kind of practical moral attitude one should adopt if it turns out that error theory is correct. Why is this a problem? In order to answer that question one should first take a quick look at error theory. It consists of two parts. The first of these parts states that moral language and thought aim into the direction of objective pretensions. Both in everyday and in philosophical mainstream thought moral obligations get experienced as objective, imposing demands upon the moral agent that are independent of his immediate desires and of their fulfillment. This all points in direction of the existence of moral reality. Mackie though uses powerful arguments, both from relativity and from what he calls queerness, against the existence of an independently existing moral reality. The reasoning is that disagreement in moral matters along the variation of cultures makes dubious the supposition of independently existing moral reality. Additionally, it would be metaphysically strange if there would exist such entities as to-be-pursuedness in the world. If the latter holds, then all moral judgments have to be false, or in error. This is error theory. The metaphysical part of that theory is widely discussed, either in endorsing or rejecting manner. Moral irealists support the first option, whereas realists argue in favor of the second. The first part of error theory, to the contrary, wasn’t much discussed at all. Vojko and myself pointed out that this part rests upon phenomenological argument, which concludes in direction of existence of independently existing moral reality on the basis of qualitative experience of that reality. The plausibility of such a move may be inferred from my qualitative visual experience that there is a cat over there to the metaphysical conclusion that there really exists a cat over there in the world. Trying to answer the earlier mentioned hypothetical question what kind of practical moral attitude to adopt in the case as error theory would turn out to be correct, people offered revolutionary proposals, which would transform and improve usual moral practice. Revolutionary expressivism, as for this matter, sets as its aim to follow functional engagements of moral discourse. Vojko and myself additionally argue that phenomenology upon which moral judgment is constituted in our view should be considered. We propose cognitive expressivism as revolutionary proposal. It first honors objective pretensions of moral discourse, treating moral judgments as genuine kinds of beliefs, ought-beliefs, in counter distinction to widely accepted semantic assumption which only allows for descriptive is-beliefs. In this respect, our proposal is hermeneutical, for it follows the established moral practice. In as far as it is expressivism, though, our proposal is revolutionary. By the way, we also push in direction of reestablishing the importance of judgment, coming as unique identity between its phenomenology and intentionality keyed ingredients.
Here is a thought that occurred to me in respect to error theory. Perhaps error theory just rejects thin moral concepts, such as right and wrong (notice that subtitle of Mackie’s Ethics says: inventing right and wrong). But it still uses thick moral concepts, such as pleasant and outrageous, retribution and beneficence, in their several grades and dimensions. The hypothesis that Mackie himself would proceed in this manner may be supported by the fact that he continued to be constructively engaged in moral discourse, despite his error conclusion. Practically, he adopted a kind of utilitarianism.
e. Scalar consequentialism.
Utilitarianism subscribes to morally right and morally wrong actions, the first ones of which increase pleasure, and the second ones increasing pain as their experiential equivalents, with objectivist measurement pretensions. But right and wrong cannot be ultimately exclusivist categories, especially in everyday practice.
Here comes scalar consequentialism, which takes it that “ there are no right or wrong actions, only better or worse actions ranked along a continuum from the action (or actions) that contributes most to overall utility to the action (or actions) that contributes the least.” (Wikipedia)
So one thought that occurred to me was that scalar consequentialism may be an extension of error theory in the just described sense. It would reject right and wrong as the ultimate moral categories, and it would adopt an accordion like scalar approach of evaluating actions as perhaps measured by right and wrong, but never achieving it in the everyday moral practice. So I suggested to Alastair Norcross as the originator of scalar consequentialism that he may rid himself of right and wrong as the ultimately thin moral stuff, and just endorse the graded thick moral concepts or properties. To this, however, Norcross firmly replied that he really needs thin properties. So what’s the matter with all that now? The official rendition of scalar consequentialism renounces, as it seems, the ultimate thin moral concepts, whereas the author of the view clings to them in an enthusiastic manner. How should one approach this puzzle?
e. Thin and thick moral concepts.
Two levels theory comes to the rescue now. Thin moral concepts, such as right and wrong, are values or moral reasons at the upper or higher level. They chromatically illuminate the encountered situation at the lower level, where several forces appear entangled in a holistic dynamical moral landscape. All that one encounters in moral evaluative practice of one’s action are scalar, graded concepts. But the entangled setting of these concepts in everyday situations gets enlightened in respect to its value from the upper or higher level containing thin moral concepts. These act as moral reasons in the encountered situation, in an indirect manner.
f. Pluralism.
