The Guiding Light
A Compass Towards Moral Right and Wrong
Matjaž Potrč

Keywords: value, reasons, monism, moral landscape.

As ships reach unknown waters or are at the loss about where to steer, there may be some lighthouse around that gives them some orientation and guidance on their path or itinerary. Often, lighthouse averts ships about some possible threat that they could face, such as shallow water with protruding rocks and cliffs. By its presence, some coastal area gets illuminated. Captain feels relieved that his route may now be more confidently taken. 
	Similarly it goes with compass towards moral right and wrong. Psychopaths may lose such a compass completely. The rest of us are often in need of it, not knowing how exactly to act in this or again in another situation. We need some guiding light in matters moral. 
	Luckily for most of us such a compass happens to be there. Yet the difficulty may consist in that its illumination does not always come in a direct manner, and moreover that it does not so come in most of those cases where it proves to be efficient. If the sailor happens to have a deficient sight, the luminous rays of the lighthouse may not help him a lot. Similarly, we are hampered in our capability to see the light because of limitations proper to our natural psychological capabilities.
	The view argued for here is that there exists a guiding light, and that there is just one such light. This light is value or it may perhaps be called the ultimate reason. So this is a monistic view about morality. Moral value is there as a kind of ideal reference point for several forces which are there at the holistic dynamical moral landscape that one happens to encounter. 
	The forces at the moral landscape are not principles or ultimate reasons. They are the matters that strive to get in touch with the guiding light. But as already hinted at they are hampered in this by the psychological empirical limitations proper to moral agents. The important thing though is that guiding light does not directly illuminate the moral landscape, but that access to it is aimed from the empirical holistic and dynamically entangled level below. So the agency is from the bottom up and not the other way round.
	Often it is meant that guiding light provides direct kind of illumination, which we oppose. As well, it is presumed that there are several lights to be found at the lower empirical holistic moral level landscape, which illuminate the areas of interest from their different angles. But such is not the case. Several forces at the moral landscape just often happen to compete between themselves in their efforts to reach the guiding light.
	In fact, it is morally wrong to have more than one guiding light, or to think that the guiding light is directly, explicitly present in moral judgment formation, or again that there are several lights below, and also that there is no guiding light around at all.
	A philosopher said that we are like sailors aiming to rebuild their ship in a stormy sea environment. That may be right, but in matters moral there is guiding light of the lighthouse available, even if it is there and efficient in an indirect manner, from below, by sailors’ and captain’s efforts.
1.	Things that matter
Things that matter in the area of moral decision and action are non-naturalist and normative. This is a line that may be taken (compare Parfit 2011). The idea is then that naturalist basis in this area will not do. Moral value, say, exercises normative force, whereas the fact that something is morally good has a naturalist basis and so cannot really ultimately matter in moral considerations. Such a reasoning does not seem to be adequate however, for there is an everyday understanding that moral goodness, or as for this matter, its opposite moral badness matter. Indeed, we usually take moral goodness to be the value to which we subscribe. So we may take moral goodness as possessing the function of value. Moral value would then be the point that matters, for it guides one’s assessment about which actions succeed to be morally good. 
But, is the fact that actions are morally good and that they are inspired by what may be assessed as moral value all that matters? What about the way one lives, guides one’s life? This seems to be something that matters and may but does not need to be inspired just by moral goodness. Although aesthetic enjoyment may be determined as something that is morally good, it is probably not exhausted by this. And I may find chocolate to be good for me and value it, although such may not be the case, for its consumption can contribute to worsening of my health. 
2.	Relevance
Relevance is a topics I am concerned with for quite a long time. And in fact, one may see a philosopher’s job to say relevant things. Not to mention that relevance is as well what one tries to achieve in one’s life, in the perdurance of each moment, or again along the passage of time. And relevance is to be found in one’s enjoying one’s time by dedicating oneself to consuming or creating something new, such as works of art in several domains, including music, literary style and painting.
