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Analytic Philosophy Disciplined
Matjaž Potrč

Analytic philosophy is one-dimensional by definition, entrenching itself into philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and into philosophy of science. Definitory same-levelling is compared to Gestalt, which recognizes two levels. The building-block approach needs to be supplemented by quality involving difference of levels. The lower level of qualitative engagement is holistic and dynamical, whereas the upper level is positioned as an ideal monistic reference point for aimings from the pluralist peaks at the lower level landscape. Upper level ideal point of reference illuminates the lower level landscape, following requests from the lower level pluralist points. The same-levelling of the one-dimensional definitory approach characterizing analytic philosophy is illustrated by hurdles that it produces as these get articulated by paradox of analysis and by Gettier cases. It is proposed that some dynamics and appropriate dialectics of qualitative two-levels approach need to discipline one-dimensional definitory troubles, in order to make sense of such areas of philosophical inquiry as epistemology. Lower everyday holistic level landscape engagement enters in a dialectics with upper level ideal point of reference engagement. Thereby philosophical activity becomes phenomenology constituted disciplining the objectivist third person point of view characteristic for analytic philosophy. Post-analytic project offers itself through disciplining of analytic philosophy. 

Keywords: analytic philosophy, definition, Gestalt, same-levelling, two qualitative levels, dialectics of levels engagement, paradox of analysis, Gettier, post-analytic philosophy.

