Tractarian Monism
Matjaž Potrč

Wittgenstein's early work profits from new interpretative dimension in respect to its monistic leanings, along the austere realism angle. 

Keywords: Tractatus, world, atomism, monism, austere realism, modal ontology.

Towards the limit of sense
	In his new book (Cerkovnik 2013) delivers an interesting overview of some key themes in Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1922) and in his early thought, sketching the influences and differences with Frege (1892), Russell (1905), and the transition to the Philosophical Investigations (2009) phase. The start is with the logico-philosophical analysis and the theory of meaning. Frege's approach to the existence and his meaning and reference distinction are then presented, followed by Russell's analysis in its contrast with Tractarian approach, where the first one helps itself with identity and the second one doesn't. Formal absolute ontology of Tractatus is singled out, pursued by picture theory, sense and truth. Thesis 7. is presented through its modal interpretation. The break with Tractarian approach and Wittgenstein Vienna circle links conclude the monograph. 
	In the following our aim is not to present the book in a systematic manner; we invite the reader herself to profit from insights offered therein. (By the way, I had pleasure to personally encounter the following persons mentioned in Cerkovnik book: Anscombe, Armstrong, Beaney, Devitt, Haaparanta, Haller, Hintikka, Jerman, Kripke, Lewis, Quine, Stalnaker, Stegmueller, Ule, von Kibed). We will just shortly concentrate upon what seems to us possibly the central theme of the book, i.e. ontological consequences of Wittgenstein's early atomistic approach. We will try to present the specificity of this approach as portrayed in the book in the direction of monism, i.e. ontological monism as underscored by formal underpinnings. Early Wittgenstein's differences in theory of meaning in respect to Frege and Russell offer a path towards ontological monism. Analytic semantic atomism turns out to be in its saddle in the holistic environment of the world. This kind of monistic holism is then compared with the austere realism ontological approach as proposed in Horgan and Potrč (2008), and with its dialectics starting with common sense intuitions. Tractarian theory of truth is compared to truth as indirect correspondence. Finally, the modal interpretation of the 7th thesis is evaluated through the monistic way to see things.
	What is the message of the book's title: Towards the Limit of Sense (Cerkovnik 2013)? Our answer is that the limit of sense is in the world, and certainly not in the world's atomistic parts. Semantic ingredients obtain their value through contextual normative mode of settling in the world's multifaceted situations.
	In this short presentation we do not aim at a minute careful textual adequacy, which would be wide off the mark for a short review of the mentioned book. Rather, we hope that our approach may serve as a profitable guide to the understanding of Tractarian phase and of its ontological and semantic  consequences.

