Moral Judgment
Matjaž Potrč

An intuitive picture of judgment presents it as a reflexive intertwining of intentional content and of the adjoined attitude, involving one’s reflexive commitment. Philosophy as we mostly know it dismisses constitutional embracing of judgment, and it rather follows separatist agenda, where the ingredients of intentional content and of its phenomenology are treated as being unrelated. This is embraced by atomistic projects in the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. A criticism of that trend is proposed by phenomenology of intentionality and intentionality of phenomenology approach. This manner of establishing full intentional relation, it is proposed, should be understood as a move towards reintroduction of genuine judgment. Moral judgment is assessed as a sub-species of a more general judgment category. Moral philosophy with cognitivism and its opposed expressivism follows separatist agenda, the first one promoting intentional content and belief as an approach to moral judgment, whereas the second one sticks to a kind of phenomenology and attitude expression. Recently though mixed proposals are gaining ground, pushing towards an intertwining of intentional content or belief with phenomenological attitude expression. This overall trend is best understood as appropriation of constituent genuine judgment in moral philosophy. Genuine judgment is supported by intentionality-phenomenology identity theory as an answer to the question about possibility for vague content to be there in a non-vague world. This shows an impact of ontological and semantic consequences proper to the transvaluationist approach to vagueness. The role of reasons or principles in moral judgment is assessed.

Judgment: intuitive rendering.
We first ask what judgment is, providing an intuitive rendering of it as the intertwining of the intentional content and phenomenology, involving one’s commitment. Examples of judgment: aesthetic judgment, moral judgment, (probability) estimation judgment. A characteristic of judgment is that it is a concrete engagement by someone, not an abstraction. Yet we may talk about judgment in a detached, third person point of view manner.
It seems some time ago since judgment was accorded constitutive role in philosophy. Aristotelian logic used judgment in its subject-predicative form in order to account for various inferential forms. “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. So, Socrates is mortal.” presents an example of this kind of reasoning. In respect to what we will propose in a moment as an intuitive sketch of genuine judgment, one can say that judgment according to the aristotelian treatment, which was still taken over by treatises in late middle ages (St. Paul of Venice, say), in fact experienced an inferential reductive rendering. Later, judgment was conceived as central philosophical topics in kantian work; some claim that Kant’s works deal with nothing but judgment. Reading actual interpretations of kantian judgments cashes in all available interpretations, from causal theories of reference to the possible worlds. The lesson to keep though is that kantian judgment is something consisting of several intertwined dimensions, trying to unify them, so that we may be dealing with synthetic judgmental power : 

“The power of judgment, while a non-basic faculty, is nevertheless the central cognitive faculty of the human mind. This is because judging brings together all the otherwise uncoordinated sub-acts and sub-contents of intuition, conceptualization, imagination, and reason, via apperception or rational self-consciousness, for the purpose of generating a single cognitive product, the judgment, under the overarching pure concepts of the understanding or categories, thereby fully integrating the several distinct cognitive faculties and their several distinct sorts of representational information, and thereby also constituting a single rational human animal.” (Hanna 2013)