1.	Analytic philosophy is one-dimensional by definition, entrenching itself into philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and into philosophy of science. 
The argument proposed here is in favor of post-analytic philosophy, and about the need to enrich analytic philosophy through some dynamic characteristics for its opposite, the continental philosophy. The bet is that the way philosophy is done should be analytic, yet straightened or disciplined by a dynamical dialectics. In these introductory sentences there is already a bunch of matters deserving clarification. But let me start with recent critical remarks by Steven Pinker in respect to the manner in which academic discourse and along with it philosophy is recently done, including as well the observation that jokes which it is sorrily lacking would do it some good. 
	The first distinction that needs to be tackled here is the one between analytic and continental philosophies. The main classical representatives of the first one are Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Classical continental philosophers are Heidegger, Husserl and Derrida. The difference in style between these two groups is remarkable. Whereas the first ones stick to logic, mathematics and science, the second ones indulge into poetic and literary, as they call it textual endeavors. The distinction between titles of analytic and continental traditions is characterized by geography: it is meant that analytic philosophy is pursued on the British island, and that continental philosophy is going on in continental Europe. This distinction is again supported by the style of the mentioned philosophers representing two sides, and by their followers. Now, even in the case that this style-involving distinction holds, the geographical partition becomes dubious. Many philosophers in continental Europe work in the analytic tradition, and some British philosophers prefer continental approach. But Euro-centrism is widely overridden, which also goes for the area of philosophy. Analytic philosophers are to be found in USA, Australia and a little bit all over the world, not the least in German speaking countries. Whereas continental style is practiced in several areas of the world. Even resorting to the claim that analytic philosophy is homely along the former British empire territories may be put into question, for it is present in other geographical locations too. Another difficulty is that analytic philosophers are not alien to literary style. Russell as for that matter received Nobel prize for literature. And if you really indulge into Wittgenstein’s work, as I did in a colloquium in Germany some years ago, you will discover that his importance comes through the ambiguity of his statements, which contributes to the richness of his thought. Now Heidegger on the other hand certainly is systematic enough, although he dedicates some of his work to such poets as Hoelderlin, also searching for poetic richness in the fragments transmitted to our age from pre-socratic philosophers. On the other hand, Husserl started as a mathematician, and had interest in such empirical psychology science area as perception. Derrida started by treating Husserl’s notes on geometry as a textual fragment. So, if style is the characteristics of the analytic-continental distinction, then we have to do with a vague matter. I coorganized Spindel conference entitled Origins in Memphis, TN in 2001, the term origins referring to common roots of analytic and continental traditions. Several papers were dedicated to the Brentanian philosophical heritage. Brentano is the beginner of phenomenological and continental tradition, with his reintroduction of intentionality in the philosophical debate. But he was as well a beginner of scientific experimental psychology contemplating for a while to dedicate himself to this area of research, similarly as did his pupil Meinong. Experimental science and philosophical questions involving epistemology and ontology were intertwined in Brentano’s work and in his tradition. So analytic-continental distinction must have started later, with the differences in style proper to each of these branches. In fact, Derrida treats philosophical works as so many texts, with their specific style of writing. Analytic philosophy turned to its main job of analysis with such people as Russell, and continued in this way of doing things. And yet, the very beginning of philosophical analysis which is to be found in Russell’s theory of descriptions started as rejection of Meinongian theory of objects. Meinong namely held it that each intentional act has its object. So as I talk about the castle made of glass this object does not exist in reality, but still it should be treated as an object in its own right. “Es gibt die Gegenstaende so dass es solche Gegenstaende nicht gibt”, claims Meinong, meaning by this that talking about the glass castle I refer to something that is not present in the reality of the world, still being there though as an object, ideal object say, to which I refer. Russell counters that view by an analysis of the sentence such as “The glass castle is pretty looking”, distinguishing three ingredients proper to that statement: 1. that there is the glass castle, 2. that there is one such castle, 3. that this castle is looking pretty. As the empirical inquiry shows, claims Russell, there is no such thing out there in the world as a glass castle, and so the ingredient 1. indicates falsity of the statement. The analysis has thus revealed that the description in the given sentence does not refer to anything out there in the world, and so Meinongian theory of objects has to be misguided. Such is the beginning of analysis, which started as an issue in ontology: whether there exist just empirically verifiable objects, or perhaps as well Platonic kind of objects. Both Russell and Meinong subscribed to some kind of science, the first one to the empirically verifiable kind of it, and the second one to the science comporting abstract Platonic kind of objects. Russell’s point was later stressed by Carnap’s criticism of Heidegger, denying meaning to such deep looking but shallow expressions as “Das Nichts nichtet”, for which no empirical confirmation can be found. Yet Carnap strangely also uses first person perspective as a necessary ingredient of such empirical inquiry. One can reconfirm that the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy is vague and undetermined, that there are many forms of intersection between them, and that a kind of style distinguishes one from the other.
	In this exercise I tackle analytic philosophy, and I argue that the difference between two approaches needs to be bridged, and that actually it is bridged already through the style involving disciplining of analytic philosophy from what may be called its continental counterpart. This is the case of what may be called post-analytic philosophy, to be found in dynamical approach. A recent pictorial presentation of history of philosophy (Daily Nous blog as a source) ends up with the difference between post-structuralist philosophers on the one hand, such as Derrida, Lacan and Foucault, and between the post-analytic philosophers, such as Quine, Davidson, Rorty and Putnam. I profited a lot from my interaction with both of these groups. Yet in respect to the here mentioned post-analytic philosophers I have to say the following. They certainly introduce new twists in regard to what may be called the practice of classical analytic philosophers, such as Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Their post-analytic directedness is to be found in some dynamical directions that they take, as compared to the classical analytic philosophy. In this sense, Quine introduced skepticism concerning analytic/synthetic distinction, supported by his view of holism. Davidson engaged into theory of action, and into a Tarskian theory of truth applied to natural language. Putnam first defended realism but then switched to a mellowed anti-realism in theory of meaning and around. Rorty embraced anti-realist approach as well. These certainly are differences in respect to the classical analytical philosophy, still to be laid out. But whatever the contribution of these respected philosophers, I argue that post-analytic philosophy still needs to be disciplined by the style proper to what is characterized as continental philosophy, especially of the so-called post-structuralist philosophers.
	If we lay aside the already introduced differences between analytic and post-analytic philosophers, we need to ask ourselves what exactly would characterize the bare bones approach of analytic philosophy. Well, the answer is obvious, although it is quite surprisingly not recognized yet according to all of its weight: analytic philosophy is characterized through analysis. One main idea was that language is good for such activities as poetry, as Frege held it, but its vagueness is not appropriate for philosophy as a science. So the task is obvious now: one needs an instrument to determine the real and exact meaning of words that one uses, and this instrument is analysis. Analysis though is introduced by definition. What is definition? It is a manner in which exact range of an expression or of its aligned concept is determined. An example of such definitory analysis is the one already mentioned and used by Russell as he tried to determine the exact empirically supported meaning of words. Another example is delivered by Frege in his important paper Sense and Reference (1892), where he gives the following take on what may be treated as definition: 

		Morning Star = Evening Star. 