	For some time I was engaged in teachings of moral particularism, where the question concerns relevance in the following sense: Is what really matters in moral judgment and deliberation something general, such as moral laws of a kind, or is relevance perhaps to be found in a unique assessment of holistic situation in which one judges? If one opts for relevance of moral generalities, one encounters counterexamples. Is lying always wrong? It seems that white lies, where one engages oneself in the situation in such a manner that one does not hurt someone’s feelings, are recommended, from the moral point of view. This is a case where several forces in the situation compete between themselves, the outcome being that compassion overrules prohibition of lying. But is this not just a case of several generalities competing between themselves, a case of moral pluralism? Generalities would still have upper hand. In opposition to this, moral particularist will search relevance just in patterns proper to the unique holistic situations, thereby excluding generalities in his search for relevance. Following this kind of guideline I ended up proposing relevance through the search of beautiful patterns, as I call them.
3.	Beautiful patterns
One implementation of beautiful, i.e. relevant patterns, as I understand it, is proposed by the theory involving hitting of reality. (Veber 1939, Bartelj 1987) This theory distinguishes presentations as an indirect guide to action and reality from direct engagement in reality. The idea would be that relevance is either searched through what may fit presentation of a situation through correspondence with it, or again through direct engagement in reality, such as one encounters along one’s itinerary. You go around, and at a certain moment, perhaps unexpectedly, something strikes you as important, as relevant to you. This may then be called the engagement through hitting of reality. As one encounters something relevant in one’s surrounding world, one experiences beautiful pattern. Something relevant comes into place. Experiences of hitting reality impose themselves in the form of beautiful patterns. The gist of these beautiful patterns is not representational. It is rather the experience of an important, relevant encounter. Each time as the world is telling you something new and important, one may say that one hits reality, through direct engagement involving beautiful patterns. Notice that aesthetic experience cannot be exhausted by presentation, which may be its necessary but not sufficient condition. As the beauty of this Flemish painting hits you, this does not happen through representation related to what it depicts. Rather, aesthetic value of the painting comes to your attention through what may be called beautiful pattern, which again comes through by disciplining of representation. This is the experienced beautiful pattern.      
4.	The guiding light
Beautiful pattern hits you in your otherwise perhaps not exciting journey through the world. It may be experience of this painting, but also an experience of meeting that particular person and reaching an insightful point in conversation in her company. Then, in a singular moment, your experience of beautiful pattern will be your guiding light. Notice that aesthetic efficacy is usually achieved through indirect means. If the aesthetic idea is directly displayed either in a novel or in a painting and similar, this will not usually be a successful or persuasive work of art.  A lighthouse usually and in its effective phase does not shine brightly and strongly so that your sight would be blinded by it. To the contrary, relevance of the lighthouse is rather in that dark and stormy night where it offers itself as your guide, for which you have desperately aspired in circumstances you found yourself in. A light guides you in the surrounding darkness, and not during a shiny day. In clear and bright day you enjoy the sight of your surroundings and the items which you encounter there or that draw your attention. Your need for the guiding light is not there in such circumstances.
5.	 Gestalt statics
As a Slovene philosopher I am interested in the work of Meinong, whose pupils include France Veber who wrote what I take to be the best philosophical opus in Slovene language, covering areas of metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of psychology and theology. Ernst Mally who was born in Kranj, Slovenia, established deontic logic. What is known as Gestalt in psychology is as well product of Meinong’s pupils. Veber used Gestalt (irealni lik) in his aesthetics. In order to get the aesthetic message of a symphony, you need to hear all this musical tones. Your registering of these tones certainly is a necessary condition for your getting aesthetic message of the symphony. The sufficient condition for you to get the value of that symphony as something beautiful though, happens at the time as you grasp the overall pattern which is transmitted through these sounds and their performance. Here is a much simpler illustration figuring several tiny stars that we may call points:

				*
			*	*	*
				*

The question is whether you grasp something over and above these points? The answer is that you grasp their arrangement, or their form, such as a cross. Don’t you? Call the form that you grasp in this case Gestalt. It certainly comes as something that is there additionally to the underlying points, as organizing their appearance. But, is this the only Gestalt that the arrangement of the points at the surface supports? No, you may perhaps as well notice the form of a diamond with a point in the middle of it, and several more, which are left for you to discover as an exercise. You may now say that each of these Gestalts overwhelms, disciplines the arrangement of points that form its basis. And this may be similar to the overall idea that is transmitted to you as you read a novel following the arrangement of letters upon the surface. Gestalt disciplines the sensory basis which materially supports it. Saying this goes perhaps too far at this stage.