We have sympathy with this account of judgment as a multi-dimensional cognitive ability, and we think that something along these lines should be elaborated again as one of the central philosophical engagements. Following the above hint, we propose a simpler intuitive rendering of judgment as a reflexive intertwining of intentional content and of the adjoined attitude, involving one’s reflexive commitment. Judgment, we propose as a first approach, is something reflexive, which means that it involves a specific person’s conscious engagement. There is a certain content involved into judgment, and a qualitative phenomenological attitude or coloring that goes along with it. The content and the phenomenology are intertwined in judgment, so that they cannot actually be separated. Judgment, understood in this manner, is someone’s cognitive act, which also includes emotional engagement, when there is an appropriate situation. In several cases, judgment displays commitment of the person engaged into it, and it may include motivation.
	Here are some examples of judgment. As I observe a painting or listen to a symphony, I may judge that my experience encountered something beautiful. The judgment in question involves a certain content (pertaining to the painting, or to the performed symphony), and it also expresses my attitude or my qualitative feeling in respect to this content, valuing it as aesthetically beautiful case. In appropriate circumstances, I will be then disposed to express my judgment to the just mentioned effect, and I will also be ready to defend it as confronted with possibly different opinions, or explain the reasons why I engaged into such judgment. We will dedicate more space to moral judgment in what follows. So it should suffice just to give a quick illustrative example here. Encountering punks torturing a kitten for the fun of it prompts me to endorse the judgment that this situation exemplifies moral badness. The intentional content of judgment in such a case has to do with the scene that I encounter but also with my possibly emotionally underpinned valuation of it. I will be committed to defend my judgment if prompted, and I will also possibly be motivated to act in preventing this and similar acts to happen. There are several more cases of judgments, to be sure. But here is the last example provided here, the estimation or probability judgment. If you ask me how long that bed is, I may fall a judgment without measuring it, say that it is around two meters long. I have a certain feeling that I am right in my estimation, although I do not aim to be completely precise. My judgment is an approximation. The same may be also said about my former aesthetic and moral judgments. To some extent it is in their nature to be vague -- in respect to the involved content’s precisification. This does not however dismiss the force of their commitment.
	A characteristic of judgment, as may be extracted from the just given examples, is that it involves a concrete engagement by a specific person, just like the engagement of myself in the above described  cases. So genuine judgment that we talk about here is a specific act by some concrete person, involving this person’s conscious endorsement, which may but does not need to be measured by degrees of probabilities. Another way to see things here is to claim that judgment endorses one’s belief full stop, or that again one does not engage into it at all. (Compare Horgan Potrč Forthcoming) In this respect the judgment as understood here is not an abstraction, such as it was roughly dealt with in the mentioned aristotelian inferential reductionist tradition. Of course, judgment may be portrayed and assessed as an abstraction. But this will then not be the sense of it we deal with here. Genuine judgment as understood here is basically a first-person perspective engagement. But this does not exclude one’s talk about judgment in a detached, third-person point of view objectivist manner. Just that we follow the earlier mentioned and not this last approach.

The demise of judgment.
Reasons for demise of judgment: philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, analytic high church, atomism. Try to establish why judgment left the scene: third person point of view was attempted; once as one switched to the first person point of view, judgmental intertwining integration was not attempted.
We live in a Fregean age. One of Frege’s most successful proposals with broad impact onto the manner in which philosophy is practiced was his embracing of second order logic as involving function and argument, substituting thus the up till then usual subject-predicate form of inferential reasoning. (Potrč Zapis in govorica...). The sign that one is still engaged into inferential judgment, namely┣, just stayed at the very beginning of the inferential path, and certainly did not attempt to promote what we call the just sketched genuine judgment. By his promotion of function-argument Frege abolished even the formerly mentioned inferential reductionist form of subject-predicate judgment from the philosophical scene. Trials to establish subject-predicate form as the basis for logic, supposedly bringing reasoning closer to practices of ordinary language (Strawson P.F. ....) did not really encounter a huge success, although thereby some stress was put upon communication-intention linguistic engagement in one’s reasoning. So Fregean way to go is one central reason for the demise of genuine judgment from the philosophical scene.
	There are further reasons for demise of judgment from the mentioned scene however. Several forms of atomism became influential in philosophy of language and in philosophy of mind. So the intertwined ingredients of genuine judgment, its content and its adjoined attitude were separated, which means that they were treated in a separatist manner.
	Analytic high church with its definitional agenda has underwritten this direction of atomistic engagement. Definitions should clarify the concepts that one uses, and in this sense it was encouraged to isolate and define each of these concepts separately. Intentional content, from this point of view, was observed as being independent from qualitative experience with which it comes upon the stage.
	This all went together with dismissal of the first person point of view. But if judgment is essentially someone’s reflexive conscious engagement into a content and one’s committal attitude towards it, the initiative to abolish the importance of judgment was thereby enhanced. 
	Even if one switched to the first person point of view (Chisholm...), the judgmental intertwining integration of intentional content and phenomenological qualitative attitude was not really attempted.
All this has underwritten the demise of genuine judgment from the philosophical scene. Holism (Fodor LePore...) as affirmed from such a separatist background, again, did not result in judgment’s basic integration of intentional and phenomenological sides into one organic unity.
This is why some proposals (Poli, Roberto....) urged to reestablish the judgment as one central philosophical engagement, although without a huge success.