This example already introduces epistemic dimension, namely dimension of knowledge into what is basically definitory handling of analysis. So Frege notices that the equation here shows progress in our knowledge: people realized the mentioned identity at a certain historic epoch, not before. What about 

		Morning Star = Morning Star.

The latter equation seems to be trivial, whereas the first one seems to extend our knowledge. We will come back to this question as we will mention the paradox of analysis in what follows. But if we remind ourselves on Russell’s theory of descriptions analysis, we see that the job of analysis is to deliver an exact meaning of a term under question, by sorting out its empirical constituents. In this sense, analysis amounts to a definitory undertaking, for definition has the following structure

		A =def B

If one does not know what a cat (A) is, the exact meaning of the word will be delivered by a conjunction of properties, such as being an animal, vertebrate, feline, with a specific DNA. Receiving such definition, one should then be able to recognize what a cat is and also recognize cat exemplars in one’s surroundings.
	I call such a definitory approach of classical analytic philosophy one-dimensional, for its main presupposition is that the left hand side of definition (A) should be at the same level as its right hand side (B), thus that it succeeds in the same dimension. 
Here are the areas of analytic philosophy following from the definitory one-dimensional approach, with their tasks:

philosophy of language (analyzing meaning of words)
philosophy of mind (analyzing meaning of concepts)
philosophy of science (making analysis naturalistically respectable).

In fact, these are the areas in which analytic philosophy thrived. Early analytic efforts were in philosophy of language (Russell’s theory of descriptions), later in philosophy of mind (Davidson was closer here), interspersed with scientific concerns about exactness and empirical adequacy (Vienna circle, Quine, Putnam).
	What is the meaning of one-dimensionality proper to analytic philosophy? Simply the following: left hand side and right hand side of a definition should be of the same weight, succeeding at the same level. Definition therewith does not allow for a qualitative difference between the two sides that are involved into it. It does not allow for a difference of levels, really. This is the main presupposition of the one-dimensional analytic philosophy, which I intend to counter with my here sketched project, injecting some sense in its one-dimensionality.

2.	Definitory same-levelling is compared to Gestalt, which recognizes two levels.
A definition promises to deliver a complete and reliable analysis by staying at the same level on both its left hand side and its right hand side. This is different from an approach that recognizes two levels. Gestalt is a case in point. 
In order to get the aesthetic message of a symphony, you need to hear all these musical tones. Your registering of these tones certainly is a necessary condition for your getting aesthetic message of the symphony. The sufficient condition for you to get the value of that symphony as something beautiful though, happens at the time as you grasp the overall pattern which is transmitted through these sounds and their performance. Here is a much simpler illustration figuring several tiny stars that we may call points:

				*
			*	*	*
				*

The question is whether you grasp something over and above these points as you take a look at them. The answer is that you grasp their arrangement, or their form, such as the form of a cross. Don’t you? Call the form that you grasp in this case Gestalt. It certainly comes as something that is there additionally to the underlying points, which organizes their appearance. But, is this the only Gestalt that the arrangement of the just depicted points at the surface supports? No, you may perhaps as well notice the form of a diamond with a point in the middle of it, and several more, which are left for you to discover as an exercise. You may now say that each of these Gestalts overwhelms, disciplines the arrangement of points that form its basis. And this may be similar to the overall idea which is transmitted to you as you read a novel following the arrangement of letters upon the surface. Gestalt disciplines the sensory basis which materially supports it. Saying this goes perhaps too far at this stage.
	We may see the two levels involved. In the basis, say at the lower level, there are sensory data, such as these are illustrated by the small stars or points in our example. At the upper or higher level, there is Gestalt, which is based upon the just mentioned underlying sensory data. This Gestalt has some wiggle room in respect to these data, as this is illustrated by our pointing out that the same sensory basis (points) may underlie formation of several Gestalts, such as a cross or a diamond with a point in the middle of it in our example.