	We learn that the very theory of objects started by a kind of Gestalt switch, as this is reported by France Veber in his System of philosophy. This work of Veber’s starts by delineating the main stations of the Meinongian school from the very beginning. The first Meinongian objects, we are informed there, were differences. And these are what one notices as just noticeable differences, in respect to the sensory basis supporting them as necessary but not sufficient conditions. We are in the area of psychophysics, featuring Weber’s law, stating correlation between sensory and what we may call higher Gestalt noticed features. Just noticeable differences are where one notices the variation in physical stimulus, following certain thresholds, which have an objectively measurable basis. The noticed differences in question are based upon psychological sensory data, but they are themselves ideal abstract objects, the first noticed objects by the theory of objects, as reported by Veber. 
	Now I was happy with this Gestalt approach, as I call it here, whose peak is in the Meinongian theory of objects. We may see the two levels involved. In the basis, say at the lower level, there are sensory data, such as illustrated by the small stars or points in our example. At the upper or higher level, there is Gestalt, which is based upon the just mentioned underlying sensory data. This Gestalt has some wiggle room in respect to these data, as this is illustrated by our pointing out that the same sensory basis (points) may underlie formation of several Gestalts, such as a cross or a diamond with a point in the middle of it in our example.
	Although there is some wiggle room here, it turns out that the just described approach is static, perhaps in the sense of a building-block theory. This became clear to me only as I was confronted by a dynamical approach. Let me also notice that I was happy to isolate two levels of what is called Gestalt here, the basic and the supervenient level. I followed that idea through my engagement into theory of categories, namely psychological categories such as prototypes or stereotypes with their tangible behavior, and also into a theory of sensory or psychophysical categories. These last, modular sensory processes involving categories, are where there are measurable results. Despite their differences, psychophysical and conceptual categories share some mechanisms.
6.	Gestalt dynamics
With the just described Gestalt idea in mind, I came to Memphis where Terry Horgan and John Tienson just published their book Connectionism and Philosophy of Psychology (1996). As I presented my two levels undertaking to them, I was surprised that they did not embrace it, despite that they followed politely my explanations. They presented the ideas of their book in a setting that also involved some mathematicians and computer theory specialists. One of main ideas their approach is based upon is that the levels of description of computational systems, so called Marr’s levels of description, are static and that they need some connectionist models inspired dynamical turn. I learned this and consequently embraced a dynamical approach where levels of description are concerned, with larger impact upon philosophy (Dinamična filozofija 2004). 
	To some extent, there is dynamics already inherent to the static Gestalt conception, in that the upper level disciplines the basic building blocks offering level of system’s description. In addition to this, dynamical Gestalt abandons tractability conditions guiding building-block conception. Not just that Gestalts are at the qualitatively different level as their building blocks. In addition, there is much here that is intractable in the dynamical space at the middle level of the cognitive system’s description. There is indirect effectivity of a lot that is positioned at that middle level. For the cognitive system, its occurrent total cognitive state is conditioned by morphological content, which is not directly accessible at all by the cognizer, and yet which guides what comes out as the outcome of the process. Morphological content is not the occurrent content into which a cognizer engages at a certain moment; it is rather all this that is in his background knowledge allowing him to engage into his total cognitive state. This background indirect efficacy is exactly the characteristics of connectionist networks hidden layers which determine the shape of the resulting total cognitive state, without that their effectivity could be explicitly followed. Roughly, such an approach amounts to what may be called dynamical Gestalt. It is Gestalt because some relevant form is there as the outcome of the process. It is dynamical, because there is no building-block tractable basis from which it would result, and happens to be an outcome of hidden but effective processes of such matters as morphological content, the content that encompasses all that cognizer knows in his background.