Separatism.
Separation of intentionality (intentional content) and of phenomenology (qualitative what-it’s-like experience). 
Instead of embracing judgment as one’s departure, one centered at intentional relation. There is intentional content, or intentional object, one argued, and on the other side there is attitude, the psychological embedding of the content. One distinguished intentional referential and intensional relations, these last ones taken to be opaque in respect to the extensional criteria. This intentional relation, consisting of directedness at an object or at an content, and its adjoined attitude, also qualitative attitude, did not amount to genuine judgment, even if they would be taken as coming together.
	But intentional content and psychological attitude, moreover, came as separated from each other. So, intentional content, such as someone thinking about a cat, was treated independently of attitudional and of qualitative, phenomenological manner in combination with which it tends to appear. There was perhaps acknowledgment that qualitative phenomenological feeling of what-it’s-like appears together with the intentional content. But this intentional content was treated as basically independent from, as separated from the phenomenological quality. In this manner, externalist, causal or co-variational explanations of content were proposed, so that the qualitative embedding, if it was recognized, was certainly not accorded any priority. The accompanying qualitative feeling of pleasure, say, coming along with my thought about cat, was treated as something secondary and as not really important.
	On the other hand, phenomenological qualitative what-it’s-like feeling was treated as coming separately from the intentional content. The usual examples of conscious phenomenological experiences involved such cases as pain, where qualitative feeling was supposed not to uphold any intentional directedness.
	Separatism in the treatment of intentional relation may involve theses of priority. So on the one hand one can claim that intentional relation has priority over phenomenological what-it’s-like experiences. Or again, one may promote the thesis that phenomenological relation is accorded priority over the intentional one. Such would be the case where consciousness, say, would be seen as basic and constitutive for intentional relation. In short, separatism promotes several theses about independency about the basically atomistically treated ingredients of intentional relation, consisting of intentional content and of phenomenological quality. This centering at parts of intentional relation, according to the atomistic agenda, as we say, does not even amount to the full blown genuine judgment, but is just in value for atomistically adapted shadow of it.

Phenomenology of Intentionality and Intentionality of Phenomenology.
Phenomenology of Intentionality and Intentionality of Phenomenology thesis. Spell out each side. Overcoming of separatism. Priority shtick is still there. At the end, realize that it does not amount to judgment yet.
As against separatism in treatment of intentional relation a thesis is promoted which tries to bring its ingredients together, in their mutual dependency. This is the thesis with the name phenomenology of intentionality and intentionality of phenomenology (Horgan Tienson 2002). The thesis simply claims that each case of intentional directedness, such as my thinking about a cat, comes with qualitative phenomenology as its constitutive ingredient. The idea is that intentional relation would even not get off the ground if it would not be supported by qualitative phenomenology. In other words, one can not think about the cat if this thought’s directedness at the object or content is not supported by some experiential quality. Notice that the thesis of phenomenology of intentionality, in this case, comes close to affirming the reality of judgment. But in fact it does not affirm it really yet, because judgment is not on the agenda. The center of attention is just intentional relation, which is this time defended against intentionality-phenomenology separatism, together with the priority of intentional relation.
The complementary thesis is that of intentionality of phenomenology. We have seen that separatist approach treats phenomenology or qualitative experiences, such as pain, as not being in dependence, or even related to intentional directedness. Pain is just a qualitative feeling, from this point of view. Intentionality of phenomenology, now, tries to counter this separatism by claiming that intentionality is constitutively there for phenomenology. Pain, say, is not an abstract experience, succeeding in the void. Rather, pain is there at some precise location of my body, such as my foot or my tooth. Taken from this point of view, intentional relation is constitutive for phenomenology. Intentional relation is a precondition of phenomenological experience, which, however, retains its priority as observed from this point of view.