3.	The building-block approach needs to be supplemented by quality involving difference of levels. 
Although there is some wiggle room in the Gestalt approach as just shortly presented, it turns out that the just described approach is static, perhaps in the sense of a building-block theory. The idea is that you lay down these bricks in a certain arrangement which then results in a new emerging level. Meinong for example distinguished objects that are there in correlation with the sensory psychological data such as just presented points that he called inferiora, from objects that are correlated to the upper Gestalt that he called superiora. You lay one brick upon another, in a certain arrangement pattern, and at some stage of the completion the building appears at the surface. Here we have two levels, where the basic inferior lower level supports the emerging superior upper level. The idea may then come to mind that there is some tractable procedure around which allows you to switch from the basic to the superior level. This then introduces two levels in the picture, which is quite different from the one-dimensional definitory approach, about which we will say some more in what follows.
The just described building block two levels introducing way to go has some limitations though. This became clear to me only as I was confronted with dynamical approach. Let me also notice that I was happy to isolate two levels of what is called Gestalt here, the basic and the supervenient level. I followed that idea through my engagement into theory of categories, namely psychological categories such as prototypes or stereotypes with their tangible behavior, and also into a theory of sensory or psychophysical categories. These last, modular sensory processes involving categories, are where one can rely on measurable empirical results. Despite their differences, psychophysical and conceptual categories share some mechanisms. The difference in quality of the two levels however needs to be recognized as a basic matter.
	To some extent, there is dynamics already inherent to the static Gestalt conception, in that the upper level disciplines the basic building blocks offering level of system’s description. In addition to this, dynamical Gestalt abandons tractability conditions guiding building-block conception. Not just that Gestalts are at the qualitatively different level as their building blocks. In addition, there is much here that is intractable in the dynamical space at the middle level of the cognitive system’s description. There is indirect effectivity of a lot that is positioned at that middle level. For the cognitive system, its occurrent total cognitive state is conditioned by morphological content, which is not directly accessible at all by the cognizer, and yet which guides what comes out as the outcome of the process. Morphological content is not the occurrent content into which a cognizer engages at a certain moment; it is rather all this that is in his background knowledge allowing him to engage into his now formed total cognitive state. This background indirect efficacy is the characteristics of connectionist networks hidden layers which determine the shape of the resulting total cognitive state, without that their effectivity could be explicitly followed. Roughly, such an approach amounts to what may be called dynamical Gestalt. It is Gestalt because some relevant form is there as the outcome of the process. It is dynamical, because there is no building-block tractable basis from which it would result, and it rather happens to be an outcome of hidden but effective processes of such matters as morphological content, the content that encompasses all that cognizer kind of dispositionally knows in his background.
	Some quality is needed to supplement two level approach, superseding building block tractable agenda.

4.	The lower level of qualitative engagement is holistic and dynamical, whereas the upper level is positioned as an ideal monistic reference point for aimings from the pluralist peaks at the lower level landscape. 
In the following I will use some data from philosophy, specifically from analytic philosophy, in order to illustrate two levels in question. I will come down to the case of epistemology or theory of knowledge in order to have some ground for discussion, although the general point about levels may also be applied to such areas as moral philosophy and others, in fact to (I suppose) all areas where one-dimensionality should be supplemented not just by two levels, but by their dynamical interaction.
	The building block approach certainly is static, in that it started with basic points and their arrangements, in direction of Gestalt production. Such an approach relies upon isolation of stimuli from a rich surrounding environment. That is a point which ecologists (J.J. Gibson) accentuated in psychology, urging to indulge into study of organisms and their functions in a real environmental dynamics, and not through isolationist empirical psychological experimental settings. 
	Just take a look at the real and environment in which such things as moral judgment formation or search for knowledge take place. It is not hard to find out that this kind of environment is convoluted, holistic and dynamical, far away from a supposed atomist or molecularist basis according to which it is usually portrayed. If I am in a situation where I deliberate about my helping that older or incapacitated person cross the road, I do not just rely upon some kind of general law or guiding line commanding me to be helpful in the situation at hand. Things are not that simple. There is no isolated set of points or commands that I notice. To the contrary, there may be various intermingling obligations and considerations into which I feel myself involved. I have to get home and bring the food and other stuff that I promised, buying it first at the store. Before this, I need to meet my job related colleague in order to discuss some proposal with him. Then I need to return to my job. In the immediate situation that I observe there is a quite heavy traffic that makes me a little bit worried about crossing the road myself at that particular point. The weather is foggy and it slightly rains so that the sight of both pedestrians and drivers may be somewhat limited in the circumstances. Obviously, the situation is far from simple. It is many-dimensional for there are several forces and considerations taking place in it. It is as well holistic, for there is no simple tractable number of elements that I can rely upon. The overall outlook of the situation varies in time as well, for weather and traffic conditions are constantly changing. Despite this complex kind of situation that I encounter though, I decide to help that older person cross the road. There may be illusion here that such a decision is taken as based upon just simple moral law or consideration. But this is not the case. There is no isolated tiny set of considerations or points in the situation upon which I can build my decision. Despite of this though I fall my decision instantaneously, and help that older person cross the road right now. How does this succeed? The answer to this question is delivered by what I call upper level of moral engagement. Now however we have first described the lower level of moral engagement, the dynamical and holistic landscape upon which it takes place. 