Wittgenstein's holistic atomism
	Cerkovnik certainly would profit if he would consult my approach to the written (signs) and spoken language (Potrč 1986), where I build upon the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, and expand it to the Leibnizian project of regimentation of spoken language towards the written signs on the one hand, and to the contextual normative approach of communication-intention on the other side. The distinction between Russell's theory of descriptions and between P.F. Strawson's On Referring (1950) I also present along the differences between the early and the later Wittgenstein. In the year 2001 (Potrč, forthcoming a) I proposed revival of judgmental as against the propositional approach to philosophy, the latter of which I trace to the Fregean heritage. Recently 2014 (Potrč, forthcoming b) I expanded the proposal to overcome Fregean approach in the specific area of moral judgment, by embracing what I call genuine judgment, i.e. a committed intertwining of intentional and phenomenological directedness. 
	Now, Cerkovnik traces the source of atomism for which Tractarian proposal is known to the Fregean propositional way to go, and to the Russellian conception of philosophical analysis. In my terminology, I would call this propositional, i.e. atomistic, tractable and anti-phenomenological (Potrč, forthcoming a) Fregean approach first, as opposed to what I call judgmental committed manner of dealing with matters. This atomistic approach proper to the philosophical analysis of ordinary language, pulling it towards the logical form that disciplines imperfections of the spoken word, is exercised by Russell on the ontological grounds. “The actual king of France is bald”, says Russell (1905) needs to be analyzed into (1) assertion about the king of France as an entity in the actual world, (2) specification that there is just one such entity around in that world, and into (3) the predicative ascription of baldness to the mentioned entity. Russell then concludes that, as (1) is not satisfied, (2) cannot be satisfied either, and so the (3) predicative assertion turns out to be false. Russell thus clings to the existence of atomistic entities in the actual world as the criterion for philosophical analysis, whereby the semantic value of the sentence under scrutiny is explained. In my (1986) I show how the ingredients (1) and (2) are held to be presupposed and not explicitly asserted by the sentence under investigation by P.F. Strawson's (1950) way to go, certainly thereby putting more weight upon normativity and the contextual, wider, indirect, perhaps possible worlds involving interpretation. Semantic value of that sentence is thus rather indirect and not direct as this was the matter for Russell's extensionalism.
	Tractarian approach to meaning is known to be atomistic. The idea is that one should come to the basic atomistic ingredients of sentences. Once possessing these, one can then put them in various possible relations in the logical space. In his atomism, Tractatus follows Fregean and Russellian semantic program, aiming at something such as compositional formal framework allowing for various permissible combinations of atomistic elements into sentential molecular wholes. Cerkovnik singles out one difference between Tractatus and Russellian analysis. Whereas Russell needs identity of the entity singled out in sentence, through his condition (2), Tractatus does not buy any identity. Why? Here is my simple answer to this question: Identity condition is questionable for Wittgenstein because whatever the sentence amounts to is not determined by direct ontological atomistic basis; rather, its meaning is obtained through its multiple possible positionings in a wide holistic logical space. Following this though for a while, one starts to appreciate why Tractatus does not buy direct (verificationist) correspondence with ontological atoms in the actual world, but rather aims at the rich space of possible situations in the logical space as determining a supposedly atomistic meaning of the semantic ingredient in question. The identity is not needed because sense appears at the limit of various and multiple interpretative contexts. In other words: Russell was searching for the verification of atomistic ingredients of assertions in the atomistic identical entities inhabiting the actual world, whereas for Tractatus, the meaning of atomistic sentential ingredients comes from their inhabiting the multi-dimensional logical space. In other words, Tractatus kind of atomism is holistic. But isn't the expression “holistic atomism” internally incoherent?  

The world
At this stage of our tiny investigation we should take a view at the world such as it is proposed in Tractatus. Again, we will just lay down the main direction of our view, inviting the reader to further dig into Tractatus and into Cerkovnik (2013) presentation of its problematic. The world, as we take it, is the multiplicity of possible relations into which the atomistic ingredients enter in the overall logical space. Notice, by the way, that this extended approach expands the Russellian kind of actual world with its ontological atomistic ingredients towards obtaining a sense of atomistic ingredient building a certain assertion through multiple possible relations in the logical space to which they may be subjected. So, Russellian ontological actualism gives way to Tractarian possibilism as the framework through which the sense of atomistic ingredients building assertions may be ascertained. Through this optics, Tractarian theses such as the world being all that what may be the case needs to be evaluated.
	The world is the richness of logical space, allowing for multiplicity of appearances of the ingredients that enter that space. In respect to this Tractatus offers truth tables as presentation of that logical space. In any way, Tractarian world is not ontological world of Russell, populated by several atomistic entities, corresponding directly to the ingredients of assertions in the case of these assertions' truth.