7.	Two moral levels
The main thesis here is that there are two levels of moral engagement. Several people would be happy with this claim, although they would interpret it in different manners. Moral intuitionists would say that there is a level of direct moral engagement, of emotional nature, which is the genuine moral stuff. There is a second explanatory level as well, but this one is of the order of confabulation. Psychologists distinguish two systems: System 1 is quick and linked to the sensory, whereas System 2 has to do with deliberation. The levels of a cognitive system’s description by Marr were already mentioned; two of them belong to psychology, whereas the underlying one is of the physical order. 
We can now recall two already mentioned Gestalt levels: one starts with the basic building block consisting of elementary atoms, such as points in our example above. There is a second, upper level, where one recognizes Gestalt. Notice that there is qualitative distinction between these levels. The first one is experienced as sensory so that categories in question there are the ones fitting psychophysics. The second, upper level is experienced as conceptual category. Categorization of tones along their various dimensions succeeds at the level close to psychophysics, whereas categorization and valuation of symphony succeeds at the conceptual level, along several dimensions that are present there.
There is difference between static and dynamical account of two Gestalt levels. The first one is building-block like. The second one engages indirect dynamical feedback relation between the two levels. The dynamics between the two levels is enmeshed, to which we point later on. 
 	Let us approach the moral area now. There is the account of two levels of moral engagement promoted by Hare, that I will present here in the way I understand it and as it fits my needs. One can point out that Hare appreciated dynamics of moral language and that he took moral judgments to be command-like, positioning himself as an expressivist. I can use Hare’s two levels in a way to reach thereby my own two levels of moral engagement story. The first Hare level is that of immediate engagement into the moral situation at hand,a kind of  reactive feedback to what one encounters. The second Hare level is that of mediate engagement into moral situation, and it succeeds where there is the need to deliberate, take decision as to moral judgment formation, as the situation requires it.
	According to my two levels theory (TLT), there is a clear vicinity with this Hare’s two level account.  What I call the lower level (which may now be called lower level of moral engagement, another thing that may be due to the Hare inspiration) is the immediate engagement into the dynamical and holistic moral landscape. So one would need to determine what exactly the moral landscape is. If Hare believes that his first level is due to the everyday, not really rationally supported moral engagement, he might be wrong though. For in this vein he would think that somehow the second rational level is reserved to an elite of a kind, which rationally handles matters, in the manner that folks in their usual environmental circumstances don’t. Perhaps I can go and say that my upper and lower levels are just two manners of description of a single moral judgmental act. There is reason or value at my higher level of moral engagement. I stay with moral engagement all right. But I also introduce some intertwined moral engagement, in the sense that there is aiming at the upper level value or reason from the lower level of holistic and dynamical moral landscape engagement. 
	In fact, the topological model gives a nice picture of the intertwined situation in which lower and upper level get involved, mutually engaged one may say. The lower moral landscape that is holistic and dynamical aims at the upper level monistic value or reason which is an ideal point of reference for moral evaluation.
	I am not sure that I want to subscribe to consequentialism, in pursuit of my monistic approach to the upper ideal level of moral engagement. As I said this is not necessarily to be seen as upper level, from the point of view of the topological intertwining: the lower level aims at the upper level, and the upper level illuminates the lower level as a point of reference in respect to value or reason. One thing that needs to be done is to ascertain the monism of value and of reason. All in opting for monism of value or reason at the upper level, I also subscribe to pluralism at the lower level. This pluralism however cannot be seen to provide ultimate value, reason, moral principle. The plurality of what sometimes appear as principles at the lower level are in fact ontic, not ontological principles, if one may use a metaphysics inspired metaphor here. One may perhaps better say that at the lower level of moral engagement, one has to do with everyday, not with ultimate moral forces. The ultimate moral force however is there in an ideal shape as ideal point of reference guiding light. This guiding light, in the sense of topological intertwining of lower and upper level, is embedded into each force that comes about at the lower level, each of their multiplicity.
	Now, realize that the upper level ideal point of reference setting is compatible with phenomenology, which is constitutively there. So the ideal dimension of the upper level of moral engagement description is phenomenology constituted. This is understandable in the manner that is known from phenomenological reduction idealization procedure.