5.	Upper level ideal point of reference illuminates the lower level landscape, following requests from the lower level pluralist points. 
Let us stay with the just introduced example figuring moral decision of mine, in direction of my action in a given situation. The former section described such situation as an intertwined dynamical and holistic landscape involving a myriad of considerations. One may be invited to conclude from this that there is no fixed point at all perhaps that would support building of my judgment and acting upon it. But this is again not the case, for several forces at the encountered landscape are protruding from its surface, such as the reason that I need sufficient time to arrange my job and family related obligations. Some of these reasons are overridden in the situation, so that there is just one reason remaining which incites me to help the older person cross the road. This reason may be spelled out as a moral law or requirement, inviting me to help the persons in need. Concerning the entire situation at hand, it feels like this reason that supports my passage to act is involved into that situation in a direct manner as well. But this is not the case, for the following may be claimed. There are several forces in the holistic dynamical situation at hand that invite me to take decision: to help the person or not to help him. In a fraction of second as I decide to help, the situation is illuminated by the reason that may be formulated as a moral law of a kind involving the requirement to help a person in need. One may say that the one winning Reason gets aimed at from a plurality of reasons at the complex and dynamical holistic experienced moral landscape. The one winning Reason then, as just said, illuminates the entire situation at hand, leading to my passage to act. A reason about the need to this passage is that people are acting creatures, which also involves their act where they refused to act in a situation where one expect them to do so. 
	There is a number of points at the lower complex landscape or level of immediate moral engagement, which are in competition with one another, so that they all aim at the upper level of moral engagement, where there is one Reason, of monistic nature, that wins the competition, illuminates the lower landscape upon requests from so many points aiming at the ideal upper level of moral engagement. Notice that upper level of moral engagement involves idealized form of moral scores, which may be just aimed at or requested from the lower level landscape. The example of two dynamical levels interaction was illustrated here for a simple case of moral decision to act. This two levels dynamical approach may be used to counter one-dimensional analytic way to go in determining moral goals by definitory means. The main hint is that one should not confuse lower dynamical and holistic level of moral engagement with the upper ideal level of moral engagement, as we presume analytical tradition does. Contrary to this tradition, one should recognize two qualitatively different levels of moral engagement and their dialectical interaction. In what follows, a further clarification will come from the example of two levels involving epistemic engagements and their dialectics as countering one-dimensionality of the classical analytic approach.

6.	The same-levelling of the one-dimensional definitory approach characterizing analytic philosophy is illustrated by hurdles that it produces as these get articulated by paradox of analysis and by Gettier cases.
Now I proceed with the illustration of one-dimensional approach in analytic philosophy for the area of epistemology or theory of knowledge. Already Plato in his dialogues aimed at knowledge and not just at a kind of convenient and not really grounded opinion. He distinguished belief, truth and justification as three ingredients of knowledge. This was proposed in literary prose of dialogue by Plato. But analytic philosophers tried to secure definition of knowledge in a real serious manner. This is what they proposed as definition:

		Knowledge =def Justified True Belief

Notice that there is no knowledge without a belief (I cannot know that the cat is on the mat /p/ without forming a belief that the cat is on the mat). Secondly, the belief needs to be true. I may have some beliefs that do not match the reality and so these beliefs cannot contribute to my knowledge. And third, even if I have a true belief that p it will still not be knowledge until it is justified. It may be the case that the cat is on the mat indeed, and that I form a belief that the cat is on the mat. But if I formed that belief on the basis of an unreliable source (a colleague told me about the cat being on the mat, but it turns out that his informations are in most cases erroneous) this will still not be knowledge. We now simplify the definition using abbreviations.

		K =def JTB

Now, there were difficulties spotted both for definition as a generic enterprise and then specific troubles for the just provided definition trying to determine knowledge. Let us start with the first worry. We have already presented Frege’s example from his Sense and Reference (1892: Sinn und Bedeutung) paper at the very beginnings of contemporary semantics and analytic philosophy. There Frege gives the following two (already reported) equations:

(1)	Morning Star = Evening Star
(2)	Morning Star = Morning Star

Whereas (1) presents a case of knowledge expansion (people learned about identity of stars that they observe at some historical moment in time), the case (2) seems to be trivial (as we have already affirmed: it does not expand our knowledge, just perhaps affirms it). Frege stated that the same referent (the planet Venus as we now know) may be presented under two or more aspects (as Morning Star in the morning, and as Evening Star in the evening). These aspects are called senses by Frege, and so he established the distinction between sense and reference. Frege wondered about the manner to account for expansion of knowledge, and he pointed out trivial nature of (2).
Later on, a similar (although not identical) worry was presented as paradox of analysis by such people as Chisholm. Paradox of analysis may be stated in the following abbreviated form, given that just an abstract account of definition is needed here:

		(1’) A =def B
		(2’) A =def A

Where is the paradox? The conundrum consists in statement that, according to the requirement for definition to be successful, its right hand side should equal its left hand side (example (2’) -- but this is trivial then, analysis does not tell us anything new, does not contribute to our knowledge and to its expansion. Then the form (1’) should do, for it seems to expand our knowledge. If I do not know what a cat is, a conjunction of properties at the right hand side of definition such as a mammal, specific DNA and so on will help me to get the meaning of the expression cat and to recognize cats in my vicinity from now on. But wait now, the seemingly beneficial property of right hand side B in that it expands my knowledge (about what a cat is) has the trouble that it is inadequate, false indeed according to the strong requirement involved into what a definition should be. For such a strong requirement is only satisfied by identity in the strongest sense and by nothing less than that. But empirical research concerning cats is open for constant new results and insights. It follows that (1’) is false.
So the paradox of analysis states that analysis is either trivial (case (2’)) or false (case (1’). This is the paradox of analysis trying to demonstrate that analysis is impossible. Obviously this worry surfaced in the heydays of analytic definitory philosophy enterprise. 
A further case in point is as promised the one from epistemology or theory of knowledge. It is known as Gettier industry. Gettier namely wrote a very short paper in the title of which he asked whether knowledge is justified true belief. This paper established a distinguished career of his, and ignited the just mentioned industrial strength efforts to provide an adequate definition of knowledge. Let us start with the following abbreviations:

		(1’’) K =def JTB
		(2’’) K =def K

Obviously, the case (2’’) will not do for a definition of knowledge, for it is trivial, does not expand our knowledge about the targeted topics if we may express ourselves in this manner. But what about (1’’)? As definition sign =def stands for equivalence, and as equivalence is a conjunction of two implications (K -> JTB & JTB -> K), one should expect the content and range of the right hand side of definition to exactly equal that of the left hand side. But this is not the case. Such was namely lesson of Gettier’s enterprise: JTB does not equal K, there is something missing in order that one would achieve a genuine state of K. Gettier shows that there are always counterexamples possible for (1’’). So, JTB does not amount to K, and there are additional conditions necessary, such as a fourth condition besides to JTB. Unfortunately, it turned out that none of the additional conditions of the form JTBG (where G stands for Gettier additional condition in the JTB conjunction) did the job. People worked frantically at this problem (therefore Gettier industry), but they did not solve it.
	What does this mean? It simply means, as I claim, that the conundrum started with the one-dimensional strong definitory requirement for analysis being successful. It was presupposed that left hand side succeeds at the same level as the right hand side, that there is no difference between them.