Judgment integration of phenomenology of intentionality and intentionality of phenomenology thesis.
As phenomenology of intentionality and intentionality of phenomenology thesis does not amount to judgment yet, a trial is needed to integrate them into the intertwining unique judgment.
	The phenomenology of intentionality and intentionality of phenomenology thesis certainly seems to be on the right track in respect to the separatist agenda concerning intentional relation. Although one may stick to the priority of intentional relation and then again to the priority of phenomenological experience in surpassing separatism, as we have just indicated, one may also realize that intentional relation integration with phenomenology is not deep enough. Phenomenology of intentionality and intentionality of phenomenology thesis needs to be treated as entrance into reestablishing of genuine judgment thesis. Judgment, as we said, consists of essentially interwoven intentional content and phenomenological attitude, promoted through unique conscious and committal engagement of a certain concrete person, in specific circumstances. This was the plea about the need to re-establish the role of genuine judgment into philosophy.

Moral judgment.
Judgment still persists in the moral domain, in moral philosophy. Give some examples.
	As we mentioned Fregean and high church analytic philosophy atomistic heritage, with separatism as its main agenda, we have realized that judgment, as a general category, needs to be reaffirmed. There are some areas though where judgment remains upon the scene, for it seem to be so central for the area under question. Earlier we have provided examples of aesthetic judgment and of moral judgments. As you encounter punks torturing a kitten for their own enjoyment you promptly form moral judgment about the wrongness of this act, thereby valuing the encountered situation. Again, is some good deed is performed that you observe, you judge this to be a case where goodness comes about. The content about the situation and its valuing, namely goodness, is intertwined with your committal and possibly motivation involving conscious experience.

Separatist heritage in treating of moral judgment.
We realized that judgment in general used to be treated in separatist manner, opposing (i) intentionality, intentional content on the one hand, to (ii) phenomenology, qualitative what-it’s-like take on the other hand. The same separatist heritage also prevails in philosophy of morals. On the one hand, there is (i’) intentional content stress of cognitivism, where judgment is treated as belief, and on the other side there is (ii’) phenomenology or qualitative stress of expressivism, where judgment is treated as an emotional reaction to a given encountered situation.
	But how are moral judgments treated in philosophy? The overall approach in moral philosophy promotes cognitivism on the one hand, and expressivism on the other hand, with various species of these. According to cognitivism, moral judgment is belief or belief-like. Cognitivists treat moral judgments as true or false, as follow-up of their embracing moral realism. In this manner, cognitivists promote intentional content, as one ingredient that we found in separatist approach to judgment. On the other hand, as we said, there is expressivism, which treats moral judgments as expressions of attitudes, perhaps as some kind of emotional reactions. In this sense, expressivism is close to phenomenological side of separatist engaged in the overall approach to judgment. Expressivists tend to be irrealist.
	Considering all this, one may realize that moral judgment, as it is approached in philosophy, follows separatist agenda in respect to intentional relation and to its phenomenological accompanying stuff. Cognitivists who take moral judgments to be beliefs endorse intentional separatist way to go. On the other hand expressivists endorse irrealism and phenomenological separatist embracing of the general judgment. This is the overall picture. But things did not remain as simple as that.

Mixed proposals: overcoming separation of pure cognitivism and pure expressivism along various dimensions.
Cognitivist expressivism, fictionalism, quasi-realism, error theory. They each try to overcome pure cognitivist/realist and pure expressivist/irrealist approaches to moral judgment along various dimensions. We call them mixed theories, in respect to the cognitivism/expressivism duality.
	In fact, there are several proposals that put under question separatist agenda in respect to judgments, in moral philosophy. We may call them mixed proposals. One such clearly mixed proposal, as its name indicates, is cognitivist expressivism (Horgan Timmons....), which holds it that moral judgments are genuine beliefs, indeed, but also that they do not support realism, and that they rather embrace expressivist phenomenology. Both genuine beliefs and underlying phenomenology come together in order to support this account of judgment. But there are other mixed proposals as well.
	Fictionalism, for example, takes moral judgments not to be genuine beliefs, and it rather treats them as fictions, whose truth thus depends upon the overall story inside which they happen to be spelled out. Fictionalism is thus another mixed proposal.
Quasi-realism does not take realism of common sense supported judgment commitments to be genuine. Again, as its name indicates, it is a mixed proposal, involving both cognitivist and expressivist ingredients.
Finally, we mention error theory. This one subscribes to common sense realism of moral judgments, but then goes on to claim that they are all false, as there do not really exist such entities as Goodness or Badness that they indicate.