	A frequent mistake that people succumb to is that they take levels of description to be ontological levels. It is as if one would describe a cat at several levels: physical, biological mental, and then conclude that there are three cats around. It is clear however that there is one vague cat around in what has been described. In a similar manner, two levels of moral engagement description that I promote are different levels of description of a single, one phenomenon, of moral judgment. In order to come to this picture, one is helped by the topological intertwining approach. Thus the topology, where two sides of one page are joined in a Moebius band builds the transition from two levels of description to the metaphysical one phenomenon approach. 
	Coming back to Hare: his two levels of moral engagement are still two levels of description of this engagement, for a single moral judgment. Moral judgment is a single matter but not necessarily an entity or even a property, in the ultimate ontological sense. In this manner I subscribe to irrealism in respect to moral metaphysics.
	Two levels are nice for distinguishing phenomenology engagement and Brain In a Vat compatible experiential world description stuff at the upper level of moral judgment or double engagement description: the engagement into both dynamical moral landscape and into the ideal point of reference phenomenology constituted point. This one illuminates the direct or immediate engagement at the lower level of moral judgment, following the request from below.
8.	The upper ideal reference point
At the upper level of moral engagement, there is value, or Reason, as you may call it. This value or Reason is not realist, and thus not adapted to cognitivist description. So one may talk about irrealism here. Value or Reason in question is monistic. So there is just one value or Reason around. Consequentialists present such a value as what is morally right or good, as opposed to what is morally wrong or bad. The monistic shape of one value or Reason is thus engendered by an internal tension (right/wrong, good/bad). So one value proceeds from two.
	The one value or reason is not immediately present in the moral situation which finds itself at the lower level. In order to reach the upper level, one may be helped by something such as phenomenological reduction. If you start with empirical cases of moral valuation, you will see that the relevant, the important thing, the things that matters, may be reached through phenomenology. It is an ideal  point of reference, just as it is usual for the phenomenological reduction. This ideal point of reference is there for the forces that are encountered in the moral landscape at the lower level of moral engagement.
9.	Monistic value and ultimate reason
Something more needs to be said about the upper level. There is one value or ultimate Reason there. This one serves as a guiding light, but not in an immediate manner. Rather, it illuminates the situation. Not by its own force, but through the aiming of the plurality of reasons at the lower level of moral engagement, where the moral landscape is holistic and dynamical, not as this just discussed ideal point at the upper level of moral engagement.
	Obviously, the Reason or value in question, at the upper level of moral engagement, is something that provides relevance. To what? To one’s everyday engagements in moral matters at the lower level. So this ideal Reason is in fact an idealization. Although being indirect in its efficiency, and an ideal matter, accessible through the procedure of phenomenological reduction, it is whatever matters in the situation at hand. Whatever matters in moral engagement happens at the everyday level of moral landscape. 
10.	The constitutive internal difference of one value
A puzzle with the monistic value that is situated at the upper of the two levels as presented up till now is that such a value shows internal difference. This difference may perhaps be called différance, honoring thereby a difference which is there within one item. An illustration of différance consists in realization that a man remains the same along all the differences succeeding from his being a baby till his becoming adult and finally turning into an old man. (Compare Horgan and Potrč Austere Realism). This is the puzzle pronounced by Theban oracle: “In the morning on four legs, during the day on two, and in the evening on three.” There are many cases around that show persistence of one entity during all the changes that it endures in time, such as that of one cat and of one book. In fact, according to my monistic inclinations in metaphysical matters, the separate unity of an item such as the just mentioned cat may show that such an entity does not exist in the ultimate ontology, although it happily regionally ex-sists in the ontic environment of one world. (Horgan and Potrč 2000) So many may be the psychological categories linked matter without the ultimate metaphysical support. This would then go along with the two levels approach, where the real metaphysical value of the one monistic world would be situated at the upper level, whereas the psychologically noticed dynamical variability of the many items as perceived in that world would lie at the lower level. Here we can return to the mentioned puzzle of one monistic value or reason: isn’t the one monistic value such that it has difference built into it, and namely an outright opposition, involving almost a contradiction? 