7.	It is proposed that some dynamics and appropriate dialectics of qualitative two-levels approach need to discipline one-dimensional definitory troubles, in order to make sense of such areas of philosophical inquiry as epistemology.
Is there a way out of the conundrum for definitory analytical approach such as it is revealed by paradox of analysis and by Gettier cases for the specific area of epistemology? The way out, as I suggest, is simple, although nobody noticed it really because they sticked to the strong definitory requirements for success of analytic philosophy enterprise. Certainly both conundrums (including Frege) recognized that triviality is no way out, towards a successful analysis. So we stay with 

		(1’) A =def B
		(1’’) K =def JTB

where the first one applies to generic case of definition, and the second one applies to the case of knowledge definition.
	It may be noticed that none of these is trivial. And as well that there are differences between left hand side and right hand side. I simply propose that one recognizes these differences. And namely as differences involving two levels, and not only this, but two qualitatively different levels. The left hand side (K, A) I propose to treat as an ideal reference point of definitory inquiry at the upper level of that inquiry, as I will call it. The right hand side of definition (B, JTB) I propose to treat as empirical holistic and dynamic changeable definitory (or epistemic in the second case) engagement at the lower level. For cat (an ideal reference point at the upper level) there are so many empirical points that point to it, aspire towards it from the lower level (mammal, specific DNA). 

8.	Lower everyday holistic level landscape engagement enters in a dialectics with upper level ideal point of reference engagement.
The two levels in question are qualitatively distinct, which is not difficult to see, for K is the aspired to be achieved ideal of the inquiry, whereas JTB are protruding points at the holistic dynamical epistemic landscape which aim at the ideal upper level. JTB is an empirical research supported mess, whereas K stays an ideally identical point of reference to be achieved. Here is the dialectics between these two qualitatively distinct levels. The just mentioned points at the lower level holistic dynamical changeable empirical landscape aim at the ideal point of reference at the upper level of definitory (epistemic) engagement. Not to forget that there is competition between innumerable forces at that empirical landscape. The upper level ideal point of reference may be called a Reason, of monistic kind, which illuminates  the landscape below, upon the request, following the aimings towards it from that lower level landscape.

9.	Thereby philosophical activity becomes phenomenology constituted disciplining the objectivist third person point of view characteristic for analytic philosophy.
One thing to notice that the definitory, and even more the strong definitory approach to analysis builds upon the objective third person point of view. One tries to provide a completely objective definition. But as pointed out earlier, people like Mach and Carnap at the very beginning of analytic movement saw that first person point of view, which in this sense is subjective, is needed so that the analytical enterprise gets off the ground at all. The introduction of two qualitatively distinct levels of analysis builds upon this heritage, adding qualitative disciplining from the side of what Nietzsche called froehliche Wissenschaft, gay science. The two levels analysis approach thus requires supplementing the lower level with refinement of style, such as it may be found in insights of the so called continental philosophy. That kind of discipline leads towards a new productive phase of post-analytic movement. Phenomenology in its constitutive form is now added to two levels dialectic dynamical interaction, improving its exclusion from the strong definitory approach. Although one should say that dynamical analytic approach involving people like Chalmers, Horgan and Tienson already paved some way.

10.	Post-analytic project offers itself through disciplining of analytic philosophy. 
Here is an attempt at a summary. Analytic philosophy started with strong requirement for a definitory approach, which proceeds at the same level for both ingredients of the definitory equation. Such one-dimensional procedure of analysis should be subverted and disciplined by introducing two qualitatively different levels, thereby disentangling conundrums such as stated in paradox of analysis. The different quality proper to two levels of analysis should be supplemented by the style proper to the textual efforts by the so called continental philosophy. The lower level of analytic engagement profits from this procedure in a direct manner, while the upper level of definitory engagement is understood through the dialectics that aims at it from the lower level, as an ideal monistic Reason illuminating the landscape with pluralist interacting mingling reasons at the lower level of definitory engagement.