Thesis: mixed proposals try to overcome separation in order to get to the genuine judgment.
What do mixed proposals amount to? They try to overcome separatist thesis. In this manner, they intuitively strive towards appropriation of genuine judgment as constitutive for moral philosophy.
	We take it that mixed proposals should be understood as trials to surpass the separatist underlying agenda of cognitivism (intentional content) and expressivism (attitude or phenomenology) opposition. Bringing together various dimensions of intentional content or belief in judgment, with phenomenology, attitude and expression, portrays mixed proposals as striving in direction of re-establishing genuine judgment. But there is a catch here, for intertwining of intentional content, beliefs, and phenomenology, would finally get you just to the intertwined intentional relation, and not really to the genuine judgment, although making some initial steps into this direction.

Trying to get to genuine judgment from mixed proposals.
A task is now clearly profiling itself: Try to reconstruct genuine judgment from the mixed proposals. This gives an overall approach to moral philosophy.
	A task is coming to one’s attention now. Mixed proposals are the beginning in the direction of genuine judgment affirmation in moral philosophy. One needs to reconstruct the genuine judgment on their basis. A proposal that we will briefly sketch in what follows embraces intentionality-phenomenology identity as going into direction of this task.

Vague content in a non-vague world.
Transvaluationist account of vagueness is a priori correct. It claims that vagueness is there in language/thought, and that no vagueness is possible in the world. A question arises though: How is vague content possible in non-vague world?
	We take it that the phenomenon of vagueness is guided by normative conditions, such as difference and transition condition, which specify its sorites-susceptibility and boundarylessness defining it, with added individualistic and collectivistic principles, and ensuing prohibitions (Horgan... , Horgan Potrč....). The a priori correct approach to the phenomenon of vagueness that we promote comes under the name of transvaluationism. A consequence of our view, treating vagueness as being weakly incoherent, is that vagueness may well be there in language and thought, but not in the language and thought independently existing world. A question arises here though: Given that language and thought are there in the world (where else?), but that the world, according to the just sketched view is non-vague, how is vagueness possible then in such a non-vague world?

Phenomenology-intentionality identity.
Phenomenology-intentionality identity provides an answer to the question about the possibility for vague content to be there in a non-vague world. Phenomenal intentionality is the key to provide an answer. This may be applied to the judgment. Each judgment is unique and it is not repeatable. It is not an abstraction.
	Our answer to the question about the possibility of vague content in a non-vague world leans on phenomenal intentionality. We say that each occurrence of intentional content comes with unique phenomenology. Unique identity of intentionality-phenomenology as an answer to How possible? question shows in direction of moral judgment.. Each moral judgment is unique thus, not repeatable, bringing belief and attitude, intentional content and phenomenology together in a unique manner in the world. So we talk about specific judgments, promoted by specific conscious persons, and not about abstractions of these judgments. We may of course talk about judgments as abstract categories, similarly perhaps as this was done in aristotelian tradition. But this would not be genuine judgment, which only comes as phenomenologically engaged content entertaining by someone in a specific situation in the world.

Principles in moral judgment.
Principles/reasons seem not to be appropriate for moral judgment if there is unique phenomenology-intentionality identity. Moral particularism denies importance of moral principles/reasons. There is a presupposition though that moral principles/reasons, if they are effective, involve reasons/principles in a direct manner. The background chromatic illumination effectivity is possible in spite of this, so that one obtains principled particularism: each judgment is unique due to the phenomenology-intentionality identity, and this still allows background chromatic effectivity of reasons/principles. In fact, just involving judgment makes it possible to account for this mixture. So moral judgment in its full shape needs to be established in order to get sense of moral philosophy.
	If intentionality-phenomenology identity theory is an entrance indeed how to come from mixed moral judgment proposals to the genuine judgment, this seems to promote a kind of moral particularism. Each judgment is unique, identical with just a specific appearance of phenomenology at this specific occasion. A question then arises whether there is any role here for reasons or principles in such an account. Our answer is that there is such a role indeed, so we would defend a kind of principled particularism, whose characteristics is that there is a role for reasons/principles in moral judgment indeed, but not as explicitly forthcoming in judgments, and rather being there in the cognitive intentional background of such judgments, chromatically illuminating the situation. This is how it seems to be the case with the constitution and nature of moral judgments indeed.

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