	Let us start with value as being morally good. That can be certainly a value, it seems. But there may be an objection to this. Value is namely a normative commodity, and as such it may be seen as opposed to the naturalistic properties, such as is the one of the just mentioned being morally good. But if nothing else for vivacity of exposition we will treat morally good as being a value, which goes along with its common sense understanding.
	Now, the puzzle is that one monistic value actually disguises itself as involving its opposite, namely the morally bad. People (Nietzsche, even if he contradicted this view of his as well; see Parfit 2011) have noticed that moral goodness may be constituted by moral badness. Anyway, the value of morally good appears to be constituted by its opposite, morally bad. And yet, moral goodness may be seen as one value of monistic kind. The puzzle shows that one thing, as we may call it, proceeds from two. (Verdiglione has this catchword that things proceed from two, and I have elaborated on the topics on several of his second renaissance symposia). So one can stay monist and acknowledge the dialectical support of one from two. Being morally good certainly feels like value, but it cannot really function without its opposite, namely the morally bad, which may figure as dis-value, all in being a condition of value, in a way. Now, good and bad are opposed poles. And this is shown by the usual depiction of values:

		1		3/4		|		1/4		0
	morally good	    pretty good	      neutral	     pretty bad	    morally bad

We can picture a line here, which goes from 1 and stops at its opposite 0. It effectuates passage over all the partial values, let us call them like that, in between the two opposites. A question surfaces here whether the value of morally good then involves as well all the range of intermediate partial values between 1 and 0, and not just the opposite 0.
	The line starts with the point 1, and it ends with the point 0. We may call 1 and 0 values, noticing that they form the two extremes of the line and of the scale that is positioned between these. This in-between scale of values consists of points 3/4, neutrality, 1/4 and of all the rest between these and beyond, towards 1 and 0. Each of these intermediate points presents a value, just that all of them are kind of partial values, in their opposition to the extreme full values 1 and 0.
	Now, according to the two levels theory of moral engagement, there is monistic one value or reason at the upper level. But now we have two opposites, i.e. two values 1 and 0, which inhabit this one monistic value. How should we understand this? One comes from two poles of it that engender things, and this is related to action, a unique one.
	At the lower level according to the two levels theory of moral engagement, there is plurality of what we have now recognized as scalar continuity of partial values, which we have identified as forces, each coming with a certain aim, namely its directedness towards the upper level ideal reference point of value. These partial values are psychologically and phenomenologically positioned, in a natural manner, in opposition to the ideal extreme full values.
	We will tackle now the internal difference, duality of one value. The view of a line with its final points 1 and 0 presents these as being as far away from each other as possible. So how can these be co-effective in the production of one monistic value? Here is a trial to answer this. Notice first that the presentation of the situation by a finite line is arbitrary. The situation may perhaps be better depicted by the usage of a circle. How do you come to it? You just simply take both extremes, 1 and 0, of the line, and join them, stick them together, so that they form a circle.
					1/0
3/4       ⥁       1/4
        neutral

Now, you can see that 1 and 0 actually form one single point, i.e. 1/0 upon this circle. You notice as well that from the point of view of its positioning upon the circle, the single point 1/0 is not different in its position in respect to each of other points, which may perhaps be infinite in the limit. There is no levelling at the arc of the circle. We can observe that there is directedness of the circle, which goes from the 1/0 point and traverses all the other points in the -1/4-neutrality-3/4- sense. But directedness may be from an opposed direction. One thing that this circular depiction of the scale of values tells us is that the opposite extremes of a value, such as good (1), form a single point together with its opposite bad (0). Monistic value is thereby preserved as the point where the opposites and the scale of what we call partial values meet. So value or reason has no special position except for being chosen as a point of reference for the rest. The abolition of levels is not complete though. The monistic point of value (1/0), namely, has the function of point of engagement for the rest of the scalar stuff that is situated at the circle. This may sound strange, for it would mean that the good and the bad are kind of arbitrarily chosen, which goes against our moral intuitions. But notice that good and bad (1,0) are to some extent subject to contextual variation. They form an ideal point of reference for all empirical moral actions. A contextual approach may just contribute to model’s flexibility. 