Austere realism
If whatever was just stated holds, then Tractarian atomistic holism may be interpreted as monism. Monism would mean that there is just one world. But how is this then compatible with multiplicity of possibilities?
	In our book Austere Realism (Horgan and Potrč 2008) we defend the thesis that there exists just one non-vague rich and dynamical material world. Language and thought, on the other hand, we hold it, are vague. Applied to the previously mentioned bald king of France assertion, this implies that the sentence in its entirety and also its presumed atomistic ingredients are vague. The world to which we compare the sentence as we try to establish its semantic value, on the other hand, is non-vague. We hold it that there is a possible correspondence between the sentence and the world. But this correspondence, if it obtains, is indirect, because in the ultimate ontology there are no ultimate ontological atomistic ingredients in the world, such as the actual king of France, or even not Tibbles the cat, if one takes another example. This last one cannot be there because if it would be, it would be vague, but there just cannot be vagueness around in language and thought independently existing world. But if the sentence “The cat is on the mat” happens to be true, this is in function of its indirect correspondence to the world.
	Comparing this approach with the Tractarian world, we may notice the following. As Tractatus centers at the world as a logical construal of many possible logical combinations, we may say that we deal with the area of language-thought, in our lingo. This world as space of logical possibilities is vague, and so it does not buy any non-vague atomistic entities (as Russell presumably did). The world as logical space is normative, and it aims in direction of several possibilities. The actual non-vague world, as we have said, is put into parentheses by Tractatus, just the opposite to what Russell aimed for. To some extent, Meinongianism with it multiple possibilities that was expelled by the Russellian atomism may be back with the Tractarian world as a rich intertwining of logical possibilities approach.
	Notice that our Austere Realism starts with common sense, and reveals the dialectics through which common sense itself, as it reaches its synthetic stage, disciplining tensions at the antithetic stage concerning its thetic intuitions, embraces the construal of truth as indirect correspondence. In this manner our approach shows compatibility of Tractarian approach with common sense, which should have pleased Wittgensteins' conversational buddy Moore.

Modal worlds
If you haven't heard anything else, you certainly must have encountered the last thesis of Tractatus, namely “Worueber mann nicht sprechen kann darueber muss man schweigen”. I like it in a Finnish rock band rendition. Now, Cerkovnik presents this thesis in a rational manner as modality involving, which is supported by its expressions “can, could” and “must, have to”.  As I understand, this is a thesis that is with us at least from 1992. But I should turn reader's attention to the fact that modal and deontic logic were introduced by the Meinongian scholar of Slovene origin Ernst Mally.
	Now, given that Tractarian world is not the actual world, and that its ontology is possibilist, and maybe in overall modal, this allows us to extend such an interpretation to the 7th thesis. You should stick to all the possibilities, in your cogitations, that are logically permissible, and so sensible. And you should not talk about these that have no place in the rich realm of logical possibilities construing the world.
	Certainly, Tractarian world is not material non-vague world to which Austere Realism subscribes. It is the world to which the analysis of sentences fits, the rich space of logical possibilities. Yet it is still a monistic kind of world. The idea that atomistic ingredients obtain their sense in an overall holistic space of their possible appearances was pursued by Wittgenstein in his post-Tractarian phase, as Cerkovnik points it out. So Tractarian monism turns out to be one central thesis.

References
	Bradley, R. 1992. The Nature of All Being. A Study of Wittgenstein's Modal Atomism. Oxford: Oxford UP. 
	Cerkovnik, B. 2013. Proti meji smisla: razprave k Logično filozofskemu traktatu. Ljubljana: ZZFF.
	Frege, G. 1892. Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und philosophische Kritik.
	Horgan, T. and Potrč, M. 2008. Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
	Horgan, T. and Potrč, M. Forthcoming. Ontological Vagueness: Why It's Impossible, and Why Ontological and Semantic Consequences are Severe.
	Mally, E. 1926. Grundgesetze des Sollens. Elemente der Logik des Willens. Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky. Reprinted in Ernst Mally: Logische Schriften. Großes Logikfragment—Grundgesetze des Sollens, K. Wolf, P. Weingartner (eds.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 197: 227–324.
	Russell, B. 1905. On Denoting. Mind, New series. 14/56: 479-493
	Potrč, M. 1986. Zapis in govorica. Ljubljana: Partizanska knjiga.
	Potrč, M. Forthcoming a. The Last Judgment.http://www2.arnes.si/~supmpotr/clanki.html
	Potrč, M. Forthcoming b. Moral Judgment. http://www2.arnes.si/~supmpotr/clanki.html
	Strawson, P. F. 1950. On Referring. In his Logico-Linguistic Papers. (1977) London: Methuen. 
	Wittgenstein, L. 1922. Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
	Wittgenstein, L. 2009. Philosophische Untersuchungen. Malden, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.