Pluralism is a popular and kind of default approach in moral theory (Ross, Audi, Timmons). Vojko pushed into moral pluralist and realist direction, and I followed. But two levels theory offers a new perspective upon this issue. I do not deny pluralism, in a sense. I just position it upon the lower level, in the two levels theory dynamical Gestat inspired setting. Finding themselves at this level, the purported pluralist principles or values cannot have this role anymore. They are just forthcoming as forces or tendencies at the encountered moral dynamical holistic landscape. So in fact, moral forces, such as beneficiency, come in various scalar grades, enmeshed in the situation, which may be illuminated from higher level positioned thin properties, in an indirect manner. It is thus wrong to suppose that pluralist forces or tendencies are ultimate principles, moral laws or values. These are forthcoming just at the upper level according to the two level theory approach. The correct thing is thus to adopt value monism.
3. Value monism.
I have been defending monism in the area of metaphysics  for some time now, under the titles of blobjectivism and existential monism. The idea is that one can defend monism even if richness and dynamics characterizes the metaphysical entity. But in the area of moral judgment, I was inclined towards pluralism. This remains to be the case, in a certain sense. I think that there is plurality of moral forces in an encountered moral dynamical and holistic situation. Yet these forces are not values. These last ones are to be found at the higher level, and are monistic. So value monism is what ensues.
a. Exclusivity of values.
There is a tendency to see many things as being valuable. The problem is though under which criterion. The view here is that values are not many, but exclusive, monistic. They still come in couples, which however does not go against monism, for each value, as it is understandable, also involves its opposed non-value. This is different in respect to metaphysical monism, where one ontological entity does not have need for its counterparts. The monistic view of values insists upon their exclusivity. As it was noticed, it is an ethical requirement not to worship other deities once as one subscribes to monotheism. This has its basis in the fact that it would be morally wrong to embrace other values once as one subscribes to monistic exclusive values.
	A simple example of values’ exclusivity and monistic approach is offered by utilitarianism, especially in scalar consequentialism rendition.There is just the value of right and wrong, which comes with internal tension thus, although it is a monistic commodity.
b. Immorality of the proposed additional values.
Once as one appropriates value and reason monism, there is the guiding light of valuation that one has at the higher level. But just right and wrong, as a monistic couple, interpreted as presence of pleasure and pain in utilitarian manner, appears partial, for there seem to be several other values around, such as human nature. But each of the proposed values that come additionally to the right and wrong utilitarian monistic principle turns out to be morally wrong, for the simple reason that they turn the attention and resources away from what is really valuable. Several proposals to enrich the landscape of ultimate values all prove to be morally unacceptable, with bad consequences for what is really valuable in the moral realm. So, Norcross shows that adopting human nature ends up in causal fetishism. From our point of view, the main wrong step is that of confusing levels of moral engagement. It is not appropriate to assign the ultimate value or reason role to what are just forces or inclines at the lower level of moral engagement, according to our two levels approach.
c. Moral pluralism principles as forces at the lower level, not full-fledged value providing.
Take moral pluralism as a case in point. It promotes several moral principles or considerations. There is beneficence, malevolence and other stuff, so that each of these is taken to be a separate principle with its own moral weight. This appears appropriate for an account of moral dilemmas, say, which may then be presented as coming together and competitive encounter of several moral principles. According to two levels view however, this plurality of items are not values or ultimate reasons, but just tendencies or forces at the lower level of moral engagement. They do not provide full-fledged value, but just point at the value that is at the upper level, in its monistic shape.
	As one encounters a moral situation, as related to one’s possible action, say moral action, it displays a holistic dynamical shape, with several inclines, forces. None of these is really an independent and sui generis principle or reason at this empirical lower level, and rather they are psychologically and phenomenologically endowed pointers at the higher level positioned monistic value. Indications in the direction of real monistic value at the lower dynamical and holistic landscape happen under constraints of psychological limitations. There are no such limitations at the upper monistic level however, for there we have to do with ideal points of reference.
d. Oughts unavailable with non-realist approaches, including deontology.
Does the just mentioned ideal points of reference mentioning imply the existence of ideal entities? In a preliminary manner, one can say that this does not need to be the case. In mathematics, say, some people may indeed adopt realist interpretation of numbers, but there is as well the possibility to treat ideal points as constructs, without any real ontological ultimate weight.