	Notice now that a circle may have joined dimensions, a surface, with two sides to it. Then a point, such as 1/0, may be depicted as a point or as a line stretching from one to the other end of the surface. Now, you may join this prolongated page at its extremes again, in a manner in which a Moebius band gets formed. The characteristics of this one is that, topologically, its surface equals the circle, all in that both surfaces of one prolonged page form a single surface. There is a hole in the middle of the Moebius band, and this one may be equivalent to the surface and circle as well.
	We learn from this that what was former called the upper level is an ideal monistic point of value which is determined by engagement from the scalar lower level that by its nature is psychologically and phenomenologically constituted. There are several things left unexplained, but at least we have pointed out how it is possible that one monistic value may come out of its two joined opposite extremes that produce it.
11.	Scalar consequentialism monism and gradation
We have seen that various grades along the right/wrong continuum may be depicted as being positioned at a single circle, so that in a manner the upper level of value or Reason has no special position in the setting. Yet on the other hand it permeates all this setting.
	Now I will briefly present my understanding of scalar consequentialism. It is consequentialism, so it is welcome for my exercise, in that it appropriates monism, i.e. one value or Reason. I am not certain that consequentialist way to go would be the only one that would secure one value. Perhaps even deontological approach may be monistic. But I am not insisting upon this point right now.
	The scalar part is that one does not really buy just one exclusivist value through which to evaluate moral acts. Scalar consequentialism takes it that “ there are no right or wrong actions, only better or worse actions ranked along a continuum from the action (or actions) that contributes most to overall utility to the action (or actions) that contributes the least.” (Wikipedia) This makes the view contextualism friendly.
	My thought was first that what I call upper level of value or Reason may not be needed at all. I thought that upper level involves just thin values, whereas lower level of moral engagement involves thick concepts. But as I spoke with originator of the view Alastair Norcross, he assured me that he needs what I now call thin concepts. So I said to myself that these have to be in the position of a guiding light. 
	The topological model and even the circle depiction of the situation involving two levels of moral engagement shows that there is intertwining of both levels. There is the monistic one, but it invites forces from the lower level in its direction in plurality of manners.
12.	Consequentialist levels, commands and contextual dynamics
Consequentialism is a monistic view, for it allows just for one value or Reason as the one providing relevance or whatever matters in the situation. Hare’s to levels approach, as presented here, should also stick with monism it seems, for it is consequentialist, although it buys two levels. But two levels invite surpassing of monistic view. Perhaps this may be effectuated by Hare’s embracement of dynamics, although he concentrated at dynamics inherent to the linguistic usage. Moral judgments, from this point of view, are something such as commands, and in this manner they are responsive to contextual dynamics.
13.	The lower dynamical holistic encountered moral landscape
The lower level encompasses the immediately encountered holistic and dynamical moral landscape. At this landscape, there are several forces that get formed. These forces aim at the ideal upper moral level of the value or Reason, searching for what is relevant in the situation, searching for and aiming towards the guiding light.The holistic dynamical moral landscape is what one encounters on a daily basis.
14.	Forces at the moral landscape
Forces at the moral landscape are clearly formed, and they may appear as oughts or something similar for the moral judger. It is as if something would pressure upon the direction of his moral actions from above, from the upper level. The forces in the dynamical moral landscape aim in the direction of the ideal reference point of value or Reason at the upper level of moral engagement. But as we said, this upper level is something that may be reached through phenomenological reduction, for the ideal reference points may be reached through whatever constitutes moral judgment, phenomenology that is.
	Forces at the moral landscape are many, so pluralism is forthcoming here. But they are not ultimate forces or reasons, or principles. They are not ideal. They are just psychological and empirical stuff, and they involve phenomenology as the bridge from the lower to the upper level, that one being constitutive for moral judgment.
15.	Moral wrongness of dismissing two levels guidelines
For consequentialist that is a monist it is wrong to worship other values as just the one value of right/good (coming from its opposite wrong/bad). It is wrong for example to engage deontic values, human nature and the stuff. Objective assessment will show, it is claimed, that such moves always lead to more moral wrongness being there in the world.
	The two level guideline is monistically bound, as we have claimed. So in generic terms, whatever comes as additional value or Reason besides to the one monistic value or Reason will be morally wrong as well.
16.	One value or ultimate reason as deontic moral law
Deontic approach is opposed to consequentialism. But we stick to monism in generic terms, in our approach to moral judgment. So it would be possible as well to have deontic moral law as one value or ultimate Reason. My monism is generic.
17.	Plurality of principles at the lower level
We may see forces at the lower level of moral engagement as plurality of reasons, and as plurality of principles. This is what one does if one goes pluralist and for example recognizes plurality of prima facie duties or principles. But these apparent duties or principles are just forces at the lower level of moral engagement that aim in direction of one value, of the guiding light or of moral Reason. Notice that we don’t deny plurality of reasons at the lower level, which may be motivating reasons, interpreted as objective or as subjective reasons. Anyway however, these are not an ultimate Reason, and they rather aim at this one from the lower level. Their aiming is exemplified through their pushing at the moral landscape.
18.	Particularist absence of guiding light?
Particularists reject all the principles or reasons and so the guiding light. But according to our view there is a plurality of reasons out there -- at the lower level of the dynamical and holistic encountered moral landscape.
19.	Moral judgment: its monistic underpinning
Moral judgment is monistically underpinned through the aiming of the force at the psychological landscape of the lower level in direction of one monistic reference ideal point at the upper level. In this manner, there is illumination of the situation at hand by one value or Reason. This illumination is required from the holistic dynamical lower level.
20.	Phenomenological constitution of moral judgment
Moral judgment is phenomenologically constituted. Phenomenology is the bridge between the two levels. Phenomenological reduction is a procedure that leads to the realization about the brain in a vat compatibility of moral directedness, which is a way to realize what is relevant, from the lower level of moral engagement.
21.	Illuminating value or ultimate reason
Upper level ideal reference point of moral engagement is the value or ultimate Reason which illuminates the encountered psychologically forthcoming situation.The illumination comes from above, from that ideal reference point. But the moving forces that strive for illumination and get to it are at the lower level of moral landscape immediate engagement.
22.	Indirect illumination
A false move in moral theory, as we understand it, comes from the requirement that the illumination would be direct, so that one would clearly have in consciousness the moral value or principle that one pursues. This is just wrong according to our view, for efficacity of the idea (sinnliches Scheinen der Idee) should be indirect, in order to be efficient, to be relevant in the situation. Compare the indirect nature of aesthetic value, in the case one wants it to be efficient.
23.	Striving of lower level forces towards the guiding light
The illumination of the situation by Reason or value is monistic, and indirect in its nature. There are forces at the lower level moral landscape that aim towards this illumination. Just in this manner there is efficiency of moral value or Reason, and just in this manner there is relevance that one can feel in the situation.
24.	Psychological conditions and limitation of moral forces’ striving
Do people always reach the guiding light and so achieve the point of relevance? This is certainly not the case, if nothing else for people’s psychological limitations. Sometimes, one may be clearly wrong in what one pursues as one’s guiding light, through one’s moral striving. Given that Reason or value is ideal, this has to be the case, for there is limitation in respect to what people can achieve because of their psychological constitution. 
25.	Moral act
Moral act happens in the environment of lower level landscape that results in several forces striving towards the ideal point of reference as value or Reason. Scalar rendition should recognize unity here by engaging into topological dynamics between the two levels, which succeeds through the guidance of phenomenology, and may be technically accessible to moral phenomenological reduction.
26.	Moral responsibility, free will and the guiding light
Moral acts succeed in the realm and in the space of reasons, i.e. at the lower level of moral engagement as described here. One feels oneself to be responsible in his acts, and thus being a master of one’s free will. Given that there is striving through forces towards the guiding light, and that the effectivity of this one is indirect, one is morally responsible for the choices that one takes. Compatibilism between free will and determinism is recommended.
27.	Moral justification from the upper level, in an indirect manner
Moral justification succeeds from the upper level, through chromatic illumination of the situation in which moral judgment gets fallen. But as there is striving of forces presenting themselves as reasons or plurality of principles at the lower level of moral landscape, moral justification is indirect. The space of reasons is decisive for justification.

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