	Take obligations, for example. Now exclude realist moral interpretations, for they would not fit into what approaches such as error theory would like, if nothing else. Then, there is an argument indicating that obligations are not available to any of irrealist or expressivist approaches. Deontology is thus unable to involve obligations and then oughts, which seems quite an interesting outcome. This may be compatible with the fact that deontology introduces additional values to the monistic right and wrong as pleasure and pain inducing matters, and that it therefore confuses what is going on at the lower level with what succeeds at the value containing monistic upper level.
e. Ought-beliefs as the lower level: cognitivist expressivism.
I like the approach of cognitivist expressivism to moral judgment, for it treats it as genuine belief (there is where cognitivist characterization comes from). But it also treats it as ought-belief, which is different to the usual characterization of moral judgment as is-belief, with its basic descriptive function. Moral beliefs according to this view thus do not describe some reality, but rather act as furthering one’s moral engagement. This is why the view is expressivism. Moral judgments do not describe, but rather engage.
	Now, from our perspective this all succeeds at the lower level of moral engagement, at the empirical holistic and dynamical moral landscape involving several entangled forces that are in competition between themselves. This also follows from our earlier preliminary statement that oughts cannot be values or ultimate reasons, for the simple fact that they appear at the lower empirical holistic moral landscape that one encounters in everyday moral practice. Despite being sympathetic to cognitivist expressivism because of its rejection of semantic assumption that treats moral judgments as descriptive, I think that oughts in question should be situated at the lower level, and thus that they are not ultimate values or reasons. They are just forces at the lower level that point into direction of monistic value or reason at the upper level.
4. Wrap-up
Here is a quick wrap-up of the sketched enterprise. I opt for monistic account of values or reasons. These chromatically illuminate the entanglement of thick concepts at the holistic dynamical lower level. Although the value is at the upper level, the action is at the lower holistic level, where the entangled forces aim at values, from this perspective that reverses the starting illuminating take on things. The upper level is an ideal reference point that allows for irrealist interpretation. 
a. Monistic thin moral concepts in their values and reasons role at the upper level illuminate the holistic dynamical moral landscape featuring graded entanglement of thick moral concepts acting as forces at the lower level. 
Monistic moral concepts of right and wrong, or pleasure and pain as its utilitarian equivalent are thin concepts, so that no real variability in content is implied into them. Despite this, they cover a lot of what is going on in everyday moral activity, at the lower empirical level of moral engagement. In this sense, value or reason is monistic. The first idea coming to mind is that this thin monistic concept chromatically illuminates the encountered underlying moral landscape, and its variability. None of lower level positioned forces really is a value, but they may be said to strive in direction of value and reason, looking for their appropriate positioning at the underlying moral landscape. In respect to the value or to the moral reason these forces are graded, or scalar: they are never full fledged ideal cases.
b. Moral intuitive judgment is psychological morphological content involving enterprise with its limitations that takes this relation in reverse from the lower level in direction of the upper level. 
The first approximation was that monistic value or reason chromatically illuminates the encountered moral situation, doing this in an indirect manner. But from the perspective of the lower level, the direction of activity has to be reversed. The motivation is in that it would be strange and incompatible with irrealism if one would postulate a real ultimately ontologically existing value or reason at the upper level. As already hinted at, the activity goes from the lower holistic dynamical moral landscape with its entangled indicative forces in direction of the ideal points of reference, value or reason that is. The situation is thus reversed. This perspective not only allows one to get rid of cumbersome realist assumptions about the higher level of value or reason. It also allows to involve a psychologically and phenomenology constituted directedness, aiming at value from the forces at the entangled lower level. It then becomes clear that moral judger has its psychological limitations that never really allow him to achieve the ultimate ideal value, but that the approaches to that one are always scalar. Chromatic illumination does not succeed from an ideal point above, but rather is something that is wished for at the lower level. That’s where the entangled forces at the empirical lower moral level point at. One aims at value, but never really achieves it, because the psychological limitations allow for scalar approximation to the value or reason only. Psychological constitution of the moral judger allows him to act from the background, in this aiming at value enterprise, from everything accumulated that he knows, from his morphological content. This is where the forces and inclinations get they value directed fuel.
c. Upper level of thin concepts is an idealization providing value allowing for irrealist interpretation.
The upper level of monistic view is inhabited by value or reason. These matters are morally thin, kind of idealization, in the sense as there are mathematical idealizations. As already hinted at, we think that these idealized values or reasons do not need to be interpreted realistically. They may be seen simply as idealized reference point in direction of which the forces or inclinations at the holistic dynamical entangled moral space aim. Thus, to see upper level thin moral concept, value or reason as an ideal reference point for the lower empirical level of moral engagement does not imply that a realist interpretation is required. Value or reason in question is just an ideal construct, aimed at but never quite reached by the forces at the lower level.

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